1. General: This is an eight hour lecture
course on Soviet principles and methods for planning operational
maskirovka. The emphasis is on planning at front level and
employment of techniques at tactical maskirovka as it fits into the
planning at operational level. The course is designed for individuals planning
to participate as members of OPFOR teams emulating Soviet division, army, and
front headquarters. The course emphasizes the practical aspects of how
camouflage is implemented to enable the staff officers to gain a better
appreciation of what can and cannot be done in practice. The course presumes a
considerable level of knowledge on the part of the students about general
military affairs, tactics, operations, organization, weapons capabilities, and
the like. It also presumes basic knowledge about the Soviet military, such as
is given in the standard course of instruction at the Command and General Staff
College. It is designed to be presented as one of a series of similar courses,
and should be given after the students have already attended the sub-courses on
operations and reconnaissance, since it presumes that they know the material
presented in those courses.
2. Teacher Learning Objective: In conjunction with other sub-courses
prepare students for roles as commander, chief of staff, and chief of
operations at division, army, and front levels. Give the students an
appreciation of the role of maskirovka in Soviet thinking and planning
Teach the fundamental principles for maskirovka in Soviet offensive
Teach the principal measures employed by Soviets in implementing
Teach the Soviet views on past, current and future trends in
maskirovka and its growing importance on the high technology
Teach the methods for organizing maskirovka, preparing plans and
issuing instructions governing its implementation.
Condition: Given reading materials and course material.
Standard: Students should have a general appreciation of the importance of
maskirovka in Soviet theory of combat. They should have an
introduction to the techniques and methods available for creating
maskirovka on the battlefield. They should be able to begin work in an
OPFOR team Soviet headquarters staff as operations officers able to make
recommendations on what kinds of maskirovka might be desirable as part
of operations planning and how this might be achieved.
4. Level of Instruction: Familiarization.
5. Method of Instruction: Lectures, discussion, and exercise.
6. Author's Intent: Six hours of the course will be lectures and discussion
of principles and methods. Two hours may be spent in a general look at the
creation of a maskirovka plan at front level. Such topics as
making estimates of the situation, reaching decisions, issuing orders and
developing plans on maps and in documents are all covered in the course on
operations planning. Therefore they do not need to be repeated in this course.
Performing these functions with respect to maskirovka is no different
than for other plans. In actual practice the operations directorate should
develop its maskirovka plans as an integral part of the overall
planning process. This is not something to be left for an after thought later.
The intent, then, is to influence the student's thinking to insure that they
integrate significant maskirovka efforts into their work as members of
OPFOR staffs. However, only minimum attention is given to the technical aspects
of how maskirovka may be achieved today, especially in such highly
technical areas as radio electronic combat.
7. Equipment/Materials: View graphs.
8. Homework: none.
References: The following titles are a selection of books and articles
containing information on basic aspects of maskirovka.
Adam, Kh, Engr. Lt. Col, and Gebel', R., "Military Camouflage,"
Military Thought, November 1971.
Asadulin, R. Maj. Gen., "Camouflage of Combat Formations in the Dynamics
of Battle," Antiaircraft Defense Herald, August, 1983.
Beaumont, Roger, Maskirovka: Soviet Camouflage, Concealment, and
Deception, The Center for Strategic Technology, The Texas Engineering
Experiment Station, The Texas A&M University, Austin, 1982.
Beloborodov, A. P. "The Factor of Surprise," Military Herald,
Berezkin, A., "On Controlling the Actions of an Opponent,"
Military Thought, November, 1972.
Chervonobab, V., Col., "Principles of Military Art and Their
Development", Military Thought, November, 1971.
Cruickshank, Douglas, N., Foreign Denial & Deception (D&D) Soviet
Maskirovka: A Bibliography, Special Studies Division USAFINTEL 500-5
Foreign Denial & Deception, Nov. 1986.
Dailey, Brian D. and Patrick J. Parker eds. Soviet Strategic
Deception, D.C. Heath, New Your, 1987.
Daniel, Donald C. Strategic Military Deception, Pergamon, New York,
Dick, C. J., Strategic and Operational Maskirovka in the Great Patriotic
War, Soviet Studies Research Centre, RMA Sandhurst, England, Feb. 1988.
Dick, C. J., "Catching NATO Unawares- Soviet Army surprise and deception
techniques," International Defense Review, January, 1986.
Dick, C.J. Soviet Views on Strategic and Operational Surprise and
Deception,, Soviet Studies Research Centre, RMA Sandhurst, England, 1986.
Fugate, Bryan I. Operation Barbarossa, Presidio Press, Novato, Calif.
Gamaliy, V., "Engineer Preparation of the Terrain and Camouflage Are
Elements of Tactics," Military Herald, April, 1980.
Glantz, David, Colonel, "Surprise and maskirovka in Contemporary
War," Military Review, December, 1988.
Glantz, David, Colonel, Operational Intelligence in the Kursk
Operation, Soviet Army Studies office, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, August,
Glantz, David, Colonel, Operational Intelligence in the Vistula-Oder
Operation, Soviet Army Studies Office, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, August
Glantz, David, Colonel, Soviet War Experience: A Deception Case
Study,, Soviet Army Studies Office, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, October 1988.
Glantz, David, Colonel, Soviet Operational Intelligence in the Kursk
Operation July 1943, Soviet Army Studies Office, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas,
Glantz, David, Colonel, The Fundamentals of Soviet Razvedka
(Intelligence/Reconnaissance), Soviet Army Studies Office, Ft.
Leavenworth, Kansas, Jan. 1989.
Glantz, David, Colonel, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World
War, Totowa, New Jersey, Frank Cass and Co, 1989.
Handel, Michael, Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World
War, Frank Cass, London, England, 1987.
Ionov, M., Maj Gen., "On Methods of Influencing an Opponent's
Decision," Military Thought, December, 1971.
Ivanov, S. Capt., "Stratagem and Deceptive Actions", Military
Herald, November, 1983.
Ivanov, S. Capt., "Camouflage," Military Herald, May, 1984.
Khvastunov, A., Sr.Lt. "The Problem of Camouflage," Military
Herald, Sept. 1984.
Khvorost'yanov, Yu., Lt. Gen., "Combat Support," Military
Herald, October, 1980.
Kiryan, M. M. Vnezapnost f nastupatelnykh operatsiyakh velikoy
otechestvennoy voyny, (The Element of Surprise in Offensive Operations in the
Great Patriotic War,), Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Nauky" 1986, Trans
by JPRS, UMA-87-006-L.
Kiryan, M. M. Fronty nastupali: Po opytu Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny, (The
Fronts advanced: From the Experience of the Great Fatherland War), Nauka,
Moscow, 1987 Trans, by JPRS.
Kurdek, Jerzy. "Maskirovka of the air defense system of a
combined arms unit", Przeglad Weojsk Ladowych, June 1988, trans
by Dr. Harry Orenstein, Soviet Army Studies Office, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas,
Lefebvre, V. A. and Lefebvre, V. D. Reflexive Control: The Soviet Concept
of Influencing an Adversary's Decisionmaking Process, Science Applications
Inc. Englewood, Colo. 1984.
Lefebvre, V. A. Conflicting Structures (Konflixtuyushchiye struktury),
Soviet Radio Publishing House, Moscow, 1973, trans JPRS, 61332, 1974.
Lefebvre, V. A. Algebra of Conflict, (Algebra Konflikta, Moscow, 1968,
trans JPRS 52700, March 1971.
Matsulenko, V. Maj. Gen., "Operational Camouflage of Troops in the First
and Second Periods of the War," Voyenno- istoricheskiy Zhurnal,
Matsulenko, V. Maj. Gen., "Operational Camouflage of Troops in the Third
Period of the War," Voyenno- istoricheskiy Zhurnal, June, 1972.
Mel'nikov, P., Col.Gen., "Operational Camouflage, Concealment, And
Deception," Moyenno istoricheskiy Zhurnal, April, 1982.
Meshcheryakov, V., Col Gen., "Strategic Disinformation in the Achievement
of Surprise in the World War II Experience," Voyenno istoricheskiy
Zhurnal, February, 1985.
Moynihan, Pamela R. Maskirovka: An integral component of Soviet Military
Art, class paper for course 670, Defense Inteligence College, Washington
Nepomnyashchiy, N., Maj., "Camouflage," Military Herald,
Orlov, N., Lt. Gen., "Methods of Assuring Secrecy of Preparations for
Operations and Surprise in Troop Operations in the years of the War,"
Voyenno istoricheskiy Zhurnal, September, 1981.
Polyaenus, Stratagems of War, trans from Greek by R. Shepherd, Ares
Publishers, Chicago, 1974.
Reznichenko, V. G. Tactika (Tactics), 3rd Ed. Moscow, 1987, trans by
JPRS, UMA-88-008-L- I and II, June 1988.
Savoie, Thomas, A., "Are We Deceiving Ourselves?," Military
Review, March, 1987.
Shishkin, N., Col., "Military Cunning and Deceptive Actions,"
Military Herald, August, 1979.
Simakov, Ye., Col., "Air Force Operational Camouflage, Concealment, and
Deception: Directives and Orders of commanders of the Air Force and of Air
Armies," Voyenno istoricheskiy Zhurnal, June, 1981.
Simakov, Ye., Col., "Operational Camouflage of Aviation,"
Sovetskoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, August, 1982.
Simchenikov, P. "Vnezapnost', Voyennyy Vestnik, 2 February 1985.
Smith, Charles, L., "Soviet maskirovka," Air Power
Sverdlov, F., Col., "Camouflage," Military Herald, May,
Vego, Milan, Recce-strike Complexes in Soviet Theory and Practice,
Soviet Army Studies Office, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 1990.
Voyennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar' (Military encyclopedic
dictionary), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1986.
9. Presentation Schedule: The course is eight hours long with the following
Lesson I - general principles 1 hr
Lesson II - measures used to implement 2 hr
Lesson III - operational considerations 1 hr
Lesson IV - organization 1 hr
Lesson V - exercise in planning 2 hrs
10. Annexes: See outlines of individual lessons.
List of Viewgraphs - they are in the text
Test for Maskirovka
1. Which of the following is not an aim of maskirovka?
- conceal friendly troops from all types of enemy reconnaissance
- deceive the enemy about troops groupings, intentions, and activities
- disrupt enemy rear service operations
- hamper the enemy in his selection of objectives for destruction by fire and
2. Which of the following is not a principle of maskirovka?
3. Which of the following is not a basic measure for maskirovka?
- Use of camouflage properties (characteristics) of the terrain, of darkness
and other conditions of limited visibility (fog, rain, etc.)
- distribution of false documents
- signal security and deception, sound masking, blacking out, and radar
- secrecy in executing engineer work
- use of smoke screens
4. Which of the following is not a consideration in use of terrain for
- use of terrain is the simplest and most accessible method
- the most ideal terrain for concealment is broken and closed with vegetation
and/ or man made structures. (protection against visual, radar, and heat
- terrain which is open, level, single tone, and devoid of vegetation and/ or
man made structures is ideal with little further enhancement - - evergreen
forests offer the most protection
- use of improvised natural vegetation e.g. freshly cut branches, leaves,
grass, reeds, moss, dirt, snow, etc
5. Which of the following is not a purpose for using smoke screens?
- deceive the enemy
- protect against thermal radiation of nuclear bursts
- degrade the effectiveness of ATGM and laser guided munitions
- interfere with infrared, TV, might vision and radar reconnaissance
- protect troops from ultraviolet radiation
6. Which of the following is not a typical means for producing smoke:
- hand and rifle grenades, pots, drums, barrels, generators
- mines and aerial bombs
- forest fires
- arty and mortar shells
- motor vehicles, APC/BMP and tank dispensers
7. Which of the following is not a type of smoke screen?
8. Which of the following is not a requirement for dummy equipment?
- right size and dimension
- must be employed in areas where placement of equipment is tactically sound
- areas where dummy equipment is placed must be devoid of actual or simulated
activity characteristic of operational equipment
- decoys must be camouflaged well enough to conceal defects in construction but
not well enough to prevent enemy detection
9. Which of the following is not a part of sound masking?
- concealing give-away noises with sound curtain
- deceiving the enemy by imitating the sound of motors in areas which are not
occupied by the troops
- turning on the engines of vehicles in areas where troops are positioned
- observing acoustic discipline when issuing commands vocally and during
10. Which of the following is not a part of light masking?
- extinguishing (dimming) illumination devices on vehicles when travelling at
- using moonlight to conceal the movement of troops
- dimming the working quarters at the CPs
- positioning artillery behind shelters which conceal the glow of the flashes
- separating workshops which use illumination devices from troop deployment
11. Which of the following is not a consideration in radar camouflage?
- using mock-ups which imitate various forms of equipment
- executing artillery fire missions from temporary positions when necessary
- conducting artillery fire with extensive prior ranging
- using roving guns and tanks to create dummy fire positions
12. Which of the following is not a part of the commander's instructions on
- aim, tasks, and measures of maskirovka
- forces and means to be used
- place and deadlines for executing maskirovka
- the procedure for detecting enemy maskirovka
- individuals responsible for maskirovka measures
Mark the following statements as true or false:
1. Dazzle paint distorts the external appearance and noticeability of an
2. Signal deception does not require detection and elimination of typical
reconnaissance tell-tale signs in the work of friendly radio equipment
3. It is believed that properly used, troops wearing coveralls can not be seen
with the naked eye at a distance of more than 20 - 30 meters
4. The area covered by smoke should be 50 times greater than the covered object
which should not be located in the center of the smoke-screen.
5. Paint is an effective means for camouflage
6. Reflexive control is a Soviet technique to influence an opponent's decision
7. Specialized camouflage sets are used to conceal specific objects (camouflage
fringe, camouflage net over dug-in tank etc.)
8. Use of paint is based on the artistic talent available to the commander
9. MKT series covers take 5 - 10 hours to erect in daytime and up to twice that
long at night.
10. Single color paint is effective in the jungle.
11. Decoys must be camouflaged well enough to conceal defects in construction
but not well enough to prevent enemy detection
12. Blinding smoke screens are used against enemy observation posts and firing
positions. It can decrease to effectiveness of fire about 10 times and can
reduce the casualties up to 90%
13. Coveralls also reduce infrared detectibility
14. Types of covers include general purpose, horizontal camouflage, specialized
sets, and vertical camouflage.
15. Signal security requires maintaining in time of necessity, complete radio
16. Dummy radio traffic is employed as part of signal security
17. Sound curtains are established by delivering artillery fire, by flying
aircraft at low altitudes, by running powerful motors without mufflers and with
18. To enhance radar camouflage units and equipment should be positioned in
shelters, covers and behind local objects which reflect radar beams
19. Corner reflectors are effective means for acoustic camouflage
20. Units should never travel along routes which are closed off to the enemy by