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Guiding Philosophy

The key to understanding the difference in OPFOR and Blue intelligence in the exercise is that Blue is exercising the intelligence collection and analysis process and people who do it, as part of their training program while the OPFOR is not. Therefore the Blue hqs should receive information that replicates the kind of raw information they would get in combat. But the OPFOR should get finished intelligence as needed to perform their exercise function. The Blue staff needs to see not only the results of collection successes, but also the results of enemy countermeasures. It likewise needs not only to plan for collection but also for suppression of enemy collection efforts.

The OPFOR is staffed only to provide an active and intelligent opponent, it is not trying to learn how to do real world jobs. The OPFOR needs the realistic level of finished intelligence that would flow in from its collection and the level should be related to the activeness and success of the actual Blue staff counter measures as practiced in the exercise. This would give the Blue intelligence a much more meaningful role in the exercise play. Red cannot use raw source information except that from a few highest level agents. Otherwise the reports to OPFOR should be the results of not only collection but analysis by the missing OPFOR intelligence staff. It is necessary to remember that all intelligence is provided only to serve a specific purpose, namely the commander's decision process at the various levels of command. For instance, we need not a periodic report on the location of individual Chapparal batteries, but a less frequent report showing graphically the locations of all known Chapparals in the context of a defense system. We don't need spot reports on individual minefields but a graphic showing the over all enemy barrier plan from a compilation of spot reports.

In general, since the purpose of the exercise is to give training to Blue forces, we need toe know the entire spectrum of what training Blue is in fact actually trying to do. That is, who beyond the operations staff is actively participating, such as the intelligence staff, artillery staff, civil affairs staff, etc. This way we could devise activities that would give all these elements realistic training. One area that certainly is not now getting the full benefit of the training opportunity is the intelligence staff.

The purpose of the live OPFOR is to try to emulate to some degree Soviet decision processes in the planing and control of the training exercise for the Blue forces. Unless the Soviet decision can be reasonably valid the purpose of the OPFOr is negated. The real Soviet decision process is absolutely based on a massive quantity of finished analytic intelligence collected by a huge multi-dimensional collection effort over many years time. There is obviously no way to duplicate this in the short span of an exercise. However it will do no good to deny the Soviet clearly demonstrated capability to obtain information. Rather the Blue forces should train to learn how to operate despite this significant threat. They should also learn how to take active measures to counter the collection threat.

The collection plans created for the exercise are intended only as a skeleton sample of the general outline and not the full detail of a plan. The exercise plan does provide a focus for specific effort in scripting the responses. It also provides a framework for a rationale on the quantity and percentage of real world situation to pass to the Red team as a result of their planning when measured against the Blue plan for counter intelligence.

However the plan is not to be taken literally in the sense of requests for individual reports from primary sources or other raw data.. The plan shows this kind of collecting only as a matter of background for the scriptors use.
The OPFOR team and the real Soviet force operate at three levels, the division and below, the army and the front and higher. Consequently there should be three levels of intelligence presented during the exercise.


1. Front and higher -

The scriptors should provide a consolidated report periodically - like every 6 hours on the results of all source analysis done by front and higher headquarters. This should follow Soviet format in style - that is major emphasis on intentions of the enemy for future actions and capabilities including force strength. The level of detail should be brigade and higher and the general location of all enemy brigades should be given. In addition the front should provide special reports on particular topics such as the overall nature of the enemy air war or the enemy helicopter threat. The results of all cosmic and all aerial photography and ELINT work comes from front but it should not come in the raw form, but rather as finished all source intelligence. The only individual spot reports that need to come from front are the reports for a very few highly placed penetration agents on enemy intentions, such as nuclear and chemical release and plans for forthcoming operations. some of the standard reports should be the following:
A. a general intelligence summary every 24 hours according to the Soviet format;
B. a special report on the location of enemy headquarters of brigade and higher every 6 or 8 hours and perhaps 2 hours old;
C. a special summary on the status, location, and activity of enemy rear area units every 12 hours;
D. During critical times such as the introduction of major enemy reserve forces by ground march through their rear area a special alert summary of this activity is important;
E. a daily report on the nature of enemy air operations;


2. Army level

The scripting cell should devote most of its time to creating the content of the army level collection and analysis apparatus. The army should be provided with a report from its own collection effort every 4 to 6 hours plus spot reports on critical events and activities as requested by the commander. The army should not be in the targeting business and should not receive detailed location coordinates on individual targets such as stinger missiles. It should receive information on the movement and status (that is size, location and rate of movement and direction of movement) of enemy units of battalion and larger size in the enemy rear area not yet seen by the divisions. This should be summaries of all known units and should be several hours old when received. However the army air staff should receive directly the information from the aerial reconnaissance missions to obtain target data for deep air strikes. Most available daily air sorties should be allocated by the air staff to the divisions for their use the next day, consequently the air staff should not be in the direct targeting business either.

The army is mainly interested in knowing about enemy threats that will materialize from 6 to 12 hours in the future. Consequently it needs to know about the location of some enemy units from just out of contact to about 100 km back and about enemy air and helicopters based 3 hrs flying time away. This means the army reconnaissance is reporting mostly about enemy forces beyond the range even of army artillery.


3. Division level

The division staff should receive the same kind of aggregated and analyzed intelligence product the U. D. Division commander receives from his intelligence unit. It should not receive so many spot reports about individual items either.

The division is the level concerned with targeting - including requests for fire by army artillery and air on targets just beyond the range of their own artillery. Therefore the division needs to know about enemy forces out to a distance of 30 km. The division has the reconnaissance means to find out about these targets and should know about units not yet showing on the screen of the JESS model. Rather than the army finding out about this kind of target directly and then firing at it directly or passing it to the division the process should be the reverse. The division should find out about it and ask the army to fire on it. The division should receive two kinds of intelligence - the front line combat intelligence acquired by its ground patrols - and the signal intelligence acquired by its ELINT and COMINT units. The front line combat intelligence is partly generated in the JESS model, but not entirely. The model does not show the division long range recon patrols and does not provide special reports such as engineer and chemical. It does not provide for capture of prisoners etc. Therefore the scriptors need to play the role of the patrols out to about 50 km as well as the division Sigint collection and helicopter observation patrols. Some of the recon patrols can be played by giving each division about 5 ground recon 9 man patrols to use at a time. These can be programed into the game easily and their use in the past has proven easy. The scriptors should report only information that is not visible on the division work station screens. The play of SIGINT is not easy because it should include the results of intercepts as well as direction finding. For best results the results of SIGINT should be correlated to the quality of the Blue COMSEC and counter intelligence planning. The division should be told about enemy intelligence collection as well, including patrols and SIGINT and about enemy counter reconnaissance efforts, and the division should try to counter these. The reports for division should be made on a more real time basis and should include spot reports of details not sent to army.

In other words the army staff should have much more total intelligence than is currently provided, but less of it should be as near real time as it is now given and it should not be so much raw reporting of individual items.
The divisions should receive more current time information than they now receive, especially for the region from 20 to 50 km ahead of their front line. The air staff should receive relatively current information on the enemy air operation and the enemy air defense network, and the air defense staff should receive warning intelligence on future enemy air operations. It may be more effective to organize the scripting team around individuals responsible for generating front, army and division reports rather than around kinds of sources, since the products we need are actually mostly all source analysis.




1. The plan designates as set of locations for front level apparat and SPETZNAZ type humint collection. These teams and cells can be played as a network providing a total product, not individual reporting elements. Except for the occasional very high value report we do not want to see the individual reports of these agents, but rather expect the front to give the consolidated results of the total effort on a periodic basis. It is important for the army to know which teams are actively reporting during any given period, and this status can be changed according to enemy action and other factors. Actually it would be best if the enemy were informed of the existence of this network and encouraged to take active measures to counter it and the OPFOR were told that this was being done and could engage in an active program to preserve the sources. In other words these HUMINT agents should not be merely a passive set of lookers.

The main purpose of this agent network is to provide early warning on the movement of the enemy reserve forces and other rear area activities. The report form for agents to report vehicle movement through their area is purely pro forma for realism. We do not intend that anyone actually send individual agent reports on this form. What we want is for front to use this form as the basis for justifying reports giving us the picture we need on enemy movements. The actual report should be consolidated over time and area and delivered after an appropriate time delay. For instance -

Report - Results of reports from teams number 51 through 55 indicate that the three tank battalions of the x Bde of the Y div crossed the ___ River at ROME between 0400 and 0600 headed North East. They were followed by --- logistic elements etc etc.

2. The reconnaissance plan also shows the location of planned aerial and cosmic reconnaissance. This is generally photography. Obviously we do not want the actual photos, but only the results at the time specified in the plan. Another standard request is for aerial infrared imagery on moving enemy forces.

3. The written part of the plan deals with standard aspects of aerial and ground based SIGINT. In this case we can specify the types of target emitters and headquarters we want in high priority. Someone has to judge what percentage of collection is valid and then provide periodic consolidated results, not lists of individual emitters. The consolidated results can be by type and or by location. For instance, we need summaries of enemy air defense radars and missile sites as found by our all source networks. And we sometimes need data sets showing all the various enemy forces located at a certain small area. Most ELINT and comint can be simulated best by consolidated reports on the location of probable headquarters - not actual fragment reports. The use of a graphic plot of recent locations is best for this. The level of reported detail should be a reflection of actual blue comsec. Just as with smaller units such as battalions, the reports about higher headquarters such as the corps or division should indicate if the units is moving or appears to be fixed.

4. There are many aspects of the enemy which are of interest to the real headquarters because the information relates to something that can be done, but in the exercise nothing can be done anyway. For instance we would want to know about enemy rail road usage if we could destroy the railroads, but if this is not being played then it is a waste of time to discuss it. On the other hand there are certain things that are so important that they ought to be scripted and should be mentioned by the scriptors to Blue, even though they don't nave any practical effect in the exercise. For instance smoke and electronic countermeasures.

5. The reconnaissance plan deals with collection of information to aid the commander's decisions including the initial decision to launch the operation. Thus it should include much information collected and available to the OPFOR prior to the beginning of the operation. This especially includes a complete picture of the peacetime location and total enemy order of battle.

Minimum essential information for OPFOR planning at the start of the exercise includes the following:
------ The OPFOR must have prior to the operation at least 12 hours, preferably several days in which to plan with 100% of the location data on the Blue brigade size units and division headquarters at their pre exercise locations. It should have 100% TOE strength data and if the exercise starts after D day it should have an estimate of what the current attrited strength of the enemy is.
------ The OPFOR should have excellent data on terrain, including trafficability and rates of movement in each area.
------ The OPFOR should have an agreed upon concept of what intelligence it will receive, including where apparat and SPETZNAZ units are. It should know what sources it can rely on and what are the time delays that will be used in consolidated reporting.
------ The OPFOR divisions must have detailed information on the location, status, and strength of the forces immediately opposing them in sector.
------ The OPFOR should know what to expect in the way of air and counter air including expected damage levels that will occur due to various kinds of air strike. Without knowing effectiveness of alternative measures one cannot plan.