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Guiding Philosophy
The key to understanding the difference in OPFOR and Blue
intelligence in the exercise is that Blue is exercising the intelligence
collection and analysis process and people who do it, as part of their training
program while the OPFOR is not. Therefore the Blue hqs should receive
information that replicates the kind of raw information they would get in
combat. But the OPFOR should get finished intelligence as needed to perform
their exercise function. The Blue staff needs to see not only the results of
collection successes, but also the results of enemy countermeasures. It
likewise needs not only to plan for collection but also for suppression of
enemy collection efforts.
The OPFOR is staffed only to provide an active and intelligent opponent, it is
not trying to learn how to do real world jobs. The OPFOR needs the realistic
level of finished intelligence that would flow in from its collection and the
level should be related to the activeness and success of the actual Blue staff
counter measures as practiced in the exercise. This would give the Blue
intelligence a much more meaningful role in the exercise play. Red cannot use
raw source information except that from a few highest level agents. Otherwise
the reports to OPFOR should be the results of not only collection but analysis
by the missing OPFOR intelligence staff. It is necessary to remember that all
intelligence is provided only to serve a specific purpose, namely the
commander's decision process at the various levels of command. For instance, we
need not a periodic report on the location of individual Chapparal batteries,
but a less frequent report showing graphically the locations of all known
Chapparals in the context of a defense system. We don't need spot reports on
individual minefields but a graphic showing the over all enemy barrier plan
from a compilation of spot reports.
In general, since the purpose of the exercise is to give training to Blue
forces, we need toe know the entire spectrum of what training Blue is in fact
actually trying to do. That is, who beyond the operations staff is actively
participating, such as the intelligence staff, artillery staff, civil affairs
staff, etc. This way we could devise activities that would give all these
elements realistic training. One area that certainly is not now getting the
full benefit of the training opportunity is the intelligence staff.
The purpose of the live OPFOR is to try to emulate to some degree Soviet
decision processes in the planing and control of the training exercise for the
Blue forces. Unless the Soviet decision can be reasonably valid the purpose of
the OPFOr is negated. The real Soviet decision process is absolutely based on a
massive quantity of finished analytic intelligence collected by a huge
multi-dimensional collection effort over many years time. There is obviously no
way to duplicate this in the short span of an exercise. However it will do no
good to deny the Soviet clearly demonstrated capability to obtain information.
Rather the Blue forces should train to learn how to operate despite this
significant threat. They should also learn how to take active measures to
counter the collection threat.
The collection plans created for the exercise are intended only as a skeleton
sample of the general outline and not the full detail of a plan. The exercise
plan does provide a focus for specific effort in scripting the responses. It
also provides a framework for a rationale on the quantity and percentage of
real world situation to pass to the Red team as a result of their planning when
measured against the Blue plan for counter intelligence.
However the plan is not to be taken literally in the sense of requests for
individual reports from primary sources or other raw data.. The plan shows this
kind of collecting only as a matter of background for the scriptors use.
The OPFOR team and the real Soviet force operate at three levels, the division
and below, the army and the front and higher. Consequently there should
be three levels of intelligence presented during the exercise.
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1. Front and higher -
The scriptors should provide a consolidated report periodically - like every 6
hours on the results of all source analysis done by front and higher
headquarters. This should follow Soviet format in style - that is major
emphasis on intentions of the enemy for future actions and capabilities
including force strength. The level of detail should be brigade and higher and
the general location of all enemy brigades should be given. In addition the
front should provide special reports on particular topics such as the
overall nature of the enemy air war or the enemy helicopter threat. The results
of all cosmic and all aerial photography and ELINT work comes from front
but it should not come in the raw form, but rather as finished all source
intelligence. The only individual spot reports that need to come from
front are the reports for a very few highly placed penetration agents on
enemy intentions, such as nuclear and chemical release and plans for
forthcoming operations. some of the standard reports should be the following:
A. a general intelligence summary every 24 hours according to the Soviet
format;
B. a special report on the location of enemy headquarters of brigade and higher
every 6 or 8 hours and perhaps 2 hours old;
C. a special summary on the status, location, and activity of enemy rear area
units every 12 hours;
D. During critical times such as the introduction of major enemy reserve forces
by ground march through their rear area a special alert summary of this
activity is important;
E. a daily report on the nature of enemy air operations;
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2. Army level
The scripting cell should devote most of its time to creating the content of
the army level collection and analysis apparatus. The army should be provided
with a report from its own collection effort every 4 to 6 hours plus spot
reports on critical events and activities as requested by the commander. The
army should not be in the targeting business and should not receive detailed
location coordinates on individual targets such as stinger missiles. It should
receive information on the movement and status (that is size, location and rate
of movement and direction of movement) of enemy units of battalion and larger
size in the enemy rear area not yet seen by the divisions. This should be
summaries of all known units and should be several hours old when received.
However the army air staff should receive directly the information from the
aerial reconnaissance missions to obtain target data for deep air strikes. Most
available daily air sorties should be allocated by the air staff to the
divisions for their use the next day, consequently the air staff should not be
in the direct targeting business either.
The army is mainly interested in knowing about enemy threats that will
materialize from 6 to 12 hours in the future. Consequently it needs to know
about the location of some enemy units from just out of contact to about 100 km
back and about enemy air and helicopters based 3 hrs flying time away. This
means the army reconnaissance is reporting mostly about enemy forces beyond the
range even of army artillery.
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3. Division level
The division staff should receive the same kind of aggregated and analyzed
intelligence product the U. D. Division commander receives from his
intelligence unit. It should not receive so many spot reports about individual
items either.
The division is the level concerned with targeting - including requests for
fire by army artillery and air on targets just beyond the range of their own
artillery. Therefore the division needs to know about enemy forces out to a
distance of 30 km. The division has the reconnaissance means to find out about
these targets and should know about units not yet showing on the screen of the
JESS model. Rather than the army finding out about this kind of target directly
and then firing at it directly or passing it to the division the process should
be the reverse. The division should find out about it and ask the army to fire
on it. The division should receive two kinds of intelligence - the front line
combat intelligence acquired by its ground patrols - and the signal
intelligence acquired by its ELINT and COMINT units. The front line combat
intelligence is partly generated in the JESS model, but not entirely. The model
does not show the division long range recon patrols and does not provide
special reports such as engineer and chemical. It does not provide for capture
of prisoners etc. Therefore the scriptors need to play the role of the patrols
out to about 50 km as well as the division Sigint collection and helicopter
observation patrols. Some of the recon patrols can be played by giving each
division about 5 ground recon 9 man patrols to use at a time. These can be
programed into the game easily and their use in the past has proven easy. The
scriptors should report only information that is not visible on the division
work station screens. The play of SIGINT is not easy because it should include
the results of intercepts as well as direction finding. For best results the
results of SIGINT should be correlated to the quality of the Blue COMSEC and
counter intelligence planning. The division should be told about enemy
intelligence collection as well, including patrols and SIGINT and about enemy
counter reconnaissance efforts, and the division should try to counter these.
The reports for division should be made on a more real time basis and should
include spot reports of details not sent to army.
In other words the army staff should have much more total intelligence than is
currently provided, but less of it should be as near real time as it is now
given and it should not be so much raw reporting of individual items.
The divisions should receive more current time information than they now
receive, especially for the region from 20 to 50 km ahead of their front line.
The air staff should receive relatively current information on the enemy air
operation and the enemy air defense network, and the air defense staff should
receive warning intelligence on future enemy air operations. It may be more
effective to organize the scripting team around individuals responsible for
generating front, army and division reports rather than around kinds of
sources, since the products we need are actually mostly all source analysis.
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RECONNAISSANCE PLAN
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1. The plan designates as set of locations
for front level apparat and SPETZNAZ type humint collection. These
teams and cells can be played as a network providing a total product, not
individual reporting elements. Except for the occasional very high value report
we do not want to see the individual reports of these agents, but rather expect
the front to give the consolidated results of the total effort on a
periodic basis. It is important for the army to know which teams are actively
reporting during any given period, and this status can be changed according to
enemy action and other factors. Actually it would be best if the enemy were
informed of the existence of this network and encouraged to take active
measures to counter it and the OPFOR were told that this was being done and
could engage in an active program to preserve the sources. In other words these
HUMINT agents should not be merely a passive set of lookers.
The main purpose of this agent network is to provide early warning on the
movement of the enemy reserve forces and other rear area activities. The report
form for agents to report vehicle movement through their area is purely pro
forma for realism. We do not intend that anyone actually send individual agent
reports on this form. What we want is for front to use this form as the
basis for justifying reports giving us the picture we need on enemy movements.
The actual report should be consolidated over time and area and delivered after
an appropriate time delay. For instance -
Report - Results of reports from teams number 51 through 55 indicate that the
three tank battalions of the x Bde of the Y div crossed the ___ River at ROME
between 0400 and 0600 headed North East. They were followed by --- logistic
elements etc etc.
2. The reconnaissance plan also shows the location of planned aerial and cosmic
reconnaissance. This is generally photography. Obviously we do not want the
actual photos, but only the results at the time specified in the plan. Another
standard request is for aerial infrared imagery on moving enemy forces.
3. The written part of the plan deals with standard aspects of aerial and
ground based SIGINT. In this case we can specify the types of target emitters
and headquarters we want in high priority. Someone has to judge what percentage
of collection is valid and then provide periodic consolidated results, not
lists of individual emitters. The consolidated results can be by type and or by
location. For instance, we need summaries of enemy air defense radars and
missile sites as found by our all source networks. And we sometimes need data
sets showing all the various enemy forces located at a certain small area. Most
ELINT and comint can be simulated best by consolidated reports on the location
of probable headquarters - not actual fragment reports. The use of a graphic
plot of recent locations is best for this. The level of reported detail should
be a reflection of actual blue comsec. Just as with smaller units such as
battalions, the reports about higher headquarters such as the corps or division
should indicate if the units is moving or appears to be fixed.
4. There are many aspects of the enemy which are of interest to the real
headquarters because the information relates to something that can be done, but
in the exercise nothing can be done anyway. For instance we would want to know
about enemy rail road usage if we could destroy the railroads, but if this is
not being played then it is a waste of time to discuss it. On the other hand
there are certain things that are so important that they ought to be scripted
and should be mentioned by the scriptors to Blue, even though they don't nave
any practical effect in the exercise. For instance smoke and electronic
countermeasures.
5. The reconnaissance plan deals with collection of information to aid the
commander's decisions including the initial decision to launch the operation.
Thus it should include much information collected and available to the OPFOR
prior to the beginning of the operation. This especially includes a complete
picture of the peacetime location and total enemy order of battle.
Minimum essential information for OPFOR planning at the start of the exercise
includes the following:
------ The OPFOR must have prior to the operation at least 12 hours, preferably
several days in which to plan with 100% of the location data on the Blue
brigade size units and division headquarters at their pre exercise locations.
It should have 100% TOE strength data and if the exercise starts after D day it
should have an estimate of what the current attrited strength of the enemy is.
------ The OPFOR should have excellent data on terrain, including
trafficability and rates of movement in each area.
------ The OPFOR should have an agreed upon concept of what intelligence it
will receive, including where apparat and SPETZNAZ units are. It should know
what sources it can rely on and what are the time delays that will be used in
consolidated reporting.
------ The OPFOR divisions must have detailed information on the location,
status, and strength of the forces immediately opposing them in sector.
------ The OPFOR should know what to expect in the way of air and counter air
including expected damage levels that will occur due to various kinds of air
strike. Without knowing effectiveness of alternative measures one cannot plan.
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