ARMY
ARMY (from Fr. armee, Lat. arinata),- a considerable body of men
armed- and organized for the purpose of warfare on land (Ger. Armee) or the
whole armed force at the, disposal of a state or person for the same purpose
(Ger. Heer=host). The application of the term is sometimes restricted to the
permanent, active or regular forces of a state. The history of the development
of the army systems of the world is dealt with in this article in sections I to
38, being followed by sections 39 to 59 on the characteristics of present-day
armies. The remainder of the article is devoted to sections on the history of
the principal armies of Europe, and that of the United States. For the Japanese
Army see JAPAN, and for the existing condition of the army in each country see
under the country heading,
Charles Francis Atkinson
Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition Volume II pgs 592-625
GENERAL HISTORY -
1. Early Armies
It is only with the evolution of the speedily military
function in a tribe or nation, expressed by the separation of a warrior-class,
that the history of armies (as now understood) commences. Numerous savage
tribes of the present day possess military organizations based on this system,
but it first appears in the history of civilization amongst the Egyptians. By
the earliest laws of Egypt, provision was made for the support of the warriors.
The exploits of her armies under the legendary Sesostris cannot be regarded as
historical, but it appears certain that the country possessed an army, capable
of waging war in a regular fashion, and divided thus early into separate -
arms, - these being - chariots, infantry and archers. The systems of the
Assyrians and Babylonians present no particular features of interest, save
-that: horsemen, as distinct from charioteers, appear on the scene. The first
historical instance of a military organization resembling those of modern times
is that of the Persian empire.
2. Persia
Drawn from a hardy and nomadic race, the armies of Persia at
first consisted mainly of cavalry, and owed much of their success to the
consequent ease and rapidity of their movements. The warlike Persians
constantly extended their power by fresh conquests, and for some time remained
a distinctly conquering and military race, attaining their highest power under
Cyrus and Cambyses. Cyrus seems to have been the founder of a comprehensive
military organization, of which we gather details from Xenophon and other
writers. To each province was allotted a certain number of soldiers as standing
army. These troops, formed originally of native Persians only, were called the
king's troops. They comprised two classes, the one devoted exclusively to
garrisoning towns and castles, the other distributed throughout the country. To
each province was appointed a military commander, responsible for the number
and efficiency of the troops, in his district, while the civil governor was
answerable for their subsistence and pay. Annual musters were held, either by
the king in person or by generals deputed for the purpose and invested with
full powers. This organization seems to have fully answered its original
purpose, that of holding a vast empire acquired by conquest and promptly
repelling inroads or putting down insurrections. But when a great foreign war
was contemplated, the standing army was augmented by a levy throughout the
empire. The extent of the empire made such a levy a matter of time, and the
heterogeneous and unorganized mass of men of all nations so brought together
was a source of weakness rather than strength. Indeed, the vast hosts over
which the Greeks but a small proportion of the true Persians. The cavalry alone
seems to have retained its national character, and with it something of its
high reputation, even to the days of Alexander.
3. Greece
The Homeric armies were tribal levies of foot, armed with
spear, sword, bow, &c., and commanded by the chiefs in their war- chariots.
In historic times all this is changed. Greece becomes a congeries of
city-states, each with its own citizen-militia. Federal armies and permanent
troops are rare, the former owing to the centrifugal tendency of Greek
politics, the latter because the tyrannies, which must have relied
very largely on standing armies to maintain themselves, had ultimately given
way to democratic institutions. But the citizen-militia of Athens or Sparta
resembled rather a modern nation in arms than an auxiliary force.
Service was compulsory in almost all states, and as the young men began their
career as soldiers with a continuous training of two or three years, Hellenic
armies, like those of modern Europe, consisted of men who had undergone a
thorough initial training and were subsequently called up as required. Cavalry,
as always in the broken country of the Peloponnesus, was not of great
importance, and it is only when the theatre of Greek history is extended to the
plains of Thessaly that the mounted men become numerous. In the 4th century the
mainstay of Greek armies was the hoplite (ôirXLr~), the
heavy-armed infantryman who fought in the corps de bataille; the light
troops were men who could not provide the full equipment of the hoplite, rather
than soldiers trained for certain special duties such as skirmishing. The
fighting formation was that of the phalanx a solid corps of hoplites
armed with long spears. The armies were recruited for each war by calling up
one or more classes of men in reserve according to age. It was the duty and
privilege of the free citizen to bear arms; the slaves were rarely trusted with
weapons.
4. Sparta
So much is common to the various states. In Sparta the idea
of the nation in arms was more thoroughly carried out than in any other state
in the history of civilization. In other states the individual citizen often
lived the life of a soldier, here the nation lived the life of a regiment.
Private homes resembled the married quarters of a modern army; the
unmarried men lived entirely in barracks. Military exercises were only
interrupted by actual service in the field, and the whole life of a man of
military age was devoted to them. Under these circumstances, the Spartans
maintained a practically unchallenged supremacy over the armies of other Greek
states; sometimes their superiority was so great that, like the Spanish
regulars in the early part of the Dutch War of Independence. they destroyed
their enemies with insignificant loss to themselves. The surrender of a Spartan
detachment, hopelessly cut off from all assistance, and the victory of a body
of well-trained and handy light infantry over a closed battalion of Spartiates
were events so unusual as seriously to affect the course of Greek
history.
5. Greek Mercenaries
The military system of the 4th century was not called upon to
provide armies for continuous service on distant expeditions. When, after the
earlier campaigns of the Peloponnesian War, the necessity for such expeditions
arose, the system was often strained almost to breaking point, (e.g. in the
case of the Athenian expedition to Syracuse), and ultimately the states of
Greece were driven to choose between unprofitable expenditure of the lives of
citizens and recruiting from other sources. Mercenaries serving as light
troops, and particularly as peltasts (a new form of disciplined
light infantry) soon appeared. The corps de bataille
remained for long the old phalanx of citizen hoplites. But the heavy losses of
many years told severely on the resources of every state, and ultimately
non-national recruitsadventurers and soldiers of fortune, broken men who
had lost their possessions in the wars, political refugees, runaway slaves,
&c. found their way even into the ranks of the hoplites, and Athens
at one great crisis (407) enlisted slaves, with the promise of citizenship as
their reward. The Arcadians, like the Scots and the Swiss in modern history,
furnished the most numerous contingent to the new professional armies. A truly
national army was indeed to appear once more in the history of the
Peloponnesus, but in the meantime the professional soldier held the field. The
old bond of strict citizenship once broken, the career of the soldier of
fortune was open to the adventurous Greek. Taenarum and Corinth became regular
entrepots for mercenaries. The younger Cyrus raised his army for the invasion
of Persia precisely as the emperors Maximilian and Charles V. raised regiments
of Landsknechteby the issue of recruiting commissions to captains of
reputation. This army became the famous Ten Thousand. It was a marching
city-state, its members not desperate adventurers, but men with the calm
self-respect of Greek civilization. On the fall of its generals, it chose the
best officers of the army to command, and obeyed implicitly. Cheirisophus the
Spartan and Xenophon the Athenian, whom they chose, were not plausible
demagogues; they were line officers, who, suddenly promoted to the chief
command under circumstances of almost over whelming difficulty, proved capable
of achieving the impossible. The merit of choosing such leaders is not the
least title to fame of the Ten Thousand mercenary Greek hoplites. About the
same time Iphicrates with a body of mercenary peltasts destroyed a
mora or corps of Spartan hoplites (391 B.C.).
6. Epaminondas
Not many years after this, Spartan oppression roused the
Theban revolt, and the Theban revolt became the Theban hegemony. The army which
achieved this under the leadership of Epaminondas, one of the great captains of
history, had already given proofs of its valour against Xenophon and the
Cyreian veterans. Still earlier it had won the great victory of Delium (424
B.C.).
It was organized, as were the professional armies, on the accepted
model of the old armies, viz, the phalangite order, but the addition of
peltasts now made a Theban army, unlike the Spartans, capable of operating in
broken country as well as in the plain. The new tactics of the phalanx,
introduced by Epaminondas, embodied, for the first time in the history of war,
the modern principle of local superiority of force, and suggested to Frederick
the Great the famous oblique order of battle. Further, the cavalry
was more numerous and better led than that of Peloponnesian states. The
professional armies had well understood the management of cavalry; Xenophon's
handbook of the subject is not without value in the 20th century. In Greek
armies the dearth of horses and the consequent numerical weakness of the
cavalry prevented the bold use of the arm on the battlefield (see CAVALRY). But
Thebes had always to deal with nations which possessed numerous horsemen. Jason
of Pherae, for instance, put into the field against Thebes many thousands of
Thessalian horse; and thus at the battle of Tegyra in 375 the Theban cavalry
under Pelopidas, aided by the corps d'élite of infantry called
the Sacred Band, carried all before them. At Leuctra Epaminondas won a glorious
victory by the use of his oblique order tactics; the same methods
achieved the second great victory of Mantineia (362 B.C.) at which Epaminondas
fell. Pelopidas had already been slain in a battle against the Thessalians, and
there was no leader to carry on their work. But the new Greek system was yet to
gain its greatest triumphs under Alexander the Great.
7. Alexander
The reforms of Alexander's father, Philip of Macedon, may
most justly be compared to those of Frederick William I. in Prussia. Philip had
lived at Thebes as a hostage, and had known Iphicrates, Epaminondas and
Pelopidas. He grafted the Theban system of tactics on to the Macedonian system
of organization. That the lattera complete territorial systemwas
efficient was shown by the fact that Philip's blow was always struck before his
enemies were ready to meet it. That the new Greek tactics, properly used, were
superior to the old was once more demonstrated at Chaeronea (338 B.C.), where
the Macedonian infantry militia fought in phalanx, and the cavalry, led by the
young Alexander, delivered the last crushing blow. On his accession, like
Frederick the Great, Alexander inherited a well- trained and numerous army, and
was not slow to use it. The invasion of Asia was carried out by an army of the
Greek pattern, formed both of Hellenes and of non-Hellenes on an exceedingly
strong Macedonian nucleus. Alexander's own guard was composed of picked horse
and foot. The infantry of the line comprised Macedonian and Greek hoplites, the
Macedonians being subdivided into heavy and medium troops. These fought in a
grand phalanx, which was subdivided into units corresponding to the modern
divisions, brigades and regiments, the fighting formation being normally a line
of battalion masses. The arm of the infantry was the 18-foot pike (sarissa).
The peltasts. Macedonian and Greek, were numerous and well trained, and there
was the usual mass of irregular light troops, bowmen, slingers, &c. The
cavalry included the Guard (6.-y~j.~a), a body of heavy cavalry composed of
chosen Macedonians, the line cavalry of Macedonia (~raIpot) and Thessaly, the
numerous small contingents of the Greek states, mercenary corps and light
lancers for outpost work. The final blow and the gathering of the fruits of
victory were now for the first time the work of the mounted arm. The solid
phalanx was almost unbreakable in the earlier stages of the battle, but after a
long infantry fight the horsemen had their chance. In former wars they were too
few and too poorly mounted to avail themselves of it, and decisive victories
were in consequence rarely achieved in battles of Greek versus Greek. Under
Epaminondas, and still more under Philip and Alexander, the cavalry was strong
enough for its new work. Battles are now ended by the shock action of mounted
men, and in Alexander's time it is noted as a novelty that the cavalry carried
out the pursuit of a beaten army. There were further, in Alexander's army,
artillerymen with a battering train, engineers and departmental troops, and
also a medical service, an improvement attributed to Jason of Pherae. The
victories of this army, in close order and in open, over every kind of enemy
and on every sort of terrain, produced the Hellenistic world, and in that
achievement the history of Greek armies closes, for after the return of the
greater part of the Europeans to their homes the armies of Alexander and his
successors, while preserving much of the old form, become more and more
orientalized.
The decisive step was taken in 323, when a picked contingent of
Persians, armed mainly with missile weapons, was drafted into the phalanx, in
which henceforward they formed the middle ranks of each file of sixteen men.
But, like the third rank of Prussian infantry up to 1888, they normally fought
as skirmishers in advance, falling into their place behind the pikes of the
Mace donian file-leaders only if required for the decisive assault. The new
method, of course, depended for success on the steadiness of the thin
three-deep line of Macedonians thus left as the line of battle. Alexander's
veterans were indeed to be trusted, but as time went on, and little by little
the war-trained Greeks left the service, it became less and less safe to array
the Hellenistic army in this shallow and articulated order of battle. The
purely formal organization of the phalanx sixteen deep became thus the actual
tactical formation, and around this solid mass of 16,384 men gathered the
heterogeneous levies of a typical oriental army. Pyrrhus, king of Epirus,
retained far more of the tradition of Alexander's system than his
contemporaries farther east, yet his phalanx, comparatively light and mobile as
it was, achieved victories over the Roman legion only at the cost of
self-destruction. Even elephants quickly became a necessary adjunct to
Hellenistic armies.
8. Carthage
The military systems of the Jews present few features of
unusual interest. The expedient of calling out successive contingents from the
different tribes, in order to ensure continuity in military operations, should,
however, be noticed. David and Solomon possessed numerous permanent troops
which served as guards and garrisons; in principle this organization was
identical with that of the Persians, and that of Europe in the 16th and 17th
centuries. Particular interest attaches to the Carthaginian military forces of
the 3rd century B.C. Rarely has any army achieved such renown in the short
space of sixty years (264202 B.C.). Carthage produced a series of great
generals, culminating in Hannibal, who is marked out, even by the little that
is known of him, as the equal of Napoleon. But Napoleon was supported by a
national army,
Hannibal and his predecessors were condemned to work with armies of
mercenaries. For the first time in the world's history war is a matter with
which the civil population has no concern. The merchants of Carthage fought
only in the last extremity; the wars in which their markets were extended were
conducted by non- national forces and directed by the few Carthaginian citizens
who possessed military aptitudes. The civil authorities displayed towards their
instruments a spirit of hatred for which it is difficult to find a parallel.
Unsuccessful leaders were crucified, the mercenary soldiers were cheated of
their pay, and broke out into a mutiny which shook the empire of Carthage to
its foundations. But the magnetism of a leader's personality infused a
corporate military spirit into these heterogeneous Punic armies, and history
has never witnessed so complete an illustration of the power of pure and
unaided esprit de corps as in the case of Hannibal's army in Italy, which,
composed as it was of Spaniards, Africans, Gauls, Numidians, Italians and
soldiers of fortune of every country, was yet welded by him into thorough
efficiency. The army of Italy was as great in its last fight at Zama as the
army of Spain at Rocroi; its victories of the Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae were
so appalling that, two hundred years later, the leader to whom these soldiers
devoted their lives was still, to a Roman, the dire
Hannibal.
In their formal organization the Carthaginian armies re sembled the
new Greek model, and indeed they were created in the first instance by
Xanthippus, a Spartan soldier in the service of Carthage, who was called upon
to raise and train an army when the Romans were actually at the gates of
Carthage, and justified his methods in the brilliant victory of Tunis (255
B.C.). For the solid Macedonian phalanx of 16,000 spears Xanthippus substituted
a line of heavy battalions equal in its aggregate power of resistance to the
older form, and far more flexible. The triumphs of the cavalry arm in
Hannibal's battles far excelled those of Alexander's horsemen. Hannibal chose
his fighting ground whenever possible with a view to using their full power,
first to defeat the hostile cavalry, then to ride down the shaken infantry
masses, and finally to pursue au fond. At Cannae, the greatest disaster ever
suffered by the Romans, the decisive blow and the slaughter were the work of
Hannibal's line cavalry, the relentless pursuit that of his light horse. But a
professional long-service army has always the greatest difficulty in making
good its losses, and in the present case it was wholly unable to do so. Even
Hannibal failed at last before the sustained efforts of the citizen army of
Rome.
9. Roman Army under the Republic
The earliest organization of the Roman army is attributed to
Romulus, who formed it on the tribal principle, each of the three tribes
contributing its contingent of horse and foot. But it was to Servius Tuiius
that Rome owed, traditionally, the complete classification of her
citizen-soldiers. For the details of the Roman military system, see ROMAN Army.
During the earlier period of Roman history the army was drawn entirely from the
first classes of the population, who served without pay and provided their own
arms and armour. The wealthiest men (equitcs) furnished the cavalry, the
remainder the infantry, while the poorer classes either fought as light troops
or escaped altogether the privilege and burden of military service. Each
legion of 3000 heavy foot was at first formed in a solid phalanx.
The introduction of the elastic and handy three-line formation with intervals
(similar in many respects to Alexander's) was brought about by the Gallic wars,
and is attributed to M. Furius Camillus, who also, during the siege of Veii,
introduced the practice of paying the soldiers, and thus removed the chief
obstacle to the employment of the poorer classes. The new order of battle was
fully developed in the Pyrrhic Wars, and the typical army of the Republic may
be taken as dating from the latter part of the 3rd century B.C. The legionary
was still possessed of a property qualification, hut it had become relatively
small. An annual levy was made at Rome to provide for the campaign of the year.
Discipline was severe, and the rewards appealed as much to the soldier's honour
as to his desire of gain. A legion now consisted of three lines (Hastati,
Principes, Triarii), each line composed of men of similar age and
experience, and was further subdivided into thirty maniples, each
of two centuries. The normal establishment of 300 cavalry, 3000
heavy and 1200 light infantry was still maintained, though in practice these
figures were often exceeded. In place of the old light-armed and somewhat
inferior rorarii, the new velites performed light infantry duties (211 B.C.),
at the same time retaining their place in the maniples, of which they formed
the last ranks (compare the Macedonian phalanx as reorganized in 323,
§ 7 above). The 300 cavalry of the legion were trained for shock action.
But the strength of the Roman army lay in the heavy legionary infantry of
citizens. The thirty maniples of each legion stood in three lines of battle,
but the most notable point of their formation was that each maniple stood by
itself on its own small manoeuvre-area, free to take ground to front or flank.
To the Roman legion was added a legion of allies, somewhat differently
organized and possessing more cavalry, and the whole force was called a
double legion or briefly a legion. A consul's army
consisted nominally of two double legions, but in the Punic wars military
exigencies rather than custom dictated the numbers of the army, and the two
consuls at Cannae (216 B.C.) commanded two double consular armies, or eight
double legions.
10. Characteristics of the Roman Army
Such -in outline was the Roman military organization at the
time when it was put to the severe test of the Second Punic War. Its elements
were good, its military skill superior to that of any other army of ancient
history, while its organization was on the whole far better than any that had
gone before. The handy formation of maniples at open order was unique in the
ancient world, and it did not reappear in history up to the advent of Gustavus
Adolphus. In this formation, in which everything was entrusted to the skill of
subordinates and the individual courage of the rank and file, the Romans met
and withstood with success every type of impact, from the ponderous shock of
the Macedonian phalanx and the dangerous rush of Celtic savages to the charge
of elephants. Yet it was no particular virtue in the actual form employed that
carried the Roman arms to so many victories. There would have been positive
danger in thus articulating the legion had it been composed of any but the most
trustworthy soldiers. To swiftness and precision of manoeuvre they added a
dogged obstinacy over which nothing but overwhelming disaster prevailed. It is,
therefore, not unnatural to ask wherein the system which produced these
soldiers failed, as it did within a century after the battle of Zama. The
greatest defect was the want of a single military command. The civil
magistrates of Rome were ex officio leaders of her armies, and though no
Roman officer lacked military training, the views of a consul or praetor were
almost invariably influenced by the programe of his political party. When, as
sometimes happened, the men under their command sided in the political
differences of their leaders, all real control came to an end. The soldiers of
the Republic hardly ever forgot that they were citizens with voting powers;
they served as a rule only during a campaign; and, while there could be little
question as to their patriotism and stubbornness, they lacked almost entirely
that esprit de corps which is found only amongst the members of a body having a
permanent corporate existence. Thus they had the vices as well as the virtues
of a nation in arms, and they fell still further short of the ideal because of
the dubious and precarious tenure of their generals' commands. The great
officers were usually sent home at the end of a campaign, to be replaced by
their elected successors, and they showed all the hesitation and fear of
responsibility usually found in a temporary commander. Above all, when two
armies, each under its own consul or praetor, acted together, the command was
either divided or exercised on alternate days.
11. Roman Empire
The essential weaknesses of militia forces and the accidental
circumstances of that under consideration led, even in earlier times, to the
adoption of various expedients which for a time obviated the evils to which
allusion has been made. But a change of far greater importance followed the
final exploits of the armies of the old system. The increasing dominions of the
Republic, the spread of wealth and luxury, the gradual decadence of the old
Roman ideas, all tended to produce an army more suited to the needs of the
newer time than the citizen militia of the 3rd century. Permanent troops were a
necessity; the rich, in their newly acquired dislike of personal effort, ceased
to bear their share in the routine life of the army, and thus the proletariat
began to join the legions with the express intention of taking to a military
career. The actual change from the old régime to the new was in the main
the work of Gaius Marius. The urgent demand for men at the time of the Teutonic
invasions caused the service to be thrown open to all Roman citizens
irrespective of census. The new territories furnished cavalry, better and more
numerous than the old equites, and light troops of various kinds to
replace the velites. Only the heavy foot remained a purely Italian
force, and the spread of the Roman citizenship gradually abolished the
distinction between a Roman and an allied legion. The higher classes had
repeatedly shown themselves unwilling to serve under plebeians (e.g. Varro and
Flaminius); Marius preferred to have as soldiers men who did not despise him as
an inferior. Under all these influences for good or for evil, the standing army
was developed in the first half of the 1st century B.C. The tactical changes in
the legion indicate its altered character. The small maniples gave way to heavy
cohorts, ten cohorts forming the legion; as in the Napoleonic wars,
light and handy formations became denser and more rigid with the progressive
decadence in moral of the rank and file. It is more significant still that in
the days of Marius the annual oath of allegiance taken by the soldier came to
be replaced by a personal vow, taken once and for all, of loyalty to the
general. Ubi bene, ibi patria was an expression of the new spirit of the
army, and Caesar had but to address his men as quirites (civilians) to
quell a mutiny. Hastati, principes and triarii were now merely
expressions in drill and tactics. But perhaps the most important of all these
changes was the growth of regimental spirit and tradition. The legions were now
numbered throughout the army, and the Tenth Legion has remained a classic
instance of a crack corps. The moral of the Roman army was founded
no longer on patriotism, but on professional pride and esprit de
corps.
With this military system Rome passed through the era of the Civil
Wars, at the end of which Augustus found himself with forty-five legions on his
hands. As soon as possible he carried through a great reorganization, by which,
after ruthlessly rejecting inferior elements, he obtained a smaller picked
force of twenty-five legions, with numerous auxiliary forces. These were
permanently stationed in the frontier provinces of the Empire, while Italy was
garrisoned by the Praetorian cohorts, and thus was formed a regular
long-service army, the strength of which has been estimated at 300,000 men. But
these measures, temporarily successful, produced in the end an army which not
only was perpetually at variance with the civil populations it was supposed to
protect, but frequently murdered the emperors to whom it had sworn allegiance
when it raised them to the throne. The evil fame of the Italian cohorts has
survived in the phrase praetorianism used to imply a venal military
despotism. The citizens gradually ceased to bear arms, and the practice of
self- mutilation became common. The inevitable denouement was delayed from time
to time by the work of an energetic prince. But the ever-increasing
inefficiency and factiousness of the legions, and the evanescence of all
military spirit in the civil population, made it easy for the barbarians, when
once the frontier was broken through, to overrun the decadent Empire. The end
came when the Gothic heavy horse annihilated the legions of Valens at
Adrianople (A.D. 378).
There was now no resource but to take the barbarians into Roman
pay. Under the name of foederati, the Gothic mercenary cavalry played
the most conspicuous part in the succeeding wars of the Empire, and began the
reign of the heavy cavalry arm, which lasted for almost a thousand years. Even
so soon as within six years of the death of Valens twenty thousand Gothic horse
decided a great battle in the emperor's favour. These men, however, became
turbulent and factious, and it was not until the emperor Leo I. had regenerated
the native Roman soldier that the balance was maintained between -the national
and the hired warrior. The work of this emperor and of his successors found
eventual expression in the victories of Belisarius and Narses, in which the
Romans, in the new role of horse-archers, so well combined their efforts with
those of the Foederali that neither the heavy cavalry of the Goths nor the
phalanx of Frankish infantry proved to be capable of resisting the imperial
forces. At the battle of Casilinum (553) Roman foot-archers and infantry bore
no small part of the work. It was thus in the Eastern Empire that the Roman
military spirit revived, and the Byzantine army, as evolved from the system of
Justinian, became eventually the sole example of a fully organized service to
be found in medieval history.
12. The Dark Ages
In western Europe all traces of Roman military institutions
quickly died out, and the conquerors of the new kingdoms developed fresh
systems from the simple tribal levy. The men of the plains were horsemen, those
of marsh and moor were foot, and the four greater peoples retained these
original characteristics long after the conquest had been completed. In
organization the Lombards and Franks, Visigoths and English scarcely differed.
The whole military population formed the mass of the army, the chiefs and their
personal retainers the elite. The Lombards and the Visigoths were
naturally cavalry; the Franks and the English were, equally naturally,
infantry, and the armies of the Merovingian kings differed but little from the
English fyrd with which Offa and Penda fought their battles. But in
these nations the use of horses and armour, at first confined to kings and
great chiefs, gradually spread downwards to the ever-growing classes of the
thegns, comites, &c. Finally, under Charlemagne were developed the
general lines of the military organization which eventually became feudalism.
For his distant wars he required an efficient and mobile army. Hence successive
capitularies were issued dealing with matters of recruiting,
organization, discipline and field service work. Very noticeable are his system
of forts (burgs) with garrisons, his military train of artillery and
supplies and the reappearance of the ancient principle that- three or four men
should equip and maintain one of themselves as a warrior. These and other
measures taken by him tended to produce a strong veteran army, very different
in efficiency from the tumultuary levy, to which recourse -was had only in the
last resort. While war (as a whole) was not yet an art, fighting (from the
individual's point of view) had certainly become a special function; after
Charlemagne's time the typical feudal army, composed of well-equipped cavalry
and ill-armed peasantry serving on foot, rapidly developed. Enemies such as
Danes and Magyars could only be dealt with by mounted men who could ride round
them, compel them to fight, and annihilate them by the shock of the charge;
consequently the practice of leaving the infantry in rear, and even at home,
grew up almost as a part of the feudal system of warfare. England, however,
sought a different remedy, and thus diverged from the continental methods. This
remedy was the creation of a fleet, and, the later Danish wars being there
carried out, not by bands of mounted raiders, but by large armies of military
settlers, infantry retained its premier position in England up to the day of
Hastings. Even the thegns, who there, as abroad, were the mainstay of the army,
were heavy-armed infantry. The only contribution made by Canute to the military
organization of England was the retention of a picked force of huscaries
(household troops) when the rest of the army with which he had conquered his
realm was sent back to Scandinavia. At Hastings, the forces of Harold consisted
wholly of infantry. The English array was composed of the king and his personal
friends, the hus caries, and the contingents of the fyrd under the local the
gns; though better armed, they were organized after the manner of their
forefathers. On that field there perished the best infantry in Europe, and
henceforward for three centuries there was no serious rival to challenge the
predominance of the heavy cavalry.
13. The Byzantines (cf. article ROMAN EMPIRE, LATER)
While the west of Europe was evolving feudalism, the
Byzantine empire was acquiring an army and military system scarcely surpassed
by any of those of antiquity and not often equaled up to the most modern times.
The foederati disappeared after the time of Justinian, and by AD. óoo
the army had become at once professional and national. For generations,
regiments had had a corporate existence. Now brigades and divisions also
appeared in war, and, somewhat later, in peace likewise. With the disappearance
of the barbarians, the army became one homogeneous service, minutely
systematized, and generally resembling an army in the modern sense of the word.
The militia of the frontier districts performed efficiently the service of
surveillance, and the field forces of disciplined regulars were moved and
employed in accordance with well-reasoned principles of war; their maintenance
was provided for by a scutage, levied, in lieu of service, on the central
provinces of the empire. Later, a complete territorial system of recruiting and
command was introduced. Each theme (military district) had its own
regular garrison, and furnished a field division of some 5000 picked troopers
for a campaign in any theatre of war. Provision having been made in peace for a
depot system, all weakly men and horses could be left behind, and local duties
handed over to second line troops; thus the field forces were practically
always on a war footing. Beside the themes under their generals,
there were certain districts on the frontiers, called clissuras, placed
under chosen officers, and specially organized for emergency service. The corps
of officers in the Byzantine army was recruited from the highest classes, and
there were many families (e.g. that from which came the celebrated Nicephorus
Phocas) in which soldiering was the traditional career. The rank and file were
either military settlers or men of the yeoman class, and in either case had a
personal interest in the safety of the theme which prevented friction between
soldiers and civilians. The principal arm was, of course, cavalry, and infantry
was employed only in special duties. Engineer, train and medical services were
maintained in each theme. Of the ensemble of the Byzantine army it has been
said that the art of war as it was understood at Constantinople . . . was
the only system of real merit existing. No western nation could have afforded
such a training to its officers till the 16th or . . . 17th century. The
vitality of such an army remained intact long after the rest of the empire had
begun to decay, and though the old army practically ceased to exist after the
great disaster of Manzikert (1071), the barbarians and other mercenaries who
formed the new service were organized, drilled and trained to the same pitch of
military efficiency. Indeed the greatest tactical triumph of the Byzantine
system (Calavryta, 1079) was won by an army already largely composed of
foreigners. But mercenaries in the end developed praetorianism, as usual, and
at last they actually mutinied, in the presence of the enemy, for higher pay
(Constantinople, 1204).
14. Feudalism
From the military point of view the change under feudalism
was very remarkable. For the first time in the history of western Europe there
appears, in however rough a form, a .systematized obligation to serve in arms,
regulated on a territorial basis. That army organization in the modern sense
organization for tactics and commanddid not develop in any degree
commensurate with the development of military administration, was due to the
peculiar characteristics of the feudal system, and the virtues and weaknesses
of medieval armies were its natural outcome. Personal bravery, the primary
virtue of the soldier, could not be wanting in the members of a military class,
the meitier of which was war and manly exercises. Pride of caste,
ambition and knightly emulation, all helped to raise to a high standard the
individual efficiency of the feudal cavalier. But the gravest faults of the
system, considered as an army organization, were directly due to this personal
element. Indiscipline, impatience of superior control, and dangerous
knight-errantry, together with the absence of any chain of command, prevented
the feudal cavalry from achieving results at all proportionate to the effort
expended and the potentialities of a force with so many soldierly qualities. If
such defects were habitually found in the best elements of -the armythe
feudal tenants and subtenants who formed the heavy cavalry arm little could be
expected of the despised and ill-armed foot-soldiery of the levy. The swift
raids of the Danes and others (see above) had created a precedent which in
French and German wars was almost invariably followed. The feudal levy rarely
appeared at all on the battlefield, and when it was thus employed it was ridden
down by the hostile knights, and even by those of its own party, without
offering more than the feeblest resistance. Above all, one disadvantage, common
to all classes of feudal soldiers, made an army so composed quite
untrustworthy. The service which a king was able to exact from his feudatories
was so slight (varying from one month to three in the year) that no military
operation which was at all likely to be prolonged could be undertaken with any
hope of success.
15. Medieval Mercenaries
It was natural, therefore, that a sovereign who contemplated
a great war should employ mercenaries. These were usually foreigners, as
practically all national forces served on feudal terms. While the greater lords
rode with him on all his expeditions, the bulk of his army consisted of
professional soldiers, paid by the levy of scutage imposed upon the
feudal tenantry. There had always been soldiers of fortune. William's host at
Hastings contained many such men; later, the Flemings who invaded England in
the days of Henry I. sang to each other Hop, hop, Willeken, hop!
England is mine and thine, and from all the evidence it is clear
that in earlier days the hired soldiers were adventurers seeking lands and
homes. But these men usually proved to be most undesirable subjects, and
sovereigns soon began to pay a money wage f or the services of mercenaries
properly so called. Such were the troops which figured in English history under
Stephen. Such troops, moreover, formed the main part of the armies of the early
Plantagenets. They were, as a matter of course, armed and armoured like the
knights, with whom they formed the men-at-arms (gendarmes) of the army. Indeed,
in the 11th and 12th centuries, the typical army of France or the Empire
contains a relatively small percentage of knights, evidence of
which fact may be found even in so fanciful a romance as Aucassin and Nicolete.
It must be noted, however, that not all the mercenaries were heavy cavalry; the
Brabancon pikeman and the Italian crossbowman (the value of whose weapon was
universally recognized) often formed part of a feudal army.
16. Infantry in Feudal Times
These mercenary foot soldiers came as a rule from districts
in which the infantry arm had maintained its ancient predominance in unbroken
continuity. The cities of Flanders and Brabant, and those of the Lombard plain,
had escaped feudal interference with their methods of fighting, and their
burgher militia had developed into solid bodies of heavy-armed pikemen. These
were very different from those of the feudal levy, and individual knightly
bravery usually failed to make the slightest impression on a band of infantry
held together by the stringent corporate feeling of a trade-gild. The more
adventurous of the young men, like those of the Greek cities, took service
abroad and fought with credit in their customary manner. The reign of the
Brabancon as a mercenary was indeed short, but he continued, in his
own country, to fight in the old way, and his successor in the profession of
arms, the Genoese crossbowman, was always highly valued. In England, moreover,
the infantry of the old fyrd was not suffered to decay into a rabble of
half-armed countrymen, and in France a burgher infantry was established by
Louis VI under the name of the milte des communes, with the idea of
creating a counterpoise to the power of the feudatories. Feudalism, therefore,
as a military system, was short-lived. Its limitations had always necessitated
the employment of mercenaries, and in several places a solid infantry was
coming into existence, which was drawn from the sturdy and self- respecting
middle classes, and in a few generations was to prove itself a worthy opponent
not only to the knight, but to the professional man-at-arms.
17. The Crusades
It is an undoubted fact that the long wars of the Crusades
produced, directly, but slight improvement in the feudal armies of Europe. In
the East large bodies of men were successfully kept under arms for a
considerable period, but the application of crusading methods to European war
was altogether impracticable. In the first place, much of the permanent force
of these armies was contributed by the military orders, which had no place in
European political activities. Secondly, enthusiasm mitigated much of the evil
of individualism. In the third place, there was no custom to limit the period
of service, since the Crusaders had undertaken a definite task and would merely
have stultified their own purpose in leaving the work only half done. There
were, therefore, sharp contrasts between crusading and European armies. In the
latter, systematization was confined to details of recruiting; in the armies of
the Cross, men were from time to time obtained by the accident of religious
fervour, while at the same time continuous service produced a relatively high
system of tactical organization. Different conditions, therefore, produced
different methods, and crusading unity and discipline could not have been
imposed on an ordinary army, which indeed with its paid auxiliaries was fairly
adequate for the somewhat desultory European wars of that time. The statement
that the Crusaders had a direct influence on the revival of infantry is hardly
susceptible of convincing demonstration, but it is at any rate beyond question
that the social and economic results of the Crusades materially contributed to
the downfall of the feudal knight, and in consequence to a rise in the relative
importance of the middle classes. Further, not only were the Crusading knights
compelled by their own want of numbers to rely on the good qualities of the
foot, but the foot themselves were the survivors of the fittest,
for the weakly men died before they reached the Holy Land, and with them there
were always knights who had lost their horses and could not obtain remounts.
Moreover, when simple and gentle both took the Cross
there could be no question of treating Crusaders as if they were the mere
feudal levy. But the little direct influence of the whole of these wars upon
military progress in Europe is shown clearly enough by the fact that at the
very close of the Crusades a great battle was lost through knight-errantry of
the true feudal type (Mansurah).
18. The Period of Transition (12901490)
Besides the infantry already mentioned, that of Scotland and
that of the German cities fought with credit on many fields. Their arm was the
pike, and they were always formed in solid masses (called in Scotland,
schiltrons). The basis of the medieval commune being the suppression of the
individual in the social unit, it was natural that the burgher infantry should
fight in serried ranks and in better order than a line of
individual knights, who, moreover, were almost powerless before walled cities.
But these forces lacked offensive power, and it was left for the English
archers, whose importance dates from the latter years of the 13th century, to
show afresh, at Crecy, Poitiers and Agincourt. the value of missile action.
When properly supported by other arms, they proved themselves capable of
meeting both the man-at-arms and the pikemen. The greatest importance i
attaches to the evolution of this idea of mutual support and combination. Once
it was realized, war became an art, and armies became specially organized
bodies of troops of different arms. It cannot be admitted, indeed, as has been
claimed, that the 14th century had a scientific system of tactics, or that the
campaign of Poitiers was arranged by the French general staff.
Nevertheless, during this century armies were steadily coming to consist of
expert soldiers, to the exclusion of national levies and casual mercenaries. It
is true that, by his system of indents, Edward III of England
raised national armies of a professional type, but the English soldier thus
enrolled, when discharged by his own sovereign, naturally sought similar
employment elsewhere. This system produced, moreover, a class of unemployed
soldiers, and these, with others who became adventurers from choice or
necessity, and even with foreign troops, formed the armies which fought in the
Wars of the Roses armies which differed but slightly from others of the
time. The natural result of these wars was to implant a hatred of soldiery in
the heart of a nation which had formerly produced the best fighting men in
Europe, a hatred which left a deep imprint on the constitutional and social
life of the people. In France, where Joan of Arc passed like a meteor across
the military firmament, the idea of a national regular army took a practical
form in the middle of the 15th century. Still, the forces thus brought into
existence were not numerous, and the soldier of fortune, in spite of such
experiences of his methods as those of the Wars of the Roses, was yet to attain
the zenith of his career.
19. The Condottieri
The immediate result of this confused period of
destruction and reconstruction was the condottiere, who becomes
important about 1300. In Italy, where the condottieri chiefly
flourished, they were in demand owing to the want of feudal cavalry, and the
inability of burgher infantry to undertake wars of aggression. The free
companies (who served in great numbers in France and Spain as well as in
Italy) were military societies very much like trade-gilds, which
(so to speak) were hawked from place to place by their managing directors, and
hired temporarily by princes who needed their services. Unlike the older
hirelings, they were permanently organized, and thus, with their experience and
discipline, became the best troops in existence. But the carrying on of war
in the spirit of a handicraft led to bloodless battles, indecisive
campaigns, and other unsatisfactory results, and the reign of the
condottieri proper was over by 1400, subsequent free companies being
raised on a more strictly national basis. With all their defects, however, they
were the pioneers of modern organization. In the inextricable tangle of old and
new methods which constitutes the military system of the t5th century, it is
possible to discern three marked tendencies. One is the result of a purely
military conception of the now special art of war, and its exposition as an art
by men who devote their whole career to it. The second is the idea of a
national army, resulting from many social, economical and political causes. The
third is the tendency towards minuter organization and subdivision within the
army. Whereas the individual feudatories had disliked the close supervision of
a minor commander, and their army had in consequence remained always a
loosely-knit unit, the men who made war into an art belonged to small bands or
corps, and naturally began their organization from the lower units. Herein,
therefore, was the germ of the regimental system of the present day.
20. The Swiss
The best description of a typical European army at the
opening of the new period of development is that of the French army in Italy in
1494, written by Paolo Giovio. He notes with surprise that the various corps of
infantry and cavalry are distinct, the usual practice of the time being to
combine one lancer, one archer, one groom, &c., into a small unit furnished
and commanded by the lancer. There were Swiss and German infantry, armed with
pike and halbert, with a few shot, who marched in good order to
music. There were the heavy men-at-arms (gendarmes), accompanied as of
old by mounted archers, who, however, now fought independently. There were,
further, Gascon slingers and crossbowmen, who had probably acquired, from
contact with Spain, some of the lightness and dash of their neighbours. The
artillery train was composed of 140 heavy pieces and a great number of lighter
guns; these were then and for many generations thereafter a special arm outside
the military establishments (see ARTILLERY). In all this the only relic of the
days of Crecy is the administrative combination of the men-at-arms and the
horse archers, and even this is no longer practiced in action. The most
important element in the army is the heavy infantry of Swiss and Germans. The
Swiss had for a century past gradually developed into the most formidable
troops of the day. The wars of Zizka (q.v.) in Bohemia (1420) materially
assisted in the downfall of the heavy cavalry; and the victories of the Swiss,
beginning with Sempach (1382), had by 1480 proved that their solid battalions,
armed with the long pike and the halberd, were practically invulnerable to all
but missile and shock action combined. By fortune of war, they never met the
English, who had shown the way to deal with the schiltron as early as
Falkirk. So great was their confidence against ordinary troops, that on one
occasicn (1444) they detached 1600 men to engage 50,000.
It was natural that a series of victories such as Granson, Morat
and Nancy should place them in the forefront of the military nations of Europe.
The whole people devoted itself thereupon to professional soldiering,
particularly in the French service, and though their monopoly of mercenary
employment lasted a short time only, they continued to furnish regiments to the
armies of France, Spain and the Pope up to the most modern times. But their
efficiency was thoroughly sapped by the growth of a mutinous and insubordinate
spirit, the memory of which has survived in the proverb Point d'ar gent,
point de Suisse, and inspired Machiavelli with the hatred of mercenaries
which marks every page of his work on the art of war. One of their devices for
extorting money was to appear at the muster with many more soldiers than had
been contracted for by their employers, who were forced to submit to this form
of blackmail. At last the French, tired of these caprices, inflicted on the
Swiss the crushing defeat of Marignan (q.v.), and their tactical system
received its death-blow from the Spaniards at Pavia (1525).
21. The Landsknechts
The modern army owes far more of its organization and
administrative methods to the Landsknechts (men of the country, as
distinct from foreigners) than to the Swiss. As the latter were traditionally
the friends of France, so these Swabians were the mainstay of the Imperial
armies, though both were mercenaries. The emperor Maximilian exerted himself to
improve the new force, which soon became the model for military Europe. A corps
of Landsknechts was usually raised by a system resembling that of
indents, commissions being issued by the sovereign to leaders of
repute to enlist men. A colour (Fähnlein) numbered
usually about 400 men, a corps consisted of a varying number of colours, some
corps having 12,000 men. From these troops, with their intense pride, esprit
de corps and comradeship, there has come down to modern times much of
present-day etiquette, interior economy and regimental customs
in other words, nearly all that is comprised in the
regimental system. Amongst the most notable features of their
system were the functions of the provost, who combined the modern offices of
provost-marshal, transport and supply officer, and canteen manager; the
disciplinary code, which admitted the right of the rank and file to judge
offences touching the honour of the regiment; and the women who, lawfully or
unlawfully attached to the soldiers, marched with the regiment and had a
definite place in its corporate life. The conception of the regiment as the
home of the soldier was thus realized in fact.
22. The Spanish Army
The tendencies towards professional soldiering and towards
subdivision had now pronounced themselves. At the same time, while national
armies, as dreamed of by Machiavelli; were not yet in existence, two at least
of the powers were beginning to work towards an ideal. This ideal was an army
which was entirely at the disposal of its own sovereign, trained to the due
professional standard, and organized in the best way found by experience to be
applicable to military needs. On these bases was formed the old Spanish army
which, from Pavia (1525) to Rocroi (1643), was held by common consent to be the
finest service in existence. Almost immediately after emerging from the period
of internal development, Spain found herself obliged to maintain an army for
the Italian wars. In the first instance this was raised from amongst veterans
of the war of Granada, who enlisted for an indefinite time. Probably the oldest
line regiments in Europe are those descended from the famous tercios,
whose formation marks the beginning of military establishments, just as the
Landsknechts were the founders of military manners and customs. The great
captains who led the new army soon assimilated the best points of the Swiss
system, and it was the Spanish army which evolved the typical combination of
pike and musket which flourished up to 1700. Outside the domain the tactics, it
must be credited with an important contribution to the science of army
organization, in the depot system, whereby the tercios in the field were
continually fed and kept up to strength. The social position of the
soldier was that of a gentleman, and the young nobles (who soon came to prefer
the tercios to the cavalry service) thought it no shame, when their
commands were reduced, to take a pike in another regiment. The
provost and his gallows were as much in evidence in a Spanish camp as in one of
Landsknechts, but the comradeship and esprit de corps of a tercio
were the admiration of all contemporary soldiers. With all its good qualities,
however, this army was not truly national; men soon came from all the various
nations ruled by the Habsburgs, and the soldier of fortune found employment in
a Tercio as readily as elsewhere. But it was a great gain that corps, as
such, were fully recognized as belonging to the government, however shifting
the personnel might be. Permanence of regimental existence had now been
attained, though the universal acceptance and thorough application of the
principle were still far distant. During the 16th century, the French regular
army (originating in the compagnies d'ordonnance of 1445), which was
always in existence, even when the Swiss and gendarmes were the best
part of the field forces, underwent a considerable development, producing
amongst other things the military terminology of the present day. But the wars
of religion effectually checked all progress in the latter part of the century,
and the European reputation of the French army dates only from the latter part
of the Thirty Years' War.
23. The Sixteenth Century
The battle of St Quentin (1557) is usually taken as
the date from which the last type of a purely mercenary arm (as distinct
from corps) comes into prominence. Brabancon or
Swiss implied pikemen without further qualification, the new term
Reiter similarly implied mercenary cavalry fighting with the
pistol. Heavy cavalry could disperse arquebusiers and musketeers, but it was
helpless against solid masses of pikemen; the Reiters solved the difficulty by
the use of the pistol. They were well armoured and had little to fear from
musket-balls. Arrayed in deep squadrons, therefore, they rode up to the pikes
with impunity, and fired methodically dans le tas, each rank when it had
discharged its pistols filing to the rear to reload. These Reiters were
organized in squadrons of variable strength, and recruited in the same manner
as were the Landsknechts. They were much inferior, however, to the latter in
their discipline and general conduct, for cavalry had many more individual
opportunities of plunder than the foot, and the rapacity and selfishness of the
Reiters were consequently in marked contrast to the good order and mutual
helpfulness in the field and in quarters which characterized the regimental
system of the Landsknechts.
24. Dutch System
The most interesting feature of the Dutch system, which was
gradually evolved by the patriots in the long War of Independence, was its
minute attention to detail. In the first years of the war, William the Silent
had to depend, for field operations, on mutinous and inefficient mercenaries
and on raw countrymen who had nothing but devotion to oppose to the discipline
and skill of the best regular army in the world. Such troops were, from the
point of view of soldiers like Alva, mere canaille, and the ludicrous
ease with which their armies were destroyed (as at Jemmingen and Mookerheyde),
at the cost of the lives of perhaps a dozen Spanish veterans, went far to
justify this view. But, fortunately for the Dutch, their fortified towns were
exceedingly numerous, and the individual bravery of citizen- militia, who were
fighting for the lives of every soul within their walls, baffled time after
time all the efforts of Alva's men. In the open, Spanish officers took
incredible liberties with the enemy; once, at any rate, they marched for hours
together along submerged embankments with hostile vessels firing into them from
either side. Behind walls the Dutch were practically a match for the most
furious valour of the assailants.
The insurgents' first important victory in the open field, that of
Rymenant near Malines (1577), was won by the skill of Bras de Fer, de La
Noue, a veteran French general, and the stubbornness of the English contingent
of the Dutch army for England, from 1572 onwards, sent out an
ever-increasing number of volunteers. This battle was soon followed by the
great defeat of Gembloux (1578), and William the Silent was not destined to see
the rise of the Dutch army. Maurice of Nassau was the real organizer of
victory. In the wreck of all feudal and burgher military institutions, he
turned to the old models of Xenophon, Polybius, Aelian and the rest. Drill, as
rigid and as complicated as that of the Macedonian phalanx, came into vogue,
the infantry was organized more strictly into companies and regiments, the
cavalry into troops or comets. The Reiter tactics of the pistol were followed
by the latter, the former consisted of pikes, halberds and shot.
This form was generally followed in central Europe, as usual, without the
spirit, but in Holland it was the greater trustworthiness of the rank and file
that allowed of more flexible formations, and here we no longer see the foot of
an army drawn up, as at Jemmingen, in one solid and immovable
square. In their own country and with the system best suited
thereto, the Dutch, who moreover acquired greater skill and steadiness day by
day, maintained their ground against all the efforts of a Parma and a Spinola.
Indeed, it is the best tribute to the vitality of the Spanish system that the
inevitable debacle was so long delayed. The campaigns of Spinola in Germany
demonstrated that the Dutch system, as a system for general use,
was at any rate no better than the system over which it had locally asserted
its superiority, and the spirit, and not the form, of Maurice's practice
achieved the ultimate victory of the Netherlanders. In the Thirty Years' War,
the unsuccessful armies of Mansfeld and many others were modelled on the Dutch
system,the forces of Spinola, of Tilly and of Wallenstein, on the
Spanish. In other words, these systems as such meant little; the discipline and
spirit behind them, everything. Yet the contribution made by the Dutch system
to the armies of to-day was not small; to Maurice and his comrades we owe,
first the introduction of careful and accurate drill, and secondly the
beginnings of an acknowledged science of war, the groundwork of both being the
theory and practice of antiquity. The present method of forming
fours in the British infantry is ultimately derived from Aelian, just as
the first beats of the drums in a march represent the regimental calls of the
Landsknechts, and the depots and the drafts for the service battalions date
from the Italian wars of Spain.
25. The Thirty Years' War
Hitherto all armies had been raised or reduced according to
the military and political situation of the moment. Spain had indeed maintained
a relatively high effective in peace, but elsewhere a few personal guards,
small garrisons, and sometimes a small regular army to serve as a nucleus,
constituted the only permanent forces kept under arms by sovereigns, though, in
this era of perpetual wars, armies were almost always on a war footing. The
expense of maintenance at that time practically forbade any other system than
this, called in German Werbe- system, a term for which in English there is no
nearer equivalent than enlistment or levy system. It is worth
noticing that this very system is identical in principle with that of the
United States at the present day, viz., a small permanent force, inflated to
any required size at the moment of need. The exceptional conditions of the
Dutch army, indeed, secured for its regiments a long life; yet when danger was
finally over, a large portion of the army was at once reduced. The history of
the British army from about 1740 to 1820 is a most striking, if belated,
example of the Werbe -system in practice. But the Thirty Years' War naturally
produced an unusual continuity of service in corps raised about 16201630,
and fifty years later the principle of the standing army was universally
accepted. It is thus that the senior regiments of the Prussian and Austrian
armies date from about 1630. At this time an event took place which was
destined to have a profound influence on the military art. Gustavus Adolphus of
Sweden landed in Germany with an army better organized, trained and equipped
than any which had preceded it. This army, by its great victory of Breitenfeld
(1631), inaugurated the era of modern warfare, and it is to the
system of Gustavus that the student must turn for the initial point of the
progressive development which has produced the armies of to- day. Spanish and
Dutch methods at once became as obsolete as those of the Landsknechts.
26. The Swedish Army
The Swedish army was raised by a carefully regulated system
of conscription, which was preached in every pulpit in Sweden.
There were indeed enlisted regiments of the usual type, and it would seem that
Gustavus obtained the best even of the soldiers of fortune. But the national
regiments were raised on the Indelta system. Each officer and man, under
this scheme, received a land grant within the territorial district of his
corps, and each of these districts supplied recruits in numbers proportionate
to its population. This curious mixture of feudal and modern methods produced
the best elements of an army, which, aided by the tactical and technical
improvements introduced by Gustavus, proved itself incomparably superior to its
rivals. Of course the long and bloody campaigns of 163034 led to the
admission of great numbers of mercenaries even into the Swedish corps; and
German, Scottish and other regiments figured largely, not only in the armies of
Duke Bernhard and his successors, but in the army of Gustavus' own lifetime. As
early as 1632 one brigade of the army was distinguished by the title
Swedish, as alone containing no foreigners. Yet the framework was
much the same as it had been in 1630. The battle-organization of two lines and
two wings, which was typical of the later linear tactics, began to
supplant the system of the tercios. How cumbrous the latter had become
by 1630 may be judged from any battle-plan of the period, and notably from that
of Lutzen. Gustavus' cavalry fought four or three deep only, and depended as
little as possible on the pistol. The work of riding down the pikes was indeed
rendered easier by the improved tactical handiness of the musketeers, but it
was fiery leading which alone compelled victory, for there were relatively few
Swedish horse and many squadrons of Germans and others, who in themselves were
far less likely to charge boldly than the Pappenheimers and other
crack corps of the enemy. The infantry was of the highest class, and only on
that condition could loose and supple lines be trusted to oppose the solid
tercios of Tilly and Wallenstein. Cumbrous indeed these were, but by
long practice they had acquired no small manoeuvring power, of which
Breitenfeld affords a striking example. The Swedes, however, completely
surpassed them. The progress thus made may be gauged from the fact that under
Gustavus the largest closed body of infantry was less than 300 strong. Briefly,
the genius of a great commander, the ardour of a born cavalry leader, better
arms and better organization, carried the Swedes to the end of their career of
victory, but how personal was the vis viva which inspired the army was
quickly noticeable after the death of Gustavus. Even a Bernhard could, in the
end, evoke no more heroism from a Swedish army than from any other, and the
real Swedish troops fought their last battle at Nordlingen (1634). After this,
little distinguished the Swedish forces from the general mass of
the armies of the time, save their system, to which, and to its influence on
the training of such leaders as Banér, Torstensson and Wrangel, all
their later victories were due. So much of Gustavus' work survived even the
carnage of Nordlingen, and his system always obtained better results, even with
the heterogeneous troops of this later period, than any other of the
time.