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The Author
Introduction to Reprinted Edition i
3. Logistical Planning 8
4. General Description of the Zone of Operations 11
5. Order of Battle of Army and Luftwaffe Units 15
6. Reasons for Changes in Organization and Equipment 18
7. Description of the More Important Battles 19
9. Terrain 42
10. Water 49
11. Heat 51
12. Cartographic Service 54
13. Camouflage 55
14. Evaluation of the Enemy Situation Through Aerial Photographs 55
15. Visibility at Night 56
16. Choice of Camp Sites 56
17. Selection of Battle Sites 56
18. Time of Day Selected for Combat 56
19. Influence of the Desert Climate on Daily Service Routine 56
20. Special Problems of the Technical Services 57
21. Influence of Light, Shade, and Sandstorms on Combat 57
22. Influence of Darkness on Radio Communications 57
23. Wind 58
24. Special Equipment and Procedures for Aircraft Crews 58
25. Dry Dock and Port Installations 59
26. Reinforcement of Sand Surfaces for Landings by Amphibious Craft 59
27. Changes in Ship Loading and Unloading Procedures 60
28. Materiel Loss and Replacement Estimates for Desert Warfare 60
29. Modifications in Supply Dump Procedures - especially for POL 60
30. Diseases and Insect in the Desert 60
31. Desert Weather Service 61
32. Special Equipment for Desert Warfare 62
33. Research and Development Possibilities for Special Desert Equipment 63
34. Unusual Supply Problems 63
35. Comparisons with Desert Warfare in Southern Russia 65
36. Troop Welfare in the Desert 65
Index 67
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a. Desert Terrain and Climate.
b. Scope of Evaluation.
c. Influence of Intelligence on Planning.
d. Availability and Evaluation of Terrain Intelligence.
e. Use of Historical Data for Planning Purposes.
The following changes proved necessary so far as equipment was concerned:
Long range artillery, long range antitank guns, and tank guns decisively
influence the course of battle in desert warfare, and it was therefore
necessary to employ more long range weapons. No alterations of the weapons
themselves were necessary.
In their 87.6 mm guns the British had a light artillery piece with a longer
range than that of the German, but the German forces in Africa soon received
100 and 170 mm guns, which had a longer range than any of the British guns. In
1941 the guns of the German Type III tanks had a longer range than the guns of
the British tanks, and this is the reason for the success of the German tanks
in that year, but from May 1942 on the British employed American tanks of the
Grant, Lee, and Sherman types, which mounted guns with a considerably superior
range of fire. In the Battle of Gazala these guns came as a disconcerting
surprise for the German tank units and in the first phase of the battle the
British were able to gain considerable successes.
Clothing and uniforms were entirely different from the clothing and uniforms
worn in Europe. The army uniform was made from a water-tight linen cut in a
style approximating the traditional uniforms of the former German colonial
defense forces. These uniforms proved unsuitable both in style and material.
The material was too stiff and did not give adequate protection against heat or
cold. In the early mornings the material absorbed moisture from the dew, so
that it became intolerable to wear the uniform. The British tropical uniforms,
in contrast, were made of pure wool and were excellent. Large quantities of the
British uniforms were captured and worn by the troops of the German Africa
Corps with the German insignia and proved excellent. This was true particularly
of the trousers. The tropical uniform of the German air force was also good.
Apart from the fact that the color, a yellowish-brown, was more appropriate,
they were made from a material which was of a lighter and better quality and
were cut in a more appropriate style. Olive drab color proved unfavorable. In
view of the normal camouflage difficulties in the desert, a yellowish-brown,
which would have been a protective color, would have been best. High boots were
unsuitable in every respect since in hot climates everything must be done to
prevent soldiers wearing any apparel on the legs, which restricts the
circulation of the blood. In this matter, the troops helped themselves by
wearing only slacks, most of which came from captured British depots and which
the troops wore over their boots. The German lace shoe with a cloth tongue
proved suitable. The shorts issued to the troops could not be work during
combat since they left the bare legs exposed to injury by thorn and stones, and
these injuries healed very slowly. The olive drab caps with side visors were
excellent, the visor, in particular, was indispensable for the infantryman and
for the gunner as protection against the intense glare of the sun. The tropical
helmets that were issued could be used only in the rear areas and were entirely
useless in combat. The German troops wore no steel helmets in contract to the
British troops, whose steel helmets ere more appropriate both in shape and
weight, being lighter than the German helmets. The tropical coats issued, which
were made from a thick woolen material, were good, but the English, which were
fur-lined and reached only to the knees, were better. Owing to the stiff
material from which it was made, the German tropical shirts were inferior to
the British, which was made of so-called "tropic" material. To
protect the abdominal area of the body against colds, the wearing of belly
bands was obligatory, which proved a wise measure. Tropical helmets and
mosquito nets proved an unnecessary expenditure. The majority of the troops got
rid of them immediately after debarking from the ships, since they were not
able to take them along owing to insufficient transportation space.
The troops were also furnished wall tents, which had a special sun apron. An
illustration of this type of tent, which proved admirable suitable, will be
found as item 54 in appendix 2. With the exception of footwear, no leather was
used in any article of apparel; it was replaced everywhere by thick linen.
The types of vehicles used were the same as those used in Europe. Vehicles with
Diesel engines were not used in order to avoid the necessity of transporting
two different types of fuel. However, experience showed hat it would have been
advisable to accept this disadvantage in order to facilitate transportation,
since fuel oil could have been transported in bulk containers, such as tank
trailers. The excellent coastal road would have allowed the use of such
transportation.
Volkswagens were used in great numbers and proved excellent. for use under
desert conditions the following alterations ere made to adapt the standard
model: Air intakes were placed inside the vehicles to reduce the amount of duct
in the air taken in by the motor. In place of the standard tires, aircraft
oversized tires were used, which proved exceptionally good on rocky terrain and
in sandy stretches. On rocky ground they reduced jolting because of their low
air pressure while on sandy tracks the wide treads of the tires prevented the
vehicles from sinking into the sand and getting stuck. On the whole, however,
the British motor vehicles, as a result of the extensive experience of the
British in desert conditions, were superior to the German, being better adapted
to the special conditions in respect to tires, power, higher ground clearance,
and lower bodies. Double tires proved unsuitable, particularly in areas where
the surface was covered with stones, as the stones became compressed in large
quantities in the space between the two tires. In the desert, motor vehicles
must always carry something or other, such as rope ladders or grids, to place
underneath the wheels if they get stuck in the sand.
To reduce the effect of sand and heat, additional air filters for all types of
vehicles were developed and used. They proved very valuable although it was not
possible to eliminate the effects of sand on the motors altogether.
Troops employed under desert conditions should be furnished a certain number of
aircraft compasses, which should be mounted on the windscreen next to the
driver's seat. By means of a small magnet, deviation were excluded, so that the
driver was able to drive in the direction ordered. The sun compasses, which
were developed for the same purpose, did not meet requirements, since they were
too complicated and failed to function properly around midday, between 1000 and
1400 hours. Pocket compasses were indispensable and had to be issued to each
man individually, since the individual soldier plays a greater role in the
desert than in any other theater of operations. This compass used by the
British, in which the dial floated on oil, was better than the German and was
preferred by the German troops when they managed to capture any.
The Germans failed to develop anything special as a protection against flies
and other insects, which became particularly pestiferous in summer.
Insecticides similar to FLIT were an urgent requirement for the combat units.
c. Special Training.
It was not possible to give the troops, which were rushed to Africa suddenly and at short notice, any specialized training. All that was done was to have them attend a number of lectures by specialists in tropical medicine and by officers who had a vague knowledge of conditions from traveling. However, those lectures gave the troops wrong impressions of what they were to expect from the effects of heat, sand, insects, and diseases instead of orienting them properly. The instructions on hygiene in the tropics, on the other hand, were good. Even units that were transferred to Africa during the further course of the campaign there received no real specialized training owing to the fact that the orders for their transfer usually came so unexpectedly that there was no time for this purpose. However, in a suggestion submitted to he Army High Command by the army in Africa, the following training subjects were considered important:
(1) Exercises of all types in marching and combat in open, sandy terrain;
(2) Cover and camouflage in open terrain;
(3) Aiming and firing of all weapons in open terrain and at extremely long
ranges;
(4) Recognition and designation of targets without instruments. The aiming and
firing exercises were to be carried out by daylight, at night, in the glaring
sun, during twilight, facing the sun, with the back to the sun, with the sun
shining from one side, by moonlight and with artificial lighting;
(5) Exercises during extreme heat;
(6) Exercises of long duration with no billeting accommodations;
(7) The construction of shelters in sandy terrain;
(8) Practice in night driving and in driving over sandy terrain;
(9) Night marching in level terrain;
(10) Orientation by compass, by the stars, and so forth;
(11) Driving by march compass;
(12) Recovery of tanks and other vehicles in sandy terrain;
(13) Laying and removing mines in sandy terrain;
(14) Exercises in mobile warfare;
If it had been possible to train the troops in these subjects and to prepare them thoroughly, considerable losses could probably have been averted.
d. Acclimatization of the Troops.
So far as the first divisions transferred to Africa were concerned, no measures were taken to accustom the troops to excessive heat. Some of the replacements sent forward later had the opportunity of spending a certain period in south Italy or in the Balkans for acclimatization. The climate in these two regions is very similar to the climate in the coastal areas of North Africa. In the light of experience, however, a familiarization period is not considered absolutely essential, since the troops employed without a prior period of acclimatization proved no less efficient in combat than those who had lived for a time in southern Italy or in the Balkans. It was not the climate alone that caused the heavy losses that were suffered, but the poor food, and the hardships during combat combined with the effects of the climate; the troops had in no way been prepared for these circumstances.
It proved very unwise to transfer units or replacements to the desert in summer, during the hottest part of the year and the time when the flies proved most troublesome. A parachute brigade provides a typical example. The brigade was transferred from Europe in July 1942, the hottest time of the year, and employed in defense in the rocky wilderness around El Alamein. The unit consisted of handpicked men and within a very short while more than 50 percent of them were sick from the combined effects of the heat, with its accompanying discomforts, jaundice, and festering sores which healed only very slowly. The causes were the brackish drinking water, which contained as much as one gram of salt per liter, and the inadequate diet, which consisted almost exclusively of canned foods. Blond and red-haired men with blue eyes and fair skins were particularly susceptible, while the brown and dark haired types soon recovered from the disorders which were almost inevitable in the beginning.
These points were not taken into account in the medical examinations, the main emphasis being placed on sound teeth and a strong heart. The result was that the elite units, such as the paratroopers, suffered particularly heavy losses. Even prior acclimatization would not have protected them.
The following experience was gained in respect to the acclimatization of persons to hot climates: Men who had lived before in temperate zones stood the intense heat very well in the first year, during which they were far more efficient than the indigenous population and Europeans who had been living in the country for a ling time. This proved to be the case when German troops were employed in Sicily, for instance, where summer temperatures are the same as those in the deserts of Africa. In the average case, the powers of resistance of the new arrival decline after the first year and his efficiency sinks below the level of that of the persons who have spent a linger time in the country. His efficiency only starts to improve gradually after a few years but never reaches the same standard as that of the first year. The following inferences can be drawn from this experience:
(1) No prior lengthy acclimatization should take place, since this would waste part of the first year of maximum efficiency.
(2) Only a brief transitional period should be allowed in a hot climate, during which the troops can be instructed in the manner of living under tropical and desert conditions and the best protective measures they should take without the added difficulty of enemy actions.
(3) After approximately one year on active service in a hot climate, the troops should be rotated to some other theater of operations. The disadvantage that they experience gained by the men can only be exploited for a relatively short time must be accepted.
e. Development of Special Equipment.
The following special types of equipment were developed:
(1) Special tropical clothing and uniforms, as dealt with in detail in Section 2,b.
(2) Special air filters for motor vehicles, including tanks. This subject has also been discussed in Section 2,b.
(3) Special medical equipment for use in tropical climates, which subject is dealt with in Annex 5.
Logistical planning is an integral part of operational planning. (Section 2,a) In this operation, plans for the supply services also had to be prepared at top speed. The main concern in these plans was to provide for the transportation of the supplies for the German troops by rail to Italian ports and by German or Italian ships from there to ports in North Africa. The selection of transportation media and supervision of the loading was the responsibility of a special branch, the Branch for Transportation to Africa. It operated under the command of the German General attached to Italian Headquarters, hitherto the German military attache in Rome. Unloading in African ports and further transportation to the troops was the responsibility of the Supply and Administration Officer of the Africa Corps, later of the Chief Supply and Administration Officer of the Panzergruppe(1) Afrika, which later again was redesignated the Panzer Army of Africa and finally the German-Italian Panzer Army.
Initially all bulk commodities, as well as all troops, were transported by sea, but when shipping losses mounted, personnel were transported by plane.
In November 1941, Field Marshal Kesselring arrived in Italy as Commander of the Second Air Force. In coordinated action with the Italian navy and air force, his mission was to protect German and to prevent British transportation in the Mediterranean. It is said that shortly after his arrival, he sighed: "Now it is clear to me that in conducting a war across the sea, the proper delivery of the means of combat at their proper place is of far more importance than any worries as to whether the enemy should be attacked on the right or left flank!"
In was not possible with the mans available to the supply command or with any improvised measures to secure adequate supply services for the armored forces in Africa. To keep open the supply lanes or to open these lanes was the responsibility of the operational command, which rested with the Italian Supreme Command. The Wehrmacht High Command had supported the Italian Supreme Command but had also occasionally interfered in the conduct of operations. It was imperative that this problem be solved if an adequate supply service was to be secured for the troops in Africa. As no solution was found, the supply service collapsed as a natural consequence after all improvised means had failed. The following dates and information concerning the functioning of the supply services has been furnished by the German General attacked to the Italian Supreme Command during the period from February 1941 to May 1943:
a. February to May 1941
The transportation of troops and supplies across the Mediterranean functioned without interruption. The convoys reached Tripoli regularly and almost without losses. Immediately after its capture, Benghasi was used as a prot of debarkation. At the request of the German command, Italian submarines were used as early as April 1941 to transport fuel for the most advanced elements of the Africa Corps. They discharged their cargo at Derna. Coastal shipping along the African coast was organized with small ships and sailing boats with auxiliary motors.
b. June to December 1941
British surface and submarine craft interfered with the transportation of German troops and supplies. The losses in shipping space and in materiel were considerable. To relieve the situation, air transportation groups were employed to move troops and materiel, while naval barges transported tanks and important spare parts. The use of Bardia as a prot of debarkation close to the front was prevented by the British air force. in December, Italian battleships had to be used to protect the convoys.
c. January to June 1942
During this period transportation was favored by German superiority in the air, which was gained by the German Second Air Force under Kesselring, and also by the fact that Malta was held down. The transportation of troops and supplies functioned smoothly and with very few losses. Enough supplies were moved forward to enable the German-Italian Army to launch an offensive with limited objectives, which advanced as far as the borders of Egypt in May-June. In addition, adequate supplies were stockpiled for a period of six to eight weeks against the eventuality of the air forces and naval vessels being employed in an operation to capture Malta.
d. July 1942 to May 1943
As a result of Rommel's advance into Egyptian territory after the capture of Tobruk (this advance was contrary to the plans of the Italian Supreme Command) the supplies deposited in the Benghasi and Tripoli areas for the front were practically useless since the distances ere too great for transportation on land and coastal shipping was prevented by the British. The Second Air Force was compelled to transfer some of its units stationed in Sicily and southern Italy to Africa and Greece in order to support the Panzer Army, which was fighting desperately at El Alamein. As a result, the Luftwaffe was so heavily engaged that it was unable even to screen Malta. The British forces on Malta regained their strength and employed new types of bombers equipped with radar and having a wider radius of action. They succeeded in bringing German convoy traffic to an almost complete standstill. The Italian battleships were in port at Tarento and La Spezia, unable to operate because of lack of fuel. Losses in materiel and fuel were so heavy that it was barely possible to obtain adequate supplies from Germany. The sea routes to Tripoli and Benghasi were completely severed. Air transportation from Crete now played the major role but quite naturally the volume was far too small to meet even the most urgent demands of the front. In addition, the Wehrmacht High Command moved an infantry division from Crete to Egypt. This division had no motorized vehicles whatever, so that it became an added strain on the transportation and supply services in Africa.
After the occupation of Tunis the distances across the sea were admittedly shorter. Nevertheless, in spite of the use of the military transport ships which had been constructed meanwhile and numerous ships of the smallest types, it was not possible to relieve the strained supply situation. Anglo-American power in the air was growing steadily and transportation capacities were sinking from day to day. Even a temporary increase of the quantities transported by air to 1000 tons failed to bring any relief. Once the German-Italian forces in Tunis were enveloped, the Anglo-American fighter planes had such complete mastery in the air, even over the Straits of Sicily, that it was hardly possible for even the smallest ships to reach Africa safely. Around 20 April, the German-Italian air transportation units ere subjected to a crippling attack.
Thus, the point must be brought out that, as a result of the gradually developing anglo- American supremacy at sea and in the air in the Mediterranean, North Africa was cut off from Europe. The German-Italian forces operating in Africa therefore could not be adequately reinforced or supplied. This lack of any possibility of maintaining supply traffic was not due to any failure on the part of the German or Italian headquarters responsible for the movement of supplies, but solely to the fact that the German-Italian operational command did not succeed in keeping the supply routes to Africa open. Any examination of the question why these routes were not kept open or could not be kept open, is beyond the scope of this study.
Plans for supplying the troops in the desert had provided for adequate supply transportation space and also an additional water supply service. Each division had the same transportation space, the same motor vehicle and weapons maintenance units, the administrative, medical, and military police units as a division in Europe, plus a water distilling company. The corps supply services included an additional, special water supply company, filter and distilling units and geological teams, details of which can be found in Annex 3.
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The zone of operations in the North African Campaign in Libya and Egypt consisted of a strip of land, sometimes as much as sixty kilometers wide, bounded on one side by the coast and on the other by the desert interior.
The ground surface was either firm gravel, sand-covered gravel, rocky, or mixed sand and gravel. Within this entire zone, large parts of which were level plain, the desert could be traversed by all types of vehicles. The only exceptions were patches of deep sand, and steep wadis, which could not always be ascertained from the map, and salty swamps, such as those at Marada, roughly forty kilometers south of Marsa el Brega. Natural defiles were formed by the serpentines of Derna and the Halfaya Pass at the border between Libya and Egypt. It was possible to create defiles by the use of mines.
Undulating, steppe-like terrain predominated. It consisted of low mounds and long ridges, whose average height above the surrounding terrain was from four to twenty meters. At times they had gentle slopes and at times they rose steeply from broad, level valleys in which there were not watercourses. The summits were naked rock covered with loose rocks of varying size which made motor traffic difficult but not impossible. In the valleys the rocky bottom was covered by a layer of dust or clay of varying thickness. In dry weather this ground could be traversed without difficulty by vehicles with four-wheel drive and capable of cross-country travel, but not without raising dense clouds of dust. The steppe-like terrain had patches of camel's thorn shrubs, around which the dust had blown to form small dunes. Traffic followed the broad paths, called Trighs or Pistes, which connected the few settlements and water holes. This terrain extended from the coast to a line roughly thirty or forty kilometers inland. The coast itself was fringed by a belt of dunes behind which was a zone of salt swamps. called Sebchen, which were usually dry. This coastal zone was frequently used as a bivouac area for troops, since it offered good opportunities for digging in tents and vehicles and had good water supply facilities. The only parts of the coast at which there were not dunes were the cliff sections at Tobruk, Bardia, and Sollum. There, the coastal sector was often intersected by deep wadis and was difficult to penetrate.
Towards the interior, the steppe-like zone gradually merged with the desert proper, which is practically devoid of any type of vegetation. On the whole, motoring was easier in the desert proper than in the steppe-like zone, although movement was rendered difficult in parts by very rugged areas. Instead of the rocky surface, patches with a deep covering of sand are encountered, which make rapid travel possible. Here, the valley floors were clay pans, as flat as table tops, which were submerged in water during the rainy periods. It is only at the foot of steep cliffs that a rocky bottom was found or a soft sandy bottom, into which the vehicles easily sank. This soft sand also covered the beds of the numerous wadis, by which the steep faces of the ridges are broken, so that it was often extremely difficult to surmount the obstacles presented, even by comparatively low steep ridges.
Farther south these patches of soft sand increased in size and seriously impeded operations by armored units. The dividing line between those parts of the desert in which mobility was good and those in which it was bad is in eastern Libya and western Egypt; between the 29th and 30th degree latitude. South of the 29th degree latitude the vast dune-covered expanses began, and to cross it was considered quite a sporting feat.
We can thus see that the area suitable for military operations was confined to the relatively narrow strip along the coast and the southern, desert, zone which was more favorable for rapid movement on the whole than the northern, steppe-like zone, if the tarred coastal road is left out of consideration.
Within the zone described, the following types of terrain obstacles were to be found:
a. Mountain ranges.
Three mountain ranges played an important part on the war in Africa, namely;
(1) The Cyrenaica Mountains At points these mountains reached a height of 875 meters above sea level; they intercepted the moisture carried inland by the north wind. The heavier rainfall here is the reason why, in this area, the chalky ground carried a growth of macchia in contrast to the desert or steppe-like areas. These mountains rose in tow high, steep terraces, which could be traversed at only a few points and were intersected by numerous deep valleys which made it impossible to conduct sizeable operations except along roads. South of the topmost ridges, the mountains sloped down gradually to the desert terrain which was good for vehicular traffic. For this reason the Cyrenaica region was vulnerable to attack from the south, a fact which Rommel recognized at once during his attack in the spring of 1941. For this reason he delivered his main attack against Mechili, a desert fort designed to protect the southern approaches to the Cyrenaica. The fact that it was so easy to bypass is the reason why the Cyrenaica was never held with any degree of determination by either side during the entire campaign, although it could be called a natural fortress. During every retreat, every effort was made to pass through this region as rapidly as possible in order to avoid being intercepted.
(2) The Gebel Mefusa Mountains protruded like a barrier between the coastal plains of Tripoli and those of Misurate. South of Tripoli they rose to a height of 700 meters above sea level, the first 300 meters of which were a gigantic cliff. In the southeast they descended in a gradual slope. In the northeast, towards the sea, the height was less than 200 meters above sea level at Homs. In the central parts, this mountain range was extremely rugged and motorized troops could only pass along the roads. The southeast slope was covered with a deep layer of wind-blown sandy loess, which made vehicular traffic difficult. From the north, this mountain range formed an impregnable fortress. From the southeast, it was vulnerable to attack in spite of the mountainous and intersected nature of its approaches, since the attacking forces could find favorable assembly areas in the foothills and could approach under cover to the proximity of the defense positions. Possibilities for by-passing existed and were taken advantage of by the British in the attack in January 1943.
(3) The Matmata Mountains, a range in south Tunisia, had a steep drop of 100 to 200 meters in the east. In the west they sloped down gradually to a high plateau, which was sandy in parts, while in others the ground was good for motor traffic, so that it could be crossed by motorized columns in spite of occasional difficulties. The steep cliff-like wall in the east and north was interrupted by numerous wadis, through some of which an ascent to the high plateau was possible.
The Matmata Mountains narrowed down the coastal plains of southern Tunisia considerably, so that it was possible to organize a defense line at the narrowest point, at Mareth. However, the steep mountainside was only a weak protection against flanking attacks, since it could be by-passed with little difficulty. Only if the German-Italian forces had been numerous enough to hold all passes and if they had had a mobile reserve available to repulse any enemy attempts at detouring the mountains, would this range have constituted an important factor in the defense.
b. Steep terraces.
Most of the steep terraces in the steppe-like terrain were not high and followed a course parallel with the coast so that they hardly interfered with troops movements. In the numerous caves, overhanging cliffs and gorges, good opportunities could be found for troops shelters, for which purpose they were frequently used, since they were the most effective protection against air attack that was to be found. Some of the steep terraces, and other similar terrain features, however, became of outstanding importance, namely,
(1) The northern rim of the Quattara Depression, on which the southern flank of the El Alamein line was based. This rim towered about 300 meters above the floor of the depression, which was 80 meters below sea level. Within the sectors held by the German-Italian forces there were only three points at which motor traffic was possible, and even there difficulties were encountered because of the deep sand. Throughout the entire campaign no better protection for a flank was ever found than in the El Alamein line.
(2) The steep terrace at Sollum, between the Bardia-Capuzzo high plateau and the Sollum coastal plain. There were two roads, with numerous serpentines, across the terrace, one from the Via Balbia - the tarred coastal road, the other from the Halfaya Pass road. During the period of positional warfare in the summer of 1941, the terraced was within the combat area.
(3) Large-sized wadis. These were found in the Cyrenaica region and in the eastern approaches to the Tripolitanian Gebel mountain and extended as far as the Bay of Sirte. Usually the bed of a wadi consisted of a layer of soft sand. Less frequently the beds were salty swamps with a growth of camel's thorn. The banks were usually steep but not continuous, since they were cut by numerous cross-wadis. On the whole they could be considered as terrain obstacles, but as obstacles that could be overcome without difficulty unless obstinately defended.
During the German-Italian retreat from El Alamein to Tunis, only one defense position was based on a wadi, namely the Buerat Line, which extended along the Zem-Zem wadi south of the Via Balbia. However, after careful deliberation, the line was developed east of the wadi in order to prevent an approach by the enemy under cover and not on the low-lying west bank, since the west bank was dominated by the higher opposite bank.
The Buerat line could be by-passed easily. It was therefore evacuated by the infantry before the attack began and held only for a short while in a delaying action by mobile units.
(4) Dune terrain. Large sandy areas were found close to the coast, near larger wadis, and in the desert proper, where the ergs(2) present barriers that sere impenetrable for traffic.
Big dunes along the coast, which interfered with traffic, were found around Agedabia, on the shores of the Bay of Sirte, south of Misurata, and in the neighborhood of Tripoli, thus mostly in western Libya. They impeded traffic seriously off the roads and even the roads were affected, since the dunes shifted constantly. After severe storms the roads became so deeply covered with sand that they had to be cleared. For this reason, a constant road maintenance service was necessary where the roads crossed dune areas.
A large area of dunes was also found north of the El Fareh wadi, between El Agheila and Marada along the shores of the Bay of Sirte. It protected the German Marsa el Brega position against flanking attacks and forced the British to make a wide detour through the region south of the El Fareh wadi, where vehicular traffic was possible.
The big dunes of the desert proper were all south of the zone of operations and only a section of them along the border between Libya and Egypt played a role of some tactical importance, since they afforded protection for the south flank of the German Alamein positions. The dunes in the desert proper were not crescent shaped like the dunes along the coast, but formed continuous ridges anywhere between forty and fifty meters high, which extend usually from north to south. A number of these ridges could be so driven by the wind to form a labyrinthine confusion of dune ridges with completely encircled hollows in which the firm ground could be seen. This enormous ocean of dunes formed what might be called a collection of honeycomb dunes. In order to cross them in was necessary to have the very best cross-country vehicles available and to drive at top speed at the first dune, break through its crest and on driving down the opposite slope, to gather speed for the next dune. While driving, the vehicle was enveloped in a dense cloud of dust, which reduced visibility to practically nil. In this way one to two kilometers might possibly be covered per day. Serious losses in personnel and materiel were unavoidable.
The Great Eastern Erg, a similar large dune area, extended from south Tunisia to south Algeria close to the western border of Libya. If adequate German manpower had been available to extend the Mareth position across the Matmata Mountains and Fort Le Boeuf to this dune area, the flank would have been as well protected as was the case in the Alamein line.
(5) Salt swamps. These swamps developed at those points where the water in the subsoil of the desert rose to the surface. owing to the constant evaporation which takes place, the salts carried by the water were deposited and the resultant brine formed either a lake or, when mixed with sand and clay, a patch of thick tough mud on which salt marsh vegetation could take root. Once a person was caught in a salt swamp it was impossible for him to escape without help. Photos in Annex 2 show how vehicles which were sunk in salt marshes could be recovered. However, this method was successful only in terrain which was not too swampy. In really soft swampy ground the vehicle had to be pulled out by another vehicle, which was often extremely difficult and could only be done if the latter was on firm ground and had a very strong engine. Most of the salt marshes were crossed by fords, which were known to the natives. Many of the fords could carry vehicular traffic, so that any salt marshes within a defensive position should always be kept under observation and all fords crossing it must be carefully reconnoitered with the aid of native guides. Frequently, the salt marshes dried out completely and then presented no obstacle at all.
The biggest salt marsh in the Libyan and Egyptian desert was the Quattara Depression, the surface of which was 80 meters below sea level. This depression and its northern rim protected the flank of the El Alamein line. The swamp itself was skirted by a zone of soft sand varying between one and two kilometers in width, on which a few vehicles could travel with some difficulty. All other ground outside of the actual swamp but within the Quattara Depression was also soft and difficult to cross with vehicles. The salt marsh which was within the German zone of operations in the Marsa el Brega line was considerably smaller. Nevertheless, in conjunction with the sandy patches and dune areas, it provided good protection against frontal attack in spite of the fact that it had numerous fords. The salt marshes of southern Tunisia, called Schotts, were of more importance. The Dscherid Schott was a feature which led to the decision to construct the Gabes line, which served as a rear line for the Mareth line. In most parts, the Dscherid Schott was considered an impassible obstacle but its eastern part, the so-called El Fedjad Schott, had numerous good fords which could be crossed without difficulty by vehicles.
Both Benghasi and Tripoli had good ports with very ample capacities for shipping and landing, for which reason the former was used as the main supply base. The capacities in the ports of Derna and Bardia, as well as the naval port of Tobruk, had much smaller capacities.
There was no continuous railroad in Libya. The two railroads, each about thirty kilometers in length, in Tripolitania and in the Cyrenaica were of no importance from the military point of view.
The only permanent signal communications system consisted of an open-wire telephone line, on poles, from Tripoli to Bardia. The distances were extremely great and the line made only limited communications traffic possible. Furthermore, it was frequently interrupted by the frequent air attacks against the Via Balbia.
The water supply facilities along the Via Balbia were adequate. The water holes in the desert, usually with a small supply of brackish water, were generally known only to the natives and were not indicated on maps.
During the main part of the year the air was very hot but dry, the hottest months being June, July, and August. The highest temperatures registered around midday were about 140· Fahrenheit. At night, even in summer, temperatures dropped to about 5· Fahrenheit. In winter, from November to January, the nights were quite cold, temperatures dropping to around 5· and rising again during the daytime to about 85· Fahrenheit. Rain fell only in winter, but was then sometimes very heavy, starting suddenly and swamping extensive areas, sometimes stopping all traffic, even on roads, for protracted periods. The only other moisture was the very heavy dew at daybreak and in the evenings.
The outstanding weather feature was the sandstorms, which are called Ghiblis. These sandstorms recurred pretty regularly every four weeks in all seasons of the year. They usually lasted three days and since they reduced visibility to nothing they brought all operations by ground and air forces to a standstill. During these sandstorms the range of vision was often reduced to less than three meters, so that orientation was impossible.
Owing to the wind from the sea, the climate in the coastal regions is almost always healthy. In spite of the enormous number of flies, there were few cases of malaria. On the other hand, the troops proved extremely susceptible to jaundice and dysentery.
Army:
The first units to be transferred to Africa between February and May 1941 were the corps headquarters of the Africa Corps and headquarters units (the corps signal battalion and several supply units) together with the 5th Light Division, which was later reorganized to form the 21st Panzer Division, and the 15th Panzer Division.
During the summer months a number of so-called oasis companies, a few battalions and some coastal batteries were moved in, with an Africa Division Headquarters which was to control them. In the autumn of 1941 these units were consolidated to form a division, later designated the 90th Light Africa Division.
Thus, the German combat troops in Africa at the end of 1941 consisted of two armored and one light division. The two armored divisions remained under the command of the German Africa Corps. In the summer of 1941 this corps and the other army units in Africa were placed under the command of the newly created Panzergruppe Afrika. On 21 January 1942 this headquarters was redesignated Headquarters of the Panzer Army of Africa, which designation was changed again in the autumn of 1942 to Headquarters of the German-Italian Panzer Army.
In the summer of 1942 the 164th Light Africa Division and the Parachute Instruction Brigade were transferred to Africa. As they were transported by plane, and since the sea transportation capacities were steadily sinking, these units never received their vehicles, so that they remained non- mobile to a great extent, a fact which was to have a very adverse effect on the withdrawal from El Alamein.
In 1942 about eighteen batteries which were not included in any of the divisions and consisted of Army headquarters batteries, coastal batteries, and new batteries of captured guns, were consolidated as Army Headquarters Artillery. This artillery was organized in two regiments and was placed under the command of the Commander of Artillery in Africa. In addition the reconnaissance battalions of the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions and the 580th Reconnaissance Battalion ( a GHQ unit) were consolidated to form a reconnaissance brigade under the immediate control of the army headquarters. The army also had the 900th Engineer Battalion, formerly a GHQ unit, available as a headquarters unit.
At the end of 1942 the ground forces employed in combat therefore consisted of the following:
The above list does not include the numerous units available to the army for logistical support.
The divisions were organized as follows:
a. Armored divisions:
Total strength of each panzer division: 12,000.
b. Light division:
Total strength of the light division: 12,000.
c. Parachute Instruction Brigade:
Total strength of the Parachute Instruction Brigade: 5,000.
In addition to the above the following units were landed in Tunis and employed in combat from November 1942 to the end of the campaign:
Thus, the ground forces employed in combat in the African theater of operations were equivalent to:
Air forces:
The fact must be stressed at the outset, that the air force units stationed in Africa were kept at a low level of strength in order to avoid further complicating the already difficult supply situation.
Additional air support was given by air force units stationed at Italian or Greek air bases which were transferred occasionally for temporary periods to Africa.
We must differentiate between three phases in respect to the organization and composition of air force units stationed in Africa, namely:
Phase a:
Command: Air Force Commander in Africa. The commander was subordinate to the X Air Corps (stationed in Athens and later on Crete) and was in tactical support of the Africa Corps (later the Panzer Army of Africa).
Flying forces in Africa:
Antiaircraft artillery:
· 1 regiment of four battalions, tactically assigned to the Africa Corps (later Panzergruppe Afrika).
Air Signal troops:
· 1 air signal battalion;
Logistical support troops:
· 1 team detailed by the Luftwaffe General in Italy.
Phase b:
Command: Air Force Commander in Africa. The commander was subordinate to the 2nd Air Force and was assigned tactical support of the Panzergruppe Afrika (later Panzer Army in Africa).
Flying forces in Africa:
· same as in Phase a;
Antiaircraft artillery:
· Organized in the summer of 1942 to form the 19th Flak Division and tactically assigned to the Panzer Army;
Air Signal troops:
· same as in Phase a:
Logistical support troops:
· From 1942 on the Air force Administrative Command, Africa, controlled by the Luftwaffe General in Italy.
Phase c:
Command: Air Corps Africa, with Air Commanders 1 and 2.
Flying forces in Africa:
Antiaircraft artillery:
Air signal troops:
· 1 reinforced air signal battalion;
Logistical support troops:
· Air Force Administration Headquarters Tunis with three air base areas.
The order of battle in Annex 3 shows the status as of January 1942, but does not reveal the number and types of weapons available. The organization and the main items of armament were the same as in Europe with the exception of the additional supply units assigned for service in the desert, namely the water supply service units, the meteorological survey teams, and so forth. It must be emphasized in respect to the tables of organization that the units at no time had the stated authorized strengths. The actual strengths were constantly subject to fluctuations according to the losses suffered and the replacements received.
Thus, the combat efficiency, which also depended on the shipment of replacements in personnel and materiel, also fluctuated.
Initially, the German units were transferred to Africa with their normal tables of organization and equipment. Changes which were effected immediately in respect to equipment were as follows:
a. All vehicles were immediately fitted with new special dust-filters.
b. Special units, namely, water supply companies, water transportation columns and geological teams, were organized immediately to take care of water supply and transportation problems. However, owing to the steadily increasing transportation difficulties, large parts of these units remained in Italy until the campaign was over.
c. All vehicles were camouflaged by a coat of desert-colored paint.
d. Uniforms and other clothing. The troops were issued tropical shirts; khaki-colored linen jackets, breeches, and shorts; lace boots and lace shoes, both cotton-lined; linen caps with visors; tropical helmets; belly bands; woolen overcoats.
In 1941 the following additional changes became necessary:
a. The antitank battalions arrived in Africa with 37mm antitank guns. In the summer of 1941, these were exchanged for 50mm guns, which were exchanged again in early 1942 for captured Russian 76.2mm antitank guns. This was necessary because of the increased effectiveness of weapons used on both sides.
b. From early 1942 on, all infantry units were also assigned antitank guns, since tank warfare is the deciding factor in desert warfare, where the antitank gun becomes of even greater importance to the infantry than the machine gun. The aim of furnishing each battalion eighteen 76.2mm antitank guns was never achieved.
c. Types I and II tanks, some of which were armed with machine guns and some with 20mm guns were withdrawn after the summer of 1941 and replaced by Type III tanks, which had 50,, guns. These again were replaced after the winder of 1941-42 by Type IV tanks, which had 75mm guns.
d. The replacement of all motorcycles by Volkswagens. Even the half-track motorcycles that were used for a while proved unsatisfactory.
a. 31 March to 19 April 1941: The first counter-attack to reconquer the Cyrenaica.
Contrary to the views of General Garibaldi, Commander in Chief of the Italian forces in Africa, Rommel, who had arrived in the theater of operations on 11 February 1941 as commander of the German Africa Corps, was of the opinion that waiting would worsen the situation. The British forces were still in a long drawn out column and were momentarily in a precarious condition, which fact had to be exploited immediately. Rommel was able to substantiate his opinions by reconnaissance and, therefore, his views prevailed. Immediately after the 5th Light Division commenced landing at Tripoli on 11 February 1941 and moving up to the front, Rommel commenced a series of reconnaissance thrusts west of Agheila on 24 march, which he followed up on 31 March by an attack with limited objectives in the direction of Agedabia. The sole object of this attack was to drive back the British troops in the advanced positions of Agedabia. Since these British troops retreated immediately, Agedabia itself was attacked and taken on 1 April, the enemy withdrawing toward Benghasi. The attack toward Benghasi, which then followed, was also successful and on 4 April that city and the port were taken by German forces.
In view of the obvious weakness of the enemy, who had been taken by surprise by the German attack, it seemed advisable to continue the advance. Rommel decided not to continue the pursuit through the Cyrenaica, but to launch an enveloping attack through the desert, in order, if possible, to prevent the retreat of considerable enemy forces. For this reason he pushed forward the bulk of the 5th Light Division south of Benghasi straight through the desert towards Mechili and Derna, with weaker forces moving by way of Msus in a flanking drive. This move also succeeded and on 6 April more than 2000 prisoners were taken at Mechili, Derna being captured on the same day.
On 9 April the pursuing columns reached the Libya-Egyptian border at Bardia, so that all territory lost in Libya had been recovered. Only the Tobruk fortress remained in British hands. It was enveloped with weak forces by 11 April. Two attempts to take it in raids on 13 and 14 April and a third attempt in a properly prepared attack on 30 April failed. The forces available were inadequate for this task.
Rommel now had to decide whether to break off the siege of Tobruk and to withdraw to the elevated terrain of Ain el Gazala or to maintain the siege with the disadvantage that he would have to establish a second front in a line level with Sidi Omar-Sollum-Bardia. He decided on the second solution. Chiefly Italian troops, namely, the X and XXI Corps, with a total of four infantry divisions, which were to be increased to five at a later stage, were to maintain the siege of Tobruk. The Sidi- Omar-Sollum front was held only in strong points in order to release the bulk of the German forces for mobile employment in the open field.
Summary
(1) The units which took part in the actual offensive operations were as follows:
(2) The important factors that brought about this speedy and thorough success were the following:
(a) The momentary weakness of the British forces, whose supply transportation had not yet been able to catch up fully with the rapid advance;
(b) German supremacy in the air;
(c) The direct attack through the desert, which the enemy had not expected.
(3) A special feature of these operations was the advance through the desert from south of Benghasi toward Mechili and Derna, which advance was ordered by Rommel in spite of the serious misgivings of most of the commanders serving under him. The actions brought out the necessity of having the commanders of mobile units far ahead in the unit column in desert warfare and of employing all means, including liaison planes, to maintain contact within the pursuing force. There is no other possible way of remaining close on the heels of the retreating enemy.
(4) Logistical requirements were not given the proper consideration. This is the reason why some of the units failed in the desert. But, on the other hand, Rommel could not afford to wait for the arrival of further fuel transports, as he would then have lost contact with the enemy.
(5) Here, for the first time, the units had to cross a long stretch of desert, some of them 300 kilometers and more, and while doing so had to gather the experience they lacked. This experience included recognition of the necessity to carry along ample supplies of fuel and water and the difficulties of orientation. In the desert it is hardly possible to establish one's position by the sun, since the sun is usually almost directly overhead. The available maps, which were reprints of Italian maps, were inadequate. Practically no reference points existed, so that all orientation had to be done by compass. Furthermore, the eyes of the troops had to become accustomed to the glare of the sun, which made contours unclear, so that it was extremely difficult to recognize objects, for instance, to differentiate between tanks and trucks.
(6) Together with the fact that any movement causes immense clouds of dust, the above factor was originally exploited by Rommel, who had his supply and baggage trains move in tank formation in order to mislead the enemy. Later, this came to the notice of the enemy, so that later attempts to employ this ruse were unsuccessful.
(7) At that stage, the German forces suffered little from enemy air attacks.
(8) Here, for the first time, the 88mm antiaircraft gun proved an effective antitank weapon. Later it became indispensable for this purpose.
b. May-June 1941: Battles for the positions on the border.
The British left Rommel no peace and in these months seized the initiative several times in attempts to take from the Germans the border positions, which commanded the outpost area, and particularly in attempts to take the Halfaya Pass. In the mountain range extending from the coast to the interior of the desert, a distance of more than 30 kilometers, the Halfaya Pass was the only point at which tanks could cross.
On 15 May the British succeeded in recapturing Sollum, Capuzzo, and the Halfaya Pass. In an immediate counterattack Rommel succeeded two days later in retaking Sollum and Capuzzo, while the Halfaya Pass remained in British hands. However, on 27 May the pass was finally retaken in an attack in which the 15th Panzer Division, which had meanwhile reached the front, also took part.
On 15 June, after careful preparations, the British launched a major offensive which aimed at retaking the border positions and advancing on Tobruk. They by-passed the German border positions and pushed forward almost as far as Bardia. The situation was critical. However, on 17 June, Rommel, again employing the 15th Panzer Division, succeeded in defeating the enemy by concentrating his forces in an attack on the west flank of the enemy, who had advanced northwards. The enemy forces were compelled to withdraw southward to avoid the encirclement of some of their units.
The more important features of these operations are as follows:
(1) The pursuit phase was now over, and the actions described are those of attack and defense.
(2) Stronger forces were employed on both sides, than hitherto. On the German side, both division, the 5th Light and the 15th Panzer - minus certain elements tied down on the Tobruk front - were fully employed, as well as one Italian division. Without the 15th Panzer Division, the German forces would not have been able to hold their own, particularly in the battle from 15th to 17th June.
(3) Whereas the fighting during the pursuit in March and April took place on either side of the Via Balbia, all the actions just described took place in the desert.
(4) The German side no longer had absolute mastery of the air; British bombing units were taking part in the fighting in concentrated attacks for the first time.
In these skirmishes and battles the 15th Panzer Division gained its first experience in desert warfare. The fields in which experience was gained were the same as those described for the 5th Light Division in section a.
New features in the operations were as follows:
(1) For the first time, all German units were exposed to lively enemy activity in the air, a feature they were to experience daily from now on. At first, several instances occurred where severe losses were suffered owing to the bunching up of vehicles and troops. It was weeks before the troops learned to counter this new combat factor by a wide dispersal of units in breadth and depth, a particularly important requirement in the desert, where no cover whatever is to be found. (The minimum distance between vehicles should be 50 and if possible 100 meters.) It also proved necessary to dig in immediately all vehicles that were halted for any considerable time. They were to be dug into the ground to at least a depth that protected the axles in order to lessen the effects of bomb fragments. in the same measure it was necessary to camouflage the vehicles. This was only possible with the use of camouflage nets, so that it was extremely difficult. Furthermore, it was now necessary for each and every man to dig a foxhole as protection during air raids.
(2) The danger of radio stations being intercepted and located made it imperative to have all radio instruments and particularly central radio stations removed at least one kilometer from headquarters sites in order not to have the functioning of staff headquarters interfered with. The resultant delay in the transmission of orders and reports had to be accepted as an unavoidable disadvantage. By the use of messengers with motor vehicles, this delay had to be reduced as far as possible.
During the time discussed above, consolidating measures were also taken in the envelopment of Tobruk. The intention to withdraw all German troops from the besieging force could not be carried out, particularly at Ras el Mdauuar, on the southern front, where two German battalions remained in position until the autumn of 1941.
(3) The danger of enemy tanks breaking through the front made it necessary to develop all- around defense positions protected by antitank mines. Rommel issued a bulletin describing the development of such positions, each held by a reinforced company, in a system of strong points. Above all, this system was adopted along the border, where the Italian "Savona" Division was employed in addition to five German oasis companies.
c. July to mid-November 1941. The siege of Tobruk and preparations for the attack on the fortress.
It was clear to Rommel that Tobruk had to be taken as soon as possible and it was obvious that the enemy would do everything possible to prevent this happening. Speed was therefore necessary. The following factors make it difficult for Rommel to take the steps which he recognized as essential:
(1) The necessity of awaiting the arrival of further troops, infantry and particularly heavy artillery, and large supplies of ammunition from Europe, since the available forces were inadequate.
(2) The steadily decreasing capacities for seaborne transportation as the result of the mounting losses of ships.
As early as in July it became evident that it would definitely not be possible to commence any systematic attack before mid-September. At an early stage it was realized that this deadline would have to be extended to october, then to November and finally to December. Gradually, the hopes dwindled that the attack could be launched before the expected British offensive commenced.
The summer months ere spent in executing the following measures:
(1) Reinforcement of the enveloping forces by artillery and through development of the terrain;
(2) Improvement of training;
(3) The movement of large quantities of ammunition and fuel to Benghasi and farther east;
(4) Improvement of the medical services, which had hitherto perforce been neglected;
(5) Overhauling and maintenance of arms, equipment, and vehicles;
The following is to be said about the activity during these months:
(1) All attempts to reduce frontage and thereby strengthen the enveloping line failed since the Italian troops, by whom the greater part of the line was held, were not able to withstand counterattacks by the British.
(2) The reinforcement of the artillery forces was pressed forward vigorously; for this purpose a special artillery commander was assigned. Flash and sound ranging proved indispensable in the location of the enemy batteries.
(3) Again and again the order had to be stressed that all units employed were to dig themselves in as deep as possible in order to reduce losses.
(4) Demonstration exercises took place to improve the standard of training, with particular emphasis on combined infantry - artillery - tank, artillery - tank - air force action and the practical application of the all-around defense strong point system.
(5) It was only from Tripoli and Benghasi that ammunition and fuel supplies could be moved forward to the front. The lack of any rail connections proved a serious disadvantage. Investigations showed that to construct a railroad to meet even the most modest demands, at least 60,000 tons of shipping space for locomotives, cars, rails, under structures, and so forth, would be required, and a period of about twelve months for the Tripoli-Benghasi section and an additional three months for the extension to Derna would be needed.
Ammunition and fuel had to be stored in the open, both in the vicinity of the ports and near the front, since tank installations and shelters were non-existent. This made wide dispersal and the burying and camouflage of all supplies at the storage depots all the more important. These precautions ere frequently disregarded so that unnecessary losses occurred.
(6) Warm clothing after sundown was particularly important in the desert, and especially so for new arrivals, as a precaution against dysentery and skin diseases, since the difference between the daytime temperatures and those at night was extreme. After sunset it was absolutely essential for every man to wear trousers and a belly band. Experience showed, in fact, that it was advisable to wear the latter day and night.
An appropriate diet was essential to prevent jaundice, which occurred frequently. A large proportion of the cases of jaundice which occurred in 1941 were due to the fact that the rations issued included large quantities of pulses and conserved meat with a high fat content. Above all, food with a high Vitamin B and C content proved necessary and on the whole, the food had to be light. Vitamin C tablets could not take the place of fresh vegetables. owing to inadequate air transportation space, it was usually only possible to fly in fresh vegetables and fruit for air force personnel in Africa.
(7) In weapons maintenance, protection of the inside parts of the weapons against sand proved a particularly important point. For this reason, all bolts and moving parts of the weapons were wrapped in sailcloth, besides the use of the standard muzzle covers. All weapons had to be cleaned very carefully, but after cleaning oiled only very thinly; otherwise the dust would eat its way into the surfaces. No special means to protect the weapons against dust were available. What has been said about the care of weapons applies in equal measure to the care of other equipment and motor vehicles.
(8) A high standard of training in the use and care of weapons, equipment, and vehicles was particularly important in desert warfare and the work of the higher echelon ordnance technicians handling weapons, equipment, and vehicles was of great significance in maintaining the combat efficiency of the troops in this respect.
In an overseas theater of operations extensive maintenance services with well-equipped workshops for the repair and maintenance of weapons, tanks, and other motor vehicles were just as indispensable as stocks of all types of spare parts, particularly for tanks.
It was also during the summer that Italian forces constructed the road to by-pass Tobruk, which was roughly sixty kilometers long. This road was metalled and tarred, and its construction which took three and a half months in the heat of summer, must be regarded as an outstanding performance. On the whole, the German troops, who were unaccustomed to the heat also came through the summer with very few losses.
On 14 and 15 September, Rommel launched an operation for reconnaissance in force in the direction of Bir el Habata, in the Egyptian desert, from the border positions. The operation was directed by the headquarters of the German Africa Corps, and was carried out by the 21st Panzer Division, which had been organized from the 5th Light Division. This operation, which was designated SOMMERNACHTSTRAUM, must be considered a failure since it failed in its purpose of discovering how far the British were in their preparations for their offensive. No opponent was contacted, as the British reconnaissance forces had recognized the German intentions and had withdrawn in good time. On the other hand, the 21st Panzer Division suffered considerable losses in a number of air attacks owing to the fact that it lost three and a half hours on Egyptian terrain in refueling, as the fuel trucks first had to move forward. These losses could have been avoided if sufficient fuel had been carried along in cans and if the fuel column had accompanied the combat units. Further losses were sustained while moving back through German mine fields, the locality of which was not known precisely to the various units.
d. Mid-November 1941 to mid-January 1942. Repelling the British autumn offensive and the retreat to the Gulf of Sirte.
The British offensive opened on 18 November 1941. At strategic level it had been expected, but nevertheless it came as a tactical surprise. This was because, from the end of October on, the German air reconnaissance hardly ever succeeded in penetrating into Egypt and because the enemy had concealed all general preparations and signal traffic with extreme skill.
Excluding the Tobruk garrison (1½ divisions and 1 armored brigade) the ground forces of the enemy, which had meanwhile been consolidated to form the British Eight Army, consisted of:
with a total of about 700 tanks.
Apart from the 5th Italian Division and one German division and the GHQ artillery besieging Tobruk, Rommel had available for operational employment:
The XXX British Corps, with the bulk of the available armor, advanced through Maddalena in order to relieve Tobruk while the XIII British Corps enveloped the border positions from the south.
The 21st Panzer Division, which was echeloned forward in the direction of Bir el Gubi, had the mission of halting the British advance, but met with no success in its efforts. For a long while the situation remained unclear to Rommel because the division reported too infrequently and because its reports were confusing. On 23 November it seemed that the situation would improve when Rommel succeeded at Sidi Rezegh in battering the XXX British Corps so badly that the commander of the Eighth British Army seriously considered breaking off the offensive. Overestimating the scope of his success, Rommel then decided on an enveloping pursuit on the next day. On 24 November he advanced with the Africa Corps in the direction of Maddalena, then wheeled north and arrived back at the Tobruk front on 28 November. Here, the situation had developed unfavorably in the meantime, since the enveloping forces had not been able in the long run to beat off the repeated attempts of the enveloped British forces to fight their way out. The enveloping ring had been breached already on 22 November at el Duda, although the breach was locally restricted. The Africa Corps how only had roughly 100 serviceable tanks available and was no longer strong enough to restore the situation, so that it became necessary to raise the siege on 7 December. The difficult maneuver of swinging the Italian Division, the Africa division and the artillery forces westward was performed successfully and a new front was established in the Ain el Gazala line. This position had to be abandoned on 16 December because it was in danger of being enveloped from the south.
For tactical reasons, Rommel thought it impossible to hold the Cyrenaica, which protruded northward and provided ideal opportunities for the enemy to by-pass it, although the Italian command, for political reasons, demanded that he do so. He therefore decided to withdraw toward Benghasi - Agedabia.
This movement was carried out in the following manner:
(1) The Africa Division was dispatched through the Cyrenaica in order to take possession of the important town of Agedabia before the arrival there of an enemy column reported to be advancing westward through the desert.
(2) The Italian division was also moved through the Cyrenaica to the rear on vehicles of the supply transportation columns.
(3) The Africa corps and the motorized Italian division at Mechili were to advance straight through the desert to Benghasi.
The motorized units carried out the movement successfully, but the available transportation space was unfortunately inadequate to move all Italian infantry forces to the rear.
At Christmas the Panzer group was ahead of Agedabia. On the last day of the year the Africa Corps, which was echeloned to the right, was once again clearly successful in a defensive action against the pursuing enemy forces and destroyed a large number of enemy tanks.
Two additional factors alleviated the situation for the armored group. One factor was the considerable reinforcement of the German air forces through the transfer of the Second Air Force Command, with the II Air Corps from the East Front to Italy and Sicily, which transfer had commenced toward the end of November. As a result, the hitherto overwhelming superiority of the British in the air was somewhat reduced. The second factor was the fact that the extremely tense supply situation was relieved by the arrival of two big convoys at Tripoli with supplies of all sorts, replacement tanks and two tank companies and artillery which were organic to the units in Africa. This was the first supply shipment to arrive between 16 September and 15 December 1941, during which period not a single ship had reached African ports.
In spite of the relieved situation, Rommel decided not to await the enemy attack in the Agedabia area and in early January retired to the Marada - Marsa el Brega line, where he hoped that his right flank would be better protected by the salt marshes.
The more important lessons learned in the battle that has been described above in broad outline are as follows:
(1) The old maxim that reports should be sent in as frequently as possible was frequently not observed, although orders had been given that a brief radio report was to be sent in every two hours, with the provision that the single word "unchanged" or a statement of position would be sufficient.
(2) Similarly, not all of the units reacted automatically to any development by carrying out new reconnaissance.
(3) The use of the "directional line" with the aid of a few natural reference points in reporting and in issuing orders proved an excellent system, particularly under desert conditions. This system is as follows:
A directional line is drawn between two points on the map, from Point A to Point B. Starting at Point A, this line is marked and numbered consecutively at intervals of one centimeter. Positions can now be reported by this line; for instance, 3 right of 37 would mean a point 3 centimeters east of 37 on the map, as shown below.
The starting number for the consecutive numbering of the centimeter marking can be fixed as desired. Brief orders can be signalled in clear text with the aid of the directional line. It goes without saying that the line must be changed frequently.
(4) Another point that had adverse effects was the fact that not all unit commanders or their General Staff officers were at all times precisely informed on the supply situation of their units. At all times every unit commander and his assistants must know exactly how much fuel and ammunition of the more important types his unit has available, what quantities of supplies are to be expected within the next twenty-four hours and what percentage of the most important weapons are ready of action. This knowledge is indispensable as a basis for all command decisions.
(5) Under desert conditions the frequent penetrations by armored forces and the open terrain expose the higher level staffs to danger to a far greater extent than is the case in any other theater of operations, so that all staffs must be protected by close defense antitank weapons. For this reason the Panzergruppe and the Africa Corps had organized so-called combat detachments consisting of tanks, antitank and antiaircraft guns in battalion and company strength, which also proved very useful as a tactical reserve.
(6) One feature peculiar to the desert operations in 1941-42 was the constant threat to the southern flank of the side that happened to be on the defensive, the northern flank generally being well-protected since it extended to the coast. This danger to the German right flank made it necessary to have strong mobile force, with ample supplies of fuel, echeloned far to the right in order to avoid being forced to abandon a position by-passed by the enemy.
(7) In desert warfare retrograde movements will usually be restricted to roads and will be difficult owing to the lack of natural obstacles favoring new defense lines. Only if a firm control is maintained during retrograde movements over great distances will it be possible to prevent the retreat continuing beyond the intended point and the danger of disintegration. For this purpose it is also necessary to compel the rear echelons, such as the transportation columns and so forth, to halt at intervals.
(8) Owing to the dust that is caused by any movement on the ground, it is difficult to differentiate between friend and foe from the air. For this reason bombing stop lines must be established and clearly defined with due allowance for safety factors.
e. Mid-January to the end of May 1942: The counter-offensive to retake the Cyrenaica; preparations for the attack on Tobruk.
On 10 January 1942 the Panzer Group reached the Marada-Marsa el Brega line, where new defense positions were to be established. However, the remaining units, particularly the Italian troops, had been so far reduced in numbers during the previous fighting, that they would hardly be able to hold the sixty kilometers of frontage against any major attack by the enemy for longer than twenty-four hours. As careful examination of the situation revealed that the enemy forces ere still echeloned far to the rear, so that they were in a critical situation similar to that they had been in the previous year. The coastal road remained closed to them until 17 January, when Rommel approved the surrender of the troops holding the Halfaya Pass since their supplies of ammunition and foods were exhausted. A careful examination of the strength rations showed that at the moment the German and Italian forces were even superior to the hostile forces at the front. Now was the moment to take preventive action, to interrupt the assembly of the enemy forces through a counterattack and to delay his preparations for the continuation of the offensive.
Rommel therefore decided to launch an attack with limited objectives in order to decide on further action as the situation developed.
The attack was scheduled for the morning of 21 January. Various deceptive measures were taken to conceal the German intentions, including strict secrecy concerning the intended attack. Thus, regimental commanders were informed only one day before the attack was to start. Also all vehicular traffic in the direction of the front was to cease during daylight from the fourth day preceding the attack. From then on vehicular traffic toward the front was firmly restricted to the nights. These measures proved fully successful.
The attack was carried out as follows:
The 90th Light Division, hitherto the Africa Division, was to break through the enemy lines on either side of the coastal road and to advance toward Agedabia. The motorized Italian corps was to follow immediately and was then to advance south of the Via Balbia while the Africa Corps was to start out from an assembly area thirty kilometers south of the Via Balbia in an enveloping pursuit designed to prevent the retreat of as many as possible of the enemy forces. The breakthrough by the 90th Light Division succeeded as planned, but Army headquarters, to which the command had been upgraded on 21 January 1942, received no reports from the Africa Corps for a long time. The corps had run into a patch of deep sand, so that it could only move forward with difficulty. The intended envelopment thus failed.
On 22 January Agedabia was taken. In the following days two attempts to pocket sizeable enemy forces in the Antelat - Saunnu area failed as the German forces were too weak and their intention had been recognized at an early stage. However, large quantities of materiel were captured in a surprise raid on Msus.
The Italian Supreme Command approved an advance as far as Agedabia but not beyond that point. It feared reverses that might again endanger the Italian infantry divisions because of their lack of mobility. The employment of these division forward of the Marada - Marsa el Brega line was therefore not permitted. Rommel nevertheless persisted in his intention to take advantage of the opportunity of the moment. He advanced through the desert at the head of a specially organized battle group and on the evening of 29 January captured the Benina quarter of the city of Benghasi. There he received Mussolini's belated approval of this advance. On 30 January Benghasi was captured and a brigade taken prisoner. In the following days the pursuit was continued straight through the Cyrenaica. Derna was taken on 4 February.
The condition of the troops and the lack of fuel prohibited any attempt at attacking Tobruk so that, from 7 February on, this units were compelled to organize themselves in defense positions, with the north flank based on the Bay of Bomba in front of the British positions at Ain el Gazala.
Since it was now to be expected that the exhaustion of the troops on both sides would lead to a period of comparative quite, Rommel flew to Rome and Germany in order to learn the intentions of the Italian supreme Command and of the Wehrmacht High Command with regard to the conduct of war in the Mediterranean, in 1943. He found that practically no plans existed and that the Italians were even every averse to any offensive operations before autumn.
In April Rommel therefore again took the initiative on his own responsibility. His opinion was that it was necessary to take anticipatory action against a new offensive by the enemy, which he expected in June, probably with even stronger forces than before. It was vitally important to capture both Tobruk and Malta, the latter of which, as a naval and air base, interfered with German seaborne supply traffic to an extent that could not be tolerated. However, since the German air force could support only one of these operations at a time, it would be necessary for them to take place in succession. He considered it desirable to attack Malta first and then Tobruk. However, if the preparations for the capture of malta required too much time, he thought it best to attack Tobruk first so that, after that town had been taken and the border line from Sidi Omar - Bardia reached, all air force strength could be concentrated against Malta.(3) Rommel's suggestion was that the attack on Tobruk should open in the second half of May.
After some argument, this suggestion was approved and it was decided that Tobruk was to be attacked first owing to the fact that it would take longer to prepare for the attack on Malta. The supply situation was exceptionally favorable in May, so that adequate quantities of fuel were available in Africa by the intended date of the attack, 26 May. To a considerable extent the ammunition situation was also relieved.
Important lessons learned in this phase of the campaign:
(1) In pursuit actions, success depends not so much on the strength of the pursuing force as on speedy action, and thus to a considerable degree on the personality of the commander involved. Relatively small units under young and energetic commanders ()colonels) proved most effective.
(2) It is highly important to assign air liaison staffs to the pursuit forces. These staffs must be equipped with radios, so that they can direct the close support air units to worthwhile targets and above all so that they can constantly report the lines reached to units in the air, and thus prevent the air forces form bombing their own forces on the ground.
(3) To envelop enemy forces is more difficult in the desert than elsewhere, since natural obstacles such as rivers and so forth, through which manpower can be spared, do not exist.
(4) It is not to be expected that any attempt to take the enemy be surprise through the use of deceptive measures that have once proved successful, such as air attacks on the enemy headquarters, will meet with success.
(5) Terrain reconnaissance cannot be carried out too carefully.
f. Late May - July 1942: The battle of Tobruk and the pursuits to El Alamein.
The operational plan underlying Rommel's new offensive was as follows:
(1) Frontal attacks by the X and XXI Italian Infantry Corps, which had been consolidated temporarily to form Armee Abteilung Cruewell,(4) to commence on the afternoon of 26 May in order to tie down the enemy forces in the Gazala position.
(2) Advance of the five mobile units under Rommel's personal command in a move around the right flank of the enemy at Bir el Hacheim in order to wheel in on the rear of the enemy on the 27th and complete the envelopment by 28 May. Counting from the right, the five units were disposed as follows: 90th Light Division, German Africa Corps with the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions, the Italian motorized corps with the "Ariete" Armored and the "Trieste" Motorized Divisions.
(3) After the elimination of the bulk of the British Eight Army's forces in the field, attack on Tobruk.
These plans miscarried for the following reasons: The two Italian infantry corps were too weak to tie down the strong enemy forces effectively. Initially, the enemy was admittedly taken by surprise by the forces that by-passed his south flank. Then, however, the attacking column spread out fanwise as the result of the 90th Light Division turning northeast and the German Africa Corps north, while the Italian motorized corps, pivoting on the inner flank, was forced to move toward Bir el Hacheim and also reduced the speed of its advance. This fan-like disposition of the attacking forces greatly facilitated the defense.
On the evening of 27 May, the attacking mobile force, which had split into three groups, was in a critical situation and in serious danger of itself being encircled. Furthermore, up to 29 May, Rommel to a great extent was unable to exercise his command, having become separated from most of his radio stations. Supplies had to be routed around Hacheim and, as convoy forces were lacking, large amounts of materiel and numerous vehicles were lost.
Nevertheless, in spite of this unfavorable development, Rommel steadily persisted in his intention to take Tobruk. He concentrated his forces once again, established a defensive front facing east and, from 1 to 6 June succeeded in eliminating a number of enemy strong points south and west of the enemy position one after the other. In this way, and in coordinated action with Armee Abteilung Cruewell, he succeeded by 31 June in opening up a direct supply route which, however, was under fire during the daytime in most parts.
Having thus eased the situation behind the center of the enemy front, he proceeded to eliminate Bir el Hacheim, a bastion in his rear. This point was well fortified with field-type positions and was tenaciously defended and it was not taken until 123 June. Now the German Africa Corps advanced northward on Acroma, were it destroyed considerable armored forces by 14 June and threatened to cut off the two divisions in position in the northern sector. One of these division fought its way out eastward, while the other cut its way through the Italian forces by way of Bir el Hacheim toward the south. Now at last the road was open to Tobruk, which the British were determined to defend. A new deceptive ruse by Rommel's now proved successful. In the afternoon of 19 June he moved his German Africa Corps eastward past Tobruk on the south, moved it back during the dark and on the morning of 290 June attacked the fortress from the southeast. On the following day the fortress with its garrison of 25,000 and enormous stocks of supplies was compelled to capitulate. On 23 June Rommel crossed the border with the bulk of his forces, the 90th Light Division already having advanced to Sidi Barani.
Thus, the operational objective had been gained and the time had arrived to release the bulk of the air forces for operations against Malta. The Italian Supreme Command and Field Marshall Kesselring, Commander of the Second Air Force, still had the intention of now directing their attention to Malta, but Rommel believed that he now had an opportunity that would never recur of pushing ahead to the Nile. He was supported by the German High Command in this opinion and succeeded in getting his way. The attack on Malta was postponed and the main mission of the air forces was to continue supporting the pursuit in the direction of the Nile.
On 28 June Mersa Matruh was captured and on 30 June Rommel arrived with his thoroughly exhausted troops and only fifty serviceable tanks before the El Alamein position, which was better fortified than any position hitherto encountered. Two attempts to break through the newly established British front there failed on 1 and 10 July, whereas serious crises resulted from numerous counterattacks by the British between 15 July and the end of the month, the British directing their attacks chiefly against sectors of the front that were held by Italian troops.
Supply traffic again diminished considerably, so that for this reason alone, if for no other, any new offensive was out of the question. It was found that Tobruk, as a naval base, had far smaller off loading capacities than had been expected.
In order to hold the front of about seventy kilometers, new units had to be transferred to Africa and the 164th Light Africa Division, the Parachute Instruction Brigade and the Italian Folgore Parachute division were brought across by air and sent into action. Transportation of the Italian infantry divisions from Libya took a great deal of time.
The more important lessons to be learned from this phase of the campaign were the following:
(1) Once again, several tactical surprise actions had been successful, because methods were changed each time. On the other hand, the "dust deception" ruse was no longer effective. Rommel had had airplane propellers installed in a number of vehicles for the purpose of creating clouds of dust. These vehicles had been organized into a dust producing platoon from which he expected good deceptive results which, however, did not materialize.
(2) It is dangerous for a force to leave a major strong point in its rear unguarded even temporarily. If the forces available are inadequate to envelop the strong point, strong reconnaissance forces capable of combat should at least be left to keep it under observation and if possible to contain it.
(3) The British mine fields, the extent and distribution of which was unknown to the German command, and the mined zones in the Ain el Gazala position frequently compelled the command to make tactically disadvantageous changes in its plans. They also proved a good substitute for terrain obstacles, of which there is a lack in deserts.
(4) Attack columns must be held together tightly and units should only be detached for some separate purpose in cases of extreme urgency.
(5) Commanders at higher levels should not change their positions too frequently, even if the attack is progressing favorable. The commander definitely must designate some specific spot as his command post and must maintain that post as a fixed point, even if the situation is unclear.
(6) In air attacks on enveloped strong points or gases it is necessary to designate the targets to be bombed with minute precision in order not to endanger the attacking ground forces. This is particularly difficult under desert conditions.
(7) Supply columns are defenseless and require protection in convoys when the situation is unclear or confused. Otherwise they are apt to fall prey to the enemy reconnaissance.
(8) In defense positions, the tanks also should be dug in at once. This should be done in such a manner that they can drive out of the positions immediately if necessary. The space between the tank and the surrounding ground in the trench provides good protection for personnel against enemy fire and bombs.
g. August - early November 1942: The battles around El Alamein.
At the beginning of August the strengths on both sides were about equal. Neither the Eight British Army nor the German forces had any appreciable measure of superiority.
It was clear to Rommel that time was working against him and that as soon as the enemy had brought forward sufficient reinforcements he would launch a powerful counteroffensive.
He therefore did everything possible to improve the German positions, with particular stress on the use of mines, including air bombs which were buried and prepared for electrical detonation. He even had what he called "mine gardens" laid in the outpost area and had all battalion command posts surrounded by mine fields. In distributing the forces in the northern half of the defense line, which he considered the most endangered and which was in the zone of the Italian XXI Corps, he placed Italian battalions and battalions of the 164th Light Africa Division alternately.
As soon as the supply situation permitted, Rommel inten