



## World War IV: The Current Global Ideological War

Daily media reporting about Islamist extremist war crimes, political posturing, and emotional public statements about the “Global War on Terror” (or “The Long War”) generally focus on the internal political failings, the murky tactical situation (especially in Iraq, Syria, and Libya), and graphic atrocities that offend us. That’s understandable, given the complex international diplomatic maneuvering, partisan debates on policy and costs, concern of families of troops deployed in combat or support operations, and media penchant for sound bite reporting of “bad news.” I have a colleague who terms it *The Third Jihad*. I see this as an enduring, global, ideological conflict, World War IV. I’ll use the term “Islamist extremist” (inferring violent fundamentalist actions) in lieu of more obscure (and probably more technically accurate) terms; simple words for understanding the complex situation.

Americans are an impatient and easily distracted people, but we need to understand the broader aspects of this world-wide and long-term war. Additionally, the accepted, politically correct terminology used to describe this war masks the true nature of the enemy. Is it a holy religious cause, **jihad**, or a fundamental Islamist extremist religious perversion, an unholy war, **hirabah** conducted by **mufsidin** (unholy warriors)?

[See <http://www.terrorismawareness.org/know-about-jihad/>]

Recent reports mask the fundamental US and international policy issues, misuse of the many elements of national power, and the broader strategic situation. The “sound bites” distract the public from understanding the basis and breadth of this conflict. There are infrequent reports about Russian actions to counter extremists in Chechnya, Chinese efforts in Xin Jiang province, the Israeli campaigns, Indonesia, Kashmir, Darfur in Somalia, Boko Haram, and Islamist extremist murderous attacks elsewhere in the world (e.g., Madrid, London). But tying these and other events and underlying analyses together is complex and tedious.

This short paper attempts to summarize some key points about **World War IV**—the ongoing ideological conflict that includes strategic and policy direction, underlying economic and social causes, military operations, effects on traditional cultures, and internal and external Islamic religious conflicts. This paper represents the personal views of the author. Members of the Institute and others have been asked to critically review the contents, and I sincerely appreciate their inputs. The errors remaining are mine alone.

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## Current Situation

Several campaigns clutter and confuse public understanding of World War IV. This is NOT a war with Islam. There is no monolithic, centrally controlled coalition of Islamist extremists attacking and killing thousands of moderate Muslims (deemed apostate by the extremists), Christians, Yazidis, Westerners, Jews, or other “infidels” (*kaffirs*). The various groups generally adhere to fundamentalism (return to the 7<sup>th</sup> or 8<sup>th</sup> Century version of Islam—if you don’t believe in that, you are the enemy. These fundamental beliefs grew in the past, to include teachings of Qutb in Egypt and Wahhab in Arabia; they continue to fuel the ideological bases of Islamic extremism. The evolution of the several groups of Islamist extremists with whom we’re at war complicates our understanding as well. Additionally, there are competing Islamist extremist groups in many regions.

There are “external” campaigns in World War IV that are relatively unknown in the West, especially in the United States. Those include the decades-long conflict in Xin Jiang Province in China, the smoldering unrest in Kosovo, fundamentalist attacks in Europe, and the long-standing bloody campaign in the Russian province of Chechnya. There are growing concerns over radicalized “lone wolves” and sleeper cells within the United States that could target key commercial and utility services (e.g., malls, power grids, major transformer stations); those threats cannot be discounted or ignored, but I’ll focus on international threats in this summary.

**Daesh.** For example, the most recent, more extreme faction that “broke away” from al-Qaeda has shifted names and embraced the most violent forms of killing—public beheadings, burning of a prisoner, other executions, other atrocities—seemingly to attract young Muslims to their extremist cause. That became Daesh, the label that I prefer to use, then the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), and then the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIL). This last term, regrettably voiced by the US Administration, the media, and others, tends to “legitimize” the “right” of Daesh to try to conquer a vast region, including Israel, in the Mid-East. What do they want? Daesh has become the most prominent and dangerous threat in World War IV; they seek to conquer, to convert, but more importantly to capture territory leading to the reestablishment of the Caliphate. An indication of this goal is the adoption of the name “Abu al Bakr” (reminiscent of an early Caliph) by its leader. **Daesh** is currently a regional threat that portends a serious global threat in the future.

**Al Qaeda.** Osama bin Laden served as the primary conduit for military and monetary support in the Pakistan/Afghanistan area during the 1980s, when the primary US intent was to defeat Soviet forces occupying the country. The traditional tribal and ethnic “war lord” structure in the area became effective in causing the USSR to remove troops, abandoning the governance of Afghanistan to a loose coalition that was unseated by the **Taliban** (Arabic for students). Funding, principally from wealthy fundamentalists in Saudi Arabi, allowed the operation of more than 10,000 **madrasas** (religious schools that indoctrinated the youth in those fundamentalist principles). Al Qaeda became “the core” Islamist extremist organization that sought to eliminate competitors and to violently oppose the infidels in the holy Mid-East region (see Appendix A). This culminated in the attacks on September 11, 2001. Al Qaeda spawned several Islamist extremist organizations.

**Taliban.** The evolution of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century Mujahideen from the more extreme Afghanistan war lord factions and from Pakistan, was based in large part on the radical Islamic teachings of the madrasas, created a dominant force in Afghanistan that was “defeated” by the NATO Alliance after that government refused to hand over Osama bin Laden. Leadership generally migrated to Pakistan “safe” cities, with Mullah Omar’s headquarters and support organizations in Quetta. Other groups have infiltrated the relatively uncontrolled areas in Pakistan’s northwest provinces, while retaining many cells within Afghanistan poised to take over after the pre-announced departure of NATO and US forces...unless those evacuation dates are delayed to allow newly elected President Ashraf Ghani to dramatically restructure the Afghan National Army.

**Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.** AQAP has long been one of the most robust al Qaeda franchise groups, fed in large part by the adherents to Wahhabism, native to Arabia. One can argue that Saudi Arabia, our *World War IV: The Unholy War*

staunch ally in the Mid-East, has an undercurrent sympathy with (and funding support of) Islamic extremism, making Saudi Arabia an enemy of the West. The spread of Islamic extremism into Yemen toppled that nation.

**Muslim Brotherhood.** This primarily political group in Egypt seeks power and extends its violence beyond anti-government attacks, but poses a minimal threat outside Egypt.

**Jabhat al-Nusra.** This Syrian group is both anti-Western and at odds with the Alawite, Shiite, and Sunni citizens in Syria. Their goals create fanatical attacks on just about anyone in the country. Another case of, “If you don’t believe in my form of Islam, you are apostate and I must convert, fight, or kill you.”

**Al Qaeda in the Maghreb.** North Africa provides a wide geographical setting for this al Qaeda affiliate, which has separate goals in the region as well. AQIM has allied with both al Qaeda and Daesh in the past, but retains a separate set of ultimate intentions.

**Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.** This spinoff of the initial Taliban “government” of Afghanistan is best described as the original Islamist extremist ideological foundation for the region. They hope to destroy the Pakistan government and conquer or kill or convert the Sunni population in this nuclear weapon-equipped nation.

**Haqqani Network.** This organization reflects the fundamentalist beliefs of one of the key war lords in Afghanistan who was renowned for shifting alliances (loyalist in the 1970s, Soviet allegiance in the 1980s, US and Pakistan affiliation in the late 1980s and 1990s, independent within Afghanistan, then Islamist extremist).

**Al Shabaab.** The primary Islamist extremist group in Somalia is known for its violence and intolerance of virtually everybody. Serious in-fighting and defections have decreased their military effectiveness; however, their ideological goals remain the same: convert or kill apostates and infidels throughout the region, including Uganda and Kenya.

**Boko Haram.** Nigerian government weakness and Boko Haram’s successes have increased its size and threats in the region, expanding from Northern Nigeria and influencing other Islamist extremist factions in Africa. They have grown and extended attacks into northern Cameroon, declaring the establishment of a Caliphate in the area. Kidnapping, especially of teenage girls sold into sex slavery, and unconstrained annihilation of peaceful villagers illustrate the violent nature of this growing threat in Africa.

**East Asia.** Much of this region adheres to the Muslim religion; Indonesia is the most populist Muslim nation in the world. The first generation of East Asian jihadists (e.g., Hanbali, Dulmatin, Janjalani) trained in al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan; they took those lessons and beliefs back home, but were allowed to operate with little or no pressure from the loose-knit al Qaeda form of control. They have attacked “soft targets” including night clubs and restaurants in Bali, but failed in the very few attacks in Jakarta.

**Iran.** The looming threat in the background, despite “successful” negotiations that don’t solve the issue, is a nuclear weapon equipped Shiite nation that has historically supported Islamic Shiite extremists—Syria, Hizb ‘Allah, Hamas, and other factions. Achievement of a nuclear capability would threaten the entire Mid-East.

**Summary.** Islamic extremism is highly diverse and groups are independent, sometimes loosely coordinated, geographically spread, and often in competition with other Islamist extremist groups. They present a wide array of threats and, therefore, a spectrum of reasonable counters based on a too-narrow national strategy and policy must be developed. One can argue that there is currently NO effective national security strategy clearly identifying vital US interests, specific threats, and strategic counters using political, economic, military, and other elements of national power.

# Facing Reality in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

## Is it really a “war”?

War is defined as “*a state of violent conflict involving the use or threat of use of armed, organized forces to accomplish specified goals; a de facto state of military conflict between two polities, overt or covert, formally declared or informally recognized.*” Polities include nations, as well as political, religious, ethnic, or cultural groups with declared vital interests, goals, and objectives. The on-going battles, suicide bombings, collateral damage, and mounting casualties portray an ongoing, bloody, and escalating war around the world. We should all understand that “war” isn’t just military battles—war involves political, economic, social, and cultural conflicts as well. This conflict meets the generally accepted definitions of **war**, and we should use that word.

## Is this a holy war?

Islamist extremists adhere to fundamental interpretations of the Qur’an, the holy scripture of Islam, fiercely believing in the “rightness” of their holy cause to adhere to the underlying religious principles, to expel non-Muslim invaders, and to overthrow apostate Muslim regimes—a “Jihad.” As with other religions, the zealots justify violence based on carefully selected snippets from “the Book” and associated religious doctrine. Moderate Muslims preach and practice tolerance, hospitality, and peace, citing different verses from the Qur’an; they, along with most non-Muslims, tend to view the on-going conflict as an unholy war. Over the last 36 years, Islamist extremists have initiated almost 20,000 violent attacks on moderate Muslims, Buddhists, Jews, Christians, Kurds, and other infidels. The dominant intra-Islam conflict pits the Sunnis against the Shiites (or Shi’a); their differences have created much of the conflict in the Mid-East.

## Isn’t it the War on Terror?

You can’t wage war on a *tactic*. The public label, *Global War on Terror*, is a political slogan, a “bumper sticker,” like the *War on Poverty* or the *War on Drugs*, connoting a massive effort to fix something that’s presumably broken. Maybe it’s a *War on Terrorists* (real enemies), but again, it’s the Islamist extremists (and loosely affiliated insurgents) who use terror and many other tactics in their ideological war with non-Muslims and with Muslims who are not dedicated to the most fundamental version of Islam. A group of Islamist extremist sheiks, mullahs, and imams declared war in 1996 and, more explicitly in 1998; we didn’t read those documents. And we didn’t “declare war” after September 11, 2001, because Westerners believe that declared war has to be between nations; the Peace of Westphalia has narrowed our concept of war. Early discussions in the White House Situation Room proposed a declaration, but nobody could figure out “against whom.”

## Is the conflict global?

The United States and key allies are engaged in cultural, ideological, and military conflicts against Islamist extremists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United States itself; Russia continues to fight Islamist extremists in Chechnya; China is engaged in the campaign against Islamic Uighurs in Xin Jiang; India combats Islamist extremists in parts of Kashmir; Israel has long battled with hard-line Palestinians (Hamas) and Hizb’allah in Lebanon; the failed Somalian government and some African allies fight extremists in Darfur; and other nations (e.g., Philippines, Spain, France, Indonesia, Britain, Sudan) have been attacked by Islamist extremists within their own countries. We follow the detailed, day-by-day tactical reporting in the media without focusing on the larger picture, disguising the reality of the broad nature of the conflict and downplaying its importance. This is an ideological, transnational, global war—**World War IV**<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> In sequence, there was the Great War (1914-1918) that was later renamed World War I; World War II; World War III that was the 45-year long economic political-military Cold War with Communism, including “hot” campaigns in Korea and Vietnam; and the current ideological war—World War IV.

## Look at the religious foundations.

Throughout the world, sovereign nations are in violent armed conflict with groups of Islamist extremists<sup>2</sup>. The use of the term “extremist” acknowledges that they “use Islam” as a false justification; however, their goals, strategies, and tactics violate most of the underlying messages in the Islamic Holy Book, the **Qur’an**; the teachings of Muhammad preserved in the **Hadith**; and the **Sharia** (Islamic law). Their extremist faith is apostasy, not true Islam<sup>3</sup>.

## What is Islam?

Of the many teachings, there are four primary religious-political beliefs in the Muslim faith.

- **Tawhid**. Belief in the one True God. It is more restrictive than mere monotheism—one must believe *only* in Allah. This leads to...
- **Jihad**. “Struggle.” This is primarily an internal striving to believe in Allah and secondarily an external struggle against apostasy by Muslims and other (infidel) faiths. The definition has included violent armed defense (e.g., against the Crusaders) and conquest (e.g., the expansion of Islam across North Africa and into Spain), but it is not “war” in the Western sense. The Arabic word for war is “**harb**.” External offensive jihad allows Muslim conquerors to permit the existence of other faiths, especially faiths of “the Book” (Jewish and Christian, as well as Muslim).
- **Caliphate**. Islamic law-based governance. Generally, Muslims (especially extremists) require adherence to “God’s law” instead of “Man’s law.” The caliphate began as a hereditary succession after the death of Muhammad. The first four caliphs—Abū Bakr, Umar I, Uthmān, and Alī—constituted what later generations of Muslims would often remember as a golden age of pure Islam. They established the traditional and enduring administrative and judicial organization of the Muslim community.
- **Da’wa**. Call to Islam—the flip side of jihad. This, like jihad, applies to one’s self and to other Muslims and infidels...a sort of missionary responsibility.

The five pillars of Islam transform a Muslim’s life into one that is in harmony with nature, inspiring the true believer to work towards the establishment of justice, equality, and righteousness in society and the eradication of injustice, falsehood, and evil.

- **Testimony (Shahadah)**. The knowing, voluntary declaration, “There is no God except Allah; Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah.”
- **Compulsory Prayer (Salah)**. Prayer is offered five times a day; there are some exceptions.
- **Charity (Zakah)**. Contributions are a compulsory payment to help the poor, needy, and oppressed and for the general upliftment of society.
- **Fasting (Sawm)**. During the month of Ramadan, Muslims refrain from eating, drinking, smoking, and sex from dawn to sunset to instill moral and spiritual standards and to keep them away from selfishness, greed, extravagance, and other vices.
- **Pilgrimage (Hajj)**. Muslims who can afford to undertake the Hajj, at least once in their lifetime, journey to the “House of Allah” (Al-Ka’bah) in Mecca.

So if one believes in Allah as the one true God, his or her internal and external struggles (conducted within the religious framework of Islamic governance) lead to the export of those beliefs and the promotion of Islam to non-believers.

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<sup>2</sup> Many labels are used to describe the ideologically driven “terrorists” engaged in locally organized, internationally directed armed conflict with existing governments, nations, and other Muslim believers. Terror is a tactic, not a definition of any group in itself; the term “*Islamist extremist*” will be used in this paper to indicate those fundamentalist, militant, religious fanatics who adhere to teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) and similar Mullahs, Imams, and Ayatollahs to return to the earliest, untarnished form of Islam—back to the basics. It’s not just al Qa’eda; scores of similar organizations exist that act independently or at the suggestion of Islamist extremist leaders.

<sup>3</sup> More will be said about the correct terminology later in this paper.

This is probably the shortest (and most incomplete) summary of Islamic centrist thought around. For a more complete description and explanation, click on [www.whyislam.org](http://www.whyislam.org).

### When did World War IV start?

An argument can be made that the foundation of this war began in 610, when Muhammad began his religious-based quest to bring Islam to his family, his tribe, the land in which he lived, and thereafter, to a sprawling military-religious conquest of the mid-East, North Africa, Spain, the Balkans, and a wide swath across Asia into China and beyond<sup>4</sup>. His vision of a global Caliphate permeates beliefs expressed by Islamist extremists.

Or you might prefer the Crusades, when European Christian warriors invaded the traditional Muslim-governed territories. Or perhaps the expansion and domination of the Ottoman Empire until post-World War I, when it was finally demolished and split asunder into poorly defined and ungovernable “nations” by the Allied Powers<sup>5</sup>. Modernists might select the Iraqi attacks into Kuwait and the First Gulf War as the starting point.

And there are a host of non-United States conflicts that foresaw and sometimes included direct American involvement or at least support (e.g., Kosovo, Bosnia, Chechnya, Somalia, Sudan, Soviet-Afghan War) that could qualify. Contrary to political and media insistence, it didn’t just start on September 11, 2001. Attacks and warlike pronouncements have been going on for a lot longer than that.

Let’s call all of those previous important, but indirect, events “background” for the conflict in which we’re now engaged—**World War IV**. These are some of the more recent key events from a US perspective:

| Date          | Place                | Event  |
|---------------|----------------------|--|
| March 1973    | Khartoum             | Kidnap of US Ambassador, Belgian Chargé d’Affaires, US DCM, Saudi Arabian Ambassador, and Jordanian Chargé d’Affaires from Saudi Arabian Embassy.  |
| 1979          | Tehran, Iran         | Seizure of 52 Americans in the American Embassy as hostages, freed 444 days later.   |
| 1983          | Beirut, Lebanon      | Attacks on the US Embassy and US Marine barracks by Islamist extremists (Syrian-supported Hizb’allah).   |
| 1988          | Lockerbie, Scotland  | Bomb aboard Pan Am flight 103 detonated, killing all crew members and passengers. Libyan Islamist extremists eventually identified.  |
| 1990-1991     | Saudi Arabia         | Saudi government chooses to allow western military forces to occupy “holy” soil to counter the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; Osama bin Laden’s offer to provide Mujahideen fighters from the victorious defeat of Soviet forces in Afghanistan is rejected. Osama’s outrage and hatred of “occupying Crusaders” flares. Osama’s subsequent strong objections to Saudi officials resulted in withdrawal of his Saudi passport and expulsion from the country. |
| February 1993 | New York             | Group led by Ramzi Yousef detonates a truck bomb in an attempt to bring down the World Trade Center.   |
| October 1993  | Somalia              | Feuding tribesmen trained and aided by al Qa’eda shoot down US helicopters, killing 18 and wounding 73 in an incident that came to be known as “Black Hawk Down.”  |
| January 1995  | Philippines          | Police in Manila uncover a plot by Ramzi Yousef to blow up a dozen US airliners over the Pacific and to crash foreign airliners into key US structures. <sup>6</sup>   |
| November 1995 | Riyadh, Saudi Arabia | A car bomb explodes outside the office of the US Program Manager for support of the Saudi Arabian National Guard, killing five Americans and two others.   |
| May 1996      | Sudan                | Osama bin Laden leaves for Afghanistan; he becomes a financial supporter and military strategic planner of Mujahideen that eventually joined the fundamentalist Taliban.   |

<sup>4</sup> This is the series of Offensive Jihads...conquest and imposition of Islam throughout the conquered areas.

<sup>5</sup> The Balfour Convention of November 2, 1917, and British Colonial Secretary Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill’s task of drawing mandate boundaries on maps [see *Churchill’s Folly*, by Christopher Catherwood].

<sup>6</sup> Project *Bojinka* outlined planned attacks by airliners from the Philippines, Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore into the World Trade Center, the White House, the Pentagon, the Transamerica Tower, the Sears Tower, and other targets. The United States had the translated details of these plans in the early Summer of 1995—but we didn’t listen.

| Date               | Place   | Event   |
|--------------------|---|---|
| Mid-1996           | Afghanistan   | Khalid Shaykh Muhammad proposes a plan to use commercial airplanes as weapons to Osama bin Laden; Osama does not commit.  |
| August 1996        | London  | Publication of <i>Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the two Holy Places</i> in the <i>Al Quds Al Arabi</i> newspaper. A rambling formalistic pronouncement.  |
| June 1996          | Dhahran, Saudi Arabia                                       | A truck bomb demolished the Khobar Towers US military apartment complex, killing 19 US servicemen and wounding hundreds.  |
| February 1998      | Widely circulated<br>“Manifesto of the World Islamic Front” | Osama bin Laden and four other Islamist extremists issue a self-styled <i>fatwa</i> <sup>7</sup> publicly declaring that it is Allah’s decree that every Muslim should try his utmost to kill any American, military or civilian, anywhere in the world, because of American “occupation” of Islam’s holy places and aggression against Muslims. <b>See Appendix A.</b> |
| August 7, 1998     | Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania                  | Al Qa’eda detonated truck bombs at two US embassies, killing 12 Americans and 212 others and wounding thousands more.   |
| Early 1999         | Afghanistan   | Osama bin Laden told Khalid Shaykh Muhammad to proceed with plans to use commercial airliners against US and SE Asia targets. He cancelled the SE Asia phase in early 2000.   |
| December 1999      | Jordan  | Police foiled a plot to bomb hotels and other sites frequented by American tourists.  |
| December 1999      | US-Canadian border  | A US Customs Agent arrested Ahmed Ressam as he was smuggling in explosives intended for an attack on Los Angeles International Airport.   |
| October 12, 2000   | Aden, Yemen   | An al Qa’eda team used a motorboat filled with explosives to blow a hole in the side of the USS <i>Cole</i> , almost sinking the ship and killing 17 sailors.   |
| September 11, 2001 | United States   | Near simultaneous commercial airliner hijacking and attacks on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon, killing almost 3000 people. Three of four attacks are successful.  |
| September 20, 2001 | Joint Session of the US Congress                            | President George W. Bush declared the existence of a state of war <sup>8</sup> based on the “acts of war” committed nine days earlier.  |
| October 1, 2001    | Afghanistan   | United States, NATO, and Allied troops begin the bombing attack against Taliban and al Qa’eda forces; invasion and ground war follow.   |
| March 20, 2003     | Iraq  | United States and Allied troops attack Iraqi targets in Operation Iraqi Freedom; rapid conquest, occupation, and insurgencies follow.   |
| Subsequent         | Afghanistan, Iraq, and other war zones                      | Diplomatic, ideological, political, economic, social, military, and political campaigns throughout the world seeking to prevent another attack on the United States and to stabilize local and regional areas.  |

If you have to pick a “beginning of the war” event, the *fatwa* distributed in February 1998 is a particularly explicit declaration of war by the Islamist extremists; the less definitive, but lengthier, 1996 *fatwa* could also be regarded as such. Both were ignored by a complacent American government. There had been minor retaliatory responses to earlier attacks (e.g., aircraft and cruise missile attacks into Libya and Afghanistan, criminal prosecutions); however, the threat was treated as being criminal in nature, not as a war. It took the “Pearl Harbor-like” homeland attack on September 11, 2001, to drive the Administration into a massive response, formally initiated on September 20<sup>th</sup>. US policy wobbled into existence after a years-long hiatus following our pull-out at the end of the aborted Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, leaving a terrible vacuum in the region.

### 21<sup>st</sup> Century Warfare Differs from Traditional War.

Many experts cite examples showing why this war is not the same as previous wars. Or is it? Assertion:

*All wars are alike in the same ways, and each war is different in different ways.*

Asymmetric warfare, often cited as a “new” condition, is prevalent throughout the ages; think Khar Megiddo, Joshua’s attack at Jericho, and insurgencies. An enemy who is not uniformed is also common. Improvised explosive devices so common to World War IV are essentially mines or booby traps similar to those used in

<sup>7</sup> The document is attached as Appendix A. Such religious “orders” may only be issued by Muslim clerics; this “declaration of war” was not a true *fatwa*.

<sup>8</sup> This is not a formal Declaration of War, but enables certain provisions of law and emergency authorities that sure look like war.

many past conflicts. Even the ideological conflict that sets the foundation for the war has been at the heart of many earlier wars. But there are some aspects that are different.

Western cultures, with a European-learned penchant for fixed “borders” to define sovereign states, picture Afghanistan, Iraq, and other nations across Africa, the mid-East, and into Asia (the historic Muslim-ruled territories) as clearly defined nations or countries. That perception grew from the relatively arbitrary mapping of the area by colonizing and conquering European powers<sup>9</sup> from the time of their political domination after World War I through the time of their departure, leaving a legacy of confusion for their tribal inhabitants.

For thousands of years, the indigenous (and often ancient) tribal populations had been invaded, conquered, moved, incorporated, and integrated by various religious, economic, and military forces. But there remain underlying traditional cultures, clans, and tribes that are the traditional bases of governance despite centuries of commerce via the Fertile Crescent trade, caravans traversing the Silk Road, Mongol conquests, European colonization, post-World War divisions and realignments, and “freedom.” These tribal-centric areas absorbed a nominally common religious flavor due to the three major offensive jihads that brought Islam throughout the mid-East, North Africa, parts of Europe, and across Asia centuries ago. But note that fundamentalist Islam joins religious and secular governance—there is no separation of the two.

As one example, Afghanistan is an artificial amalgamation of many sub-tribes of Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Persians (strongly tied to the culture of Iran to the west), a central Hazara core of the Mongol-Uighur descendants of Genghis Khan’s short conquest, and bits of other tribes and other clans (e.g., Baluchis, Kazaks, Kirghiz, Aimaks, Hindus). Almost none of the major tribal-cultural groups are wholly within the arbitrary borders imposed in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, leaving only a legacy of artificial lines on a map. There is some sense of nationality with the shaky central government; however, the several warlords (e.g., former Uzbek General Abdul Rashid Dostun, Shiite Muhammad Mohaqeq, Pashtun Gul Agha Shirzai, Abdul Qadir, Qari Baba, Shiite Karim Khalili, Ismail Khan) have remained in charge of their “provinces.”

As another example, Iraq was artificially defined by the British as a nation following the breakup of the Ottoman Empire after World War I<sup>10</sup>. The three primary cultural entities include collections of tribes of generally moderate Sunni Kurds in the north, Sunnis of multiple tribal and religious factional beliefs in the center-west, and diverse Shiite clans in the south and east (most tied to Shiites in Iran), with Bedouins and a few other minority groups complicating the population.

The peoples of the three major groupings in Iraq lie **inside and outside** Iraq—the “natural” nation of Kurdistan is located in lands claimed by Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran. A restored central Hashemite Kingdom of Sunnis would stretch westward to link with Jordan. The Shiites, the majority of the Iraqi population, are religiously and culturally tied to Iran (formerly Persia). There was serious consideration, in a senior-level London Conference after the start of Gulf War II, to split Iraq into its three natural, cultural parts after overthrowing Saddam Hussein...but that could break our close ties with Turkey (the only democracy in the traditional Muslim world) over the Kurds, upset the “mid-East balance,” and abet expansion by Iran,<sup>11</sup> a potential and exceptionally dangerous near-future enemy. But this could still happen should a civil war grow from the wide spread secular insurgency in Iraq, creating multiple civil wars and opportunities for external interference—**chaos**.

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<sup>9</sup> Let’s blame the British (and the French and others who acquiesced), who “redefined” Afghanistan, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and other post-Colonial and post-World War I “Mandate” nations with a Western disregard for ethnic and cultural tradition. One can argue that the British intentionally divided ancient tribal and cultural areas and peoples to create (or maintain) “nations” with built-in instabilities, diminishing notions of unity and resurgence against their former (British) occupiers.

<sup>10</sup> A Foreign Service officer named Winston Spencer Churchill was primarily responsible for drawing the arbitrary borders of Iraq.

<sup>11</sup> US foreign policy for decades has sought to support and maintain the uneasy power balance between Iraq and Iran, pitting one against the other, supporting the weaker most of the time, and preventing a central hegemony in the region.

Both of these examples<sup>12</sup> point out the difficulties of setting policies for 21<sup>st</sup> Century governance in an increasingly globalized world. There is a tenuous stability in Afghanistan and Iraq.


Americans (and most Western Europeans) don't fully understand the cultural bases of the region; we don't realize that "*It's All Tribal.*"<sup>13</sup> Recognize that much of "it" lies in our cherished ignorance about the ancient history and steadfast nature of the culture in the region in terms of Islamic religion, shared sectarian and clerical governance, social and economic traditions, and the emergence of terrorism<sup>14</sup>.

There's also the tendency to focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and US support of Israel as causative factors—poppycock! Arab nations distract their subjects from internal failings by pointing to Zionism and US imperialism—this is called "blamestorming."

There are several, linked factors that contribute to our growing failures in the Arab world.<sup>15</sup>

### **The Religion and Expansion of Islam.**

From the emergence of Islam in 610 and its violent spread by Muslim warriors over the next few centuries, Islam dominated lands throughout the mid-East, across North Africa, into Spain and a bit of France until they were halted in 732, into eastern Europe (the Balkans, Turkey, to the gates of Vienna in 1683), and along the Steppes well into Asia in the east, then spreading south into Indonesia and the Philippines. These were the offensive jihads. This conquest was highly successful.



<sup>12</sup> You could also include the "artificially-mapped" nations of Israel, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt, as well as most of the Balkan states—all are or have been created without due regard for culture, clan, or tribe. And don't forget Kosovo, Bosnia, Chechnya, Timor, the Philippines, Kashmir, and Xin Jiang; although conflicts (more like civil wars) in those areas are mainly contained within "national" boundaries, the ideological challenges are similar. Let's not get into the South American or African situations.

<sup>13</sup> Previous papers with this title led to this expanded explanation of the global ideological war—World War IV.

<sup>14</sup> Americans call it "terrorism," pretending that the tactics of Islamist extremists and insurgents are merely "criminal." Terror is a tactic, not an "ism." The ideological underpinnings of the ongoing war are international in scope, non-state sponsored, and increasingly justified as anti-Crusader actions within a defensive jihad. But we inappropriately continue to call it "terrorism."

<sup>15</sup> Meaning the world traditionally seen by Muslims as their historic realm from northern Africa through the mid-East into Asia and beyond—wherever Islam has spread.

As with Christianity (and other religions), Islam splintered into a few major and many minor sects...some liberal, some strict, some fundamentalist or extremist, some “conservative,” some “modern,” and some ultra-traditional. Muslims, Christians, and Jews are monotheists<sup>16</sup>. And, in a sense, we’re more like each other than some of the sectarian groupings within each of the major religions are.

The unfortunate results, from the perspective of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, grew from the teachings of militant Islamic fundamentalists like Muhammad ibn Abdul al-Wahhab in Arabia during the 18<sup>th</sup> Century and interpretations by subsequent Islamist extremist scholars, like Egypt’s Qutb. Al-Wahhab’s fundamentalist teachings preached a return to the original foundations of Muhammad—without divergence or division of the faithful. Wahhabism became the State religion of Saudi Arabia and, in some sense, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, and major parts of Pakistan, Indonesia, and some other traditionally Muslim states. Islamist extremists are intolerant of schisms and deviation within the faith and especially by infidels (*kaffirs* or unbelievers), and they justify violence in terms of revisionist interpretations of religion. With the increased external pressures of globalization and wanton behavior by the West (pop music, power, and pornography), Wahhabism and variant fundamentalist beliefs grew more rapidly, seeking protection in an internalized set of standards.

Seemingly moderate Muslims have generally refused to recognize or react to the threats of Wahhabism to their own Islamic foundations, often diverting huge amounts of petro-money to create fundamentalist religious police and schools (Madrassas) and to support the militarization of fundamentalist groups throughout the traditional Muslim world. Mujahideen (freedom fighters) in Afghanistan became the victorious Islamist extremist defenders of a former Muslim nation, militant teachers and prophets, insurrectionists, jihadists, and terrorist insurgents. In a way, al Qa’eda is the product of unrestrained fundamentalist Islam.<sup>17</sup>

### **Terminology.**

But are they Mujahideen (freedom fighters) engaged in jihad (holy war)? Those terms connote unwarranted legitimacy. Contrary to commonly accepted, “politically correct” use, they are more accurately described as **mufsiduun** or **mufsidin** (evil doers) engaged in **hirabah** (“unholy” war) that violates many of the teachings and restrictions in the Qur’an.<sup>18</sup> By using the almost universally accepted “polite” terms, we all contribute to the international view of tolerance, political and religious correctness, and legitimacy of our enemies.

The apostate Islamist extremists, who are really mufsidin, are a major threat to established Islamic nations, which are seen as illegitimate Muslim-governed autocracies (or kleptocracies), while many citizens of those nations support the hirabahists with funds, volunteers, and clandestine intelligence<sup>19</sup>. Slowly, major nations in the traditional Muslim-governed areas of the world are coming to recognize and to criticize the Islamist extremists as those who should more appropriately be known as apostates. Unfortunately, the hirabahists accurately portray some of the traditional Muslim-governed countries as violators of the Qur’an as well. It depends on your point of view.

### **Governance.**

The Arab world, dominated by Islamic thought for many centuries, has had the cultural and tribal tradition of ruthless dictators, kleptocracies, and corrupt oligarchies from long before the time of Muhammad. Since Muhammad infused them with Islam, religious governance by clerics became intricately woven with secular

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<sup>16</sup> All are “People of the Book,” and the three faiths trace their lineage back to Abraham.

<sup>17</sup> It’s not just al Qa’eda. There are many extremist fundamentalist Islamic groups—some linked, some isolated, all dangerous.

<sup>18</sup> See Jim Guirard’s excellent paper on Al Qa’eda’s Satanic War, posted on [www.TheAmericanMuslim.org](http://www.TheAmericanMuslim.org).

<sup>19</sup> Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in particular, increasingly perceive the threats to their governments, the dangerous contributions of citizens, and the unholy nature of Islamist extremists. Other nations (e.g., Indonesia, Pakistan) show signs of understanding.

rule in many cases. In their ignorance and arrogance, Western crusaders, colonizers, and conquerors tried to instill their form of governance (representative democracy) in the Arab world nations when they departed...either of their own will, or as required by the larger community of nations, or by being thrown out. But, as Winston Churchill once observed, ***“Democracy is the worst form of government in the world...except for the others.”*** The culture and traditions of those who live in the Arab world include almost no understanding of the principles of representative democracies (or human rights), so the seeds of Western democracy are difficult, maybe impossible, to plant and nurture in this cultural climate.

For the two examples above, governance acceptable to the democracies of the West will probably be fleeting. As shown above, Afghanistan is a loose-knit confederacy that barely tolerates a weak central government, with warlords holding the real authority outside the capital city of Kabul. And they aren't very reliable—Dostun (the Uzbek General) was on the Soviet side prior to their invasion, switching to the Mujahideen until the Soviets fled, and conducting battles against allies as well as the Taliban during the NATO campaign of World War IV. President Kharzai is a Pashtun (no non-Pashtun has ruled Afghanistan in the recent past), but he was self-exiled for many years and is seen as a Western puppet. During the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, every ruler of Afghanistan was either assassinated, lynched, or deposed—there were no “orderly” transitions.

Iraq presents another model of the ability of a small group, the Ba'athists and their allies (both domestic and foreign), to overrule the voices of the diverse tribes of the major ethnic groups. Misguided US and Allied attempts to install a democratic<sup>20</sup> Iraqi government have the strong potential of setting off a post-war revolt.

Perhaps the worst case lies in Saudi Arabia, which is governed by a corrupt familial aristocracy of growing proportions—wealthy, privileged, and almost untouched by religion or the needs and desires of the people. Iran has already had one fundamentalist Islamist extremist revolt. And other nations in the traditional Islamic world are ripe for violent civil unrest leading to civil war.

A primary issue of the on-going war between the United States (and allied nations) and Islamist extremists is: ***Shall men be governed by God's law or by Man's law?*** The Islamist extremists adhere to a traditional view that God's law is the ***only*** valid law, interpreting (or misinterpreting) the teachings of Muhammad to reach that conclusion. Western nations focus on individual rights, freedom, and other “enlightened” principles. It's an ideological confrontation heated by past and present Western policies and actions. So Muslims have **Sharia**.

### **Education.**

Fundamentalist schools in the Arab world teach by memorization of religious-based “facts.” This “truthiness” substitutes for truth-seeking, originality, and creativity, so the most talented students go elsewhere (e.g., the West) for a useful education. The best and brightest become expatriates for modern education in the sciences and technologies and, subsequently, gainful employment abroad. In war-torn Iraq, almost two million Iraqis have fled the country. In oil-rich countries in the Arab world (e.g., Egypt, Saudi Arabia), the brain drain leaves hordes of highly intelligent but unskilled graduates who are either unemployed or have been absorbed into swelling bureaucracies, subsidized in large part by huge petroleum revenues. In many cases, local graduates migrate to religious duties as teachers (often in radical fundamentalist Madrassas), dupes or promoters of fundamentalism, and militant instructors for the “practical” aspects of insurgency and terrorism. Forty percent of Muslims are under 14 years of age, without much to look forward to in their lives. The best students leave, and the uneducated contribute to the burden on each nation's economy.

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<sup>20</sup> We call it democracy, but the form of democracy in culturally very different countries might not be very similar to ours.

## **Legal Systems.**

The Arab legal world is a complicated mix of laws, bribery, and complex procedures to Westerners. Some rules are vaguely recognizable as variants of the ancient Code of Babylonian King Hammurabi, dealing with property and family rights, legal processes, and penalties—the “eye for an eye” form of retribution that prevails throughout much of the Arab world. In some countries, the “rule of law” is meaningless, with bribery and trickery valued above justice in a seemingly arbitrary manner. In some of the Muslim countries, the concept of law is novel; in others, it can be based on ancient code, religious laws (the Muslim *Sharia*), conquerors’ imported laws (such as some of the laws imposed by Genghis Khan<sup>21</sup> and his descendants), or rules brought by the “civilized” West. Where myriad cultures or tribes are included in a “nation,” conflicting laws and legal processes contribute to chaos. In large part, these factors enhance the perception that the Islamist extremists are “reformers” of their fellow Muslims—a reasonable view to many of their supporters. Under a strictly Islamic form of government, the Qur’an, Hadith, and Sharia would be the *only* bases of law, and Imams would be the judges, attorneys, and juries (our terminology).

## **Economy.**

From feast to famine. Afghanistan has three major industries: smuggling, opium poppies and heroin production<sup>22</sup>, and diversion of foreign aid. The oil states in the Arab world have squandered much of their wealth for many years, although they are still economically viable. But the petroleum-based command economies of the past, coupled with strict control of the leadership in a socialist system, failed to create sustainable industries or value-added commerce for the future. For those nations whose economies rested on petroleum, no one had to work; it was a welfare world. Now, with lowering oil reserves, business competition, and global market economics, the socialistic societies have no work ethic and few developed businesses to preserve the welfare economic systems. About 30 percent of Muslims subsist on less than \$2 per day. People in the Arab world see, envy, and fear the rapid pace of technological growth and globalization in once-poor nations; they are frustrated without similar opportunities. They have no work; and they have no political recourse to fix the situation. Governments use the polemic anti-American, anti-Western, and anti-Israeli excuses, claiming that their economies are being manipulated by outsiders. And, to some degree that’s correct, although wholly inadequate in explaining domestic governmental failures to provide education, training, incentives for commercial development, and forward looking programs to move into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century’s globalized technocracy. Graft is a way of life in most Muslim/Arab nations. Bribery of officials at all levels is a cultural norm in many societies.

## **Population and Wealth.**

The United States has 300 million people (at least 6 million are Muslims). There are five times that many Muslims—approximately 1.4 billion people, or 20 percent of the world’s population—with a much higher average birth rate. The United States and its willing and unwilling allies dominate the military and economic instruments of power, with the seeming ability to temporarily inflict new forms of government on weaker polities; however, as shown in far too many insurgencies, conquest won’t last, since persisting insurrection historically wins in the long run.

## **The Clash Between Tradition and Globalization.**

Most people are more comfortable with “the way we’ve always done it,” and few are comfortable with change, especially dramatic change. Coping with change requires great energy, particularly when change is forced by external governments (including the UN and NATO); non-governmental institutions (including the G-8 and WTO); multinational and conglomerate businesses; and internal and regional political, economic, social, and

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<sup>21</sup> Genghis Khan conquered both Afghanistan and Iraq; Alexander tried, but only temporarily conquered small areas.

<sup>22</sup> Afghanistan produces more than 90 percent of the world’s opium and about 90 percent of the world’s heroin.

military pressures such as the rapidly growing fundamentalist Islamic insurgency movement. But change happens, and the 21<sup>st</sup> Century promises an increased rate of change. Globalization is seen by many Muslims, not just the Islamist extremists, as a serious threat to their traditional way of life. Some nations (not Afghanistan or Iraq) will move easily into new political, economic, and social models; others, the more traditional in nature, will oppose progress and suffer from the new world situation.

Increased availability of world-wide information via the Internet, satellite TV, free exchange of newspapers and magazines, and international cell phones bombards the traditional nations' peoples with images of non-traditional events and "modern" social norms, not all of which are tolerable to many Muslims. Within the Arab world, declining economic prospects, failing central governmental response to citizens' needs, and absence of domestic opportunities increase the unease and dissatisfaction of subject peoples. The 21<sup>st</sup> Century is the age of technological globalization; however, the entrenched Arab world (or at least, the Arab nations mired in the 7<sup>th</sup> or 18<sup>th</sup> Century mode) has few tools with which to respond to change. Terrorism and Islamic insurgency therefore become the tools of choice for many.

### **Why do the Islamist extremists hate us?**

**They don't tell us that they hate individuals!** They clearly hate and reject American policies and actions<sup>23</sup>. Viewed by fundamentalists, America and its UN, NATO, and Zionist allies have interfered with and invaded the traditionally sacred Muslim lands as the new crusaders<sup>24</sup>. That demands that each "true" Muslim join in the jihad to rid the traditional Muslim world of all Western and Jewish influences and presence using whatever tactics that are effective (e.g., guerrilla raids, terror, suicide bombings).

This is not primarily an offensive jihad to conquer new lands for Islam; it is an insurgent, limited war to expel the invading crusaders and their Infidel influences, to reclaim "Palestine," to oust corrupt regimes, and to restore fundamentalist Islamic rule. The recent morphing of Daesh into a conquering and ruling Caliphate changes that earlier set of goals to convert moderate Muslims to the extremist form of Islam.

The attraction of fundamentalist religious insurgency using insurgency and terrorism as effective means of countering crusaders and, more broadly, globalization is sold to the third, fourth, and fifth male children in a family. The first son inherits the family land (if there is any); the second son uses the family's clout (if any exists) to get an inadequate education and either welfare or a job in the bureaucracy; and the other children, including all of the daughters, get no real education and no economic future. The younger sons are often attracted to the hope promised by Islamist extremist recruiters. It's also disturbing that the birth and survival rates in the Arab world are very high; one Israeli scholar claims that the Palestinians don't have to resort to violence, since they'll procreatively overwhelm Israel, with its declining birth rate, in the next 20-30 years. This is truly a new world<sup>25</sup>, particularly for the Western-trained political-military mind to comprehend and accommodate.

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<sup>23</sup> See, for example, Michael Scheuer's incisive book, *Imperial Hubris*, initially attributed to "Anonymous."

<sup>24</sup> Commercially dominating the oil-rich region; occupying territorial bases in Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE, Bahrain, etc.; supporting or tolerating foreign crusades and anti-Islamic attacks in Chechnya, Xin Jiang, Uzbekistan, Algeria, etc.; and bolstering corrupt dictatorships in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, etc.

<sup>25</sup> The 1648 Peace of Westphalia essentially gave "nations" a monopoly on war, marking the close of a long period of religious wars. Thereafter, European armed struggles were waged principally for political ends. This is the beginning of First Generation Warfare, with orderly lines and columns of uniformed soldiers and mass armies employed by nation-states; it didn't last long unchanged. Second Generation Warfare was based on fire and movement (to avoid fire), but the essence was still attrition warfare. Third Generation Warfare emphasized maneuver, adaptation of technology, and strategic "ideas" such as Blitzkrieg, defense in depth, and asymmetric warfare. Fourth Generation Warfare emphasizes information and psychological objectives and includes the loss of the nation state's monopoly on war; a return to a world of cultures and states in conflict; and internal division along ethnic, religious, and special interests lines. Is this really the future, or a return to less-structured warfare?

### **Islamist extremist Justification for the War.**

There have been myriad views about motivations—they hate us; they don't like our irreligious attitudes; they oppose "globalization" of the economy; they're jealous of our consumerism; et cetera. But we need to read the 1998 *fatwa*. It lists three primary reasons for declaring war on the West:

1. The United States has been occupying holy lands in Saudi Arabia, plundering the mid-East, supporting "puppet" kleptocracies, humiliating and terrorizing Muslims, and establishing bases from which to conquer traditional Muslim-ruled territory.
2. Even though past devastation by the "crusader-Zionist" alliance, the Americans want to repeat the massacres, not being content with the [economic and military] blockade.
3. American aims are religious and economic, aimed to serve Israel; to fragment Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan; and to guarantee Israel's survival and continue occupation of Saudi Arabia.

These "crimes and acts" are, in the minds of the Islamist extremist leaders, a clear American declaration of war on Allah, Muhammad, and all Muslims. See Appendix A. More discussion of these factors under Options.

### **US and Allied Policies.**

America, Americans, and our allies have been attacked several times but most egregiously on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, triggering immediate and emotional public demands for retaliation and revenge. So the cause of defeating Islamist extremists (we called them terrorists at that time and narrowed the enemy to al Qa'eda, although there are literally hundreds of Islamist extremist groups, many of which are loosely linked to al Qa'eda) and the nations that supported them triggered the invasion of Afghanistan and then Iraq. Retaliation was the primary reaction. There is also a prevailing National Security policy and February 1, 2006, *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* (sic) seeking to free citizens of autocratic-governed nations, to export democracy, and to preemptively attack those who would do us harm—all well-intended demonstrations of our role as world policeman. The most recent *National Military Strategy—2015* repeats the objectives of the earlier 2010 NSS:

- The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners;
- A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;
- Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and
- A rules-based international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.

These goals are sufficiently vague to allow broad interpretation, unfocused strategy, and short-sighted actions against Islamist extremists, who are not recognized as the threat or the enemy. They permit apologies for our actions, weakness in our strategy, and abrogation of the US role as leader of free nations.

**The primary policy objective following the September 11 attacks was to prevent any further attack on the US homeland or its citizens.** Additional policy objectives grew, extending the war to Iraq to eliminate the threat posed by programs and plans for weapons of mass destruction, a plausible and probably accurate assessment of lethal chemical and biological weapon programs, and to depose Saddam Hussein. The WMD statements became a rallying point for critics of President George Walker Bush's policy about such programs—sometimes called weapons of mass "distraction."

Despite the initial murky pronouncements and suspicious behind the scenes pressures, the policy objectives of the United States in 2001 and, generally, the allies actively supporting the United States include:

- Prevent terrorist attacks in the United States and the sovereign territory of our allies.
- Regime change. In the case of Afghanistan, this involved forging (forcing may be a better word) a coalition with the Northern Alliance, which was a loose confederation among feuding warlords, to throw

out al-Qa'eda and the Taliban, and put a moderate Pashtun leader in charge. In Iraq, the removal of Saddam Hussein and the ruling Ba'athists from power was the first major objective. Unfortunately in both cases, the United States initially restricted its range of options by excluding or limiting the non-military instruments of national power (e.g., diplomatic, social, economic, political).

- Defeat of Islamist extremist forces and elimination of sanctuaries. In Afghanistan, this involved a series of military operations using CIA and Special Operations Forces, warlords, bombing, and tailored NATO ground forces in diverse geographical areas of the country. In Iraq, the invasion followed more traditional doctrine, with bombardment, rapid attack, decisive force, and surprisingly quick successes.
- Free the citizens of past oppressive regimes and form democratic governments in their place... whatever "democratic" means. Bring nations and their citizens into the modern, globalized economic world.

President Barack Obama has stated a simpler policy, including phasing out of Iraq:

*"I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qa'eda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future."*

This has shifted to a more modest policy to deter and degrade the most recent threat, Daesh.

### **Islamist extremist Objectives.**

The Islamist extremists have several objectives, not all of which involve the United States.

- First, they want to defeat occupying forces (Crusaders and infidels) in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere and to end US support (or acquiescence) of oppression of Muslims by other nations (e.g., Peoples' Republic of China, Russia).
- Second, they want to evict the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Crusaders (infidels) from traditional Muslim-governed lands—the wide swath of territories conquered centuries ago in the spread of Islam in the First and Second Offensive Jihads<sup>26</sup>, but particularly in the mid-East. This includes removal of US troops from Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and other Persian Gulf nations. It includes decreasing and eliminating Western political, social, cultural, economic, and religious influences from the Muslim world and restoring "local" control of petroleum resources.
- Third, to replace materialistic, immoral, and irreligious ruling despots, dictators, and oligarchies supported by Western power in order to restore fundamentalist religious governance in Muslim nations and historically Muslim-governed lands, leading to the restoration of fundamentalist theocracies throughout the region.
- Fourth, to end all US aid to Israel, eliminate the Jewish state, and create an Islamic Palestinian state.

The complex question facing the United States and its allies is, "How do we cope with spreading global religious insurgency and the underlying root causes of non-state-sponsored violence?"

### **What are the Options?**

Facing reality is always difficult, especially in the midst of geo-political chaos tainted by a horrendous global economic crisis. The United States has many alternative vital concerns and policy directions, including these oversimplified options:

- Quit. Pull out of Iraq completely, dumping a relatively unstable religious, tribal, and cultural insurgency on the weak central government faced with potential violent cultural insurrection—civil or ideological war. And pull out of Afghanistan, leaving a new government with the Taliban, cross-border, and internal tribal conflicts; abandon Pakistan to its primary external security threat—India.

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<sup>26</sup> Jihads may be generally classified into internal (disciplining one's religious self), offensive (conquest to spread religion), and defensive (preserving religion against attack). But, as stated earlier, World War IV isn't a jihad. It is more accurately termed hirabah, or unholy war.

- Pass the buck to the UN (for Iraq) and NATO (for Afghanistan), significantly reducing US military presence in both countries. This would likely result in forming Kurdistan (in the north, including parts of Turkey, Syria, and Iran in a cultural cohesion), a reunited Hashemite Kingdom (in the west-center, with Jordan), and a Shi'ite alliance in the south with Iran. All three of those political outcomes would create a less stable world and at least three mid-East wars. This would also create opportunities for Pakistan-backed Islamist extremists (Taliban in part) to retake control of major regions in Afghanistan. Either this option or the first-mentioned withdrawal would terminate US influence in the Muslim world.
- Continue to engage Islamist extremists and insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq politically, militarily, and economically, recognizing that the Islamic insurgencies could spread, take on new faces (e.g., rebellions elsewhere, attacks on the United States and its mildly committed allies), and grow as Islamist extremists attract those with unfulfilled expectations to violently radical ideas, including martyrdom.
- Accelerate the training of indigenous police and military forces to take over stability operations. This is generally the path being taken, albeit at a glacial pace—"our" criteria for readiness are probably unrealistically robust. But the risk of internal collapse due to premature US and allied withdrawal argues for some demonstration of professional capability by those police and military units. This is a very long-term commitment. The "surge" in Iraq won't work in Afghanistan.
- Shift national policy and strategy goals for the longer term. Recognize that the spreading Islamist extremist insurgency cannot be countered solely or even primarily with military responses, which must be phased down and coordinated with other actions. Stability operations, safety and security of innocent citizens, and reconstruction require application of the economic, cultural, ideological, political, legal, law enforcement, and social instruments of our national power in cooperation with other nations. Military forces can contribute to stability and "nation building," but only within a broader spectrum of means and solutions.
- Attempt to form a cohesive alliance, primarily of Muslim countries in the Mid-East, to attack and neutralize the fundamentalist ideology of Daesh and to defeat that military organization throughout the growing range of conquered territory. This is the LONG WAR that must be faced.
- Devise new and more realistic national policies vis-à-vis Israel, the idealistic export of democracy and "free trade" around the world, overseas military presence, and support of some regimes (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Egypt). This would entail (a) redefining **vital** national interests—not "feel good" policies, (b) setting reasonable and affordable national security goals and strategies, (c) identifying our "real" enemies, those in the region who might threaten our vital national interests (e.g., Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt), and (d) creating broader strategies for resolving the current conflict and extricating ourselves from "entangling alliances."
- Escalate; establish US colonies. Recognize that Islamic insurgents, warlords, fundamentalist religious leaders, and former government partisans will maintain (and probably intensify) sniper, improvised explosive device, and other attacks on US and alliance troops in concert with assassinations of post-conflict leaders of doubtful political legitimacy and terrorist raids in the lands where we "infidels" dwell. So pull out the stops, apply massive military might, and conquer the offending territories, subjugating their peoples (at least the nasty tribes and religious factions). ***Unrealistic—won't happen.***

Separately, perform introspective self-examinations related to the "charges" and "justifications" expressed in the *fatwas* and statements of Islamist extremist leaders. Are we "intruding" and "occupying" sacred Muslim lands? If so, consider withdrawal; if not, stay put. Are we supporting intolerant dictators who suppress freedoms? Have we drifted too far from our cultural foundations and moral values? Are we increasingly arrogant, greedy, intolerant, materialistic, and aggressive? Perhaps our way of life needs a bit of readjustment and willingness to cooperate and collaborate with other cultures, restoring our (US) bases of governance and behavior to more traditional levels. Identify our "faults" and correct our course. This analysis and action plan could remove or diminish popular support for the Islamist extremists.

More recently, diplomatic initiatives (so long absent or ineffective) have opened official channels with Iran, Syria, and other “interested” nations. Surprisingly, some of the stated Iranian goals for the Iraq situation are similar to US and Alliance objectives in the region—peace in the region, economic stability. The discouraging notes include the mutually aggressive military posturing of both Iran and the United States—the US naval task force near Iranian waters, Iran’s nuclear threats, the economic and trade sanctions imposed, and the demands for nuclear program termination reflect bullying by US and Iranian officials. Not the right path to compromise, negotiation, and peace in the area. More surprisingly, Israel is conducting diplomatic discussions with Hamas, Lebanon, and Syria—the latter only a year after destroying a nuclear reactor in Syria. The n-dimensional nature of the complex situation reflects competing goals and, perhaps, a common search for stability.

However, the lingering (and growing) impasse concerning Iran’s nuclear weapons program must be addressed through economic sanctions, diplomatic threats and pressures, and unyielding determination to prevent Iran from achieving a nuclear weapons capability that would dominate tensions in the Mid-East and beyond.

The military “surge” strategy in Iraq, which was more accurately a localized reinforcement in Anwar and Baghdad (for example), has shown great promise—particularly in conjunction with concomitant Sunni and more recent Shiite commitments to curtail violence. The internal US political haggling, with “time tables” and funding threats, fuels the Islamist extremist psychological advantages in this ideological war. When one compares the overwhelming US responses to Pearl Harbor at the beginning of World War II with the “business as usual” military forces and political-economic commitment after 9/11, it’s clear to the Islamist extremists that the United States wasn’t really serious about World War IV at its outset.

Afghanistan presents the more unsettled situation, with a weak central government, “deals” with warlords and provincial leaders, the uncontrolled opium-heroin industry, Pakistani ambiguous policies vis-à-vis the Taliban, NATO reluctance to escalate, and increasing levels of violence. A military surge won’t work there. We went from a “light footprint” policy to a traditional air-supported ground force approach and now a more standard counterinsurgency strategy—this isn’t indecisive, it’s adapting to changing situations. The spread of this campaign to Pakistan creates additional complications in a complex region.

Iraq may resolve into a quasi-stable state, with or without extensive US involvement. Afghanistan will probably revert to the long-standing tradition of local tribal governance without regard for “boundaries.”

Iran, the growing threat in the region and beyond, continues to support Shiite Islamist extremists in the on-going conflict for religious supremacy in historical Muslim lands. Economic sanctions and political negotiations may be somewhat effective; however, the Grand Ayatollah and strong central control portend a lasting threat to peace and security in the Mid-East and beyond.

## Appendix A

### Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders World Islamic Front Statement 23 February 1998

*Shaykh Osama Bin-Muhammad Bin-Laden*

*Ayman al-Zawahiri, Amir of the Jihad Group in Egypt*

*Abu-Yasir Rifa'i Ahmad Taha, Egyptian Islamic Group*

*Shaykh Mir Hamzah, secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan*

*Fazlur Rahman, Amir of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh*

Praise be to Allah, who revealed the Book, controls the clouds, defeats factionalism, and says in His Book: "But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the pagans wherever ye find them, seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war)"; and peace be upon our Prophet, Muhammad Bin-'Abdallah, who said: I have been sent with the sword between my hands to ensure that no one but Allah is worshipped, Allah who put my livelihood under the shadow of my spear and who inflicts humiliation and scorn on those who disobey my orders.

The Arabian Peninsula has never -- since Allah made it flat, created its desert, and encircled it with seas -- been stormed by any forces like the crusader armies spreading in it like locusts, eating its riches and wiping out its plantations. All this is happening at a time in which nations are attacking Muslims like people fighting over a plate of food. In the light of the grave situation and the lack of support, we and you are obliged to discuss current events, and we should all agree on how to settle the matter.

No one argues today about three facts that are known to everyone; we will list them, in order to remind everyone:

First, for over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples. If some people have in the past argued about the fact of the occupation, all the people of the Peninsula have now acknowledged it. The best proof of this is the Americans' continuing aggression against the Iraqi people using the Peninsula as a staging post, even though all its rulers are against their territories being used to that end, but they are helpless.

Second, despite the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist alliance, and despite the huge number of those killed, which has exceeded 1 million... despite all this, the Americans are once against trying to repeat the horrific massacres, as though they are not content with the protracted blockade imposed after the ferocious war or the fragmentation and devastation.

So here they come to annihilate what is left of this people and to humiliate their Muslim neighbors.

Third, if the Americans' aims behind these wars are religious and economic, the aim is also to serve the Jews' petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there. The best proof of this is their eagerness to destroy Iraq, the strongest neighboring Arab state, and their endeavor to fragment all the states of the region such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan into paper statelets and through their disunion and weakness to guarantee Israel's survival and the continuation of the brutal crusade occupation of the Peninsula. All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war on Allah, his messenger, and Muslims. And ulema have throughout Islamic history unanimously agreed that the jihad is an individual duty if the enemy destroys the Muslim countries. This was revealed by Imam Bin-Qadamah in "Al-Mughni," Imam al-Kisa'i in "Al-Bada'i," al-Qurtubi [al-Qutb, the Egyptian Islamic fundamentalist] in his

interpretation, and the Shaykh of al-Islam in his books, where he said: "As for the fighting to repulse [an enemy], it is aimed at defending sanctity and religion, and it is a duty as agreed [by the ulema]. Nothing is more sacred than belief except repulsing an enemy who is attacking religion and life."

On that basis, and in compliance with Allah's order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty Allah, "and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together," and "fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah."

This is in addition to the words of Almighty Allah: "And why should ye not fight in the cause of Allah and of those who, being weak, are ill-treated (and oppressed)? -- women and children, whose cry is: 'Our Lord, rescue us from this town, whose people are oppressors; and raise for us from thee one who will help!'"

We -- with Allah's help -- call on every Muslim who believes in Allah and wishes to be rewarded to comply with Allah's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's US troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson.

Almighty Allah said: "O ye who believe, give your response to Allah and His Apostle, when He calleth you to that which will give you life. And know that Allah cometh between a man and his heart, and that it is He to whom ye shall all be gathered."

Almighty Allah also says: "O ye who believe, what is the matter with you, that when ye are asked to go forth in the cause of Allah, ye cling so heavily to the earth! Do ye prefer the life of this world to the hereafter? But little is the comfort of this life, as compared with the hereafter. Unless ye go forth, He will punish you with a grievous penalty, and put others in your place; but Him ye would not harm in the least. For Allah hath power over all things."

Almighty Allah also says: "So lose no heart, nor fall into despair. For ye must gain mastery if ye are true in faith."

## Appendix B

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