|
Disposition of Soviet forces in the various theaters of operation. Relative disposition before the Battle of Warsaw Views of the commander- in-chief with respect to the missions and plans involved in the Battle of Warsaw. Plans of the commander of the Western Front Disposition of forces in the Battle of Warsaw. Plans of the commander of the Western Front. Disposition of forces in accordance with the plans of the latter. See map pertaining to chapters XV11 - original text - Tr.
In evaluating the preparations for the operation on the Vistula, it may be well to note briefly the military resources of the republic in general, the distribution of the same, and to consider the powers of resistance of the Polish government as these existed at the time of our preparations for the conflict and at the very beginning of the fighting on the Vistula.
The Polish government, which had just been formed out of three different parts, having gone through a profound class struggle involving a great variety of party and political groups, was doubtless in a condition wherein war constituted a most difficult and hazardous undertaking. The weaknesses of the Polish government, however, had been overestimated. A large part of the Polish communists believed that the entrance of Red Army forces into Polish territory and their crossing of the western boundaries of White Russia would render the outbreak of a revolution in Poland inevitable.
In his report before the Tenth Congress of the Communist Party Lenin said that in the war with Poland we had made some blunders, though he would not state whether he was referring to strategic or political blunders, though he would not state whether he was referring to strategic or political blunders. At all events Lenin said "a blunder was committed as a result of our overestimation of the superiority of our own strength."*
*V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XVIII, Pet 1, p. 108.
Our commander-in-chief also underestimated the strength of Poland. In a discussion of February 26, 1920 with members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front he stated that in the event that the Polish front should become active, it would be the easiest one before the Soviet forces, considering the many internal weaknesses and signs of disintegration already apparent within Poland. This overestimation of the internal weaknesses of Poland were noted also later. Thus our field Headquarters suggested that the Western Front, even after placing the Sixteenth Army in reserve, would still have sufficient forces left in the remaining three armies to bring about a complete defeat of Poland (report submitted to the chairman of the revolutionary Military Council on July 21, 1920). As was shown by the history of the war, this political and military evaluation was not in accord with the actual strength of the Polish government. The nationalistic enthusiasm which consumed the petite bourgeoisie and intelligentsia of Poland afforded sufficient cohesive power for the unification of the various factions that were divided up to then. The peasantry, at best, remained noncommittal and, where it was prodded on by the priests, in certain cases was even hostile to the Soviet Union, Finally, the military aid which France was to give Poland, considering the huge quantities of military material which it had left over from the World War, was greatly underestimated. As was shown later, the assistance extended Poland by France involved more than the supply of arms and military equipment and included the sending of military experts ranging from air pilots to high ranking staff officers. The result of all this was to have its effects upon our strategic plans and on their execution. At the same time it would have been entirely erroneous and injurious to draw any general conclusions of an opposite nature. In the first place, there is no doubt that our calculations with respect to a revolution in Poland were well founded. Poland was clearly ripe for revolution. The movement of the working class in Warsaw and Lodz and the accompanying repressions of the Polish bourgeoisie, the reception of the Red Army by the working class in White Russia, etc., all this was clear proof of the prospects in this connection. The working class in Poland had begun the formation of its own Red Army for action against the Polish bourgeoisie. The fact that our calculations anent the class front in our revolutionary war with White Poland were well founded may be seen from the wave of revolutionary movements that swept through Europe, which became particularly powerful in Germany , Italy and Great Britain. These facts are indisputable and tend to show that our political estimate of the situation was correct. But, therefore, our estimate of the strength of the Polish bourgeoisie, their organizational power and influence on the peasantry, and our evaluation of the aid which France would afford Poland had been underestimated prior to the beginning of the decisive operations, as the further course of the events demonstrated.
Our overemphasizing of the weakness of the Polish government also had its effect on the employment of our military forces, that were at the disposal of our commanders in the field, but also in so far as the general resources of the People's Commissariat of military and naval affairs were concerned.
As we know, the Red Army at this time numbered about 3,500,000 men. This was inclusive of the military forces of the VCHK (All Russian Extraordinary Commission}. It would appear that with such a huge number of forces and the conclusion of most of the fighting on the other fronts of the Soviet Union, it should have been possible to concentrate a truly overwhelming superiority of forces in the Polish theater of operations. But this was not the case. Out of 3,500,000 men the commander in the field had a total of only 639,845 men (on June 1, 1920). A total of 2,810,357 men remained in military labor units. The remainder were employed behind the lines. And thus while the country was carrying the extreme burden of maintaining this huge army the actual war was being conducted only by a small part of these military forces.
This picture of the restricted utilization of our military forces on the Polish front is to be seen later. At this time when the crisis arrived in the campaign on the Polish front, i.e.,during the fighting on the banks of the Vistula, the total strength of the Soviet commander-in-chief developed in the west in the Tver sector and in the Ukraine amounted to 210,840 infantry and cavalry troops; on the Southwest Front, inclusive of the Tver sector - 122,786 infantry and cavalry troops; on the Caucasus Front - 35,291 infantry and cavalry troops, The percentage of this distribution was as follows: Within the theater of operations, only 25%, and on the Caucasus front 16%. This shifting of the center of gravity of the main forces of the republic to the secondary Ukrainian theater of operations in the summer of 1920 may be explained only by the great activity of Wrangel's forces and the successes of the latter. Within the Ukrainian theater of operations itself the Red forces were distributed as follows: in the Polish sector of the front were about 35,000 infantry and cavalry troops, or 21% of the entire available forces of this front (in round numbers). And on the Tver sector there were operating 87,561 infantry and cavalry troops, or 79%. (in round numbers) of the available forces of this front. In computing the forces of the republic employed both on the Polish and Wrangel fronts, we readily see that the Soviet strategy was to divide the available forces here equally between these two fronts. And thus on the front where the decisive operations were to develop there were concentrated about 87,000 infantry and cavalry troops out of a total of about 210,000 troops. And if we consider the group of forces that was actually to decide the mission on the Polish front we find that for the "complete defeat of Poland" there were assigned only 53,000 infantry and cavalry troops, or not more than 25% of those forces at the disposal of the commander-in-chief within the European theaters of operation.
The development of the military operations in the Western Front in July and August, the defeat and continuous retreat of the Polish forces, the revolutionary movement in the West- European armies, changed the aspect of the war and its implications both as regards the Soviet Union and internationally. The scope of the entire conflict and the means required for its prosecution gradually expanded. Describing the progress of the conflict at the September party conference, Lenin devoted most of his time to an analysis of the undertaking and to its significance:
"The war with Poland, or more properly the July and August campaign, has basically changed the international political situation."
The change in the situation on the Western Front and the Curzon note emphasized to the Communist party the vital importance of securing for the conflict the requisite forces and equipment. And it was particularly here, in this sphere of the conflict, that there was a slackening in the necessary effort.
On July 16th the commander-in-chief submitted a report to the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council in which he stressed the following:
Concerning the above report of the commander-in-chief, Trotsky received the exhaustive instructions of the Soviet government set forth in telegram No. 707 dated July 17, addressed to the commander-in-chief, a copy of which was sent to the Central Committee of the Communist Party.**
** Kakurin and Melikov,The War With Poland, p. 475
The directive began: "The note of Lord Curzon testifies to the fact that the capitalistic governments of the Entente regard our successes on the Polish front as greatly threatening the already unstable international and domestic regime established after the peace of Versailles." This description of the situation thoroughly reflected Lenin's estimate of the effects of our successes in the west on the situation of the Allied powers.
At the September party conference Lenin developed this as follows: "Our advance to Warsaw produced such a tremendous effect on Western Europe and on the entire world situation, as to completely upset the relationships of the conflicting internal and foreign political forces. The approach of our army to Warsaw has definitely established the fact that somewhere in the neighborhood of Warsaw is the center of the entire system of world imperialism resting on the treaty of Versailles."
In his address at the congress of workers and employees of the tannery industry on October 8 he added the following:
"If Poland would have become Sovietized, if the Warsaw toilers received the aid from Soviet Russia which they were expecting and hoping for, the peace of Versailles would have been disrupted and the entire international system won by the victories over Germany would have collapsed."
The boundary line proposed by Lord Curzon extended approximately through the Brest-Litovsk meridian.
Thus we note that by mid-July, in rejecting Lord Curzon's note, Lenin already fully realized the effects on Europe produced by our advance on Poland. British mediation was regarded as a step in the direction of aiding our enemies. From this followed the need for the concentration of a maximum of forces against Poland and an intensification of our efforts before the Allied powers could bring Rumania in the war against us or reinforce General Wrangel. The directive referred to this as follows: "In view of the above situation, the commander -in- chief and all other agencies of the war department will adopt measures to insure every possible speed and vigor in the advance on the heels of the retreating Polish White guard forces while at the same time without relaxing the pressure against the bourgeois-nobility forces in Poland,preparing a reserve for employment in the contingency that Rumania should lose her head and follow into the footsteps of Poland." From this we note that the decision of the government was well-founded with respect to the position of Rumania when it declined the question of a regrouping of our forces on the Polish front and, moveover, suggested the adoption of all possible measures for the reinforcement and protection of the advancing forces. In the event that Rumania should have entered the conflict, new reserves were to provide for such a contingency, but not a single man was to be diverted from the Polish front.
With respect to the lack in our preparations for the conflict with
Poland, we may further stress the poor organization of the functions of control
in the field on the Western Front. The field headquarters adopted no measures
whatever looking toward added agencies of control to provide for the handling
of the newly concentrated forces on the Western Front, nor did it provide for
sufficient means of communication and equipment for the maintenance and control
of the large forces involved, especially in so far as communications with
railway troops were concerned. This deficiency,as well as the lack in the
organization of the front and army supply services adversely affected our
further operations. From the report of the commander-in-chief submitted to the
chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council on July l6th, we see that the
commander-in-chief considered a protraction of the conflict beyond the autumn
to be hazardous. All this indicated that every effort had to be made to
conclude the war with White Poland during the summer and that, with this in
view it was essential to concentrate all available forces and means consistent
with the aims of our undertakings. Our failure in this connection was affected
to a certain extent by the optimistic views entertained with respect to the
situation on the Polish front.
Meanwhile the Polish bourgeoisie strained every possible effort: Sixteen
classes had already been called to the colors. The mobilization of the Polish
manpower already included man 35 years of age. New formations were being
organized at utmost speed. France supplied arms, equipment, aviation and
instructors.
Did we possess sufficient forces for the execution of the missions designated by the government? Figures speak in this respect. The Polish Army consisted of 131,000 to 143,000 infantry and cavalry troops. Against these we had 87,763 infantry and cavalry troops. From the figures already presented above we know that by a more rigid organizational effort the People's Commissariat for War and Navy in the execution of the directives of the government could have considerably augmented our forces and means of combat. Even those small forces that were employed against Poland hardly performed their mission. "The Red Army had covered without interruption 500 to 600 km. and in some instances as much as 800 km. and it reached the city of Warsaw.
Warsaw was almost given up by the Poles. This at least was the view expressed by the press of the world."*
"It turned out that the war afforded us an opportunity to almost complete the defeat of Poland, yet at the decisive moment we proved short of the necessary forces,"**
"Our Army demonstrated the fact that the vast, though devastated land of the Soviets in the summer of 1920 was only a few steps from complete victory.***
Certain historians writing on the war with Poland speak of the erroneous action of our high command in advancing to the Vistula without interruption, stating that strategically it would have been more proper to halt somewhere on the Polish boundaries or on the Western Bug river. In our opinion,such views may be entertained only by those who would place politics ahead of strategy. In presenting the instructions of our government, we have already shown that the possibility of having the Allied powers muster against us new foes had compelled our government to demand of our military forces the defeat of Poland in the shortest possible time, and the Red Army was categorically called upon "prompt and vigorous action against the retreating Polish White guards,"It is quite obvious that a halt on the Bug from the strategic standpoint was impossible. Aside from a consideration of the possibility of the appearance of new enemies, from the political standpoint it was impossible to overlook also the huge growth of the revolutionary movement that was taking place in that period, to which Lenin referred as follows:
"When the Red forces approached the Polish frontier the victorious advance of the Red Army brought forth an unheard of political crisis."* And further - "With the approach of our forces to Warsaw the whole of Germany was set aflame. The picture presented there was similar to that which might have been observed in Russia in 1905 when the "Black Hundred"aroused and set on political motion the wide and more backward elements of the peasantry which one day went against the Bolsheviks and the next day demanded the entire land of the landowners."** And further - "The advance on Poland had wrought such a change that the British Mensheviks formed an alliance with the Russian Bolsheviks. Such was the effect of our advance on Poland." The entire British bourgeois press wrote that the "Committee of Action" represented nothing more nor less than the Soviets. And this was true. The name was different but in essence it was one and the same thing.*** And finally he pointed out that "you also know the repercussions of the European crisis in Italy. Italy is one of the victor-nations, and while the victory of the Red Army created a movement in Germany and a change in the policy of Great Britain, in Italy the struggle assumed proportions wherein the workers began seizing factories, taking over buildings of manufacturers and to rouse to action the rural populace of the country. Italy is now in a position which can in no way be called peaceful."***
We may add to the above that our successful advance had the effect of considerably demoralizing the Polish government and Polish high command to which we shall refer later.
It may be well also to present here the estimate of the September
All-Russian Communist Party conference, after hearing the report of the
chairman of the Polish communists, comrade Ulanovsky, who had just arrived
directly from Warsaw, happily noted that the leading Polish workers are in full
agreement with the action of the R.S.F.S.R., and are regarding the events of
the past few months in the same light as the communists of the armed hand in
sovietizing Poland and have made no concessions whatever to either nationalism
or fascism The conference noted with satisfaction that some of the individual
critical voices of Polish communists heard in Berlin (article in Rote Fahne)
were not the voices of the Polish communist party.
In the complete solidarity of views of the Polish and Russian communists the
conference saw insurance that the final victory would be a victory of the
Soviets, in spite of the trials and tribulations involved in the struggle
confronting them. The conference sent its fraternal felicitations to the Polish
communist workers.
Now, proceeding to a presentation of the gradual evolution of the plan for the
operation on the Vistula, we shall turn back somewhat to those basic
instructions issued by the commander- in-chief in conformity with the political
directive that had been received by him. The first general instructions of the
commander-in-chief were issued on July 20 in directive No. 4315/Op This
directive instructed both fronts.(groups of armies) to "continue the
vigorous development of the operation in conformity with previously issued
orders without restricting the same to the boundaries indicated in the note of
Lord Curzon." * On July 21 the commander-in-chief released the report of
the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council (No. 481), which was rather
cautious in tone. It was apprehensive of Rumania's entrance into the war -
"having already sufficient forces and means for the purpose" of
joining the conflict in support of Poland. The commander-in-chief was of the
opinion that "our advance into the interior of Galicia in the
circumstances would be highly dangerous," and he therefore suggested to
the commander of the Southwest front to undertake an operation of a more
limited objective, namely, to defeat the Polish right-flank army, "with
the object of cutting off the Polish front from that of Rumania and to gain an
opportunity for the employment of a part of the forces of the Southwest front
in possible action against Rumania." Further, the commander-in-chief
considered, in the event that it became necessary to reinforce the Rumania
front eventually, to maintain the Red Sixteenth Army in reserve. This army
might also be maintained in reserve for possible action against Latvia, in the
event that the latter should enter the conflict. The commander-in-chief was of
the opinion that the complete defeat of Poland could be accomplished with the
remaining forces of the three armies of the Western Front."*
Available documents on the subject fail to supply the answer to this suggestion of the commander-in-chief. The more detailed instructions to both fronts (groups of armies) issued by the commander-in-chief on July 21 and 22 enable us to judge that basically his orders were concurred in by the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council. These were set forth in the directive of the commander-in-chief issued to the commanders of the Southwest and West fronts at Moscow on July 23,1920. *
* The question with respect to the directives of the commander- in-chief issued at moscow call for special elucidation in connection with the assertions made by A. I. Yegerov in his book entitled Lemberg-Warsaw, (p.33) to the effect that directive No. 4345/op was issued at moscow on July 21 and directive no. 4434/op was issued there on July 22.
A careful examination of all available material and recollections of individuals who participated in the undertaking show the following:
On July 20, 1920 the train of the commander-in-chief received from the outgoing journal of the Field Headquarters Nos. 4343, 4344, 4345, 4346 {See Document AKA No. 1507, outgoing journal, Field Headquarters, p. 151).
On July 22, 1920, in the afternoon, the commander-in-chief arrived at Minsk from Smolensk, remaining there until the morning of the 23rd. the commander-in-chief issued both of the directives mentioned. The first of these was Directive No.4344/op, which actually shows the notation 0:30 hours, July 22 but which is a clerical error,inasmuch as shows the time of the issuance of the direction as the night of the 22d of July. Whereas on this night, as we know now, the commander-in-chief was not in Minsk but rather still in Smolensk. As regards Directive No. 4343/op addressed to the commander of the Southwest Front, we again personally verified the date of this document and have ascertained that it was actually issued on July 23d and not on July 2l, which fact may be verified by any one by consulting Document No. 1742 AKA, p. 159. On the basis of these documents we categorically confirm the dates as herein shown to be: the night of July 23d and the morning of July 23d, respectively.
The directive in question was issued first to the commander of the Southwest Front,No. 4343/op. This gave the mission of the commander of the Southwest Front to "crush the Polish Sixth Army and the Ukrainian Army driving them back in a southerly direction toward the Rumanian frontier; the cavalry army was to be utilized for the purpose." The directive called for the employment of the cavalry army in the execution of this mission on a narrow front, in a definitely indicated area and without a dispersion of the forces involved. Furthermore, the Southwest Front, by August 4th, with the aid of a powerful assault group of the right flank, was to seize the Kovel - Vladimir-Volhynsk area, maintaining contact with the left flank of the armies of the Western Front while protecting its own left flank.* On the next morning, July 23, the commander-in-chief, by directive No. 4344, designated the mission of the Western Front to "defeat the enemy and capture the city of Warsaw by not later than August l2th."
The boundary line between the two fronts (group of armies) extended through Ratno, Voldava, Novaya Alexandriya (Pulava) on the Vistula. All these points to the Western Front. Even though the subsequent instructions of the commander-in-chief involved considerable changes in the missions of the Southwest Front, in so far as the Western Front was concerned the mission remained the same, and the directive of the 23d of July maintained its importance for the Southwest Front up to the beginning of August l920. It may be well now to present an analysis of the two directives. This is particularly necessary because of the fact that the two directives are stressed in all works dealing with the operations on the Vistula. Consideration of the functions of control and command during the changes in the campaign begins with these directives. Claims and counterclaims are also based on these directives. On the basis of the evolution of the missions set forth in the two directives, which are so clearly expressed therein as to preclude any misinterpretations, we arrive at the following conclusions.
In the middle of the month of July the commander-in-chief considered it possible to bring about a complete defeat of the principal Polish forces with the armies of the Western Front alone. By the beginning of August, however, he already recognized the power of resistance of the enemy.
How are we to explain the great optimism of the commander- in-chief?
A number of answers may be given to this. In the first place, in deciding to
shift the Southwest Front (group of armies) to the Rumanian frontier, the
commander-in-chief had taken into consideration the menace of the Rumanian army
to the left flank of the Southwest Front as long as Brest-Litovsk was not
occupied and the Southwest Front was not insured communications through Polesie
to the north. Secondly, the commander-in-chief counted on a swift conclusion of
the action against the Polish Sixth Army and then, in the execution of his
previous plan, he might shift the main forces of the Southwest Front to Brest
and Lubin. As we shall see later, the commander- in-chief was wrong in this
connection. The unforeseen difficulties encountered were greater than had been
expected.
In his July directive to the commander of the Western Front, the
commander-in-chief had designated the capture of Warsaw as the next objective.
The scope of the operations of the Southwest Front was more extensive and the
commander of this group of armies was allowed greater freedom in the selection
of his main objectives. The city of Lemberg was not contemplated the main
objective in Directive No. 4343/op. As regards the Cavalry Army the directive
merely states that it will deliver its main effort, "protecting itself
against the direction of Lemberg," but there is no doubt that the
directive shifted the center of gravity in the efforts of the Southwest Front
directly south to such an extent, compared to the suggestion of the commander
of the Southwest Front, Yegorov, of July 22d, that the city of Lemberg was
inevitably in the line of action of that front and constitute its main
objective in the execution of Directive No. 4343/op.
Thus, both directives, No. 4343/op and No. 4344, may be regarded in conjunction with one another as a compromise between the instructions of the government in the directive of July l7 and the suggestions of the commander-in-chief in the latter's report No. 48l of July 21. The first result of this compromise was the adoption of missions in two diverging directions. On the one hand, Warsaw was assumed as the immediate objective, on the other, Rumania was considered as the ultimate objective, in the course of which the city of Lemberg became the immediate objective. There is no need to dwell on the tremendous importance which Lemberg and Warsaw assumed, the latter especially.
We have already mentioned the fact that this city constituted the center of all Polish governmental activity. Aside from this political importance,the city of Warsaw was at this time also the principal supply center of that country. Here is what General Sikorski has to say in this connection." The city of Warsaw was one of the main industrial centers of Poland. Its fall was equivalent to the loss of a major engagement. The selection of the city of Warsaw as a main objective threatened the shifting of the theater of operations far into the interior of the country and constituted a really successful example in the selection of a strategic objective." Whether it was expedient to assume two such major objectives at one time with the relative strength of the opposing forces (as shown at the beginning of this chapter) is quite another matter. It must be admitted that, apparently, the plan involved contemplated a conclusion of the war by a victorious attack on Warsaw. The delivery of this attack devolved solely upon the Western Front. Even though Directive No.4343/op contemplated the employment of a powerful assault group by the Southwest Front in the Kovel - Vladimir-Volhynsky area on August 4th from the spirit of the directive we may readily assume that this group of forces was more in the nature of a connecting link between the inner flanks of the two fronts (groups of armies) than an active assault force.
Only during the days that followed in the latter part of July, 1920, did the commander-in-chief begin to indicate the first moves in connection with a reconsideration of matters affecting the Southwest Front (group of armies) in the operations on the Vistula. These moves were perhaps the result of the impression that had been gained of the increased resistance of the enemy on the Bug and Narev rivers. In a conversation with the commander of the Southwest Front (group of armies) over direct wire on the 28th of July the commander- in-chief expressed the thought of the transfer "in connection with matters affecting the Brest area" of first the Twelfth Army and later the far wing of the Polish sector to the Western Front (group of armies*). This shifting of forces, of course, was to involve also a change in the aims and objects of this army wing, with a change in the functions of the forces involved to active cooperation with the Western Front, which was naturally to transfer to second place the question of the capture of Lemberg. This conversation, however, had no further consequences at that particular time.
The situation existing at the time on the Southwest Front (group of armies) had the effect of postponing the execution of the missions of the armies of this front in accordance with Directive No. 4343/op for a definite time. In the Brody area the First Cavalry Army was engaged in vigorous fighting with the Polish Second Army and part of the Polish Sixth Army. The Red Fourteenth Army was encountering equally strong resistance. As we have seen, only the Red Twelfth Army had been making better progress. Thus it is to be admitted that, for reasons beyond our control, we failed in bringing to a successful conclusion that operation, with the limited objective of the Southwest Front, of which we believe the commander-in-chief to have been the sole sponsor, the outcome of which was to result in the crushing of the Polish Sixth Army. Now this matter was protracted; meanwhile by August 2d the situation underwent a radical change compared to the situation existing in the latter part of July.
The essential change in the situation consisted of the fall of Brest. This involved the reaching by the armies of the Western Front of the western portions of Polesie; at the same time, the Twelfth Army of the Southwest Front was rapidly moving up to the left flank of the Western Front. Rumania had not taken any active steps while the resistance of the Polish forces on the line of the Western Bug river increased considerably. It was quite proper under the circumstances to concentrate most of the attention to our Western Front, which was to decide the outcome of the conflict. We are of the opinion that the commander-in-chief was quite justified in the action taken, and properly followed the course which should have been taken. Henceforward, in his conception, the Polish wing of the Southwest Front (group of armies) was to perform a secondary role in the interests of the Western Front (group of armies), directing all of its efforts toward assisting the Western Front.
Looking at the events after a lapse of ten years, we can only express regrets over the fact that this plan, which was entirely logical and correct in its essence, had not been executed promptly and decisively. The path for the preliminary solution of the problem involved in connection with the establishment of cooperation between the two fronts (groups of armies) called for a strict coordination of efforts. And yet the problem involved did not represent anything new or surprising. It had been under consideration long before the time when it became necessary to put it into execution. Even though the contemporary historian is in a less favorable position compared to the historian of past generations in so far as the former has not available many of the archive documents which the historian of the future will have at his disposal, he nevertheless had a great advantage in relation to the latter. This consists of the testimony of living, trustworthy eyewitnesses. In those instances where our guiding clues are interrupted in the archives, for some reason or another, we are forced to take up this path. We have resorted to this in the present instance. According to Tukhachevsky, the matter of cooperation between the two fronts had come up back in April of 1920. During the latter part of April the question was taken up at a conference of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic presided over by comrade Skliansky. The government representative at the time already suggested unification of the armies operating on the Polish front under a single control, and the commander-in-chief agreed in the matter in principle,but insisted on the adoption of this only after our armies would reach the Brest meridian, i.e., he favored postponement of the decision involved until the time when the marshy forest Polesie area separating our Western and Southwestern fronts had been crossed.
After the fall of Brest, which followed, as we know, on August 1st, the commander-in-chief proceeded with the adoption of the plan for the establishment of cooperation between the two fronts in accordance with the decision adopted at the conference of the Revolutionary Military council of the REpublic in the latter part of April, 1920. This may be noted in the directive of the commander-in-chief No. 4578/op/987/sh of August 3d. This directive provided for the transfer at a nearly date to the control of the commander of the Western Front of the Twelfth Army and the First Cavalry Army, and contains various instructions with respect to the establishment of contact with these armies by the commander of the Western Front (group of armies).
In the transfer of the Twelfth and First Cavalry armies to the Western Front (group of armies) the boundary line between the two fronts was to be shifted directly due south, passing through Berdichev - Staro-Konstantinov Bielozersk - Pomorzany Mikhova, all points excepting Berdichev and Staro-Konstantinov to the Western Front. The directive did not alter the missions of the Southwest Front, or more properly, of the Polish wing of this front, which still continued its operations in the spirit of the directive of the commander-in-chief of July 23d, No. 4343/op, and this practically amounted to the sanctioning by the commander-in-chief of a continuation of the Lemberg operation. Apparently, the commander-in-chief was of the opinion that the commander of the Western Front would assign timely missions to the Twelfth and First Cavalry armies upon establishing contact with these armies and, not wishing to interfere with the plans of these armies or to impose new requirements upon them, permitted the events on the Southwest Front to develop in the manner that they were proceeding.
Subsequent events have shown that the commander-in-chief failed to consider properly the time element in this connection along with those problems which in the case of our extensive theaters of operation were bound to arise in the changing of the direction of the operations of large military units. were bound to arise in the changing of the direction of the operations of large military units. Actually, on August 3d the moment had arrived for effecting a change in the missions assigned to the armies of the Polish wing of the Southwest Front (group of armies). We cannot blame the commander of the Southwest Front for not changing the missions which he had assigned to his three armies from independent to auxiliary undertakings so long as the commander- in-chief neglected to do so.
The book entitled Lemberg - Warsaw by Yegorov tends to show that the commander of the Southwest Front (group of armies) regarded his role on the Polish Front as being independent from beginning to end, and that he had formulated his own plan for an invasion far into Galicia, the first step in which direction was to consist of the seizure of the crossings of the Lower San. Comrade Yegorov believed this constituted the best method for the cooperation of the two fronts (groups of armies) in the Polish theater of operations.
In having the two armies of the Southwest Front (group of armies) transferred to the West Front (group of armies), the commander-in-chief apparently for the reasons stated above, neglected not only to acquaint the commander of the Southwest Front with his plans concerning the further utilization of these armies, but in his subsequent instructions further confirmed the commander of the Southwest Front in his intentions of continuing the Lemberg operation and, in a manner of speaking, himself pushed him southward. This may be seen from telegram No. 4592/op of the commander-in-chief dated August 3d which called for the prompt movement of the Twelfth Army directly against Vladimir-Volhynsk, i.e., in a more southerly direction with respect to the situation on the front of the First Cavalry Army.* Thus the directive of the commander of the Southwest Front No. 707 (sic) 4433/op was the direct consequence of the above telegram and caused the movement of the main forces of the Twelfth Army due south in the direction of Vladimir-Volhynsk - Tomaszov, at the same time ordering the First Cavalry Army to defeat the hostile Lemberg group of forces at the earliest possible moment.*
This directive assumes much importance. It should supply the reasons for the failure of those armies of the Southwest Front that had been transferred to the Western Front (group of armies) to reach the new strategic areas. The directive of the commander-in-chief of August 6th (No.4634/1001/sh) provided for the incorporation into the Western Front of also the Fourteenth Army, which indicated, as pointed out by Yegorov in his book, the complete elimination of the control of the Polish wing of the Southwest Front by its commander.
Before proceeding with a further study of the events involved, let us consider the characteristics of the functions of control during the preceding four days (August 3 to 6). This was the transition phase before the commander-in-chief was formulating his final concepts with respect to the cooperation of the two fronts (groups of armies). Here we soon begin to note some difficulties of a technical nature. The commander of the Western Front in his telegram of the 7th of August (No. 0209/op) points out that the establishment of direct contact with the three southern armies will require 10 to 14 days. He anticipates considerable difficulties in connection with the organization of the supply and communications of these armies. He therefore requests that the armies transferred to his command be allowed to take with them all of their transport and communications (signal) equipment. On August 8th the commander of the Southwest Front (Telegram No. l50-4526/op) rejects this request stating that this would paralyze the entire control of the Southwest Front (group of armies) under General Wrangel.*
Thus, it may be said that already back on August 8th the question of the establishment of the cooperation of the two fronts (groups of armies) at the vital points of the struggle which was to decide the outcome of the conflict and which was definitely assuming its shape in the middle Vistula, was still undecided. At this same time, the commander of the Southwest Front (on the night of the 8th of August) by Directive No. 748/sek was taking measures for the adoption of his concepts regarding the invasion of Galicia.
He was directing the main forces of the Twelfth Army (3 infantry
divisions) against the line: Tomaszov - Rava Russkaya, which was to bring about
the adoption of the diverging efforts of the inner flanks of the Southwest and
Western Fronts; at the same time he was taking measures looking toward the
placing of the First Cavalry Army in reserve.** This was the situation with
respect to the cooperation between the two fronts (groups of armies) at the
time when the plan of the operations of the armies of the Western Front on the
Vistula was finally adopted and entered the initial stages of execution.
The commander-in-chief had directed the attention of the commander of the
Western Front in his directive of August 7th to the fact that the Ivangorod
(Demblin) area was unavoidable in the further advance of the left flank
Sixteenth Army, since for the time being it could not count on the assistance
of the Twelfth Army in view of the direction of the latter directly due south
with the object of placing the First Cavalry Army in reserve.
In his directive of August 8, No. 468l/op/1023/sh, the commander-in-chief advised the commander of the Western Front that the transfer of the Polish wing of the Southwest Front (Twelfth, First Cavalry and Fourteenth armies) had already been decided upon.* This directive, apparently, was in response to previous conversations conducted earlier between the commander- in-chief and the commander of the Western Front over direct wire. This conversation covered the plan of operations of the armies of the Western Front with regard to the fact that the general situation demanded the prompt unification of all armies under a single commander.**
Analyzing the plan of operations on the Western Front it is necessary to bear in mind that the commander of the Western Front, after his telegram to the commander-in-chief of August 7th, referred to above, was awaiting from day to day for the transfer to his control of the three armies of the Southwest Front (Twelfth, First Cavalry and Fourteenth armies).
In formulating his plan of action the commander of the Western Front (group of armies) had duly considered the following:
1. The forces of the enemy were assumed to be considerably superior to our own forces on the banks of the Vistula (he estimated the hostile forces to consist of 70,000 infantry and cavalry effective, against 40,000 of his own) but therefore the morale of the Soviet forces was considered to be much better.
Here is what an eyewitness who participated in the events on the Polish side, The French General Fourrier, has to say in this connection.
"And actually during this period the psychological condition of the Polish people was very low. The working class, thoroughly agitated by the communists, might easily decide on aiding the Reds; while the peasantry and those who in the East would be called 'intelligentsia,' were weary. All were accustomed to easy victories and the easy victories and the war, which was being carried on somewhere on the distant frontiers, no longer concerned anybody.
" The army was suffering defeats and had no support back of it. It felt spiritually abandoned and even before the launching of the decisive offensive by the Bolsheviks there were certain symptoms of decay which greatly worried the Polish high command. The attack of the enemy, delivered in the circumstances, was a real disaster."
2. The principal mass of the hostile forces early in August was disposed to the North of the Western Bug River, withdrawing toward Modlin and Warsaw. In view of this fact, the left flank of the entire Polish forces on the Vistula comprised the major Polish strength and should therefore constitute the immediate objective of our operations, inasmuch as under the unfavorable strength of the opposing forces there was no other large-scale objective which the Red forces might assume.
3. The general concentration and reinforcement of the left flank was secured by a concentration in the Lublin area of the Twelfth Army and First Cavalry Army, the matter of whose transfer to the Western Front had been taken up by the commander of the Western Front in the early part of August but had been delayed by questions affecting the lack of signal communication equipment, and was to be accomplished by August l3 to l5.
4. In the event that the enemy decided to accept battle on the Bug, the situation would permit the shifting to the south of the Third and Sixteenth armies from the mouth of the Western Bug river.
There was some disagreement between the commander-in-chief and the commander of The Western Front on or about August 7th concerning the assumed disposition of the hostile forces. The commander-in-chief was of the opinion that the main forces of the enemy were situated south of the Western Bug river while the commander of the Western Front, on the other hand, assumed these to be situated to the north of the Western Bug.
Based on his own assumptions, the commander-in-chief endeavored to eliminate the hostile manpower somewhere between the Western Bug and the Vistula while it still had no opportunity to recover after a series of defeats, was still without reinforcements and deprived of an opportunity to effect a regrouping of its forces and establish itself on the powerful lines of the Vistula river with the defense system afforded by this river in the form of the Modlin fortifications (Novogeorgievsk), Zgierz the Warsaw bridgehead fortifications and the Demblin (Ivangorod} fortifications. In view of our unfavorable situation with respect to the relative strength of opposing forces, the matter of gaining time in the exploitation of our superior morale assumed decisive importance.
This thought was forcefully conveyed by the commander-in- chief, S.S.Kamenev, in his directives and conversations over direct wire with the commander of the Western Front during August 7 to l0. He suggested the shifting southward, to the Demblin area, of our Third and Fifteenth armies north of the Western Bug.
On the 8th of August the commander of the Western Front (group of armies) already recognized certain signs of a regrouping of the hostile forces on his front and reached the conclusion that the enemy was intending to avoid a general engagement between the Western Bug and Vistula rivers. Accordingly, the commander of the Western Front assumed that the turning of the Third Army directly due south would amount to sending it into empty space. And as a matter of fact, as we shall see later, according to Pilsudski's plan of August 6h the Polish armies, being regrouped for the Third Army directly due south would amount to sending it into empty space. And as a matter of fact, as we shall see later, according to Pilsudski's plan of August 6th, the polish armies, being regrouped for the launching of a counterattack had instituted a hasty withdrawal toward the Vistula.
With the above, in view, the commander of the Western Front issued on August l0th a directive in which he designated the following general mission for his armies; "The enemy is continuing his withdrawal along the entire front. Our armies are to bring about his complete destruction and, after crossing the Vistula river, the enemy will be driven to the southwestward." Further, in conformity with this directive, after crossing the Vistula the spearhead of our forces was to be turned directly south. From which it may be concluded that the ultimate plans of the commander of the Western Front involved the capture of Warsaw with its fortifications from the rear, in the event that it failed to fall meanwhile under the blows delivered against it frontally. Our forces situated to the south of the Western Bug had been directed as follows: Sixteenth Army, with main forces against the sector of the Vistula river to the north of Warsaw - Modlin (exclusive) - Yablonna (inclusive),* and the Mozyr group -against the sector of the Vistula to the north of Demblin, where it was also to effect a crossing of the river (at Kozenitse). The tip of the right flank of the front (fourth Army) was to cross the Vistula on August l5th, while all of the remaining armies were to cross this river on August l4th.
Thus we see that the plan of the commander of the Western Front was quite aggressive in nature, providing for offensive undertakings for all of his armies. The commander of the Western Front, who was at the city of Minsk as the time, maintained supervision over the control of all of his five armies (inclusive of the Mozyr group), to which of course rendered the problems of control and communications rather difficult. It was found impossible to move up the front (group of armies) headquarters in time, owing to the difficulties encountered in establishing communications with the armies of the Southwest Front (group of armies).
In conformity with this plan, there was brought about the following disposition of our forces: To the north of Warsaw, on a front of l00 to ll0 km. was advancing an assault force of three armies with the strength of about 40,000 infantry and cavalry effectives, comprising about 80% of the entire available forces of the Western Front (in round numbers). To the south of Warsaw, on a front of l00 to l70 km. were advancing about 10,000, infantry and cavalry effectives belonging to the Sixteenth Army and the Mozyr group, comprising about 20% of the available forces of the Western Front (group of armies). The Mozyr group was stretched out the most (4,l93 infantry and cavalry effective strengthened on August l2th by the 58th Infantry Division that had been detached from the Twelfth Army, which brought up its strength, according to the information of some writers, to 6,600 infantry and cavalry effectives), operating on a line of l00 km.
This group of forces, prior to the concentration of the First Cavalry Army and the Twelfth Army in the Lubin area was actually the group of forces securing in the Ivangorod area the operations of the entire front. The timely arrival in this area of two of our armies the total strength of which amounted to 26,225 infantry and cavalry effectives (Twelfth Army - 11,225 infantry and cavalry; the First Cavalry Army - 15,000 cavalry troops )* together with a total strength of 32,885 infantry and cavalry troops. We then had a quite satisfactory disposition of forces, that conformed properly to the decisive plans of the commander of the Western Front. The powerful assault force in the Modlin area numbered about 40,000 infantry and cavalry effectives. The somewhat smaller force, yet quite powerful was situated in the Demblin area and numbered 32,885 infantry and cavalry troops, and there was the Sixteenth Army connecting the weak center of these forces.
Later on, after presenting the strategic plans of the other side, we shall endeavor to present a general analysis of the plan of the commander of the Western Front. For the time being we shall merely note that the main objective pursued by the commander of the Western Front was not the gaining of any particular ground, or some definite geographical feature or point as an objective in itself, but rather the hostile manpower. This manpower, however,as we shall see later, was already situated near its main bases of operation. Consequently, their fate was already closely connected with the fate of the defended territory and with the principal focal point of the same, namely, the city of Warsaw. This is why the latter, while not constituting an objective in itself, in so far as the commander of the Western Front was concerned, at the same time became the main objective of the operations, inasmuch as it attracted the main forces of the enemy.
As may be seen from the book by A. I. Yegorov, to which we have frequently referred to above, the commander of the Southwest Front had assumed a rather extensive mission for the Polish wing of his front. As far back as the 23d of July he regarded the Lemberg operation as the key to his invasion far into the depth of Galicia, endeavoring to establish himself later on the line of the San river from Peremyshl up to Radymno, thence by a movement through Krasnik and Yanov to reach the sector: Vistula river - Annopol - Zavikhost.* The intentions of the commander of the Southwest Front in this connection remained unchanged until the very time when both of his right- flank armies were transferred to the actual control of the commander of the Western Front. But inasmuch as the Lemberg operation was protracted, the commander of the Southwest Front found it impossible to carry out his plans, for all of his orders in the days preceding the transfer of his Twelfth and First Cavalry armies (4-7 August) had been subordinated to the interests of the Lemberg operation rather than the reaching of the line of the San and Vistula rivers. A comparison of the favorable aspects of the plans of the two commanders is raised by the question of paramount importance involved, inasmuch as it calls our attention to the old, ever recurring matter of the relationship between movement and battle.
The plan of the commander of the Western Front (group of armies) contemplated the culmination of the military crisis by the definite means of a decisive engagement to be conducted by the entire group of armies at his disposal. He sought the hostile manpower with a view to bringing about its destruction in those areas where it was most likely to be found, i.e., in the areas leading to Warsaw, as the objective of principal importance to both sides.
The commander of the Southwest Front, judging from the logic of his strategic plans of action, had assumed the mission of gaining the distant objectives of the enemy in those areas which, considering the nature of the existing situation at the time, had assumed secondary importance for the enemy, as was apparent (as we shall see later) from the fact that he practically denuded the Galician frontiers of troops and shifted all available forces to the Middle Vistula. Thus, the action of the right-flank armies of the Southwest Front, in the event that they should have succeeded in undertaking the execution of the plan of the commander of the Southwest Front, would have amounted to the simple seizure of territory that was of but slight importance to the enemy at the particular time and the fate of whose armies was now being decided at the walls of Warsaw. Until such time as the main forces of the enemy concentrated in the area protecting the city of Warsaw had been crushed, there could be no thought of any extensive invasions into the heart of Poland through Galicia.
In general, we believe that an advance on Cracow without first defeating the concentrated Polish forces at Warsaw would have amounted to dividing the skin of a bear that is yet to be caught. During the final days preceding the transfer of the right- flank armies of the Southwest Front to the control of the commander of the Western Front (group of armies) the commander of the former proceeded with the formal execution of the directive of the commander-in-chief. It should be noted, however, that the version to the effect that the commander of the Southwest Front had supposedly refused to execute the directive of the commander-in-chief with respect to the transfer of the First Cavalry Army is unfounded.
We shall now return once more to the matter of cooperation between the two fronts (groups of armies), in as much as after the commander of the Western Front had issued his directive for the march on the Vistula this entered a new and final phase of development.
The final solution of the mater was given impetus by the conversation which took place between the commander-in-chief and the commander of the Western Front on the night of the 11th of August. The conversation itself was preceded by the directive of the commander of the Western Front covering the march on the Vistula, No. 236/op/sek. This directive stated:
"The enemy is continuing his retreat along the entire front. He will be completely crushed; after we effect the crossing of the Vistula, the enemy will be driven in a southwesterly direction. for which purpose:
*Ivangorod is the Russian designation of the Demblin fortress.
The 58th Infantry Division is transferred to the Mozyr group by orders of the commander-in-chief.
5. Boundaries between Fourth and Fifteenth armies: Girzhen - Plotsk _ Piontek (incl. to Fifteenth Army_); between Fifteenth and Third Armies: Naselsk - Dlutovo - Vyshgorod - Sochazev (incl. to third Army); between Third and Sixteenth Armies: Novgeorgievsk - Blone (incl. to Third Army).
6. The political situation demands the immediate complete destruction of the hostile troops.
On the night of the 11th August a new telephonic conversation was held between the commander-in-chief and the commander of the western Front over direct wire. This was of equal importance to the impending operations as the above directive, in as much as after this telephonic conversation the commander-in-chief issued a directive for a regrouping of the First Cavalry Army in the direction of Lublin. True, this also indicated some divergence in the views between the commander- in-chief and the commander of the Western Front with respect to the estimate of the disposition and intentions of the hostile forces, inasmuch as the commander-in chief still believed it possible to bring about a decisive battle between the Vistula and the Western Bug rivers without permitting the enemy to get beyond the Vistula; but in the end, after listening to the statements of the commander of the Western Front, the plan of action of the latter was adopted with the following expression; "I am allowing you freedom of action, but am leaving the mission of the immediate defeat of the Polish forces to stand without any resort to a strategy of greater depth, since in that event I fear we shall not have sufficient time for such action."
A detailed analysis of the plans and decisions of the various members of our high command will be presented after we have first presented the plans of the other side. The positive and negative aspects of the same will thus become more apparent.