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This article was published in the Naval War College Review, Nov-Dec,
1982, pgs., 69-86
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The author states his thesis- "Our thesis is simple: in retrospect
from 1952 to 1982 there is an unmistakable and enormous progress in our
understanding of Clausewitz. In substantiation of this view, we discuss the
most important Clausewitzian studies so as to see them against their strategic
background and to highlight some features of current interest."
In his extensive foot notes, Dr. Tashjean cites very numerous authors from
their articles as well as their books.
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Dr. Tashjean first cites and evaluates Werner Hahlweg's edited
publication of Carl von Clausewitz - Schriften-Aufsatze-Studien-Briefe - the
sixteenth edition of Vom Kriege in which he restored the original text
on the crucial issue of civil-military relations in high command. He writes
that this 'restoration' was essential because beginning with the second edition
in 1853 the editors had 'modified' the text to change the concept of war as a
continuation of politics by other means into a concept that war 'replaced'
politics. This was then the theory and claim used by the Prussian (German)
general staff. He quotes Bismarck at length on this issue in his refusal to
agree, and to let the generals exclude him from war planning and execution. Dr.
Tashjean also cites the value of Hahlweg's addition of a considerable number of
detailed technical, biographical, and historical references. In addition,
Tashjean notes that Hahlweg included discussion of a large volume of modern
commentary on Clausewitz. He judges that Hahlweg's opus should be studied in
conjunction with the recent English translation of Vom Kriege by Peter Paret
and Michael Howard.
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Dr. Tashjean moves on to discuss the controversy within American
academia over limited war - that is between those who support Upton's concept
that 'when war begins politics ends' and its opponents. This controversy found
its impact on actual practice during World War II and in American
considerations of potential war in the Pacific and Asia. At the social,
cultural, political level the controversy is shown in that between the
'internationalist' Republicans and the conservatives who are isolationists. The
controversy was shown as well during the Korean War in the ideas of MacArthur
versus Truman. He describes the issue clearly in Aron's terms as between 'war
being the continuation of politics with (not by) other means. In practice this
means, is the conduct of a war to be restrained by over all political
considerations or not. MacArthur viewed the objective of the war to be the
total defeat of the enemy while the Truman administration considered political
objectives as paramount.
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Dr. Tashjean sums up: "Thus Clausewitz began his career on the
American stage as an authority figure of great intellectual respectability, but
playing to half a house. The absent half never entered from the right, an
American Ludendorff bold enough to break with the classic interpretation of the
Clausewitzian, formula, as the real Ludendorff had when he argued that as
international politics becomes extreme or bellicist, the formula becomes
tautologous."
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Dr. Tashjean continues with the legacy of the Korean War policy and
results, noting the influence of the half of Clausewitz in the war's analysis
of Colonel Harry Summers.
He writes: "All in all, then, the Korean war underlined four harbingers of
the future. However awkwardly and precariously, a bilateral strategic balance
had been put in place. Secondly, there had been a vivid lesson confirming that
mucking around near the border of China could be not only exceedingly slow,
messy, and inconclusive, but might risk escalation to nuclear levels involving
the Sino-Soviet block .Thirdly, the PRC established itself as a natural pivot
or 'horizontal' inter-regional escalation: Korea, China, and Vietnam emerged as
one strategic region for no sooner did the Korean war wind down than PRC
support of North Vietnam increased substantially. Finally, Clausewitz had been
'naturalized' in America as the ideological symbol of an establishment
consensus which defeated sunbelt Uptonianism"
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Dr. Tashjean moves on to discussion of 'problems of limited
conventional war' versus nuclear war. Which problems he avers have remained
with us ever since. (1982) In this section he discusses the Manhattan Project
and then the shock in the Truman Administration when the Soviet Union detonated
its first atomic weapon in 1949. This was followed by the Eisenhower's
administration response to the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the decay of the
Sino-Soviet Pack. He mentions also the outcome of the Carte Blanche war game in
1955 from which policy makers concluded that use of nuclear weapons in Europe
would create disastrous collateral damage on civilian populations. All this
helped lead to increased consideration of 'deterrence' rather than 'war
fighting'.
Dr. Tashjean judges the new policy priorities as a shift from Clauswetzian
doctrine. Quote: "the maintenance of peace is now an overriding objective
of national policy in a sense quite alien to Clausewitzian times and
circumstances. The vocation of soldier has acquired a profoundly humane purpose
inasmuch as military power can serve only to prevent war and secure
peace." In all this, the author is citing Ramon Aron, whose book he
considers a major contribution to studies of Clausewitz.
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Dr. Tashjean continues with a more extensive discussion of Aron in the
context of Max Weber, Bismarck, and German concepts in general.
He comments: "Our criticism, applying equally to all other Clauswitzian
literature, is to note the total absence of illumination by anthropology both
empirical and philosophical.. The very last word of Clausewitz on war, at the
end of his very first chapter, is that "its dominant tendencies, hatred,
and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force, of the play of
chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam, and of
its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it
subject to reason alone".
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He continues: "The first of these three aspects mainly concerns
the people, the second the commander and his army, the third the
government." He elaborates on this theme. He writes that these three
categories correspond to the three 'estates' in Indo-European societies,
rulers, warriors, and workers. He notes that at the same time Hegel was
propounding a similar categorization based on Christian concepts. He cites
George Dumezil for further study. The anthropological point is that war is a
fundamental exercise of the warrior's self - image.
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Continuing, Tashjean notes that in 1976, the year Aron's book was
published, there also appeared biographies of Clausewitz and translations of
Vom Kriege. Further, he notes that Clausewitz became the subject of
courses at the National Defense University and the three senior military
service academies. He writes that Peter Paret's biography of Clausewitz had
received well deserved praise. Dr.Tashjean recommends that future biographers
include more attention to General Scharnhorst and his influence on Clausewitz.
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Dr. Tashjean turns to discuss the volume of new publications in 1980,
The jubilee year led by an anthology devoted to assembling many comments and
critiques of Clausewitz by a host of scholars.
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In the following section Dr. Tashjean discusses the strategies employed
by the Vietnamese Communists, essential Maoist and not Clausewitzian. And he
discusses the western efforts to consider Alexander Atkinson's text, Social
order and the General Theory of Strategy. Atkinson included texts of
captured Chinese documents relating to strategy of revolutionary war. Dr.
Tashjean recommends Atkinson's book as an important contribution to the study
of modern strategy in the context of revolutionary warfare.
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Next, Dr. Tashjean turns to Colonel Harry Summers' book, On
Strategy, which he considers 'indispensable'. He compares and contrasts
Summers' and Atkinson's theories at length. Atkinson appears to believe that
the Communist victory in China was inevitable, while Summers' considers that
the Communist victory in Vietnam was not inevitable.
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In the remainder of this section Dr. Tashjean describes and compares on
both Summers' and Atkinson' books in the context of their contributions to
scholarly understand of Clausewitz's ideas. He cites numerous other authors who
have followed these two.
His conclusion: This much, at any rate, is clear: there is no comparison
between America's post-Korean Clausewitz and our post-Vietnam Clausewitz. The
latter is incomparably superior to the former in seriousness, reach, and depth.
Atkinson's criticism of Clausewitz on absolute war appears to be entirely
separable from, and independent of, his derivation of revolutionary strategy
from the Clausewitzian political formula on war. In other words, even if
everything Atkinson says about absolute war in Clausewitz is right, his
expansion and universalization of Clausewitz remains valid. In this way the
future of Clausewitz is so enlarged as to become, for the first time in all
history, the truly global personification of fundamental strategy."
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The Clausewitz Papers, Volume II: A Postscript
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Dr. Tashjean notes the then new publication of the second volume of
Professor Hahlweg's massive compilation of Clausewitz. He writes that Hahlweg
has discussed the then forthcoming volume with him. The volume will contain
philosophy and theory and will include the Kantian influence of Kiesewetter and
philosophy that expands on 'matters military' in Clausewitz's writing.
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