AFGHANISTAN: A MILITARY HISTORY
FROM THE ANCIENT EMPIRES TO THE GREAT GAME

ALI AHMAD JALALI

University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, Kansas, 2021, 391 pgs, index, extensive bibliography, scholarly notes, maps,

The Wikipedia biography of the author:- Professor Ali Jalali is currently a professor at the U.S. National Defense Univerwsity, and has been a senior officer in the Afghan Army, a student at U.S. Infantry School at Ft. Benning, a student at the Russian Frunze military school, student at British higher military school, and at French Sorborne, He has been Minister of Interior in Afghan government, Ambassador of Afghanistan to Germany, lecturer at U.S. Military and other institutions, and author of many books and articles on Soviet military subjects.

Link to the reviewer's comment on Professor Jalali's book on Afghanistan military history since the beginning of the 'Great Game' to the present.
Chapter One of this book is a analytic description of the geography - terrain - in Afghanistan similar to the second book. Chapter two in this book is a concise summary of the perior prior to 1800.
Caveat; I have been honored to be a professional colleague, since the 1980's of Ambassador Ali Jalali in the preparation and delivery of lectures and writing (or editing) of works on the Soviet Military subjects. And even more so to claim that we have been and are personal, and family friends.

Reviewer's comment:
The importance of this book is in Professor Jalali's analysis, which integrates the details of military significance with the broadest aspects of social culture, politics, geopolitics and economics. He includes an extensive history of developments, including names and dates, providing the factual basis for his analysis.

The excellent maps and diagrams are critical, as they show the shifting content of the very different geographic size and location of what comprised the region that now is termed 'Afghanistan'; plus or minus large regions, during different eras, even centuries. The history of Afghanistan can be considered a 'case study for Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan, and Niccolo Machiavelli's Discourses on Titus Livy. Professor Jalali's two books form a seamless whole, critical for understanding of the real Afghanistan today. This is a massive 297 page book, massive because Col. Jalali has crammed each page with names, names, dates, and more names. The content, as expected from a veteran military professional; ranges from the widest level of geopolitics, geoeconomics, the rise and fall of dynastic empires; to the minutia of weapons usage, army and unit organization and composition, strategy and tactics, logistics, administration and more. But it is not limited to description, all these topics are subject to his incisive analysis based on his personal participation in all aspects of military and government in Afghanistan. He includes extensive notes and bibliography in several languages.
The author has filled each chapter with the most important events and the individuals involved. His purpose is to identify these in order to comment and analyze their significance and their relevance to the wider aspects of historical development. Space limits his capacity to include detailed descriptions and biographies of many of these events and individuals, who are likely little known to American readers.

So I have endeavored to create links to basic information, frequently found in Wikipedia entries or other standard references. I include two versions of references one contains lengthy text from sources and the other is limited to the URL's to those sources. These entries are interesting because they usually include excellent illustrations, maps, and further references. But they are very much a background supplement. They do not include the essential essence of Professor Jalali's detailed descriptions and analysis of military doctrine, organization, weapons, and tactics nor the interrelation of these with geopolitics. As I mentioned, he fills pages with the names of the individuals who count, who are ruling or seeking to be ruler; but also famous poets, religious leaders, historians, contemporary observers and others. The very great majority of these characters are not only unknown to American students ( readers) but their names are in languages also unknown. Only a few of these individuals can be found in general references such as Wikipedia. His sources are the contemporary or near contemporary writing of the observers or historians writing in the languages of the local peoples in all of which he is fluent. But they all had important roles (mostly military) in the historical developments that Professor Jalali analyzes. Their activities are the essence of his account. One may categorize this study as 'micro-history' but its lessons, which he draws, are for sure 'macro-history' in their significance.

Reviewer comment:
Human societies are organized at three 'natural' levels, family, clan and tribe. All of these have natural leaders - rulers - which may be a dominant individual, a family, or an acknowledged group of 'elders'. At the larger level, kingdoms and empires, these are artificial political entities created and controlled by force whose rulers seek legitimacy acknowledged by sufficient numbers of their ruled and by the rulers of comparable polities. These, Professor Jalali designates as 'states' with 'state militaries' as opposed to the military members of clans and tribes. A 'dynasty' is designated for a political entity, created by an individual, that remains functional by two or more generations of the same family. In some cases the 'dynasty' was successful in creating its own 'state'. In other cases several 'dynasties' in succession ruled the same 'state'.
In his excellent, detailed study of Chinese grand strategy, Rush Doshi forms much of his analysis around three broad strategies rulers use to gain and expand their control; "coercive capability (to force compliance), consensual inducements (to incentivize it), and legitimacy (to rightfully command it)" He writes: "For rising states, the act of peacefully displacing the existing hegemon consists of two broad strategies generally pursued in sequence. The first strategy is to blunt the hegemon's exercise of those forms of control, particularly those extended over the rising state; after all, no rising state can displace the hegemon if it remains at the hegemon's mercy. The second is to build forms of control over others; indeed, no rising state can become a hegemon if it cannot secure the deference of other states through coercive threats, consensual inducements, or rightful legitimacy."
My disagreement with Dr. Doshi is over the typical use today of 'state' as an actor. Actions are conceived of and executed by individuals. And the history that Professor Jalali describes is one of aggressive, dominating individuals (many beginning with virtually nothing but their own personal nature) who use the strategies which Dr. Doshi proposes to dominate, and replace other competing individuals exercising domination. For many of these actors the first level of control, coercion, is as far as they get, waging conflict after conflict. But as they are able to expand the zone of conflict to newly bordering areas, they employ consensual inducement by offering subordinates and populations a share of captured wealth and/or booty or loot. In the developments Professor Jalali analyzes, the most obvious source for legitimacy was the ideology (belief system) of the Islamic religion. The second source is typical in other ancient and medieval societies; the inheritance by family members. - That is apart from power itself - power is its own basis for legitimacy in its exercise.
The condition, which he illustrates, is that war is the province of the individual, not some amorphous, abstract concept such as the 'state'.

So what have we, the readers, in this book? A story, a real life play -time span near 2000 years; stage location - centered in a mountaneous region at the intersection of northern, eastern, and western broad regions; players - indigenous peoples alternately seeking safety or expansion and external peoples seeking to control the region or use it as a path toward further expansion.

The analyst and 'policy maker' today who hope to understand the reality of Afghanistan should (at least) study the descriptions Professor Jalali provides in his introduction chapter. Can the Taliban overcome these fundamental characteristics of Afghan society to enforce its ideological concepts onto this fractionated society?

Introduction:
The chapter is an excellent summary of the subjects of the remaining chapters. Some notes in his summary:
"In the past twenty-five hundred years, the history of the lands encompassing today's Afghanistan is tortuously linked to the history of West, Central and South Asia. Afghanistan's identity as a state is based less on geography and more on history."
"The territory of today's Afghanistan overlaps the boundaries of all these regions and is thus part of each one."
"Consequently, the history of Afghanistan is strongly influenced by the dynamics of its peripheral status between major regional centers of power and the impact of its location on the geopolitical fault line astride West, Central and South Asia."

He enumerates the most significant of the external conquerors from these regions who invaded, often on their way elsewhere, or who succeeded (even relatively briefly) in maintaining power over parts of today's Afghanistan.
"During the Islamic era, Afghanistan evolved into one of the main centers of the Muslim world and a cradle of Islamic civilizations."
Then came the destruction reaped by the Mongols and Timurids.
Then: "Ahmad Shah Durrani, the founder of modern Afghanistan, restored the centrality of regional power to Afghanistan by establishing control of government over the entire present-day Afghanistan, Pakistan, and parts of eastern Iran and stretched the rule of the empire to northern India as far as Delhi."
"Over the past three millenniums, Central Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia have been the vortex of numerous military conquests that facilitated exchanges of military culture and technology in Asia and also influenced military developments far beyond this region."
"The experience covered all forms of military science, including force structure, battle formations, weapons and equipment, and combat tactics."

One of the forms of political-military structure that the author terms is "nation-in-arms" - "that provided for the rise of local and tribal leaders and non-state armed groups when the central government collapsed or the state army disintegrated in the face of foreign invasion or dynastic upheavals"
"As a result of these patterns, few state armies in pre-modern Afghanistan successfully monopolized the use of force."
"The 'armed nation' concept dominated the Avestan age in Bactria when the nation at the same time was the army..."
As political organization reached an 'imperial level' the ruler could create 'state armies' "supplemented by local militias and professional mercenaries."
"In general, Afghanistan's military history is shaped mostly by three unique features: a distinct geography unsuitable for large invading armies and difficult to sustain logistically; the decentralized sociopolitical order of self-relying local communities; and the multiplicity of military institutions within a social system imbued with military pluralism."
What is strikingly clear, perhaps shocking, to the student of European history, is that NO Western country (and population) endured such constant warfare conducted simultaneously at all levels of society, over 2000 years, as has the people, and their efforts at political organization, of those living in the geographic region known as Afghanistan.

He concludes his general overview by noting that the student of Afghanistan's history faces very great obstacles not only from the nature of the subject but also from the nature of the primary sources of information on that society.

Chapter 1 - A Geographic Overview:
Professor Jalali opens his detailed description of the geography - weather, terrain, climate, hydrology - that summarizes the whole story.
"Geography is a defining factor in Afghanistan's military history." Of course by this he also includes its social, economic, and political history. And also this history of its surrounding neighbors. Moreover, he points to the dynamic nature of this reality. It has not been static, but an active inter-relationship in which geography has affected history and history has affected geography. He mentions that geography had decisive influence on the actions of the principal invaders. His topographic map in this chapter illustrates the situation very well.
In summary, he writes: "The geographic influence in Afghanistan has internal and external dimensions. And: "The climate of the Hindu Kush influences the political, social, and economic development of the land."
While humanity has 'moved on' over the 2500 plus years, the geography is the same today as it was for the many different participants in its history.
He identifies many of these individuals and groups as well as the significant geographical features such as mountain ranges, deserts, rivers, trade routes, agricultural resources, and locations that determined their decisions and actions. In another summary he identifies a critical condition: 'The territory of today's Afghanistan straddles the geographic boundaries of three main regions. It encompasses the converging space and dividing verges of Central Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia with historical connections to China. The earliest identification of the human occupation is "ancient Ariana" 'the land of the Aryans'; which is also identified as Zoroastrian "Avesta'.
Professor Jalali cites the first Western geographers, Erastosthenes, Strabo, Pliny; and includes Erastosthenes's map of Ariana (one part) situated between Persis and India and (the other) situated between Sogdiana and Bactriana. And he cites the various writers over the centuries who mentioned 'Afghans' or 'Afghanistan'.

References: subjects in chapter one, that Professor Jalali discusses, for which I have inserted more details, URL links plus extended text

References: subjects in chapter one, that Professor Jalali discusses, for which there are only URLs

Chapter 2 - The Early History of Afghanistan: Migrations, Displacements, and the Struggle for Domination:
The chapter is packed with details, so the following description is a very limited survey.

The early indigenous' people are unknown. Proto history begins with myths and stories about the invasion from the north by "Indo-Iranian peoples who migrated south from the steppe north of the deserts over centuries, in waves, across the Hindu Kush and then many continued east into modern India. There are the "Aryans' who are mentioned in the earliest Hindu epics. While others migrated west into Bactria and modern Iran. Another excellent map identifies the location of Bactria to the west on both sides of the Oxus River and between the Pamir and Hindu Kush mountain chains. Written accounts of this era are by Greek, Persian and Muslim authors such as Firdausi (Shah-Nama).
Professor Jalali describes this early era (which has continued):
"The early military history of the land known to classic writers as ancient Ariana is linked to three sets of constant struggle between rival forces:
1 - the struggle between migrating hordes and the natives;
2 - the war of settled communities against nomads;
3 - the strife between the religious followers and the unbelievers. "
He describes each of these centuries-long conflicts in detail. The result of these three types of conflict, frequently occurring at the same time he summarizes:
"In such a pugnacious environment, the peace of settled communities was constantly under threat from within and without. The situation that lasted many centuries could be described as a state of 'no peace' rather than that of a state at war." He continues: "The volatile situation caused by continued conflicts stimulated the development of military forces and their weapons in an evolutionary process that took hundreds of years."
"The Indo-Iranian tribes, with their cultural links to Central Asia, where the horse was first domesticated and then spread around the world, were accustomed to breeding and using horses in war and peace from ancient times."
Professor Jalali describes chariot warfare , bronze armor, spears, bows, swords, slings.
"what can be gleaned from a collection of Sassanid and later sources and traditions is that from the second millennium BC the current territory of Afghanistan was a part of a powerful confederacy in eastern Iran, of which Bactra (Balkh) was the center.... The first recorded invasion from the west was an Assyrian incursion into Bactria sometime before the rise of the Achaemenids."
He continues with narration and analysis of the Achaemenid Empire from Cyrus to Darius III. And continues with Alexander's conquest and continued campaign in Central Asia, Afghanistan and modern Pakistan. During this period "Afghanistan was part of seven satrapies of the Achaemenid Empire: Bactria, Margiana, Marv, Aria, Drangiana, Arachosia, Sattagydia, and Gandhara".
An excellent map of the Achaemenid Empire locates Afghanistan in this empire. He stresses the significance of Bactria throughout this era. He describes in detail the organization. composition, weaponry, tactics, campaigns and battles of the Achaemenids.

References:
Some individuals and events mentioned in chapter two: URL plus extended text

References:
Short list - only the urls: Some individuals and events mentioned in chapter two:

Chapter 3 - The Passage of Alexander the Great 330 - 323 BC:
The history, biography, and campaigns of Alexander the Great are probably the most well known of the many subjects narrated and analyzed in this book. However, Professor Jalali devotes more attention to Alexander's campaigns in and around Afghanistan that many readers will have studied. He makes excellent use of the much greater ancient sources of information about Alexander than was available for the previous chapters.
In particular he focuses on Bactria, Assakenia, and Aornos. The chapter heading is appropriate to indicate that Alexander merely passed through Afghanistan without accomplishing much lasting changes. However in the following chapter the readers learn of significant continuing Greek influence as successors melded with other new arrivals. Another map shows Alexander's routes through Afghanistan and names the various regions. The chapter is divided into sections :
The Macedonian army of Conquest and Correlation of Forces
Professor Jalali describes the organizational structure and size of the components of Alexander's army and their commanders

The Logistics
Alexander's remarkable extended campaign lasting several years was accomplished by his excellent logistics system which provided not only supplies but also continual newly recruited men to replace both the casualties and the garrisons he had to establish along the route In addition he seized supplies from local inhabitants as he advanced. And he restored his fiscal condition by seizing the immense Persian treasure.

On the Way to Bactria
Professor Jalali writes: "The Battle of Gaugamela dealt a decisive blow to the military might of the Persians. "After that the campaign began with the chase after Darius into Bactria were he was murdered. But Alexander was not finished in conquests. An excellent map depicts the various subregions including Gedrosia, Arachosia, Dragiana, Kirmania, Bactria, Aria, and Swat and the routes Alexander took through these regions.

The Passage to Bactria
Professor Jalali divides the march into phases. He first continued directly east to the border of Bactria, but then various rebellions caused him to turn abruptly south across Drangiana and then northeast to Kabul. This placed him south of the Hindu Kush. He had to winter there, waiting until 329 for snow melt to cross back north over the mountains .He accomplished they via the Khawak Pass, surprising Bessus.

The Conquest of Bactria and Soghdiana
Professor Jalali divides Alexander's lengthy campaign here:
1 - Defeating Bessus, who had declared himself the successor of Darius as the Great King of Iran
2 - Pacification of the turbulent area across Bactria and Soghdiana
3- Containing the persistent threat of incursions by nomadic hordes from the Central Asian steppes
Bessus was captured by his own Soghdianan allies and executed by Alexander, but the local leaders continued to resist by defending their fortified walled cities and conducting 'guerrilla' warfare through out the open country. Professor Jalali analyzes Alexander's changes in Macedonian organization to cope with this different form of warfare.

Ferghana Insurgency
As the uprisings spread through the Ferghana valley, Alexander, camping then along the Jaxartes river, conducted a devastating siege campaign against their fortified cities. Then he turned back to stop nomad incursions across the Jaxartes. Professor Jalali includes a diagram of the battle. He describes Alexander's tactics. But then Alexander faced yet another rebellion in his rear area in which a Macedonian detachment was ambushed near Maracanda. Alexander had destroyed the large Persian armed forces quickly in three major battles. But defeating these varied local leaders required several years.

Invasion of India
Professor Jalali describes in detail Alexander's preparations for the Invasion of India. Again, Alexander showed his skill at logistics and recruitment. By this time his army included tens of thousands of 'Asiatic" troops. Professor uses the classical authors (Arrian, Diodorus), for an extensive study of this phase of Alexander's campaigns.

The Battle of Aornus (includes a sketch map)
Professor Jalali uses both the ancient Greek historians and Sir Aurel Stein's report of his personal explorations. It is interesting that Professor Jalali devotes much attention to Aornus but only one sentence to one of Alexander's greatest battles - Hydaspes.
Considering the extent of the deaths of inhabitants and destruction wrought by Alexander he may rate among the great conquerors who passed through Afghanistan; Genghis Khan and Tamerlane.

References:
Some individuals and events mentioned in chapter three: URL plus extended text

References:
Some individuals and events mentioned in chapter three: only URLs

Chapter 4 - Disintegration of Greek Power in the East and the Rise of New Empires: Greco-Bactrians, Sakas, Kushans, and Ephthalites, 323BC - -642 AD:
Professor Jalali continues with narration of the Wars of the Diodochi (successors) over the spoils and power that resulted from Alexander's brief conquest. Both rapidly were divided amongst his rapacious military assistants. He focuses on the eastern regions in which the territory of Afghanistan was central. First to break away was the area least influenced by the Macedonian - Greek ruling element - Punjab out of which the local leader, Chandragupta, created the Maurya Empire. When the successors holding the Seleucid Empire began fighting over Syria and Egypt, the Greek ruler of Bactria (Diodotus) took advantage and declared his independence. But Bactria soon was divided by local Iranians who created the much more powerful Parthian Empire. The rulers of both allied to prevent a Seleucid return. But all three; Chandragupta, Diodotus and Seleucus, also faced opponents within and without.
In another map, Professor Jalali shows the then central extent of the Bactrian Kingdom and its neighbors, Maurya and Parthia.

Military actions in Opposing Directions,
In this section he describes the conflict between the Greek rulers of Bactria and Iranian rulers of Parthia while both had to watch Maurya and Selecuia. The Greek influence in Bactria gradually declined, but not before Euthydemus managed to expand his domain north across Sogdiana as far as the Aral Sea and East Turkistan on the border of Chinese influence. The Greek ruler of Selucia, Antiochus III, managed to push Parthia eastward and besiege Balkh (unsuccessfully). Warfare between the contending rulers continued with campaigns in and across the region later called Afghanistan. Rulers came and went as dynasties (family rule) collapsed. The rulers of Bactria, having fought on all sides and even expanded at times as far as Punjab, finally were exhausted and collapsed.
Then came the Sakas, the latest of the nomadic hordes that periodically swept out of the vast steppes. The Parthian ruler, Mithridates II managed to push the Saka east, where they settled in Sistan and Arachosia. Not to be deterred, the Sakas soon campaigned eastward into India.

Successive invasions from the North,
Professor Jalali describes the entrance of still more nomadic hordes. "Around 120 BC the Yueh-Chi were driven from the Tarim basin." They earlier had pushed the Saka south, Now they continued south and pushed the Saka further eastward into Punjab (called then, Indo-Scythians) One of the Yueh-Chi tribes created the new Kushan Empire. They took advantage of the Roman conflict with the Parthians. Eventually the Parthian dynasty was succeeded by the Sassanid dynasty of Ardasher and Shahpur I. Naturally, they proceeded to break up the Kushan Empire. Which resulted in the creation of the Gupta Empire. During the following centuries the conflicts between dynasties continued. The Ephtahalies gained extensive control in the 5th Century but were defeated in 568 AD by a combination of Turks and Sassanids,. Having lost in the west, the Ephtahalites continued to rule in northwestern India.

Countering Threats from the Northern steppes,
Professor Jalali narrates a brief retrospective of the continual warfare between steppe and settlement starting with Cyrus who dies in battle with the Massagetae, continued with Alexander's lengthy effort to create a fortified border, and then continued under Antiochus I. The Greco-Bactrian and Parthian kings continued to create and restore border fortifications. These consisted of sections of walls but in more cases with walls around cities and even villages.

(At this same time the Han Emperors were constructing a border wall along the desert north of Dung Hung),

Professor Jalali also notes the efforts at 'pacification' and assimilation including the spread of Zoroastrianism and Buddhism.

The Exchange of Military Culture.
Professor Jalali writes: "The unceasing competition for supremacy by the dominant powers in West, Central, and South Asia over the centuries led to constant clashes among rival armies but also resulted in the exchange of military culture over a wide region." He notes that: "The experience covered all forms of military science, including force structure, battle formations, weapons and equipment and combat tactics." He describes many interesting examples. Among these is the major changes the Yueh-Chi adopted when they replaced the Kushans and became the overlords of settled regions. The Romans also adopted such features as armored cavalry (Cataphract) from the Parthians. Also: "Meanwhile, the Greek, Saka, Kushan and Ephthalite armies that conquered India adapted the use of war elephants and war chariots, which were still fashionable in the subcontinent."

References:
Some individuals and events mentioned in chapter Four: URL plus extended text

References:
Some individuals and events mentioned in chapter Four: Only the URLs

Chapter 5 - The Arab Conquest and Islamization of Afghanistan, 642-921 AD:

This is a critical chapter in which Professor Jalali devotes much detailed description with decisive analysis. Warfare entered a new phase along with the social-political-economic changes wrought by the Arabs who spread Islam as they conquered wider and wider regions. The religious / ideological, conquest of Islam eventually created a social, cultural unity never before achieved across the wide region. However, this form of 'unity' never succeeded in unifying even sections of the geographically diverse region politically. There were always aggressive individuals who sought to achieve domination (control) over wider areas and populations. And the the fragmented region was a ripe target for similarly aggressive rulers of the adjacent territories.
Professor Jalali writes: "The fast advance of the Arab armies was fostered by a combination of the ideological force of the new faith and a strategy to harness the martial culture of the Arab tribes into a unified power for conquest beyond the borders of the Arabian Peninsula".
He describes how geographic reality enabled or curtailed Arab success in the different regions, such as North African plains and Hindu Kush mountains. Most of the initial campaigns were raids rather than permanent conquests, which came later. During this period the Arab armies adopted many military features of the Byzantines, Persians, Khorasanians, and Turks.
He analyzes that: "The evolving military establishment not only became the basis of a universal model adapted across the Muslim world of the middle ages but also strategically outwitted the Western knight-based military culture during the Crusades (1095-1290)." "The most distinctive features of the Arab Muslim's military doctrine were the rapid concentration of forces in the war zone and fast advance by mobile forces to the battlefield." "The Arab armies of conquest arose from small and fragmented tribal fighters and developed into a formidable military machine by the beginning of the eighth century"

The Muslim Arab Armies
"The Muslim army was organized into a regular force and put under a separate department for the first time under the Caliph Omar (634-644)". The process was completed by Abd-al-Malik ibn Marwan (646-705).
The chapter continues with detailed descriptions of all facets from individual weapons to unit organization and tactics and siege warfare.
Professor Jalali notes the typical development inside the Arab government: "Meanwhile, as the empire expanded and an unrelenting struggle for power and competing claims of legitimacy dominated the politics of the Muslim world, the original unity of the Arab army failed to survive." He also notes the development of slave armies. And massacres or enslavement of defeated populations soon followed.
"Initially the bulk of the Muslim armies was composed of infantry, and Arab leaders relied heavily on their foot soldiers." As the Muslim domains expanded their armies added more and more cavalry. Professor Jalali describes the development of new tactics. The first armies were tribal led by typical tribal chieftains. As the armies expanded, the became organized on the typical decimal system. And specialized components such as combat support were created. The fighting forces included infantry, horsemen. archers, patrol units, camel corps and foragers. He describes the variety of weapons including swords, long spears, bows and arrows of various types. He describes the battlefield tactical order of battle; right and left wings, centers, advance and rear guards. Tactical operations included repeated charges and withdrawals and arrow storms; then cavalry attacks against the enemy flanks. The Arabs learned siege warfare and adopted typical equipment such as catapults, towers, and battering rams.

The Arab Conquest of Afghanistan
The Arab conquest of Afghanistan began in 642 as they pursued the Persian king, Yasdegerd III, and then his successor as Sassanid monarch at Merv. By that time the region - Afghanistan - had already disintegrated politically into many independent or quasi-independent dynasties whose names proliferated. Local adoption of religions also included Buddhism, Zoroastrianism and Nestorian Christianity. The Arab advance was along the two geographic corridors - north of the Hindu Kush from Merv - and south of the mountains from Fars and Kerman provinces through Sistan to the Indus river and Sind. Military operations along both axes were directed by the Arab governor at Merv. The advance was expanded after the Sassanid defeat at the Battle of Nahavand in 642.
The northern corridor was the more important due to its strategic significance and the wealth and urban populations. It was vulnerable due to the many semi-independent dynasties in separate provinces. He quotes a local author who 'lists about two dozen local rulers". The southern corridor was through two major local dynasties: The Kabul- Gandhara regions on the north-west and the Sistan -Zabuistan regions on the south and east.
Professor Jalali describes and analyzes the lengthy process and identifies the distinct phases as:
"1 Military conquest and colonization
2 Increasing political authority of the Islamized native powers and their influence in shaping the politics of the Islamic Caliphate
3 The rise of independent Muslim dynasties in Afghanistan"

Another excellent map identifies the separate axes of advance.

Military campaigns on the Southern Axis
The Arab advance began in 644-645 lead by Abdullah ibn Amir through Sistan. The Sassanid ruler, Yasdegerd III fled along this route toward Khorasan. That is from present Iranian Sistan to Baluchistan Province of Pakistan. Many towns surrendered, but the capital at Zaranj (a very strongly fortified city) held out during siege until a political agreement was reached. But in 649 Sistan revolted, and the new Caliph, Uthman, directed Abdullah ibn Amir to reconquer the province, which then required 10 years for inconclusive control. Later, Abdur Rahman ibn Sumra conducted a new campaign into Helmand and Kabul.

Failed Advance to Kabul.
Abdur Rahman succeeded in capturing Kabul by use of siege machinery, but could not hold it. The conflict between the locals at Helmand, Kandahar and Kabul and the Arabs from the south continued for years.

The Death Valleys of Zabulistan
"In 695 AD, Caliph Abdul Malik appointed Hajaj ibn Yusuf as governor with authority over Khorasan and Sistan. He sent a large army to subdue Zunbil and capture Kabul, but the Arabs were surrounded in mountainous territory near Ghazni and forced to sue for peace. An even larger and well equipped Arab army repeated the effort but was again blocked, this time in winter. The commander, Abdur Rahman ibn Ash'ath, decided that his boss, Haji, was too demanding. He revolted and led his army back to Iraq, where they were eventually defeated. This ended, temporarily, the Muslim conquest of southern Afghanistan.

Campaigns on the Northern Axis
These began in 641 AD, also with the mission of killing Yazdegerd III. The Arab effort continued without much success against the local rulers until the battle of Talas in 751.

The Geopolitics of the Military Campaigns
Shifting from details about weapons and tactics, Professor Jalali turns to macro-level geopolitics. His analysis focuses on four 'geographic and political realities' that influenced decisions and events in Khorasan and Soghdiana.
-1 the "geographic proximity of Tokharistan and Soghdiana and the strategic importance of Cisoxiana - the territory south and west of the Amu Darya River".
- 2 "the absence of a dominant power in the region".
- 3 "the political disunion of local principalities."
- 4 "the long distance between the region and the imperial center with the resulting complexity of control".
He includes another fine map depicting the extent of Islamic Khorasan. It shows that Khorasan included today's Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, eastern Iran as well as most of Afghanistan.
His lengthy analysis includes a much more detailed description of the geography and terrain (topography) of the region than appeared in chapter 1. A key point he makes that is largely not understood today is that the Amu Darya River was not the border that it has become today.
Rather, the Amu Darya was near the center of the region flowing from east to west. The defensive, fortified border established by both Cyrus and Alexander was the Syr Darya (Jaxartes) River.
"Geographically, the middle Central Asian settled tract between the Jaxartes River (Syr Darya) in the northeast and the Hindu Kush Massif in the south is divided by the Hissar Mountains into two distinct areas." "The Amu Darya flows within the bounds of ancient Iranian-Zorastrian civilization extending from the Syr Darya in the north to the Hindu Kush Mountains in the south".
The northern sector was called Soghdiana and the southern was called Tokharistan.
"The Arabs' conquest of Soghdiana and the Jaxartes region was hinged on control of Tokharistan." "The early Arab expeditions met strong resistance in these {listed} cities, which were repeatedly attacked by Arab raiding columns." The Arabs considered Balkh as the key city.
Professor Jalali continues with details about the political conditions in the region, namely, division into many small, disunited principalities mostly under the general overlordship of Turks further north. This 'disunion' favored the Arabs. But the great distance to the caliphate capital in Iraq 'made exercising central control over military campaigns difficult."
As usual, great distance from one's overlord encouraged local satraps, commanders, to expand their local power until finally declaring independence. There were 'civil war's between competing local tribes (Mundar, Rabi'a and Bakr ibn Wa'il). This would be be followed by the overlord (caliph) launching campaigns to restore central power. And the reverse occurred when the local, formally subordinate satrap decided to launch a counterattack to overthrow the central power. Such campaigns even reached Basra.
(Note the similar results in Spain).
Professor Jalali cites other authors in distinguishing this lengthy period into four phases:
- 1 "a period of fragmented raiding expeditions with little occupation"
- 2 "a decade long (705-715) campaign under the renowned Arab commander Qutayba ibn Muslim Bahili"
- 3 "the phase (716-737) was marked by the counteroffensive of resurgent Turks and the local princes to reverse the Arab gains."
- 4 " phase was Arab reconquest in which Arab armies established the caliphate suzerainty by accommodating local princes and recognizing their internal self-rule and status."
This phase culminated with the victory over the Tang dynasty at the Talis River in 751 (considered even now as one of the decisive battles in world history).

Initial Raids
In this section Professor Jalali analyzes the first phase from the 650's AD - Events in Khoraistan were greatly determined by political events (overthrows and conflicts) in the leadership of the caliphate itself, including the civil wars of 656-661 and again in 683-685 and 689-692. The initial expansion was ordered by caliphs Umar and Othman and reached Herat. He describes in detail the repeated Arab campaigns to control Tokharistan and Soghdiana. In 674 they reached Bukhara..

The decade of Qutayba's Conquest and Pacification
In this second phase the man sent as campaign commander, Qutayba ibn Muslim Bahili, conducted repeated campaigns in which he massacred locals and colonized towns with Arab tribes and "committed "systematic atrocities against the populations". Professor Jalali describes his various campaigns.
But - "Qutayba - the man who conquered Transoxiana for the empire - met his end in dramatic fashion." He revolted but lacked military support and was murdered along with his family in 715 by a local ruler, Waki' ibn Abi Sud al-Tamimi who proclaimed himself the new governor .

The Turkish Counteroffensive
In this third phase, with Chinese encouragement, local Turkish tribes, united in confederacy, attacked Arab garrisons with mobile cavalry. The Arabs continued to use brutal suppression but local princes and populations turned against them. The Arabs suffered a major defeat in the Fergana valley in 724 - the 'Day of Thirst'. By 728 they were forced out of most of Transoxiana.

The Arab Reconquista
In this fourth phase the Turkish confederacy "Turgesh' dissolved when its king was assassinated. And the Arab governors began a more thoughtful approach to the local populations. The northern most areas continued at border zones but Bukhara and Samarkand became even more wealthy Silk Road centers in which Muslim culture and learning thrived. The Umayyad Caliphate was replaced by the Abbasid Caliphate, based in Khorasan, in 750. This was just in time to confront the expansion efforts of the Chinese Tang Dynasty across the mountains into Central Asia. The Arab army in Khorasan was commanded by Ziyad ibn Salih, They won the decisive victory in 751 at the Talas River near modern Taraz in Kazakhistan.

Khorasani Influence in Shaping the Politics of the Islamic Caliphate
Professor Jalali describes the gradual replacement of Buddhism and Zoroastrianism by Islam as the caliphs and Muslim religious leaders convinced the local political and economic leaders to convert. This, in turn, enabled locals to enter Muslim organizations including government service, and military service. But as the population became more Muslim in religion and culture it also exerted its independence. Professor Jalali summarizes the result as: "the Iranians became Islamized but not Arabized, while the Arabs adopted certain strains of Iranian culture". The locals, rather than attempting to preserve their independence OUTSIDE the expanding Muslim world, now attained more local independence WITHIN its expanding domains. This process was furthered by the Khorasan population supporting its local Arab leaders (the future Abbasids) over the centralist Umayyad dynasty. The armies sent east by the caliphs were comprised of Arab tribal units which generated their own rivalries and 'competitions' to take the spoils of conquest.

Professor Jalali quotes the famous Muslim historiographer, Ibn Khaldun, with an analysis that pertains to today - actually to all time. "the improved revenues led to the abundance of 'bounties and salaries,' "life became more relaxed and the character of tribal warriors softened, giving way to laziness and corruption." "The elites were competing for material gains while government expenditures were exceeding revenues. These two factors paved the way for disintegration of the polity, opening opportunities for certain groups to mobilize new forces to challenge the power of the declining dynasty."

The process is practically a human cycle that we see today.

The Abbasid revolution began in far eastern Merv. A local leader, Abdur- Rahman (renamed Abu-Muslim), organized a large army and opened war on June 17, 747. He advanced westward rapidly and defeated the last Umayyad caliph, Marwan II, at the Zab river between Mosul and Arbela in January 750. He was acting with the overlordship of Abul Abbas Abdullah, who was elected caliph.
Professor Jalali writes that the Abbasid Revolution was much more than one dynastic house replacing another. It created a 'new era' in Islamic civilization.

He devotes detailed analysis to the causes and results of this 'revolution' in which Iranian ideas - from the influence of Khorasanis and Persians - entered Islam. Khorasani armies increased their role and influence in the caliphate. But, their great leader, Abdur-Rahman, was seen to have too much power, so was assassinated. This generated yet more local rebellions and attempts at independence. And there were also conflicts for power among the caliphs and their own chief military commanders. The conflicts also were between the central power of caliphs in Baghdad and the local rulers in far eastern Khorasan.
Professor Jalali discusses all this, naming the leaders and would-be leaders. Among these the following names are prominent: Barmak and Barmakid dynasty, Hayyan an-Nabati, Qutayba, Abdur Rahman ibn Ziyad, Nasr ibn Saiyar, Amir Yaqub Laith Safar, Tahir ibn Hussein, ,

References:
Some individuals and events mentioned in chapter Five: URL plus extended text

References:
Some individuals and events mentioned in chapter Five: only the URLs

Chapter 6 - Decline of the Abbasid Caliphate and the Rise of Local Muslim Dynasties, 921-1215 AD:
This was a very complex and changing era as there were many competing rulers and would-be rulers both inside the region called Afghanistan and from the adjacent territories north, west and east who fought back and forth across the territory. Professor Jalali sets the stage for this next era. First, he shifts back to mention the three family dynasties that controlled large parts of Afghanistan, and fought with or supplanted each other: the Tahirids (821 - 873), the Samanids (819-999) and the Saffarids (861-1003).
As he indicates, the acceptance of Islam brought a new (ideological) basis for determining legitimacy claims by individuals seeking power. And it brought a new level of fervor to the new Muslim warrior class that served as the military force employed by powerful individuals seeking to expand domains beyond existing territories - especially into Central Asia and India.

"The rise of the Tahirid dynasty in Khorasan coincided with the decline of the Abbasid Caliphate's control over the empire's peripheries as the thrust of Arab projection of power declined in the middle of the eighth century."
Interesting, as the office of caliph's military and political power declined his religious authority increased, which was revered by the Muslim population. This enabled the religious caliph to assign or un-assign legitimacy of rule to the many expanding local rulers. The process of local rulers attaining more and more real independence was achieved by the Tahirid (821-983) and Samanid (819=-999) and Saffarid (861-1003) dynastic houses.
Professor Jalali describes the situation: these dynasties ruled by self - acclamation and military force, i.e. "the sword". Sustaining military force - that is armies - required more financial and other resources than the local domain could produce. Thus expansion, by raiding or conquest, that required large militaries - armies - was a circular affair - larger armies require more revenue, obtaining more revenue requires more and larger armies, which require more revenue. All the local rulers are competing with all the others in their efforts to expand power in order to redirect revenues from neighbors to themselves. And one dynastic house will overthrow, supplant, a former dynasty in control of the same territory.
The history of this period confirms again that seeking of political power, including wars as a means, is the activity of individuals who seek domination and the conflict ensues due to others seeking their own domination or to avoid domination.

The Rise and Fall of Local Muslim Dynasties
A brief summary of the succession of dynasties with description of their varied power. But: "Beside the internal struggle for power among local dynasties in Afghanistan during this period, the omnipresent push of nomadic hordes from the north continued to pose a constant challenge to the power of states in the south." Among these were the Qarakhanids, the Uigur Turkics. the Seljuqs and Khwarazmids. He lists the Tahirid (822), the Saffarid (872), the Samanids, the Ghaznavid, The Ghorids.
His conclusion: "In any case, the situation kept Afghanistan in a state of militarization that often hindered the development of nonmilitary institutions."

Military Institutions
Professor Jalali writes as did Hans Delbruck, "The nature of military institutions and their conduct was intricately linked to the sociopolitical nature of the society." He distinguishes between 'state' armies and local militaries. "While state armies focused on dynastic interests, nonstate local groups and factions emerged that took on paramilitary tasks and local interests sometimes acted as outlaw bands or sources of local resistance."
In other words a 'state' under this definition is a political entity created by or taken over by a family dynasty, that has some level of bureaucratic organization, officially recognized tax collection and one or more levels of the 'forms of control'; coercive capacity, consensual inducements or legitimacy.

He describes the organization and influence of the residents in neighborhoods who established their own local defense. But they could also act as local 'gangs' to seek extortion and other abuses. They were para-military bands. called 'ayyarans' The Saffarids developed from one of these.

The Saffarids
The dynasty was founded by Yaqub ibn Laith who created his 'state' by steady increase in personal power from coppersmith to local leader to warlord to commander of the Sistan provincial army to Amir of Sistan. From there he conquered Herat, Kerman, and Fars between 867 and 879 and was designated by the caliph as viceroy of Balkh and Tokharistan. Professor Jalali describes and analyzes Yakib's military career in detail including a very vivid description of the Battle of Dayr al-'Aqul at which Yaqub was decisively defeated by the Abbasid army. At Yaqub's death he was succeeded by his brother, Amr Laith. He gave up conquering Baghdad and turned north-east to try to conquer Transoxiana, which was ruled by the Samanid's. He was defeated in 900 despite having a strong army. Amr was captured, taken to Baghdad, and executed in 903. Thus ended the brief Saffarid dynasty. Professor Jalali summarizes their source of power and its use. "Both Yaqub and Amr founded their power on the sword and focused on the army as the most important element of the state." Next he focuses analysis on this army.

The Saffarid Army
Professor Jalali identifies the core of Yaqub's military in the local Sagzi (Sistani) tribal warriors and the 'ayyaran bands. The Sistani infantry was renowned for centuries. To these, as his power expanded, he added Kharijites and Badghis. Then as success expanded it attracted more and more mercenaries, including Arabs, Turks, Indians and others. He estimates that the Saffarids may have been the first to recruit actual Afghans - that is Pashtuns. (Success always breeds success until un-success rapidly breeds the opposite,) As was already typical, he also incorporated 'slave' soldiers (usually Turkish youth captured by their fellows in the steppe lands to the north). They served as an eliete bodyguard. ( Again, typical of all despots such as Augustus Caesar's German bodyguards.) To keep these warriors happy, pay was generous and prompt, after the paymaster conducted a close inspection. (Of course the payments were based on taxes and booty.) Professor Jalali describes Saffarid battle tactics that incorporated the standard tactics already practiced by the various ethnic elements in the expanding army. From initial insurgent methods as the army increased it was able to adopt conventional warfare. Rapidity of movement based on light weight troops enabled maneuver and created surprise.

The Samanids
They succeeded the Saffarids. They came from Transoxiana. As was typical, the dynasty had an individual founder (Saman Khuda) who managed a rise in power similar to Yaqub ibn Laith. He first gained influence with the Arab governor of Khorasan and then saw his four sons rise further in the Abbasid caliph's service, when they defeated a rebellion by Rafi' ibn Laith. The brothers were appointed as local governors by the new, Tahirid dynasty (821-873). The Tahirid's were then defeated by Yakub Laith. Then the, still reigning Abbasid caliph, Mu'tamid, appointed Ahmad ibn Saman's son, Nasr ibn Ahamad, to govern all of Transoxiana, thus establishing the Saman family into great local power.
Sure enough, Nasi's brother, Ismail (892-907), drove out the Saffarids in Khorasan in 900, creating the new, Samanid dynasty. The Samanids had three powerful amirs: Imail (892-907), Ahmad (907-913), and Nasr (913-943) who expanded the family power from Central Asia on the east to the Persian gulf on the west and from India to near Baghdad.. (Note the rapidity of this remarkable expansion). They were generally well thought of by contemporary and later authors, due to their favoritism of and reciprocal support by established aristocratic families. They ruled through local supporters and greatly improved culture, industry and commerce. The Persian influence expanded. While their capital at Bukhara came to equal Baghdad, they retained the support of the Abbasid caliphs.
Professor Jalali enumerates the complexity of the bureaucratic government offices. The local governors they used were a combination of military leaders and hereditary local amirs. Again, their army was based on Turkish or Slavic slave warriors (ghulams) mostly coming from the steppe lands to the north. These were either purchased at the thriving slave markets or sent by the steppe chieftains. At this point Professor Jalali mentions that one of these slaves was - Alptign - who was to overthrown the Samanids and create the next dynasty - the Ghaznavid's.
Professor Jalali describes the role of Turkish slave soldiers who constituted the amir's inner guard, then might be appointed miliary commanders, then could rise to be commander of the army and a powerful person at court. The Samanis faced external threats from the usual three directions: the Quarluq Turks to the north, military commanders to the distant south, and the wealthy districts in Iran. On the north, the Samanids were defending Islam as agents of the caliphs in Baghdad. and as the ideological fervor of expanding Islam declined this became more difficult when the former outsiders, the Qarakhanids, converted to Islam. The Samanid's reverted to frontier defense. (like the Romans did.) They faced the same problem of dealing with nomadic tribes having no wealthy cities to loot, as did Cyrus and Darius against the Scythians and Alexander. They constructed a line of border forts. Local raids north were conducted by 'volunteer' Ghazis.
The southern problem required political methods as the wealthy region was a major source of Samanid taxes and the local leaders, being so far from Bukhara, were able to exert independence. Moreover the professional military there were the Turkish slave troops and their leaders. By the time Abdul Malik ruled as Amir (954-961) these Turkish commanders were staging uprisings (rebellions). It was at the death of Abdul in 961 that the aforementioned Turk (slave military commander on Khorasan), Alptigin, attempted, but failed, to put one heir on the Samanid throne, and Abdul's brother, Abu Salih Mansur, became king. Defeat naturally created danger, as Abu sent a large cavalry force against Alptigin in Afghanistan in 862. Alptigin won the battle. Victory enabled Alptigin to seize and establish his own local domain centered on Bamian and Ghazna. There was born the new, Ghaznavid kingdom, named for a place rather than for a founder family. The mountain terrain was important in securing Alptign's initial local power. Meanwhile, to the west the Samanid's faced the rival Persian Ziyarid family dynasty and the Buyids in Iraq. All this assisted the Qarakhanid invasion that captured Bukhara in 999. The last Samanid, Ismail II, was assassinated in 1005.

The Ghaznavid Empire
Professor Jalali describes yet another rapidly expanding family dynasty, after Alptigin died in 963, followed by his son and two slave leaders, Sebuktigin was a slave yet also Alptigin's son-in-law. Professor Jalali comments that the resulting new domain became the largest Muslim empire after the demise of the Abbasid caliphate. Sebuktigin was able to attract the nearby Pashtun tribes, expanding his power clear to Peshawar. The desperate Samanid's facing the invasion of Qarakhanid forces asked Sebuktigin for help, which he gladly provided at the cost to the Samanid's of his power expanding across Khorasan to Balkh. He was the first Muslim to invade India via that northwest line through the Kyber Pass. He defeated the local ruler, Jaipal, to take Gandhara Valley and Punjab. Sebuktign's death in 997 resulted in the usual war between his sons, Mahmud and Ismail. Mahmud won and retained the approval of the caliph in Baghdad. He waged continual war (17 campaigns) into India on the grounds of destroying infidels. simultaneously the Ghaznavid army as able to block Qarhhanid expansion sufficiently to supplant the Samanid's in Transoxiana. They also defeated the Buyids to the west and conquered eastern parts of Iran.

The State and the Army
As Professor Jalali has described it, the Ghaznavid 'state' was an entity of its army that conquered by the sword - (The first step Doshi cites - 'coercive capacity') the military element - army - expanded and elaborated itself as the territory it gained expanded bringing more and more wealth.
Professor Jalali identifies three 'main features':
"the dominance of the slave soldiers;
the ethnic diversity of the military forces;
and the focus on high mobility for rapid concentration and movement of forces over long distances."
Professor Jalali describes the Ghaznavid army organization in detail. There were many different slave units, some based on ethnic origins, such as Tajiks, Khorasini and Indians, and non-slaves including also Turks, Arabs, Dailamis, Khalaj, Pashtuns - whose presence greatly expanded - , and Kurds. But "the Turks dominated the leadership." He notes that: "During battle, each ethnic military horde would fight bravely to preserve its good name in competition with the other national contingents."
He continues: "Operational mobility and the capability to deploy armed forces rapidly in the right place a the right time ensured the dominance of cavalry forces in the army, redeployment of large forces in strategic areas, and the establishment of a reliable logistics system. The cavalry constituted the bulk of the Ghaznavid army". But there was also a significant infantry including special troops from mountainous regions. Favorite weapons of cavalry or infantry included bows, spikes, spears and wide shields, battle axes, maces, lances, lassos, and long swords. In battle, tactics included repeated cavalry charges by different units with in between arrow barrages by light cavalry.

A chief important characteristic of the Turkish slave soldier was loyalty to his boss. Another was the physical strength and agility gained from life on the steppe.
But as it conquered parts of India the Ghaznavid army obtained Hindu slaves as well. And there was the inherent danger that anyone becoming too powerful would be thinking of acquiring more power. Recognizing this from the Samanid example, the Ghaznavids closely watched for such ideas and replaced senior commanders.
Professor Jalali notes that "the Ghaznavids were the first Muslim dynasty to use elephants in large numbers for battle and to integrate their use in combat."
He names the main officers in the command hierarchy and estimates that the army structure was on the decimal system as were those or most contemporary armies. he estimates that the size of the Ghaznavid military force increased from 100,000 in peacetime plus thousands added in wartime. He notes also that the army included experts in siege warfare and use of siege engines.

Ghaznavid Military Conquests
Professor Jalali includes a map showing the great extent of the Ghaznavid Empire 978 - 1187. He notes that Mahmud's most famous campaign was against the Somanth temple in 1025-26, which he describes in some detail. He disputes the logsitic numbers provided in standard sources as being impossible - as the ratio of carried water to troop numbers is insufficient. (I include this campaign among the references). Apart from this notorious campaign, Professor Jalali ascribes Mahmud's victories to the disunity of Indian political strucure and obsolete tactics, plus the renewed 'fervor' of Jihad that drew thousands of warriors from far away Central Asia and Khorasan.

The Rise of the Ghorids
Another map shows the location of Ghor in south-west Afghanistan.
Professor Jalali describes the mountainous region, which gave the local rulers defensive strength. "The cul-de-sac geography of Ghor, with its craggy peaks and deep valleys, made the mountainous tract a natural fortress with limited access from the surrounding lowlands." The initial Arab invaders bypassed this difficult region as they invaded into India via the northern and southern routes. But the neighboring Ghaznavids conquered the territory but wisely left local rulers to act as vassals. In the 11th century a local family, Shansabanis, ruled and established their capital at Firozkoh. Professor Jalali discusses the controversial scholarly opinions about the actual origins of the Ghorid peoples. "After Sultan Mahmud conquered Ghor in 1010" the local horsemen joined his armies. But the advent of local Ghorid warriors into the Ghaznavid army (and territory) enabled them to seek not only more independence but eventually to replace their suzerains. Mahmud's successor, Mas-ud II died in 1115 and the usual contest for the throne between his sons began.
The battle at Ghazni in 1117 in which the Seljuq sultan Sanjar supported Bahram-Shah against Arslan resulted in the former's victory. He reigned for 35 years, but he was the last Ghaznavid ruler. Bahram poisoned the Ghorid leader, Qutbuddin Mohammad, which prompted Qutbuddin's brother, Saifuddin Ssuri to attack and defeat Bahram in 1048. Saifuddin proclaimed himself the new ruler at Ghazna and delegated Ghor to another brother, Bahuddin Sam. But Bahram organized a new army and then defeated and executed Saifuddin. This brought Alauddin Hussein, another Ghorid brother, to attack in 1151. After 3 battles he defeated Bahram then took and burned Ghazna, killing 60,000 citizens. Alauddin ruled the combined area from his own capital at Firozkoh until 1161. Then the Ghorid brothers, MohammadGhori at Ghazna and Sultan Ghiasuddin ibn Sam from Firozkoh expanded their empire - Mohammad into India and Ghiasuddin into Sistan, Herat and Kerman. Ghiasuddin then clashed with the Khwarazm Shahs, defeated them in 1192 near Merv.

The Ghorid's Military Establishment
Professor Jalali writes that the Ghorid dynasty ruled on the basis of its army (as with the other dynasties). They benefited from the decline of the Ghaznavids in Afghanistan and the Seljuqs in western Khorasan. They took over the Ghaznavid use of Turkish slave warriors. In particular these Turkish troops were able to continue the Muslim rule in India after the main Ghorid empire disintegrated. He notes that the Ghorid ruler enjoyed personally supervising the training of these slaves, and would promote those who demonstrated outstanding skill and loyalty. The sultans created a special personal guards division (jandar). The chief component of the army was its cavalry, which had high mobility as speed. As with most steppe warriors they could shoot arrows from horseback. The light cavalry would prepare the battlescape by arrow fire and then the heavily armored cavalry would launch a decisive attack. This tactic was used in the Battle of Tarain in 1192. The army also had infantry, siege engines and artillery men and elephants.

The Indian Conquest
Professor Jalali describes the campaigns in detail, beginning with Mu'izuddin Mohammad Ghori campaign through the Gomal Pass in 1175. He began by displacing the Muslim rulers who had taken what is now mostly Pakistan. By 1182 he had conquered all of Sind but not Gujarat. He then shifted to the north into Punjab, taking Peshawar in 1179. By 1186 he had driven the last of the Ghaznavids out of Lahore. Then he turned to the Hindu principalities further east. Those former Turkish conquerors had ruled by retaining the conquered Hindus in their religion. The Ghori Muslims (and their Turkish troops) were eager to destroy 'infidel' Hindus. For this the Ghorid army had to face the Rajput warriors, led by Prithviraj.
Professor Jalali describes the strength and weaknesses of the Indian armies. They relied on large numbers of infantry with a large number of elephants in the first line. (Virtually the same as the Indian order of battle at Hydaspes but absent the chariots. Their order of battle, then, plus their tactics, was at a disadvantage against the Central Asian horse archers and armored heavy cavalry.

A Battle that Changed India
This is the famous second battle of Tarain in 1192. Professor Jalali includes a diagram of the battle and provides both a detailed description of the battle and, more significantly, his military analysis. (See the references). His section title, above, reflects his appraisal of the importance of this battle and campaign. More important still is his evaluation of the long-lasting results - that a Muslim ruler remained on the throne at Delhi until 1857, for centuries after the Ghorid dynasty lost all its power and territories outside India.
This and other battles took place during Mohammad Ghori's wars against the Rajput ruler, Prithviraj (1149 - 1192). They won the first battle of Tarain but did not recognize the significance of the Ghori battle tactics. Professor Jalali attributes their subsequent defeat to their (and general Indian) reliance on their outdated standard military methods; from recruitment, to staffing, to use of elephants, to ineffective cavalry and poorly trained infantry masses. For his second effort, Mohammad assembled (some authors claim 120,000 but Jalali estimates only 60-70,000) expert Arab, Afghan, Tajik, Khorasimi, and Turkish warriors, trained and experienced in mounted desert warfare. Prithviraj assembled contingents from 150 chieftains - a unwieldy mass of horsemen, elephants and masses of foot troops. The Rajputs were overconfident and lax in local security measures. Mohammad launched a surprise dawn attack while the Rajputs were waking up. The Ghorids were into their camp before the nearest men were aware. But the camp was so large that those in the interior did have time to muster and form line of battle.
Professor Jalali's two phase diagram depicts the battle. Mohammad left his infantry and main force in camp and relied on four divisions of light and one dividsion of heavy cavalry. The battle tactics were standard (centuries old) steppe warfare - launch repeated attacks by the light cavalry archers on sequential front and flanks to disrupt their opponents until those were worn out at which time the heavy (well armored) cavalry would launch the decisive attack directly into the confused mass. For this Mohammad used his 12,000 picked, armored, mounted swordsmen who massacred the befuddled Indians.

Professor Jalali's assessment of the larger results: "The outcome of the battle sealed the fate of northern India for many centuries to come. It paved the way for the establishment of the Muslim's Delhi Sultanate; except for the hills and deserts of Rajuptana no Hindu chief ruled in the north until the rise of the Sikh maharaja Ranji Singh in the early 19th century."

But the Ghorid empire was beginning to crumble outside of India. "Sultan Ghiassuddin died in 1203 and his successor, Sultan Mohammad Ghori died in 1206. The Ghorid's were defeated by the Khwarazm ruler, Sultan Mohammad (r, 1200 - 1220)" The remaining Ghorid's were subjected to Khwarazm-Shahid rule. Lacking the spoils of success, their various ethnic tribal components began to abandon their army. But the Khwarazmazid empire was in turn short lived as the terrible Mongol armies soon destroyed it - in the following chapter.

Professor Jalali's assessment of the Ghorids credits their remarkably rapid expansion of power with expanding Muslim rule into India more lasting that the previous Muslim conquerors achieved.

References:
Some individuals and events mentioned in chapter Six: URLs plus extended text

References:
Some individuals and events mentioned in chapter Six: only the URLs

Chapter 7 - The Mongol Cataclysm, 1220-1370 :
This is another subject that is relatively well know to the American reader, at least in its general relation to Europe and China. But Professor Jalali greatly expands our knowledge of the Mongol destructive campaigns in Afghanistan. His chapter title is apropos - cataclysm it definitely was, in Central and South Asia to an extent not experienced as much in western Europe. It was like both a tornado and a hurricane.
Professor Jalali summarizes: "Over four years (1219 -1223) the Mongols massacred millions of local inhabitants, enslaved hundreds of thousands of others, turned vast farming lands into killing fields, and destroyed the irrigation systems. The impact of the destruction continues even today in Afghanistan." He estimates that 20-30 % of the population was killed.
He devotes this lengthy chapter to detailed description and analysis because this Mongol 'episode', although relatively brief in comparison with the reigns and wars of some dynastic rules, resulted in more lasting, detrimental effects than any others. His description of Temujin's early exploits is well known as the conqueror consolidated many local and neighboring tribes into a confederacy of experienced, nomadic warriors. Among those who fled the Mongols were the Merkits, who had moved into the northeastern border of the expanding Khwarazm-Shahid empire of Aluddin Mohammad Khwarazm Shah. The Shah was completing his own expansion by driving the Ghorids out of Afghanistan and by pushing the Seljuk's westward. Thus both 'emperors' were about to deal with the Merkits. The result in 1215-1216 was that the two armies met in the Qipchaq steppes. Unfortunately for him, the aggressive and self assured Mohammad didn't take the Mongol commander's advice that there was no conflict between the parties, and instead attacked the Mongols. (BAD BAD). Chinggis was busy in China, so the incident passed. But Mohammad recognized a potential threat and became fearful well before fear was psychologically appropriate due to reality.

Professor Jalali evaluates the two sides, which he finds to be "drastically different". He describes the well organized, centrally controlled, disciplined Mongol military forces developing tactics even more advanced than those of the ancient steppe horse archers. He observes that the newly expanding Khwarazm-Shaid Empire did control a huge region, but it was weak and unorganized, and composed of a variety of ethnic tribes. He provides the wildly different estimates of various commentators on the size of the Khwarazm military forces and settles for a figure of 100,000 - 150,000 varied elements. Many of these were mercenaries, including the best cavalry of the Qanquli and Qipchaq Turks. The result was a 'very shaky' mixture. Moreover, the Sultan was also not favored by the caliph in Baghdad nor by many Muslims.

Here is a priceless evaluation the Professor Jalali pens for all times, from consideration of Chinggis Khan. "Having overwhelmed his rival powers in Asia, Chinggis Khan saw no immediate threat to his dominions. He was aging and could have lived in peace within his vast and unified empire. However, a powerful empire with an enormous military machine, could hardly resist the temptation to grow greater. Neither could such a great power maintain peace among the militarized nomad tribes without keeping them engaged in more wars and plunder."
Sound familiar?
Chinggis Khan met Khawazm-Shah's, delegation and claimed there would be peaceful mercantile relations. Then came the first catastrophy. A Mongol merchant trading caravan at Otrar was too wealthy for the local governor to ignore. Khawazm-Shah could not resist approving their execution and confiscation of the prizes. Thus came the storm, a tornado out of the east.

The Mongol Military structure
Professor Jalali describes the structure, organization, components, weapons, discipline, logistics and more. He uses local, contemporary and subsequent sources written in local languages. Some specific characteristics include:
"As in many medieval armies in the region, the Mongol army was organized on the decimal system. ...
The Mongol military consisted entirely of cavalry ..
The army was supplemented by auxiliary forces that provided combat support and logistics services to the army. ...
The Mongol's way of war, as a nomadic activity, was shaped by the horse, and their campaigns were influenced by their way of war...
As the empire expanded, people from the conquered lands swelled the ranks of the Mongol army...
The use of infantry, raised among sedentary populations for garrison duties, gave the Mongol army wider variety and greater flexibility and allowed it to greatly expand the empire...
Another unique characteristic of the Mongol army was its reduced dependence on cumbersome supply trains despite the constant requirement for forage for the large reserve of horses...
Mongol soldiers were subject to strictly enforced discipline standards applied equally to all with no exceptions. ...
The primary weapon of the Mongol forces was their native bow which was a recurved bow made from composite materials (wood, horn, and sinew) and was, at the time, matched for accuracy, force, and reach....
The Mongols' battle tactics were a combination of maneuver by light horsemen, bow-shooting from a distance, and cavalry charges by heavily armed mounted soldiers....
The Mongol army's operational techniques were flexible and agile. Psychological warfare and deception were distinct features of their operational methods.

Swarming Westward
In this section, Professor Jalali describes the campaign that began in 1219. He directs particular attention to the strategic and tactical failures of Sultan Mohammad Khwarazm-Shah. But he also notes that the Sultan had few choices, given the quality and organization of his own army and the problem of attempting to defend a wide area containing many large, important cities. He decided to relay on fortification of the cities defended by his army distributed in large garrisons, rather than to attempt to confront the Mongols in an open battle. But the result was that the Mongols were able to attack and destroy each city in sequence.

Planning the Military Campaign
Professor Jalali includes an excellent map that shows the routes of the several Mongol armies in 1220. He divides the campaign into four phases. Phase one was to attack and eliminate the cities along the Syr Darya River. The second phase was to cross the Syr Darya to besiege and destroy, in a sequence, the central Khwarazm cities, especially Nur, Bukhara and Samarkand. In the third phase the Mongol army then crossed the Amu Darya into Khorasan to destroy the leading cities there, including Balkh, Merv, Nishapur, and Herat. The fourth phase consisted of quelling resistance, retaliating against any communities that revolted, destroying local fortresses and defeating remaining detachments. With each city they captured they massacred many, enslaved others, and forced prisoners to serve as 'arrow fodder' in front of their warriors as they besieged the next city. But they frequently examined the inhabitants and selected any skilled artisans they considered worth while to retain for exportation.
Meanwhile, Sultan Mohammad fled his capital, Samarkand, westward, hoping to raise a new army. Genghis Khan ordered Subedai, Chepe and Toquchar to capture Mohammad. They did no succeed in that, as Mohammad died on an island in the Caspian Sea before they could reach him. But, instead, they continued north across the Caucuses and west into Crimea and then as far as the famous Battle of the Kalka where they destroyed a Kyivan Rus - Kypchak Tartar army before returning to Mongolia. But Mohammad's son, Jalaluddin escaped and raised another new army, which caused Genghis Khan some trouble discussed in another section.

The Conquest of Khorasan and Afghanistan
Here we arrive at the Mongol destruction of 'Afghanistan' itself. Professor Jalali provides another map that depicts the further campaigns in 1221-1223. That the Mongols remained so long in this region indicates the difficulty they encountered in subduing the population, and destroying the infrastructure. He identifies several causes that necessitated the prolonged effort. The mountainous terrain was and always had been and still is a defensive attribute. Another result of this is that it enables the societies to form independent local power bases and numerous fortified villages and separate fortresses. The campaign map indicates that the campaign begain as the Mongols crossed the Amu Darya to attack Termez ( a well known city today). Simultaneously, Genghis Khan sent a detachment back north to secure the Syr Darya at Urganj and another westward to secure the area that Subodai had briefly controlled during his pursuit of Sultan Mohammad. From the destroyed Termez the khan road south-west to Balkh, which was also destroyed after its population was massacred. He remained in that area including Badakhshan over the winter. (Badakhshan is that narrow finger of Afghanistan that reaches eastward between Pakistan and Tajikistan to the Chinese border.)
As his detachments operated against Urganj and again against Merv, Nishapur, and Herat; Genghis Khan rode south across the Hindu Kush to eliminate all local resistance in Ghor and Sistan and to eliminate Jalaluddin. The campaign in Khorasan was difficult for the Mongols. After sieges, the great Muslim centers of Merv, Nishapur and Herat were obliterated, their population massacred in what Professor Jalali describes as the most 'bloody' destruction. He writes: "The fall of these great cities resulted in a massive loss of civilian life, as the Mongols had no intention of taking prisoners". He cites the huge losses (in the millions) given by contemporary historians, but indicates, by referring to modern population estimates that those are 'incredible'. Still, estimating that total losses amounted to 25% of the population. T he number killed amounts to 1.25 million. In addition to the famous, large cities, the Mongol destruction included every town and village. Some sieges lasted for months but the Mongol's were determined and persistent in wanton elimination of all.

Ghazna Emerges as a New Center of Resistance
In this section Professor Jalali continues his narration and analysis of the Mongol campaign as it continued south into Ghazni. Since Jalaluddin had been the viceroy of Ghor and Ghazna during the reign of his father, he had a strong power base there. But the elite of his warrior units were the northern based Qanquli Turks lead by Amin Malik, who eliminated rival commanders. Jalaluddin managed to assemble a significant force, numbering between 60,000 and 70,000 warriors, but it was heterogenous, consisting of Turks, Turkomen, Ghori, Tajiks, Khalaj, Qarluqs, Balki, and Ghilzai Pashtuns.

From the Plains of Parwan to the Banks of the Sind River
This is the culminating episode for Jalaluddin. It occurred at the Battle of Parwan, for which Professor Jalali supplies a detailed battle map and analysis. despite that victory, Jalaluddin's army split up due to rivalry between some of its composed ethnic units and their leaders. The denouement was the the Battle of Sind (or the Indus) in which Jalaluddin performed remarkably well but was overwhelmed, at which he jumped (horseback) across the river to the astonished admiration of Genghis Khan.
"Coming Back to life" - Renewed Anti-Mongol Uprisings
But all was not sweetness and roses for the Mongols. Even in eventual defeat, Jalaluddin's exploits encouraged more revolts and uprisings throughout Afghanistan - that is Ghor, Sistan, Khorasan and Gharjistan. From his headquarters camp at Kabul, Genghis Khan dispatched Mongol units throughout the region to destroy all evidence of resistance. This time Herat was totally destroyed, its population massacred or enslaved. Learning that Jalaluddin was active in Lahore, the khan sent detachments into Punjab and Baluchistan, but Jalaluddin had moved west into Persia.

The War of the Fortresses
The story continues. Professor Jalali considers 1222: "The year 1222 was one of the most terrible periods experienced by the mountain fortresses of central Afghanistan as the Mongols penetrated through the most rugged districts of Ghor and Gharjisan to reduce the impregnable mountain fortresses between Ghazna and Herat." They accomplished this by siege and starvation rather than successful assaults. These sieges lasted months and in some cases over a year. Professor Jalali names some of the more important or powerful of these, including, Kaliun, Fiwar, Firozkoh, Tulak.

Marching Homeward
Professor Jalali does not overlook the Mongol return home. "Far from experiencing a peaceful homeward journey the Mongols left a bloody trail of devastation as they passed through ruins on their return eastward. Chinggis Khan destroyed more human life than any other known conqueror." ... "For decades and centuries, the devastating aftermath of the invasion continued to take heavy tolls on the population in the affected lands." Professor Jalali continues by describing the breakup of the united Mongol Empire among sons, grandsons and cousins.
These became rivals of each other, a typical process as we have seen among the rivals in the families of the various dynastic realms.
He focuses his attention to the situation that affected Afghanistan as it was divided between the rival successor khanates of Chaghtay in Central Asia and the Ilkhanids of Persia.
He considers three major trends:
"1. Clashes of rival Mongol khanates along their loosely defined borders
2. The struggle of native principalities to survive amid competing Mongol colonists.
3. The massive displacement of the population and the changing social and political landscape.

The Clashes of the Khanates
While the rulers of the Chaghatay and Ilkhanid domains contested inside Afghanistan, they had external conflicts as well. The Chaghatay had to deal with the eastern successors of Ogdai and Tolui, while the Ilkhanids had to deal with the Mamluks of Egypt, the Seljuqs of Asia Minor and the Golden Horde Mongol-Tartars from Sarai.
The Native Kurt Dynasty
Professor Jalali continues to describe the aftermath of the Mongol invasion. By the 14th century the several Mongol khanates were loosing control over Afghanistan. This enabled the local, Kurt dynasty which ruled Herat, Ghor and much of Khorasan to begin to gain independence in 1345. This dynasty was actually an old noble family in which members served Sultan Ghiasuddin Mohammad ibn Sam. During the Mongol supremacy, the Kurt king served the Ilkhanids against the Golden Horde and against the Chaghatayid khans by participating in Ilkhanid campaigns. They ruled from Herat and attempted to expand their control eastward through Afghanistan to the Indus River. But they faced opposition from local, independent lords. The dynasty was overthrown by Amir Timur - Tamerlane.

Massive Social Displacements
In the centuries that followed the Mongol invasion many of the local survivors fled south or west or into India. They were replaced by the movement of people from the north. The Kurt dynasty rulers did manage to restore Herat despite intermittent Mongol incursions.
In this section Professor Jalali discusses the question of the origins of the Hazara people who occupy the mountainous region in central Afghanistan.

References:
Some individuals and events mentioned in chapter Seven: URLs plus extended text

References:
Some individuals and events mentioned in chapter Seven: only the URLs

Chapter 8 - Timur and Timurids, 1335-1526:
No sooner than the weakening of the Mongol power over Afghanistan, a new, terrifying conqueror arrived to disrupt the recovery from Mongol destruction. As Tamerlane, this conqueror entered into European notoriety already during his lifetime. Professor Jalali greatly expands our knowledge of the disaster he wrought in Afghanistan.
He opens this chapter with a general description of the appraisals of Timur's life and 'accomplishments' by Western historians, authors and the public opinion since his life. He was already a famous - infamous - personality in Renaissance times. He quotes the general opinion: "As a conqueror and empire builder, Timur ranks among the few great warriors who have global impact throughout history." .. "However the legacies of these three great military leaders - Alexander, Chinggis, and Timur - differ enormously, as do the ways each ascended to imperial power." He was much more the sole beneficiary of his own opportunistic aggressiveness. "Timur was a resolute and ambitious leader whose ability to survive in a turbulent political environment and whose carefully calculated opportunism contributed to his ascent."

The Rise to Power
Professor Jalali summarizes Timur's early life and accomplishments. Timur lived in the western part of the Chaghatayed Khanate territory of the Mongol divided empire, which was also splitting into two parts after 1334. The western region, the Ulus Chaghatay, that included Transoxiana and Afghanistan, was itself further divided into two camps, each on one side of the Amu Darya, occupied by different tribes.
Professor Jalali makes a very significant point: "The political life of the Ulus Chaghatay was controlled by tribal chiefs who exerted influence using the military power and economic resources that they controlled. Therefore, the personality of leaders and their abilities to seize opportunities were the keys to power."

Timur was an insignificant member of the important Barlas tribe. He seized his opportunity in 1360 when Tughluq Timur invaded Transoxiana and the then existing tribal leaders either fled or submitted. He was appointed a new leader by Tughluq. Professor Jalali observes that Timur never forgot the importance of obtaining powerful outside support. But Timur lost leadership to Haji Beg. Professor Jalali continues:" Survival through patience and perserverence was another component of Timur's rise to power." When Tughluq Timur invaded a second time, Timur regained leadership. When that suzerain became unpopular, Timur switched his support. Professor Jalali cites another maxim: "Parting ways with prospective losers was another element of Timur's long-term rise to power."
But Timur and his superior, Amir Hussein, failed to dominate they fled into Khorasan where he gained support from the local Kurt dynasty in Herat. Timur continued to Sistan where he became a freebooter, warrior. There is was wounded and received the nick name (Timur-i lang - Timur the lame).
Professor Jalali finds another of Timur's habits: "Choosing the best times to disengage and then to return and strike back constituted another tenant of Timur's scheme of political maneuvering."
Timur and Amir Hussein returned across the Amu Darya and launched attacks on the Ulus rulers. Success (as usual) breeds success as more warriors joined his forces. Amir Hussein took control of the Ulus Chaghatay in 1364 but appointed a Chinggis Khan descendent as figurehead ruler. (obtaining legitimacy). At this point Timur was dissatisfied with his position as joint ruler, so began open warfare against Amir Hussein. He was successful in battle in Balkh and Hussein's death in 1370 left Timur in full command throughout Transoxiana. Again seeking political legitimacy, Timur promptly married Hussein's widow (as his 4th wife), who was a direct descendent of Chinggis Khan as daughter of the last Chagatai khan, Amir Qazan. From this Timur titled himself "Timur Gurgan - that is 'son-in-law, of the Great Khan". Another source of legitimacy. but to be sure, Timur placed a full blood Chinggis descendent as the puppet ruler of the Ulus. This in addition to his continual stressing his roll as a powerful adherent and supporter of Islam.
Professor Jalali concludes: "But what marked Timur as a different type of leader was his ability not only to maintain his grip on power but also to expand it into a great empire." He over came the independent power of the various tribal leaders by centralizing power in his own hands, expanding his central army by including these tribal warriors.
This was Chinggis Khan's method as also was employment of these booty-seeking soldiers in campaigns outside the Ulus.

Timur's Military Machine
Professor Jalali analyzes Timur's war capacity. He notes that the core of the army was Timur's Tatar tribes, especially the Barlas. They were the age-old nomadic warriors dependent on their horses, and on booty they could loot from sedentary populations. Their very life style and personality was based on their pride in the achievement of domination of and wealth from the population. And Timur knew that. Professor Jalali identifies 12 tribes as the core of Timur's standing army and an additional 28 tribes as supporting elements. Plus, Timur added units from the many other conquered peoples. As was the standard, Timur organized his units on the decimal system - from 10 to 1000, then a tumen of ten of those. These were led by 330 officers. In addition there were 12 other officers who each commanded a unit based on 1000. The smallest had 1000 - each larger had 1000 more with the highest officer having 12000.
Professor Jalali describes the defensive and offensive armament, including siege engines, and details of camp life and other implements such as saws, axes, and personal gear. Pay was based on the number and quality of the horses each soldier and officer had. The pay was generated by tribute from cities and regions and land allotments. Engagement orders of battle were the standard left, center and right wings or different formations adjusted on the basis of opponents.

The Conquest of Afghanistan
Professor Jalali notes that this was relatively easy becaue the local rulers in the area were weak and disunited. In the eastern regions the locals were already Turko-Mongols who "submitted". In the west the Kurt dynasty in Herat had 'freed itself' from the Ilkhanid's, but were fighting the Sarbanders. The last Kurt malik (king) was Ghiasuddin Pir Ali who kept on friendly terms with Timur. Timur wanted more than a 'friend', he wanted a vassal, but Ghiasuddin wanted independence. In 1380 Timur sent his leading army toward Herat, crossing the Amu Darya to take Balkh and Sheberghan. The next year Timur began operations. but by then the entire Khorasan region was opposed and preparing to fight.
Professor Jalali describes the campaign in which Timur had to besiege fortified cities. He was wounded during the siege of Foshanj. Herat was much stronger and was defended by a large regional force including Ghorids, who conducted night attacks on Timur's camp. The Timurids found a weak access point from which they capturerd some citizens whom they promised leniency. The city surrendered, but Timur destroyed the walls anyway and sent Ghiasuddin into exile at Samarkand. The following year Timur continued to conquer other cities throughout Khorasan. But resistance did not end. During following years all of Sistan and most of Khorasan continued to revolt and wage war even knowing they were doomed. Timur massacred entire populations and built pyramids of skulls.
Professor Jalali describes the protracted defense the citizens of Zaranj performed before being overwhemed. The city was destroyed along with the region, which Professor Jalali notes has never recovered its "verdant and populous past".
But Timur was not finished. He continued throughout Hemand and Urozgin into the mountaneous home of the Pashtuns. He encountered fierce resitance everywhere and met it with his typical methods. He wintered in captured Kandahar, then returned to Samarkand in 1384. Destroying resistance in Afghanistan was preparation for further campaigns west through Persia to Anatolia and east into India.

Conquest of Persia and West Asia
Professor Jalali briefly describes the following 20 years of Timur's destructive campaigns throughout Persia, leaving towers of skulls by destroyed cities.

Timur's Ventures Far Afield
Professor Jalali devotes this section to Timur's many campaigns as far as Russia and India and his preparations to invade China.

Timur's Descendents
Professor Jalali notes that only Shah-Rukh of Timur's four sons remained to inherit the empire. He made Herat his capital. In turn, he made his son, Ulugh Beg, (the famous astronomer) governor of Samarkand, During their reigns they revived much of the regions that Timur had destroyed. Shah-Rukh ruled from 1409 to 1447 and Ulugh Beg ruled from 1409 to 1449. With Persia having been so devastated Persian culture became centered in Herat and Samarkand. Ulugh Beg was murdered in 1449, begining the disillusion of the empire. Herat remained a cultural center under the rule of Timurid princes until 1506. One famous descendent was Babur, who was driven out of Samarkand but, remarkably, was able to organize a new army which he led from Kabul to invade India and establish a new Mughal Empire.
Professor Jalali continues with a sketch of the efforts of the various Timurid descendents as they fought each other and local opponents as the empire disintegrated. "By 1500, the divided Timurid Empire had lost control of most of its territory and in the following years was effectively pushed back on all fronts." "Persia fell quickly to the Shi'ite Safavid dynasty of Shah Ismail I. Much of Central Asian lands were overrun by the Uzbeks under Mohammad Khan Shaybani". Babur was defeated and forced to divert his attention and efforts to conquering India.

Failed Attempts by the Shaybanids to Form a Nomadic Empire
These were Uzbek invaders who drove the Timurid lords out of Transoxiana. Professor Jalali concludes the chapter with his analysis of the ultimately failed efforts of the Shaybanids to establish rule over Central Asia. Their leader was Mohammad Khan Shaybani (1451 - 1510). He cites contemporary authors who recounted the Shaybani wars against the Shi'ite Safavid ruler Ismail I, to the west and the Kazaks who were pressing from the north. The newly called Kazaks ("renegades") split off from the Uzbeks and fought Mohammad Shaybani. "Another important issue is the religious basis of Shaybani's war on the Safavids and Kazaks." Shaybani and his adherents were Sunni while the Safavids were Shi'ites. The Kazaks were simply considered 'apostates'. As is usual the religious war was especially violent. Professor Jalali points to the results of Ismail I's (Safavid) in which Mohammad was killed and dismembered.
Professor Jalali also points to Babur's opposition to the Shaybanids. His assessment of this period of multi-sided warfare during political chaos: "To conclude, we can state that Mohammad Shaybani represented a turning point in the history of Central Asia. In fact, it was the historical ramifications of Shaybani's failure that made him a distinct figure in the region's history." The result was major political changes in which new empires were born - Safavid, Ottoman and Mughal. Professor Jalali also cites Rene Grousset's assessment that 'the sedentary was beginning to get even with the nomad and cultivation was winning against the steppe."

References:
Some individuals and events mentioned in chapter Eight: Some references overlap into Chapter 9 or 10 - URLs plus extended text

References:
Some individuals and events mentioned in chapter Eight: Some references overlap into Chapter 9 or 10 - only the URLs

Chapter 9 - Afghan Tribes and the Gunpowder Empires, 1500 -1709:
This chapter and Chapter 10 are probably the most fascinating and least known (to Americans) of the book.
This chapter overlaps the previous one during which the origins of the new political basis for the conflicts between the participants developed.
Professor Jalali considers that: "The military history of Afghanistan in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is marked by a three-way persistent struggle for domnance among the three regional powers that carved up the terrotory of today's Afghanistan into separate spheres of control." It was also a period during which gunpowder, especially cannons, came to influence and even decide victory in battle.

(Note that the same relationship of gunpowder cannon to the supremacy of larger centralized 'states' over the multitude of local warlords took place in Europe.)

The three outside powers that fought each other in the territory of Afghanistan were: The Safavids of Persia (1501 - 1722), the Mughal Empire of India (1526-1857) and the Uzbek khanate of Central Asia (1500 - 1876)
Professor Jalali reports that the native populations in Afghanistan "fought a desperate struggle for survival." In this struggle it was the "Afghan tribal confederations that not the only forced the occupying empires out of the country but also marched triumphantly into the imperial capitals and made then capitulate to their authority." He outlines the process: "First it was the Ghilzai Pashtuns of Kandahar ... that took the war to the heart of the Persian state." .. Later Ahamad Shah Durani marched to Delhi and made the Mughal Empire his vassal. And the Afghans forced the Uzbeks back across the Amu Darya

But first it was the continued three- power struggle that dominated. These centered on the three regions:
"1 The Uzbek-Safavid battle ground in Khorasan to the northwest.
2. The Safavid-Mughal area in Kandahar in the southeast
3. The Uzbek-Mughal frontline in Badakhshan and Balkh in the northeast."
But all three faced even more pressing conflicts with their own neighbors - The Safavids with the Ottomans and Tsarist Russia; The Mughals with the rest of India; The Uzbeks with the Kazaks and Oirat Empire in China and Eastern Turkistan.

Warfare described in this chapter continues to take place and interact on multiple levels. |
1 between aggressive would-be leaders of tribes and localities;
2 between the individuals who managed to gain control of local regions and leaders of neighboring regions;
3 between rulers of larger territories within 'Afghanistan';
4 between those rulers and rulers of territories adjacent to Afghanistan;
5 between the rulers of those adjacent domains and each other using Afghanistan as a venue and source of power.

The Turko-Afghan Legacy in India
This was a three century era during which Afghan rulers held the throne in Delhi. When the Ghorid dynasty was defeated in Afghanistan in 1215 they moved into India lead by Sultan Shahabuddin Mohammad Ghori (1150-1206). His officers continued to rule.
Professor Jalali provides some fascinating statistics:
"During the more than three centuries of rule by the Turko-Afghan dynasties in India (1206-1526), thirty four Muslim kings ruled from Delhi. For one-third of this period, Afghan (Pashtun) sultans sat on the Delhi throne. During those centuries when Afghanistan was dominated by the successors of Chinggis Khan (1227-1370) and then by Timur and his descendents (1370-1510) the principal Afghan rulers did not rule in their homeland but instead reigned in India."
And they were well supplied by Afghan wariors for their armies. "During this peridd of India's medieval history, five Turko-Afghan dynasties ruled in India.
1 The slave kings (Mamluks) led by Qutbuddin Aibak (1206-1210), who was succeeded by his son-in-law,
2 Sultan Shamsuddin Iltimush (1211-1236).
3.The Mamluks were followed by the Afghan Khalji dyasty (1290-1320).
4.Then came the dynasty of Tughluq Turks (1320-1414), followed by Mohammad Tughluq (1325-1351) during which he expanded the Delhi territory throughout India. But the domain weakened and shrunk back to Delhi and environs.
5. Then came to Sayyid dynasty followed by that of Bahlol Lodi (1451`-1526). He invited more Afghan tribes to colonize north western India. But naturally the tribes wanted to be at least partially independent. All the while, the native Hindu kings could not oust the Muslims. The struggle continued - between Muslims and Hindus and between centralizing and localizing Muslim kings. .

The Mughal Empire and the Afghan Tribes
Professor Jalali notes that the conflicts between the Muslim Mughal Empire and Afghan tribes was similar to the conflicts between the Delhi Sultanate and Afghan tribes, except that the sultanate was dealing with Afghans already in India. At the time most of Afghanistan itself was controlled by the invading Turko-Mongols. But the freeing of the Aghans In Afghanistan only generated more conflict with an India based Muslim ruler (Mughals) who was determined to extend his power back into the ancestral homeland. While, again, the power of the rulers IN Afghanistan to push eastward out of their mountains had advantages. He mentions several of the prior historical examples beginning with Alexander, then Sultan Mohammad Ghori, Chinggis Khan, Tamerlane, Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni, and Babur. Some of these worthies only went to India to loot and plunder wealth, while others decided to stay. His analysis of these many conflicts during centuries is comprehensive. He then analyzes the struggles of Emperor Jalalddin Akbar in greater detail.
He finds three major trends:
1 Attempts by the defeated Afghan nobility to regain power in India.
2 The growth of an anti-Mughal nationalist - religious movement in the Afghan tribal areas;
3 Tribal resistance to the movements of Mughal armies through their valleys..

The Afghans strike back
Professor Jalali then focuses on Babur's wars in every direction. While the Moghuls were Moslem, they were not considered by many Afghans to be legitimate as they were descended from the Tatar-Mongol invaders.
I was surprised to learn that already, Babur and Humayun faced Muslim rulers to the east, even in Bengal. (But considering today and the split of India following the Britsh withdrawal the result is apparent, namely the Muslim domain that became Bangladesh)
This was the doing of Sher Khan Suri. Professor Jalali describes the war and battles in detail. He summarizes: "During his four years of rule, Babur succeeded in establishing his control over a narrow stretch of land in northern India." "He and his successors had to fight their way in all directions to achieve imperial power." His years (1526-1530) were followed by his son, Humayun (1530 - 1559) and again 15 years later. The Moghul's retained a base of power in Afghanistan.
Professor Jalali untangles the complex movements back and forth, expansion of one against another and the reverse. Much of the central struggle was between Sher Khan Suri and Humayun. First, Sher Khan drove Humayun out of India (battle of Kanauj in 1540), but the latter escaped by a remarkable journey across deserts and mountains to the court of the Sh'ia Safavid shah Tahmasp. But with that help he returned.

The Reign of the Suri Dynasty
So Sher Khan achieved his dream (but not permanently). Professor Jalali tells the tale with his usual insiveness and critiques. So Sher Shah took Delhi and began the usual efforts to expand his new domain. He employed Afghan warriors to defend his western border (against Afghans). Sher Khan was a renowned general, strategist, and organizer but he reigned for only 10 years until he died, leaving another civil war over successon. His successor, Islam Shah had to contend with fractious Afghan nobles but died in 1554. This enabled Humayun to regain his throne, but he too died, in 1556. But then things changed. He was succeeded by his son, Jalalddin Akbar (age13) who had grown up while accompaning his father through trials and tribulations. He learned hard lessons. The first result was another battle (the second) at Panipat. Then a powerful Mughal empire ensued.

Anti-Mughal movements in the Afghan Tribal Areas
There were still Afghan tribal leaders east of Dehli in Bengal who fought against Akbar. Worse, Akbar faced Afghan leaders on his western border as well. One leader was Bayazid Ansari (called Pir Roshan) who used 'reformist religious Sufi ideology' to gain support among the Pashtun tribes. Professor Jalali explains the results in detail including his books such as his Kayr ul-Bayan. He terms Pir Roshan "an anti-establishment activist living under Mughal rule."
Professor Jalali analyzes Pir Roshan's religious theories. Pir Roshan had his religious opponents, whom Professor Jalali names, Sayed Ali of Termez (Pir Baba) and Akund Darweze whom Akbar used to retaliate. But Pir Roshan was also an accomplished military commander who was sometimes successful against Mughal forces in minor battles. He was 'routed' in a major battle at Nangrahar. (The capital of that province is Jalalabad and it has figured much in recent wars).
Professor Jalali also describes the battle Akbar had with the Yousafzais. This tribe controled much of the Afghan border and (modern) Pakistan in the Swat valley, and the Yuurafzai name has been in the world news lately. However, it was a Yousafzai who killed Pir Roshan in 1581 near Tarbela. Later Pir's youngest son, Jalala continued to lead resistance, which was extended by his grand children and even great-grand children for another century. Professor Jalali credits this will helping create the Afghan nationalist movement into the 18th century. Jalala led the opposition to the Mughals into 1592 when he captured Ghazni. He was killed but his nephew (also son in law), Ahdad, continued rewsistance, raising the famous Afridis, Orakzai and Bangash tribes against Akbar's son, Jahangir.
(The Afridi gave both the British in the 19th century and the Soviets in the 20th century significant trouble from control of the Kyber Pass region.) Read on.
After Jahangir died in 1627, the Afridi, led by Abdul Qadar, attacked Mughal army units attempting to move from Peshawar to Kabul. They continued east and looted Peshawar. The successor Emperor, Shah Jahan managed to reached an agreement that secured a peace.

The Culmanation of tribal Uprisings during Aurangzeb's Reign
Emperor Arangzeb was Akbar's great-grand son. Remember that the Mughal empire garrisoned and controled Kabul and Jalalabad, while the Kyber Pass lies between them and Peshawar and Delhi, and while the Swat valley lies north of Peshawar. The Afghan struggle (war) against the Mughals continued. But both sides also had to contend with rivalries and conflicts between tribal and other elements of their own miitary supporters. (So typical) Profefssor Jalali divides the struggle into two regions. In the northern sector including Swat, Bajaur and Sama, the Yousafzais remained in control, but they were countered by their opponents of the Khattak tribes, which supported the Mughals. To the west the Afridis and Mohamands continued to frequently control the Kyber Pass. The Yousafzais attacked across the Indus River and captured some Mughal forts.
Aurangzeb counter attacked by sending army units along three separate routes from west, east and south, which temporarily subdued the rebellion. Meanwhile. the Afghan tribes between Peshwar and Kabul had their own reasons to oppose the Mughals. Professor Jalali describes these complex causes and results featuring three different Afghan tribes in detail. The Afridis had long and frequent opposition, but it was the actions of the Mughal government in Kabul that triggered a general uprising in 1572. They (as usual) blocked the Kyber Pass and destroyed the Mughal army and its commander who was arrogant and foolish enough to attempt passage. Professor Jalali describes the debacle in delicious detail. Naturally, victory generated more excitement and uprising which spread as far south and Kandahar. Aurangzeb replaced the discredited former governor with a more experienced previous governor, Mohabat Khan, who knew how to bribe his way through (gold always speaks wonders). But Aurangzeb and the Delhi government was not satisfied with loss of face and mounted another direct assault on the Afridis in their Kyber Pass in 1673, even bringing the powerful Rajput component of the new force. The new Mughal commander, Shuja'at Khan, was just as foolish as his predecessors. This time he attempted to use the Karapa Pass in winter of 1674. He was killed along with thousands of his Indian soldiers. Only a few of the stalwart Rajputs managed to extracate some survivors. Disasters brought Aurangzeb, himself, to the scene with a much larger army equipped with artillery. But he didn't attempt the passes. Rather he sat between Rawalpindi and Peshawar for a year and a half and conducted 'diplomacy' to divide the (always divisable) Afghan clans. He directed his Turkish general to attack the various Afghan tribes. Auranggzeb died in 1707 without having completed his efforts.
But it was the powerful Kushha Khan who continued the Afghan conflict for more years until he died in 1689.
Meanwhile, the deployment, diversion of some of the Mughal military establishment into Afghanistan left the southern India Decan Plateau open, which, naturally, enabled the Marathas to expand their domains.

Main features of of the Afghan-Mughal Asymmetric war
In this section Professor Jalali analyzes and critiques the extended period of warfare he has described in the previous section. He considers it 'asymmetric' because it is military campaigns pitting the organized government army of a central 'state' against the disorganized, frequently contending, fractious, ad hock, tribal warriors recruited by individual leaders. These tribes had one advantage from the mountaneous (hilly) terrain in which they lived. But they never succeded in gaining strategic goals. The Mughals could gain success by using inter tribal issues to divide then. But their conventional army required extensive logistic support, difficut to achieve. And the Mughals were faced with warfare on their far southern frontier. Another military difference was that the Mughal army contained large, excellent cavalry components that enabled rapid movement in open areas but difficulties in mountaneous terrain, while the Afghan infantry were the opposite, strong in mountains and weak in plains. The Mughal army was largely professional (at least longer standing regular) while the Afghans were temporary, militia, mobilized and disbanded as separate campaigns occured. The Mughals were able to employ natural warriors such as various Afghan and Rajput tribes (and their leaders) against each other. Professor Jalali considers the political aspects as well: "What the Mughals failed to achieve on the battlefield was compensated for by political means. The internal feuds and lack of political mobilization in the tribal areas allowed the Mughal court to make separate deals with competing leaders, set tribe agains tribe and pit clan against clan." As to technology: "The Mughal soldiers were better armed, and their infantry was equipped with mathlock muskets. The Afghan tribes had limited access to firearms."
He comments: "In the early 1970's, when I was commissioned to help set up the military museum in Afghanistan, I came across a musket among old army stores that once belonged to Khushal Khan Khattak (1613- 1689). He had inherited it frrom his father, Shahbaz Khan, known as the "Khatak gun', it is nearly seven feet long and one inch in caliber".

The Mughal Empire and the Uzbek khanate
Professor Jalali turns to other aspects of the Mughal era in Afghanistan. Remember, again, that despite the centuries of periodic Afghan uprisings, the Mughal Empire included much of Afghanistan and maintained a 'state' border with the Uzbek khanate in Transoxiana. Having been driven out of his homeland, Babur not only crossed Afghanistan to gain his foothold in India, but retained (or fought over) much of Afghanistan against the encrochments of the Uzbek khans, especially Abdullah Khan II after 1556.
(Remember also, the significant role of the Uzbek population and war lords in northern Afghanistan during the conflicts with the Soviet invasion and with the Talibans)
Abdullah Khan II invaded Bakakhshan in 1584 but didn't continue across the Hindu Kush toward Kabul, held by its Mughal governor, Hakim Mirza. The Uzbeks continued with intermitant control (against both the Mughals and Persians) of the strip between the Oxus River and Hindu Kush until driven back by Ahmad Shah Durani in 1747. It was the realistic conclusion of Mughal emperor Akbar that his northwestern frontier would be more sustainable on the Hindu Kush against Uzbek cavalry armies. So he signed a treaty with Agdulah Khan in 1588. He had enough to contend with against the Persian confrontation on the more vulnerable south-western frontier at Kandahar. The agressive Mughal emperor, Shah Jahan, thought it opportune to regain Badakhshan in 1646, and did so, but then recognized his mistake and returned it in 1647.

The Safavid-Mughal Competition for Control of Kandahar
In this section Professor Jalali turns to that vulnerable south-west territory beyond Kandahar. There the Mughals faced the off and on efforts of the Safavid dynasty ruling Persia to regain their ancient control plus access on to India. In the 14th century Tamerlane had conquered the whole region. It was held by Timurids against the Safavids until Kandahar was taken by Babur in 1522. During the following century it was controlled (back and forth) by Safavids and Mughals. Professor Jalali recounts these episodes, all instigated by the rivalry of succeeding, aggressive Mughal and Safavid rulers bent on regaining what they all considered a key strategic linking fortress enroute either west or east. Finally, it was the Afghans, themselves, who, in 1722, threw out the last Safavids enroute to a follow up by taking Isfahan as well.

References:
Some individuals and events mentioned in chapter Nine: URL's plus text

References:
Some individuals and events mentioned in chapter Nine: only URLs

Chapter 10 - The Rise of Local Afghan States and Their Invasion of Persia, 1709-1747:

Professor Jalali begins this chapter with his discussion of the fate of Kandahar during the 200 years of Safavid-Mughal wars. As he describes in previous chapters, both the Safavid's (Persians) and the Mughals (India) had their separate conflicts with the Uzbeks north of the Hindu Kush mountain chain. But the direct route between Persia and India lay south of the Hindu Kush main mountains across the partially flat (largely desert) region that also includes the southern extensions of the mountains in which Kandahar stood out as the key fortress city guarding that route. He notes the Persians held the city more than half of that period, but only 'intermittent' times. The many Afghan tribes lived in this large region. Their support (mostly nominal) of either side was significant. And neither the Safavids nor Mughals were the dominant power locally. The Afghans remained under the indirect power of the remanent of the Turko-Mongol conquerors from the invasion of Chinggis Khan, which was mainly based in the cities, but retained local internal autonomy in their rural, hilly and valley fastnesses. The tribes, themselves, naturally gravitated toward either participation in affairs toward India or Persia depending on their eastern or western locations. Professor Jalali identifies the Afghan Ghilzais (who followed the Ghorids) as active in Indian politics between 1192 and 1526. But the western Ghilzais were active toward the Safavids. The adherence of the Safavids to Shi'ism created a significant 'cultural divide' with the Afghans. The Afghans complained to Persian Shah Abbas. He acceded to this by appointing local rulers and governors. The Sunni Mughals faced no such problem. But their interest in the Kandahar region was based on strategic concerns about potential invasions from the west. Furthermore, in `595 and 1637 the Safavids and Mughals found it to their mutual interest to give the former control. But, as Professor Jalali, notes, the strict Shi'ia Shah Suleiman Safavi instituted religious control from 1694. This led, in part, to the revolt of the Abdali and Hotak tribes in 1722 - 1729. .

Renewed Persian Repression
Professor Jalali next describes the results of the religious repression. As contemporary sources, he uses the accounts of a Polish Jesuit priest, Tadeusz Jan Krusinski, and the biography of Shaykh Mohammad ali Hazin, and others. He identifies the three main factors that led to the Safavid repression, then the revolt and its success. "First, the Sunni-Shia split". This included a Safavid effort to gain support from the Hazara Shi'ia population in the mountains. "Second, the Mughals of India renewed their attempts to regain control of Kandahar and sent an embassy mission to Isfahan to negotiate..." The Safavids reacted to this with increased repression. In 1704 they sent a Georgian, George XI (Gugan Khan), with Georgian troops to be governor in Kandahar. He was even more strict and harsh in dealing with the local Afghans. He especially focused on Afghan Hotak leader, Mir Wais Khan. Once sent to Isfahan, Mir Wasis recognized that the Safavid court was week and corrupt, thus ripe for overthrow. .

Independence of Kandahar
Professor Jalali continues the narration and his observations. Having been beguiled by the astute Mir Wais, the Safavid's sent him back to Kandahar with letters of support. He quickly organized the tribal leaders into luring the Georgian garrison out of the city to their death, after which he could attack the remaining garrison and seize the city. Then he defeated the main Persian forces. He quickly organized the entire province for defense, stressing the religious nature of the Safavids. He sent false diplomatic letters to both the Mughal and Safavid courts pledging his loyalty.


Persia Strikes Back
The events continue their course. After dithering a while, the Persians decided to launch a campaign, but by that time the Afghans were ready. From 1709 to 1713 they repelled the initial Persian expeditions. Then the Persians committed a larger army of Arabs, Georgians, and Abdali Afghans. Professor Jalali characterizes Mir Wais's strategy as a 'mobile defense'. He identifies three components: 1, defense from behind the fortress walls; 2, supply of Kandahar and other forts with extra supplies to withstand lengthy siege plus destruction of all food sources not brought inside and evacuation of the rural population into these forts; 3, creation of a mobile strike force positioned behind where the Persian army would be during a siege.
The Persian campaign began in 1713 and forced its way through Afghan frontier elements to the city. The siege lasted nearly a year. The city withstood continual assault. Simultaneously Afghan cavalry attacked the Persian rear areas. Persian logistics was greatly stressed. With winter coming the Persian commanders had to decide to withdraw. But the Persian element and Georgian element took different routes. Mir Wais organized a cavalry force equipped with swivel cannon on camelback which destroyed the Persians. Only a few Georgians escaped. A second Persian effort was defeated before even reaching Kandahar.
As always, success breeds success. Mir Wais was able to unite more Afghan tribes under his personal leadership. Mir Wais Khan died in 1715. He was followed by his brother, Mir Abdullah, who proposed not only peace but a return of Persian hegemony. This was opposed. He was killed by Mir Wais Khan's son, Mir Mahmud, in 1717.

Independence of Herat
The year following the Ghilzai victory at Kandahar the Abdali tribe at Herat revolted, defeated a Persian relief force in the field and then besieged Herat. They captured the city, but internal rivalry and infighting resulted in repeated changes of control of Herat until, finally, by 1729, the Persian commander, Nader Afshar defeated them and recaptured Herat.

The Afghans Conquer Persia
Professor Jalali continues with the remarkable Afghan 'conquest' of Persia, which proved to be rather short-lived. It was Mir Wais Hotak's son, Mir Mahmud Hotak who became 'king' in 1717. Another Persian effort at reconquest was defeated. The Hotaks didn't wait to organize their own territories based on Kandahar, nor seek to expand their power north to Kabul, still held by the Mughul governor, but thought they could immediately defeat Persia.

The Afghan army
Professor Jalali describes and evaluates the army that Mir Mahmud Hotak proposed to lead to the conquest of Persia. It was a conglomerate force of warriors from various Pashtun tribes and others such as the Hazaras, Baluchs and highlanders from Kabul. The troops included infantry musketeers and archers; and cavalry and light artillery. The artillery was swivel guns mounted on camels. The camels carried not only the gun but also two gunners and ammunition. Professor Jalali cites a contemporary observer, Tadeusz Krusinski's, assessment that the Afghan cavalry was excellent. They were expert with their swords and spears. Observers were impressed with the discipline and responsiveness of the warriors to execute commands rapidly. They traveled light, so did not require extensive logistics and baggage trains. But they numbered only 12,000 or less. Mir Mahmud's initial effort, which had to cross Sistan, failed when he could not defeat the Persian defenders. He spent another 2 years in further preparations.

The Persian Campaign
So in January 1722 Shah Mahmud Hotak set out again with an initial strength (possibly) of 90,000 assembled from different tribes. Professor Jalali compares various estimates of the size and ethnic composition of Mahmud's forces at Guinabad and at the siege of Isfahan. His conclusion is that Mahmud left Kandahar with 54,000 -55,000picture men, plus a large logistic service force that had 60,000 camels to carry baggage. One wonders how many men can handle a camel. He reached Gulnabad, 9 miles from Isfahan and established his camp.

The Battle of Gulnabad
Professor Jalali Professor Jalali provides a clear schematic picture of the two phases of this battle. In one he shows the two armies in line of battle. The Safavi army has its large cavalry units on each flank and its large infantry in the center behind artillery. There are cavalry units in reserve behind both flanks. The Afghan army is deployed in a single line with infantry in the center and cavalry on each flank, but with its "Zanbouraks' (swivel canon mounted on camels) behind the right flank cavalry. In the other diagram the smaller Afghan force has sent its cavalry on the left flank to drive the Safavid's back while its right flank cavalry has turned the Safavid left flank and is attacking their rear. During the battle the Safavid cavalry penetrated part of the Afghan line but was then defeated by the 'zanbourak' light artillery.
He considers the battle to be most remarkable because it pitted the weak, irregular and poorly armed Afghan force against a strong Safavid regular army twice its size, yet scored a decisive victory. He presents a vivid picture of the two armies: The Persians in excellent uniforms, well equipped, looking great; and the Afghans in tatters, a motley crew, looking bedraggled in their primitive camp. When the Afghan force arrived before Isfhan, the Persian court didn't know what to do. Professor Jalali states that if they had remained in their fortified city the Afghans (lacking in siege equipment or skill) could not have taken it nor remained long outside. But the army command presumed themselves to be superior so they under estimated the Afghans and decided to go out and defeat them in open battle. The Persians had 50,000 men (30,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry) with 24 artillery pieces. Shah Mahud Hotak deployed his in 4 divisions as described in the diagram. The engagement consisted of the cavalry of both armies maneuvering around. The Persian heavy artillery was ineffective. As the Persian left wing cavalry advanced, the Afghans let them through in order to bring them up against the Zanbourks, which surprised, dismayed and routed them. The Afghan cavalry struck decisively,.The Persians, having lost only 2,000 killed was routed and fled the field. Typically, the victorious Afghans prefered to loot the Persian camp rather than pursue and destroy the loosers. But Isfahan remained - with its population of some 600,000 citizens now demanding action. The court remained ineffective. Shah Mahmud knew better than to attempt an assault, sotook his time negociting while the inhabitants ran out of food. Professor Jalali cites the Jesuit, Krusinski who estimated that 20,000 Persians died in the battle and another 100,000 starved in the city. The result was that Persian Shah Sultan Hussein went to Mahmud's camp, surrendered, gave him the regalia of rule, and wished him well as the new ruler. So the Afghan, leader of a far off piece of mountaneous real estate, became the emperor of a rather sizable, and surely very rich, realm. But how to retain it.
Professor Jalali tells us in the following sections.

The Road to Glory and the Path to Disaster
We can again turn to Rush Doshi's recipe for exercising the three steps in 'forms of control' to observe what Mahmud and his successor, Ashraf, needed to achieve: 'coercive capacity' - consensual inducements - legitimacy. Professor Jalali explains the problem in terms of the reality of governing a huge, wealthy, opposing, and fractionated polity on the basis of a small, intruding military force whose base is far away.
He point out that: "During nearly eight years of occupation, Shah Mahmud Hotak and his successor, Shah Ashraf (1725-1729) faced dwindling resources and increasing public resentment against the Afghan's domination. So they resorted to "sheer force, brutality, and escalating violence". Step one in Doshi's recipe. But they lacked sufficient power to make that effective in the face of mounting counter mobilization of areas outside their reach from Isfahan. They even lacked the ability to employ 'consensual inducments' back in Afghanistan to recruit replacement. The Afghans were not interested in moving to Persia. Soon they had to resort to 'inducing' non- Afghans and non-Persians, such as Kurds and Tatars. Moreover, there still was a 'legitimate' Persian shah in the body of Sultan Hussein's son, Prince Tahmasp Mirza, who was able to recruit a new army. Even worse for the new Safavid monarch, there appeared on the scene another of those unexpected, poor, but ambitious figures from an unlikely outside area, like Timur and so many other founders of new dynasties we have witnessed - Namely a fellow named Nader Afshar - who via the usual route of first gaining employment by an incumbent (in this case Tahmasp) and who, by sheer brilliance in the pursuit of power, would supplant his suzerain. As Nader Shah he became the 'Napoleon' of the middle east.
Professor Jalali narrates and analyzes this remarkable process. Once underway, the expanding armed force led titularly by Tahmasp but actually in military genius by Nadar Shah, within 2 years - 1729-1730 - drove the dwindling armies of Mahmud and then of Ashraf out of Persia in four major battles. Ashraf fled, but as is the fate of so many,was murdered back home in Afghanistan.
Professor Jalali's assessment: "The nacent military organization and rudimenary administrative setup was sufficient for conquering a country under a weak, corrupt, and divided polity, but it was incapable of governing the state they had won so easily." .. and more.

Persian Reconquest
Next comes the typical reaction - power abhores a vacumn. Ambition achieved generates increased ambition. Professor Jalali tells the tale. Once moving toward supreme power, Nader Afshar became Nader Shah. He did what the to Hotak's failed to do, that is solidify power in one's own base and source of power. Nader Shah proceeded first to bring all of Persian under his strong personal authority, then expanded it north, west, and south against Ottomans, Russians, and the remaining regions such as Baghdad. Then he moved east to take Kandahar. Professor Jalali focuses on Nader Shah's exploits, if one can all destcruction an exploit, in Afghanistan starting with a year long siege of Kandahar, during with the Afghans persisted not only in effectively defending their city but also continuously attacked the Persian LOC and dispersed elements.
Professor Jalali continues with Nader Shah's campaigns, for which he recruited Abdalis and Ghilzais and made them his favorite elite cavalry. He found an Afghan named Ahmad Khan, thus the sequencecontinued when this worthy became Ahmad Shah Durrani. But, Professor Jalali accounts that Nader Shah's siege of Kandahar cost him mightly, not only in time and resources but alsdo in prestige. However, once the city and southern Afghanistan was in his hands he was able to continue on into India, where he defeated the Mughals at the Battle of Karnal and siezed Delhi. Again, as Professor Jalali has pointed out so frequently, as Nader Shah gained wealth and ower he also sucumbed to despotism and paranoia. Sure enough, we met his final end when he was assassinated by two of his own officers. Once his fear generating dictatorship ended, his empire built from so much blood, disintegrated in another blood bath.

References:
Some individuals and events mentioned in chapter Ten: -URLs plus extended text

References:
Some individuals and events mentioned in chapter Ten: only the URLs

Chapter 11 - The Durrani Empire and Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, 1747-1834:
Note the dates shown for this chapter. The content overlaps the subject period of Professor Jalali's other book in order to complete the story of the firm creation of modern Afghanistan.
As the time period, which Professor Jalali describes in this book, shifts to more recent _modern- eras his description and analysis becomes more extensive and detailed. The subject matter is more and more directly related to and influential on current Afghanistan and its neighbors.
The chapter begins with a summary of another of the frequent 'back and forth' episodes during which power and control of territory shifted between the rulers of Persia and southern Afghanistan. In the previous chapter we learned how the sudden, unexpected ability of a really 'small time' Afghan war lord was able to take advantage of the weakness of the Persian ruller and his court to capture his capital at Isfahan. And then how a new non-Persian war lord was able to use initial military support of the Persian heir to drive the Afghans out and restore Persia, and reconquer Afghan territory, become the "Napoleon of Asia" and finally suffer the fequent termination of similar donquerors, assassination. Professor Jalali summarizes the usual results, namely, a civil war over succession followed by the dismembering of the hard work of centralization, when the governors of the various component regious declared independence. He names these local leaders and assesses their military forces. By 1760 one figure, Karim Khan, managed to defeat all these rivals and found yet another family dynasty, named Zand, which survived (1750 - 1796).
But just as Nadar Shah had begun as military commander for Prince Tahmasp, now Nadar Shah's Afghan military commander, Ahmad Shah Durrani, began to assert his own power. He took his troops back to Kandahar and convened a meeting of the local, tribal leaders, to assess the situation, The core of the posibilities lay in the potential for acquiring wealth, that is loot and booty, by exappropriating it from the Persians.
Professor Jalali provides a succinct geneology for Ahamad Shah. He was not an upstart, lone, obscure warrior. His father, Zaman Khan Abdali, had been a commander in Afghan campaign against Herat in 1716 and became its ruler, along with his older son, Zulfiquar Khan. The two brothers fled Herat when Nadar Shah captured it in 1731, only to be put in jail in Kandahar by Shah Hussein Hotak. It was by freeing Ahmad Khan that Nader Shah brought him into command of the Persian guard during Nader's campaigns in India. Thus, when he became ruler in Afghanistan, Ahmad Khan was not some freebooter but an experienced, "polished administrator". He knew not to attempt unprepared conquests of external territory, but to concentrate first on establishing a firm regime in Afghanistan. He asserted the right to rule all the tribal components of the population in "Afghanistan" actually including the Pashtuns in modern Pakistan. He created consultative groups of tribal leaders who were the actual commanders of the tribal military resources. He sought to provide an inducement for the usually antigionistic local tribes to unite in the acquisition of plunder. In exchange for support of their own local authority the tribal leaders provided the military resources for the Durrani regime to engage in its own campaigns.
(Thus, he employed Doshi's three steps to consolidate power; coercion of opoonents, consensual inducements from loot and booty, legitimacy by claiming to listen to others.)
The result of all this was the opportunity of an indigenous Afghan, from a single of the many competing tribal leaders, to consolidate and create a real, centralized political authority that could claim surzeranity over a territory that would be Afghanistan.
Professor Jalali explains that during the previous centuries it was either foreign rulers who had or sought to incorporate Afghan territory into their their empires or it was Afghan rulers who simply used a power base in Afghanistan to create empires that became powerful through conquest of external territory. He cites three Afghan dynasties - Khalji, Suri and Lodi - whose Afghan kings ruled part of India from Delhi, while most of Afghanistan itself was ruled by Mongol-Tatar conquerors. Then the Afghan Hotak family leaders diverted their main attention away from their home in Kandahar to attempt to rule Persia.
Professor Jalali draws attention to the difference about Ahamd Shah's example. He was only an Abdali, from one of the many Pushtuns (not to mention other) ethnic groups who had not been involved in his accession to power. Thus obtaining legitimacy, as Professor Jalali stresses (and I pointed out) was critical.
Professor Jalali cites the two standard bases for claiming legitimacy - heredity or raw military power -. And, he notes further, claims on ideological (religious), grounds or foreign threat are common.
He hits on the key: "Although Ahmad Shah claimed to be a descendent of a ruling Afghan house (and made the assertion in his correspondence with foreign powers), in the eyes of his fellow Afghans he lacked royal blood. He therefore needed to base his legitimacy on power that as achievable only through military conquest, with promises of plunder for the people who were willing to join him." But, he continues, Ahmad Shah claimed and executed his campaigns for plunder, not to enable him to become a ruler of a foreign territory but to establish a powerful state that would encompase the territory from the Indus to the Amu Darya. Although he did make pronouncements about being also an legitimate soverign at Delhi he did not attempt to do so. He must have recognized that conditions in India would make an attempt too dificut. By then India had other strong powers, the Marathas, the Sikhs and competing French and British merchant colonizers.
Professor Jalali especially describes the growing power of the Marathas from southern India even though Ahmad Shah did defeat them at the momentous Third Battle of Panipat (see below).. The Sikhs also were creating effective military power in northern India beginning with Guru Gobind Singh (1666 - 1708). He also point out the British victory over the Mysore king Tipu Sultan despite his French support.
The result was that Ahmad Shah limited his attentions to that part of what is now Pakistan that is inhabited by Afghans or can be controlled.
Turning to the west and the again weak and disunited Persian, Professor Jalali quotes the contemporary English officer, Sir John Malcolm, who wrote approvingly about Ahmad Shah's recognition that another attempt at conquering Persia was not worth the effort and instead focused on developing its natural territory into an Afghanistan. On the north, Ahmad Shah also recognized the reality and decided that the Amu Darya was the logical territorial border, so refrained from involvement in the never ending conflicts among the Central Asian magnates.
However, Professor Jalali points out, that double reqirement to obtain financial resources through plunder and to engage his restless warriors in lucrative endevors remained and India was the obvious theater in which to achieve both.
All of this section is Professor Jalali's description of the political- military background that was the environment in which Ahmad Shah entered and exploited.

The Durrani State
Next, Professor Jalali considers the political-military environment inside Afghanistan. He summarizes the results of the previous 5 centuries of supreme political rule by the descendents of the Chinggas Khan and Tamerlane conquests, the Turko-Mongol rulers who controled the fractionated, mountaineous region by using the many local, tribal and other strong men. It was 'divide and conquer' - actually hold - by keeping these local populations disunited. So Ahmad Shah had a work cut out for him in creating a unified,cenralized, polity. He and his successor Durrani dynasty had to carefully create a centralized government system that simultaneously preserved and worked through a decentralized tribal and urban establishment.
Professor Jalali explains the situation: "Historically, such a system worked in the country only under powerful and charismatic leaders who mobilized the nation in a spirit of common causes such as undertakng foreign conquest, fighting off foreign invasion, or waging ideological war." He explains how Ahmad Shah utilized the system.: "The Afghan ruler mobilized and mainained the unity of the tribes and offered them the opportunity to secure their homeland and conquer prosperous foreign lands." However, he explains further, this method failed to create a really unified nation, and it persisted in relying on militarized and competing local authorities. As for so many past dynasties, once the opportunities for successful foreign plunder, internal conflicts and competitions for power, and lack of a full belief in loyalty to a central power again took place the fragmentation reoccured. But, Professor Jalali concludes, the idea of a country known as Afghanistan remained through out the following turmoil.

The Afghan Military Establishment
This is a very extensive and detailed section.
Professor Jalali next examines the details of the army on which the ruler depended. He confirms what Delbruk and others have observed: "The military forces of the Durrani Empire were structured in line with the political makeup of the state."
The Durrani's expanded and organized their army as their domain expaned.
Again, he notes the circular effect: "Expansion required large armies and maintaining such armies required funds, which were often unavailable locally and had to be acquired from other areas=- usually through the military invasion and conquest of resource-rich countries. Thus, the quest for power through expansion led to a need to form larger military forces."

(Napoleon faced the same cycle)

His conclusion: "Therefore, the empire that Ahmad Shah Durrani founded was based mostly on military power manifested in mainaining large armies."
Next to the details. The military 'force' with which Ahmad Shah began was that 16,000 Afghan warrior unit he led when serving Nader Shah. They were an experienced and highly trained elite unit. Ahmad then recruited levies commanded by their tribal leaders. And thus the Afghan army remained, a combination of a military element serving the central (state) power and a large force consisting of separate tribal units. This was relatively inexpensive, but also dependent on the personal goals of those tribal chieftans. The same problem so many other rulers had faced in preceeding centuries. The central ruler paid the local lords in various ways when needed. The regular army was only about one third of the potential total available force. As a whole the army was about 3/4th cavalry. They were well armed with muskets and pistols in addition to swords and lances. Their strength lay in their high standard of discipline.
This central army was organized into various types of cavalry composed of various ethnic groups. There were also an excellent infantry, artillery, engineer, logistic and signal service units, and even an elephant corps. The artiilery was mostly heavy guns, but 'zanbourak' camel mounted swivel gun units remained and proved to be very effective.
The various kinds of tribal contingents were sent by their chieftans. The chieftans were required to supply a stated number of warriors according to contract that specified payment in the form of land. Professor Jalali describes many other components of the total military including the armies of the provincial governors, and fortress garrisons. He names the Kara Nokar as an emergency militia force of cavalry except for the Kohisan infantry. He names also the Eilajari, another public militia. Then there also was the Dawatalab, called up to participate in expeditions, and the Wolossi called up to repel foreign invasions.
Professor Jalali gives the maximum extant of the Afghan Empire under Ahmed and Timur Durrani at 2.1 millionsquare kilometers. It extended from Nishpur on the west to Sarhind on theeast andfrom theAmuy Darya on thenorth to theGuld of Oman on the south. It is no wonder that control and defense of such a huge area with enemies on all but the ocean borders required a sizable military. The regular,standing army numered only 30,000. Then there was the army deployed in foreign campaigns, such as 18-25,000 in Punjab in 1747 and 60-85,000 for the invasion of India in 1751. By Zaman Shah's time (1793-1801) the campaign army reached 100,000 men.
Professor Jalali concludes his enumeration and organiztional listing of the full Afghan army establishment in 1800 with details naming each of the many components and their strengths, totaling between 115,000 and 116,000 men. They were mostly cavalry organized in units from 5 to 10 men comprising a platoon of 20-50. Then 2 to 5 platoons formed a company. These then formed a regiment. The guard units had 1,2000 men. The irregular detachments were of 100 men.

Military Conquests
Ahmad Shah confined his initial expansion program to the east to establishing an Afghanistan border on the clear geograpic features and areas settled by ethnic Afghans, which was generally along the Indus (Sind) River. To the west he settled on absorbing the territories around Herat and Farah with additional frontier control to Mashad and Nishapur. However, when their government controls of the next adjacent regions became weak and disorganized, he had to act.
Professor Jalali gives the reader an apt and evocative expression: "In fact, rising empires are like fast-moving torrents that overflow the decaying banks of a stream." He identifies the Afghan eastern operations to two very significant military campaigns. The first was to control Punjab and the second was to defend Ahmad Shah's border against the Marathas, which he accomplished in the decisive victory in the Third Battle of Panipat in 1761. Additionally, their huge loss there led to the Marantha defeat also by the British.

The Expansion to Punjab
Professor Jalali identifies four military campaigns in which the Duranni Empire, during 1747 - 1756, gained control over the large swath of territory from Punjab to Delhi. In the first, the Ahmed Shah led the cavalry part of his army across the swollen Indus in a surprise attack to defeat Shah Nawaz Khan's local army at Lahore. He then Ahmed Shah defeated the large, main Mughal army, commanded by Qamaruddin Khan (and another Ahmad Shah), by crossing the Ravi River in the Mughal rear and capturing its camp and baggage at Sarhind. This forced the Mughals to about face and entrench near Manipur. The contest was inconclusive. It required two more campaigns for Ahmad Shah to defeat the Mughals and force the emperor to give Punjab to him.
Meanwhile the Hindu Marathas had been gaining power and expanding their domains in southern India to force the Delhi emperors to loose territory. Then in 1737 they defeated the Mughals near Delhi. The Maratha's were opposed by other Hindu rulers due to the former's oppressive behavior. Nevertheless, they exploited claims to be freeing Hindues from centuries of Muslim subjugation. As the Marathas reduced Mughal power at Delhi, Ahmad Shah was enabled to sieze the city in 1756 but allowed the emperor, Alamgir II to remain on his throne, while appointing Afghans, including his son, Timur, to be the real powers.

The Khorasan Campaign
Ahmad Shah was doncerned about his relatively open western frontier. In 1751 he personally led his army to besiege Herat, held by Shah Rukh Miza, one of Nader Shah's grand sons. He then moved to Mashhad, where he let Shah Rukh Mirza retain his throne. But his move to and effort against Nishapur failed, loosing thousands of men and his artillery. He returned the folowing year.
And Professor Jalali gives the readers a delicious bit of detail. Ahmad Shah lacked heavy artilllery, so commissioned the founding if a giant cannon on the spot. The cannon fired one huge projectile that so frightened the defenders that they immediately surrendered, not noticing that in the process the cannon had exploded while discharging its one and only shot. Shah Rukh gave Nishapur and the regions around Herat to Ahmad Shah. Meanwhile Ahmad had sent other military forces to force the local magnates between the Hindu Kush and the Oxus to submit to becoming Afghan territory, thus establishing a permanent national boundary that remains today.

The Maratha War
While Ahmad Khan was busy on his western campaign, in 1758 the Maratha's attacked Delhi and drove his officials including Timur back into Punjab. Naturally, Ahmad Shah didn't like that, so in 1759 he moved once more into Punjab, defeating the various small Maratha garrisons. This, in turn, generated the usual realiatin by the arrogant Maratha's, who fancied themselves to be great warriors. In 1760 they assembled a huge force estimated to total some 30,000 souls, but estimated by historians to contain only 25,000 or so fighters. The rest were usual mix of various kinds of camp followers and supporting servants. The senior Maratha ruler was Balaji Bajiro but the army was commanded by Sadashiv Rao Bhau.
In this section Professor Jalali describes the events during which the two armies moved toward contact. The Maratha's moved north to Delhi, Then they moved further north as the rainy season ended. Sadashivrao Bhau was already having great difficulty supplying his huge numbers of non-combtants. Sadashivreo Bhau captured the fort at Kunjpura, killed the garrison and gained some supplies. He was trying to cut Ahmad Shah's supply route, while Ahmad was cutting Bhau's supply route. They were maneuvering across the Jumna River to gain a better position. Both commanders were using diplomatic efforts to seek spport from the various local rulers. Eventually the Maratha's camped at Panipat and Ahmad Shah moved to establish his camp near the city.

The Third Battle of Panipat 1761
Professor Jalali provides a diagram that shows the shifting locations of the Afghan camp near the large Maratha camp. His description of the complex movements of both armies prior to the battle fills 7 pages. They maneuvered, while in close proximity to each other, for over two months, during which time each sought to cut off their opponent's supply route. The Afghans were the more successful at this and the Marathas suffered the worst because their army was encumbered by a large mass of camp followers and servants. He writes a vivid description of the composition of both armies and their commanders. Eventually it was the Marathas which offered to sign a peace agreement. Some of Ahmad Shah's officers recommended signing, but he refused, realizing that, despite having the smaller army, he was in the stronger position and condition. The strength ofthe Marathas was in their sizable, excellent artillery, but it was too cumbersome for the field battle.
By January 1761 the Marathas were facing famine. Professor Jalali describes the various tactics recommended by Sadashivrao Bhau's officers. The decision was to form a large square formation featuring their infantry musketeers and the artilllery, then march in this formation back to Delhi. Professor Jalali mentions the size of the forces given in the sources, but discounts them. He estimates that each side fielded "between 60,000 and 80,000 cavalry and infantry. He deletes the possible half million non-combatants whose presence so hindered the Martha commanders. He estimates the Maratha force at 55,000 horse, 15,000 foot, 25,000 auxiliaries and2-3000 allied horse. He cites the eye-witness computation by Nawab Shuja ud_Daulah of the Afghan force as 41,000 horse and 38,000 foot with 70-80 cannon. Another witness, Kasi Raj included an additional 4 times that many for irregulars.

Moving to Battle
Professor Jalali includes two diagrams to show the details of the battle. He rates the quality of the two armies, and their commanders, on the eve of battle. He describes the Afghan army as highly disciplined, well organized, experienced, unified with excellent command. In contrast, the Maratha's were a diverse force divided into 2 types of regular troops led by different Maratha lords, plus two types of volunteer categories. They were disorganzied, and already physically reduced by hunger. Their artillery included powerful cannon that were too heavy for effective battlefield maneuver. Professor Jalali's 4-page analysis is concise yet clear. As the large Maratha 'square' formation moved slowly toward theJamna River, Ahmad Shah deployed his forces in a lengthy line of battle across the original corner of this 'square' forcing the Maratha commanders to alter front to their right, thus disrupting any attempt to retain the initial formation. This increased the confusion. The Marathas opened the battle early with an artilllery salvo that went over the Afghan's heads. The battle lasted 8 hours. The best of the Maratha soldiers fought well and initially drove the Afghan right wing and center back. TheAfghan zanbourak's were effective. The Marathas were also ourgunned by Afghans using muskets while Marathas mostly had only swords. The Afghan left wing was successful. Around noon Ahmad Shah decided to commit his powerful reserve slave guard units to a counter charge against the Maratha center whileordering his left wing commanders to out flank their opponents and strike their rear. By that time the Maratha units were being pushed into a mass. Leading commanders were killed.. Suddenly the Maratha line collapsed as the warriors turned and fled. The ensuing slaughter was immense.
Professor Jalali lists much of the copious treasure that the Afghans collected from the enemy camp.
Panipat was one of the decisive battle in history. It altered the balance of forces in the entire Indian sub-continent, reducing Maratha power. Ahmad Shah realized he didn't want to get involved, as previous conquerors had, but becoming an emperor at Delhi. Instead he appointed a supporter as emperor with rusted Afghan generals in command. Then he returned to Kandahar. But, Professor Jalali concludes, that didn't end the threats to the Afghan border. With the Marathas facing enemies to their base 1500 miles south, it was thegrowing power and ambitions of the nearby Sikhs in Punjab who benefited from the expulsion of Maratha power.

Ahmad Shah and the Sikhs
Professor Jalali required only one page to summarize Ahmad Shah's dealing with these aggressive Sikhs in three campaigns from 1762 to 1767. He drove them back but could not defeat them. They continued and even created their own state in Punjab in the 19th century.

Decline of the Empire
Professor Jalali includes a map showing the great extent of the Durani Empire by 1772. But the death of Ahmad Shah brought on the usual struggle over succession. Then disintegration ofcentral power as the many local tribal war lords regained powers. Ahmad's son, Timur Shah, move his capital from Kandhar to Kabul and also used Peshawar as a winter capital.
Professor Jalali indictes one of Timur's activities. He had 36 children from 10 mothers. ( He reminds me of Augustus Strong of Saxony -father of his country.)
By 1826 the civil wars brought Dost Mohammad, of the Barakzai clan, to the throne. The weakened Afghan central government retained Afghanistan state but lost tereritory on theeast in Punjabto the Sikhs and on the east andPersians on the west. Ahmad's grand son, Zaman Shah, lost his throne. By the 19th century Afghanistan again became of interest to powerful foreign rulers, this time the Russians and British.

References:
Some individuals and events mentioned in chapter Eleven: URLs plus extended text

References:
Some individuals and events mentioned in chapter Eleven: only the URLs

Epilogue Professor Jalali concludes his epic by refering to its continuation in his other great history - Military History of Afghanistan, From the Great Game to the Global War on Terror.

References:

Reviewer comment - Appendix: Motivation

Reviewer comment -Appendix:

Reviewer comment - Appendix:

Chronology

Selected maps and illustrations

References: The bibliography is massive and comprehensive, but here I list some links to ancillary, tangential works and articles about some personalities and subject not listed with each chapter:

Wikipedia History of Afghanistan
The history of Afghanistan as a state began in 1823 as the Emirate of Afghanistan after the fall of the predecessor, the Afghan Durrani Empire, considered the founding state of modern Afghanistan. Its history is tied to that of other countries in its region, mostly Tajikistan, Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and India. The written recorded history of the land presently constituting Afghanistan can be traced back to around 500 BCE when the area was under the Achaemenid Empire, although evidence indicates that an advanced degree of urbanized culture has existed in the land since between 3000 and 2000 BCE.

Wikipedia History of Muslim conquests of Afghanistan
The Muslim conquests of Afghanistan began during the Muslim conquest of Persia as the Arab Muslims migrated eastwards to Khorasan, Sistan and Transoxiana. Fifteen years after the Battle of Nahavand in 642 AD, they controlled all Sasanian domains except in Afghanistan. Fuller Islamization was not achieved until the period between 10th and 12th centuries under Ghaznavid and Ghurids.

Afghanistan entry in the Encyclopedia Britannica, Eleventh Edition, 1910-11 - Vol I, pgs 306-319

"The Great Game" Wikipedia entry -Great Game

J. R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450-1620. In addition to the author's discussion of events in Western European history, which then serves as a valuable comparison with the history of Afghanistan, Dr. Hale opens with a chapter explaining something not often found in text books, the question and answer to- "Why there were wars?" His answer, wars were caused by the decision of specific individual rulers (leaders) to wage war to achieve their own objectives. Professor Jalali proves that the same policy applies to Afghanistan.

Classic Greek Warfare - my essay on Greek warfare that includes the Wars of the Diaodchi

Wars of the Diaodchi

Sir Aurel Stein, On Alexander's Track to the Indus The central focus of this book is Alexander's siege and capture of Aornos, but it includes his campaign through Afghanistan and north-west India.

Sir Aurel Stein, Index to his reports including through northwest Pakistan

Alexander the Great -Wikipedia entry

Alexander's Malian Campaign

Ruth Sheppard, Alexander the Great At War, The author is identified as 'editor' and the book is published by Osprey. It indicates that the content text was taken from a list of Osprey books whose authors are named, but they are not linked to any of the 15 individual chapters.The chapters on Alexander in Afghanistan, Central Asia and India are brief.

Peter Green, Alexander of Macedon, 356-323 B.C.

Robin Lane Fox, The Search for Alexander

Major Gen. E. B. Atkeson, The Final Arguments of Kings: Reflections on the Art of War. The author is concerned about ideas about war, strategy, policy, and civil -military relations today, which he considers inadequate. When studying warfare in other times and places, such as Afghanistan, the student might like to know about what the particpants then thought about what they were doing. Did they have any theories about the nature of war? ,

Early Muslim Conquests - Wikipedia entry

Muslim Conquest of Persia - also known as Arab conquest - Wikipedia entry

Rene Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes the standard study - The content includes the entire centuries during which nomadic social groups romed about the open steppe graslands and deserts between the Carpathians in Europe and the mountain borders of China, and occasionaly, but repeatedly, invaded the sedentary societies along the perifery of that vast expanse.

Timothy May, The Mongol art of War excellent maps, subjects organized by function rather than chronology, notes and bibliography,

Justin Marozzi, Tamerlane: Sword of Islam, Conqueror of the World

Rush Doshi, The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order

List of Battles Between Mughals and Sikhs - Wikipedia entry

List of Battles involving the Ghaznavid Empire - Wikipedia entry

List of Battles involving the Seljuk Empire - Wikipedia entry

List of Battles involving the Sikh Empire - Wikipedia entry

List of Sunni dynasties - Wikipedia entry

Mahmud Ghazni's Invasions of India 17 times - Wikipedia entry

Military History of Iran - Wikipedia entry

David Nicolle, The Armies of Islam 7th-11th Centuries, Osprey Men at Arms # 125 - Nicolle is expert on arms and armament, this is well illustrated on that topic.

Konstantin S. Nossov,Indian Castles 1206-1526, Osprey Fortress series # 51 - excellent illustrations of remarkable 'castles' much different from those in Europe

S. R. Turnbull, The Mongols, Osprey Men at Arms # 105 - illustrations of weapons and armament- campaigns mostly focused on Europe.

David Nicolle, Armies of the Ottoman Empire 1775 - 1820, Osprey Men at Arms # 314 - Mostly about the weapons and uniforms of the personnel

David Nicolle, Armies of the Caliphates 826 - 1098, Osprey Men at Arms # 320 - another excellent study of arms and uniforms with color illustrations

Antony Karsulas, Mounted Archers of the Steppe 600 BC - AD 1300, Osprey, Elite series # 120

Konstantin Nossov, War Elephants, Osprey, New Vanguard series # 150 - includes uses by Carthaginians and Near Eastern rulers - very interesting informatin about uses in India.