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Attrition is a dirty word. Soldiers and politicians seek quick,
decisive victories; the World War I-style slugging match evoked by the term
attrition is the last thing a commander or statesman wants to replicate. In the
tactical and operational realms, this hesitancy is both understandable and
desirable. Strategically, it is problematic. People cite Sun Tzu’s
aphorism “For there has never been a protracted war from which a country
has benefited” as if it were true.
1 The American Revolution conclusively demonstrates that he was wrong. In fact,
there is an entire and respected branch of strategy, insurgency theory, based
specifically on attrition as the preferred defeat mechanism, and at least one
author claims special operations forces produce strategic effect best through
attrition.
2 The common explanation of insurgency strategy is that it pursues attrition
because resource limitations prevent a more nuanced approach; the unstated
assumption being if they had sufficient resources, insurgents would fight
conventionally. There is, of course, a large grain of truth in that assessment;
however, as a strategic ap- proach, attrition has some distinct benefits. In
fact, attrition may be the most effective form of strategy available in some
types of war or for attaining certain political objectives.
Strategy has its own language, and language is important. Strategists have to
all mean the same thing when they use the words of their art. We might start
with winning. Strategists in the national security field agree that winning is
a political condition of some permanence (not a temporary military, economic,
informational, etc. advantage). There is also a general consensus among
strategists that winning has physical, moral, and psychological aspects, and
all are important.
Clausewitz wrote, “Military activity is never directed against material
force alone; it is aimed simultaneously at the moral forces which give it life,
and the two cannot be separated.”
3 So, any strategy needs to address both the material and moral components of
war to be successful. When strategists talk about how to win wars, as opposed
to other potential strategic military missions such as deterrence or
post-conflict activities, they often use the terms annihilation, attrition, and
exhaustion. That triptych comprises one useful way of thinking about how
strategy works and serves as the theoretical construct for this article.
Understanding these terms and how they interact is important to strategy
formulation. Like many concepts, annihilation, attrition, and exhaustion
manifest themselves at all three levels of war, although their utility as
theoretical tools at the tactical level is limited. Because the terms can
describe both objectives and methods of conducting operations, they are common
in operational and strategic thinking. Their utility to theory at the different
levels varies, and there is no requirement for conformity between the levels.
The strategist might pursue an attritional strategy, but the planner at the
operational level need not design an attritional campaign. If he can achieve
the results the strategist seeks through a battle or campaign of annihilation,
the planner is free to do so. The first blow may produce decisive operational
effects, a clear tactical or operational win. That is good, but if the
strategist has correctly analyzed the overall environment, it is unlikely those
effects will be strategically decisive.
6 Parameters serves as the theoretical construct for this article.
Understanding these terms and how they interact is important to strategy
formulation. Like many concepts, annihilation, attrition, and exhaustion
manifest themselves at all three levels of war, although their utility as
theoretical tools at the tactical level is limited. Because the terms can
describe both objec- tives and methods of conducting operations, they are
common in operation- al and strategic thinking. Their utility to theory at the
different levels varies, and there is no requirement for conformity between the
levels. The strate- gist might pursue an attritional strategy, but the planner
at the operational level need not design an attritional campaign. If he can
achieve the results the strategist seeks through a battle or campaign of
annihilation, the planner is free to do so. The first blow may produce decisive
operational effects, a clear tactical or operational win. That is good, but if
the strategist has cor- rectly analyzed the overall environment, it is unlikely
those effects will be strategically decisive.
Annihilation:
The idea that strategy may be conducted in differing forms goes back at least
to Clausewitz, but its most famous proponent was German military historian and
critic Hans Delbruck. He named and drew the distinction between what he called
annihilation and exhaustion.
4 A strategy of annihilation is based on the idea that a single event or a
short series of directly related events can produce victory. Annihilation
produces victory by eliminating the enemy’s capability to defend. Over
time, the concept has developed physical and moral manifestations; that is,
advocates have concocted ways to use the basic concept of annihilation to
achieve political results in both the physical and moral spheres. In its
initial and theoretically pure form, one that emphasizes the physical component
of strategy, the strategist uses a single great battle or short campaign to
produce strategic effect suf- ficient to cause the enemy’s capitulation.
Typically, again in the purest theo- retical form, the battle or campaign
destroys the opponent’s armed forces, leaving the enemy nation vulnerable
to ravaging by the victorious forces. The capital falls; forces occupy
successive portions of the countryside with- out opposition and do with them as
they wish. Theoretically, the defeated nation accepts the inevitable and
surrenders to avoid further punishment; however, that step is not necessary,
since the victor has eliminated all pos- sible means of resistance and can do
as he desires. The classic example of this form of an annihilation strategy is
Napoleon’s campaigns from 1805 to 1807. In October 1805, the French
emperor
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