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The Battle of Artemisium, or Battle of Artemision, was a
series of naval engagements over three days during the second Persian invasion
of Greece. The battle took place simultaneously with the land battle at
Thermopylae, in August or September 480, off the coast of Euboea and was fought
between an alliance of Greek city-states, including Sparta, Athens, Corinth and
others, and the Persian Empire of
Xerxes I.
Commanders and leaders:
Greeks: Eurybiades Themistocles Adeimantus
Persians: Achaemenes Ariabignes Artemisia I Damasithymos
Strength:
Greeks: 271 ships 4,065 marines 46,070 oarsmen
Persians: 1,207 ships 36,210 marines 205,190 oarsmen
Casualties and losses:
Greeks: 100 ships lost Unknown number of marines and oarsmen killed or drowned
Persians: 400 ships lost Unknown number of marines and oarsmen killed or
drowned
Herodotus gives a detailed description of the Persian fleet that assembled at
Doriskos in spring 480
However, after the fleet was struck the storm off the coast of Magnesia,
approximately one third of the fleet was lost. Thus, by Herodotus's reckoning,
the Persian fleet would have had approximately 800 triremes at Artemisium.
Region Number of ships
Phoenicia and Syria 300
Egypt 200
Cyprus
150 Cilicia
100 Ionia 100
Pontus 100
Caria 70
Aeolia 60
Lycia 50
Pamphylia 30
Dorians from Asia Minor 30
Cyclades 17
Total 1207
Some modern scholars have accepted these numbers, especially since the ancient
sources are unusually consistent on this point. Other authors reject this
number, with 1,207 being seen as more of a reference to the combined Greek
fleet in the Iliad, and generally claim that the Persians could have launched
no more than around 600 warships into the Aegean.
Greek fleet Herodotus claims there were 280 ships in the Greek fleet at the
Battle of Artemisium, made up of the following contingents (numbers in
parentheses refer to Penteconters, other ships are all Triremes):
City Number of ships
Athens 127
Corinth 40
Aegina 18
Chalcis 20
Megara 20
Sicyon 12
Sparta 10
Epidaurus 8
Eretria 7
Troezen 5
Styra 2
Ceos[ 2 (2)
Opuntian Locris (7)
Total 271 (9)
The Athenians had been building up a large fleet since 483, ostensibly for
their ongoing conflict with Aegina. However, it is probable that this build up,
initiated by Themistocles, was also made with a future conflict with the
Persians in mind. The Athenians initially requested command of the Allied
fleet, but let Eurybiades of Sparta command it to preserve unity.
Strategically, the Allied mission was simple. The fleet needed to protect the
flank of the army at Thermopylae, whilst not being cut off themselves. For the
Persians, the strategic situation was equally simple, although with more
options. They needed to force their way through either one of Thermopylae or
Artemisium (since holding both was necessary for the Allied effort), or to
outflank either position. The Athenian general Themistocles proposed that the
Allied Greeks block the advance of the Persian army at the pass of Thermopylae
and simultaneously block the Persian navy at the adjacent Straits of
Artemisium. An Allied naval force of 271 triremes was thus dispatched to await
the arrival of the Persians. Approaching Artemisium towards the end of summer,
the Persian navy was caught in a gale off the coast of Magnesia and lost around
a third of their 1200 ships. After arriving at Artemisium, the Persians sent a
detachment of 200 ships around the coast of
Euboea in an attempt to trap
the Greeks, but these were caught in another storm and shipwrecked. The main
action of the battle took place after two days of smaller engagements. The two
sides fought all day, with roughly equal losses; however, the smaller Allied
fleet could not afford the losses. After the engagement, the Allies received
news of the defeat of the Allied army at Thermopylae. Since their strategy
required both Thermopylae and Artemisium to be held, and given their losses,
the Allies decided to withdraw to Salamis. However, seeking a decisive victory
over the Allied fleet, the Persians were later defeated at the Battle of
Salamis in late 480 . Outflanking the Straits of Artemisium was theoretically
much easier than outflanking Thermopylae, by sailing around the east coast of
Euboea. The Greek position at Artemisium may have been chosen in order to watch
for such attempts. If narrowness of the channel had been the only determinant,
the Allies could have found a better position near the city of Histiaea. The
Persians were at a significant tactical advantage, outnumbering the Allies and
having "better sailing" ships. The "better sailing" that
Herodotus mentions was probably due to the superior seamanship of the crews;
most of the Athenian ships (and therefore the majority of the fleet) were newly
built, and had inexperienced crews. The most common naval tactics in the
Mediterranean area at the time were ramming (triremes were equipped with a ram
at the bows), or boarding by ship-borne marines (which essentially turned a sea
battle into a land one). The Persians and Asiatic Greeks had by this time begun
to use a manoeuver known as diekplous. It is not entirely clear what this was,
but it probably involved sailing into gaps between enemy ships and then ramming
them in the side. This maneuver would have required skilled sailing, and
therefore the Persians would have been more likely to employ it. The Allies,
however, developed tactics specifically to counter this. Herodotus suggests
that the Allied ships were heavier and, by implication, less maneuverable.
Their weight would further reduce the likelihood of the Allied ships employing
the diekplous. The source of this heaviness is uncertain; possibly the Allied
ships were bulkier in construction. Another suggestion is that the heaviness
was caused by the weight of fully armoured hoplite marines. The Allies may have
had extra marines on board if their ships were less maneuverable, since
boarding would then be the main tactic available to them (at the cost of making
the ships even heavier). Indeed, Herodotus refers to the Greeks capturing
ships, rather than sinking them.
When the Persians saw the Allied fleet rowing towards them, they decided to
seize the opportunity to attack, even though it was late in the day, as they
thought they would win an easy victory. They quickly advanced on the much
smaller Allied fleet. However, the Allies had come up with a tactic for this
situation, where they turned their "bows on to the barbarians, [and] they
drew their sterns together in the middle". This is usually taken to mean
that they formed into a circle, with their rams pointing outwards; Thucydides
reports that in the Peloponnesian War, Peloponnesian fleets twice adopted a
circular formation, with their sterns together. However, Herodotus does not
actually use the word circle, and Lazenby points out the difficulty of forming
a circle of 250 ships (the Peloponnesian fleets had 30–40 ships). It is
thus possible the Allies formed into more of a crescent formation, with the
wings drawn back to prevent the Persian ships sailing around the Allied line.
Whatever the case, it seems likely that this maneuver was intended to negate
the superior Persian seamanship, and perhaps specifically the use of diekplous.
Having assumed this formation upon the giving of a prearranged signal, the
Allied ships moved suddenly outwards from this position at a second signal,
rowing into the Persian ships and catching them off guard. Their superior
seamanship negated, the Persians came off worst from the encounter with 30 of
their ships captured or sunk. During the battle a Greek ship, captained by
Antidorus of Lemnos, defected to the Allies. Nightfall then ended the battle,
with the Allies having fared better than they possibly expected to. Euboea's
eastern shore, the "Hollows", where a large part of the Achaemenid
fleet was shipwrecked. During the night, another storm broke (this time
probably a thunder-storm, possibly with a south easterly wind), preventing the
Allies from setting off southwards to counter the Persian detachment sent
around the outside of Euboea. However, the storm also hit the Persian
detachment of ships, driving them off course and onto the rocky coast of 'the
Hollows' of Euboea. This part of the Persian fleet was thus also shipwrecked,
losing most of the ships.
The following day, which was also the second day of Battle of Thermopylae, the
Persian fleet, now recovering from the two storms, declined to attack the
Allies, and instead attempted to make the fleet seaworthy again. News of the
shipwreck off Euboea reached the Allies that day, as well as a reinforcement of
53 ships from Athens. Again waiting until late afternoon, the Allies took the
opportunity to attack a patrol of Cilician ships, destroying them, before
retreating as night fell. These ships were possibly survivors of the wrecked
detachment sent around Euboea, or were perhaps anchored in an isolated harbour.
On the third day of the battle the Persian fleet was ready to attack the Allied
lines in full force. Seeing the Persian fleet assemble, the Allies attempted to
block the Straits of Artemisium as best they could, and waited for the Persians
to attack. The Persians formed their ships into a semicircle and tried to
enclose the Allied fleet, upon which the Allies rowed forward and joined
battle. The battle raged all day long, with the Allies hard put to defend their
line. When the fleets finally disengaged at nightfall, both sides had suffered
roughly equal losses. However, the smaller Allied fleet could scarcely afford
such losses;[34] half the Athenian ships (the largest contingent in the fleet)
were damaged or lost. The heavily equipped Egyptians fought successfully
against the Greek hoplites. According to Herodotus, the Athenians were the best
fighters on the Allied side. On the Achaemenid side, the best results had been
achieved by the Egyptians, who wore a heavy individual equipment comparable to
Greek hoplites, and were able to vanquish five Greek ships: In that sea-fight
of all Xerxes' fighters the Egyptians bore themselves best; besides other great
feats of arms that they achieved, they took five Greek ships and their crews.
Of the Greeks on that day the Athenians bore themselves best; and of the
Athenians Clinias son of Alcibiades; he brought to the war two hundred men and
a ship of his own, all at his private charges. —?Herodotus Returning to
Artemisium, the Allies saw that they would probably not be able to hold the
line for another day, such were their losses. They thus debated whether they
should withdraw from Artemisium, whilst they awaited news from Thermopylae.
Themistocles ordered the men to slaughter and barbecue the flocks of the
Euboeans, so that they would not fall into Persian hands. Abronichus arrived on
the liaison ship from Thermopylae and told the Allies of the destruction of the
Allied rearguard at Thermopylae. Since holding the Straits of Artemisium now no
longer held any strategic purpose, and given their losses, the Allies decided
to evacuate immediately.
The Persians were alerted to the withdrawal of the Greeks by a boat from
Histiaea, but did not at first believe it. They sent some ships to see if this
was the case, and finding that it was, the whole fleet set sail for Artemisium
in the morning. The Persians then sailed on to Histiaea and sacked the
surrounding region. The Allied fleet sailed to Salamis, off the coast of
Attica, to assist with the evacuation of the remaining Athenians.
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