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The battle of Delium in 424 BC was
a costly Athenian defeat that came during an unsuccessful attempt to seize
control of Boeotia (Great
Peloponnesian
War). In the summer before the battle the Athenian general
Demosthenes had been in
contact with some potential Boeotian rebels who were opposed to the policy of
the Boeotian League (led by Thebes). The plan was for the rebels to seize
Siphae, on the southern coast of Boeotian (the northern shore of the Corinthian
Gulf) and Chaeronea, in the west of the area, and hand them over to the
Athenians. At the same time the Athenians were to capture Delium, on the
eastern edge of Boeotian (and the site of a temple to Apollo). The rebels hoped
that this would trigger democratic revolts across Boeotia, and that the newly
democratic cities would then support Athens. The plan went wrong almost from
the start. The Spartans discovered the plot and informed the Boeotians, so the
element of surprise was lost. The Athenians then failed to properly synchronise
their attacks. Demosthenes moved first, but when his fleet reached Siphae he
found the place occupied by a strong Boeotian army. The Athenians were unable
to make any progress, and the rebels decided not to act. Demosthenes was forced
to retire without achieving anything. The Athenian army, under the command of
Hippocrates, only appeared on the scene after Demosthenes had retired. The
temple at Delium was captured, and the Athenians began to work on fortifying
the site. The short distances involved in some Greek warfare is well
demonstrated here - the Athenians reached Delium on the third day after leaving
Athens. They then spent the third and fourth days and most of the fifth day
building the fortifications, before Hippocrates made a rather odd decision. The
fortification work was completed by the afternoon of the fifth day. Instead of
staying in the fortifications overnight, Hippocrates decided to begin the march
back to Athens. His army consisted of 7,000 Athenian hoplites, some cavalry and
a large force of light troops, mainly made up of resident foreigners and poorly
equipped Athenian citizens. After marching for just over one mile the hoplites
decided to pause and rest, but the light troops continued onwards. The
Athenians would soon be forced to fight without them. The failure of
Demosthenes's naval expedition meant that the Boeotians had been able to
concentrate on Hippocrates. By the fifth day of the expedition the Boeotians
had gathered at Tanagra, close to Delium. They also had 7,000 hoplites,
supported by 1,000 cavalry, 500 peltasts and 10,000 light troops. At this date
the Boeotian army was commanded by eleven generals, two from Thebes and nine
from the other major members of the League. When they discovered that the
Athenians were heading home ten of generals wanted to avoid battle, but the
eleventh, Pagondas, son of Aeolidas, one of the two Theban generals, convinced
his colleagues to offer battle. The Boeotian army then advanced towards the
Athenians, before forming up on the far side of a hill. The Boeotians deployed
in a somewhat unusual formation. Their basic formation was conventional, with
the hoplites in the centre and the cavalry and light troops on the wings, but
the Theban contingent, on the right of the line of hoplites, took up an
unusually deep formation - twenty five men deep. The Athenian deployment was
more conventional. Once again their hoplites were in the centre and their
cavalry on the wings, but their line was eight ranks deep. The main part of the
battle only involved the hoplites, as the light troops and cavalry were
initially held up by watercourse. The Boeotians began to advance while
Hippocrates was still moving along the Athenian line giving his pre-battle
speech. He was forced to abandon his efforts when he was only half way along
the line. Both sides then advanced towards each other at the run, and a
stubborn clash between the two lines of hoplites began. At first the Athenians
were victorious on their right and in the centre, inflicting heavy casualties
on some of the Boeotian contingents, and in particular on the Thespians.
Pagondas responded to the crisis on his left by sending some of his cavalry
from his right to his left, around the back of a hill just behind the
battlefield. On the Boeotian right the deep Theban formation was having more
success, pushing the Athenians slowly back. Meanwhile, the cavalry had made its
way round to the left, and now appeared on the Athenian's right flank.
Believing that the cavalry was the first part of a fresh army the Athenian
right panicked and fled. The panic spread along the line and the Athenian left
also broke. The Athenian army scattered, with some men making for Delium, while
others fled towards the mountains or the coast. The Boeotians mounted a
pursuit, but the battle had been fought late in the day, and nightfall saved
the Athenians from a worse disaster. The battle was followed by some unusually
drawn out negotiations between the two sides. In most cases a truce was quickly
agreed to allow both armies to retrieve their dead, but in this case the two
sides argued over the rights and wrongs of the Athenian invasion and of their
occupation of Delium. Only after the temple had been recaptured (using an early
flame thrower) did the Boeotians agree to let the Athenians recover the dead.
The battle had been a costly affair. The Athenians had lost nearly 1,000 men,
most of them citizen hoplites, and amongst them Hippocrates. The Boeotians lost
around 500 men. The Athenian casualties were amongst the highest suffered in
any hoplite battle.
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The Battle of Delium (or Delion, a city in Boeotia) took place in 424,
during the Peloponnesian War.
It was fought between the Athenians and the Boeotians, who were allies of the
Spartans, and ended with the siege of Delium in the following weeks.
Opponents: Athens versus Boeotia
Commanders and leaders:
Athens - Hippocrates
†
Boeotia -Pagondas
Strength:
Athens - 15,000 total
Boeotia - 18,500 total 7,000 hoplites 1,000 cavalry 500 peltasts 10,000 light
troops
Casualties and losses:
Athens - About 1,200
Boeotia - About 500
Prelude:
In 424, the Athenian generals Demosthenes and
Hippocrates planned to invade Boeotia. Demosthenes mistakenly sailed too early
and landed at Siphae, where his plans were betrayed by a Phocian named
Nicomachus. As Hippocrates had not yet arrived, Demosthenes could not attack
and was forced to withdraw. Hippocrates eventually arrived in Boeotia with an
Athenian army and began to fortify the temple at Delium. After five days, the
fortifications were complete, and Hippocrates set up a garrison and sent the
rest of his army back to Athens.
At the same time, the Boeotians gathered their army to challenge Hippocrates,
but when they saw that the Athenians were leaving, many of them thought that it
was pointless to attack. Pagondas of Thebes, the commander of the Boeotian
forces, urged them to attack anyway because he knew that the Athenians would
eventually return and use Delium as a base for further invasions.
Battle:
Troop movements during the battle Pagondas moved his army into position near
the Athenians although both armies were hidden from each other by a hill. The
Boeotians had 7,000 hoplites, 1,000 cavalry, 500 peltasts and 10,000 light
troops. The right wing was formed by troops from Thebes, and the Thebans drew
themselves up to a depth of 25 men, rather than the usual 8; the centre by men
from Haliartus, Coronea, and Copiae; and the left wing by troops from Thespiae,
Tanagra, and Orchomenus. They were later joined by the Locrians. When
Hippocrates learned of the Boeotian army, he joined the main Athenian force,
leaving 300 cavalry behind at Delium. The Athenians had about the same numbers
of hoplites and cavalry, but had fewer lightly armed troops, mostly from their
allied cities. They lined up at the usual depth. Because of the asymmetry in
deployment, the Theban right wing would almost certainly be victorious but also
because of their deployment the Athenian hoplite line was longer and would
outflank the Boetian left line. That unique deployment by the Theban general
Pagondas explains the subsequent unfolding and progress of the battle. The
Boeotians charged unexpectedly while Hippocrates was giving a speech to his
men. The centre lines saw the heaviest fighting. As Thucydides reports, the
Boeotian left wing was surrounded and close to defeat, and only the Thespian
contingent stood its ground. The victorious Athenian line got into confusion as
it circled round the Thespian contingent and surrounded it. Some of the
Athenian hoplites fought and killed one another when they met at the other end,
mistaking their countrymen for the enemy.
That was history's first documented incident of "friendly fire"
(Geoffrey Regan, Back Fire, Robson Books Ltd., London, 1995).
It is thought the incident occurred in part because no "state" shield
devices were in use, which did not seem to have become general until the Second
Battle of Mantinea, fought in 362 BC between the Thebans and the Spartans (and
each side's allies). In any case, Pagondas sent his cavalry to support the
Boeotian left wing and the Athenians were defeated in turn. Meanwhile, the
Boeotian right wing was also victorious, and the Athenians fighting there
fled;. When the Athenian centre saw that its two wings had been defeated, it
also fled. About 500 Boeotians and 1,000 Athenians had been killed, including
Hippocrates.
One of the Athenian hoplites in the battle was the philosopher Socrates. Plato
has Alcibiades give the following account of the retreat of the Athenians at
Delium, and Socrates' own actions then:
Furthermore, men, it was worthwhile to behold Socrates when the army retreated
in flight from Delium; for I happened to be there on horseback and he was a
hoplite. The soldiers were then in rout, and while he and Laches were
retreating together, I came upon them by chance. And as soon as I saw them, I
at once urged the two of them to take heart, and I said I would not leave them
behind. I had an even finer opportunity to observe Socrates there than I had
had at Potidaea, for I was less in fear because I was on horseback. First of
all, how much more sensible he was than Laches; and secondly, it was my
opinion, Aristophanes (and this point is yours); that walking there just as he
does here in Athens, 'stalking like a pelican, his eyes darting from side to
side,' quietly on the lookout for friends and foes, he made it plain to
everyone even at a great distance that if one touches this real man, he will
defend himself vigorously. Consequently, he went away safely, both he and his
comrade; for when you behave in war as he did, then they just about do not even
touch you; instead they pursue those who turn in headlong flight.
The Boeotians chased the Athenians until nightfall. Most of the Athenians
returned to the fort at Delium, where a Boeotian herald announced that they
were offending land that was sacred to the Boeotians and must leave. The
Athenians replied that the land was now theirs and was now sacred to them and
that they held it in self-defense from the Boeotians.
Aftermath:
For two weeks, there was no action, but the Boeotians were joined by 2,000
hoplites from Corinth, as well as other troops from their various allies. The
Boeotians constructed a strange device, which, according to the description in
Thucydides (4.100), seems to have been a kind of flamethrower and used the
weapon to set fire to Delium and chase away the Athenians. Only about 200
Athenians were killed; the rest were allowed to escape. After Delium had been
recaptured, Demosthenes and his forces finally arrived, but the lack of
communication between him and Hippocrates meant that his arrival was
essentially useless. He landed near Sicyon but was quickly defeated.
In addition to showing an innovative use of a new technology, Pagondas made use
of planned tactical warfare for one of the first times in recorded history. In
the previous centuries, battles between Greek city-states had been relatively
simple encounters between massed formations of hoplites. Cavalry played no
important role, and all depended on the unity and force of the massed ranks of
the infantry, straining against the opponent. At Delium, Pagondas made use of
deeper ranks, reserves, cavalry interventions, light-armed skirmishers
(peltasts) and gradual changes in tactics during the battle.
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