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The Battle of Thermopylae was fought between an alliance of Greek
city-states, led by King Leonidas I of Sparta, and the Achaemenid Empire of
Xerxes I over the course
of three days, during the second Persian invasion of Greece. It took place
simultaneously with the naval battle at Artemisium, in August or September 480
BC, at the narrow coastal pass of Thermopylae ("The Hot Gates"). The
Persian invasion was a delayed response to the defeat of the first Persian
invasion of Greece, which had been ended by the Athenian victory at the Battle
of Marathon in
490.
Date 20 August or 8–10 September 480
Location Thermopylae, Greece
Result
Persian victory - Territorial changes Persians gain control of Phocis, Boeotia,
and Attica
Opponents:
Greek city-states versus Persian Empire
Commanders and leaders:
Greeks - Spartans - King Leonidas of Sparta † Demophilus †
Persians - King Xerxes I of Persia Mardonius Hydarnes II Artapanus
Strength
Greeks - Total 5,200 (or 6,100) (Herodotus) 7,400+ (Diodorus) 11,200
(Pausanias) 7,000 (modern est.)
Persians - 2,641,610 (Herodotus)[7] 70,000–300,000 (modern est.)[8][b][9]
Casualties and losses 4,000 (Herodotus)[10] c. 20,000 (Herodotus)[5]
By 480 Xerxes had amassed a massive army and navy, and set out to conquer all
of Greece. The Athenian politician and general Themistocles had proposed that
the allied Greeks block the advance of the Persian army at the pass of
Thermopylae, and simultaneously block the Persian navy at the Straits of
Artemisium. A Greek force of approximately 7,000 men marched north to block the
pass in the middle of 480. The Persian army, alleged by the ancient sources to
have numbered over one million, but today considered to have been much smaller
(various figures are given by scholars, ranging between about 100,000 and
150,000) arrived at the pass in late August or early September. The vastly
outnumbered Greeks held off the Persians for seven days (including three of
battle) before the rear-guard was annihilated in one of history's most famous
last stands. During two full days of battle, the small force led by Leonidas
blocked the only road by which the massive Persian army could pass. After the
second day, a local resident named Ephialtes betrayed the Greeks by revealing a
small path used by shepherds. It led the Persians behind the Greek lines.
Leonidas, aware that his force was being outflanked, dismissed the bulk of the
Greek army and remained to guard their retreat with 300 Spartans and 700
Thespians, fighting to the death. Others also reportedly remained, including up
to 900 helots and 400 Thebans; most of these Thebans reportedly surrendered.
Themistocles was in command of the Greek Navy at Artemisium when he received
news that the Persians had taken the pass at Thermopylae. Since the Greek
strategy required both Thermopylae and Artemisium to be held, given their
losses, it was decided to withdraw to Salamis. The Persians overran Boeotia and
then captured the evacuated city of Athens. The Greek fleet—seeking a
decisive victory over the Persian armada—attacked and defeated the
invaders at the Battle of Salamis in late 480 BC. Wary of being trapped in
Europe, Xerxes withdrew with much of his army to Asia (losing most to
starvation and disease), leaving Mardonius to attempt to complete the conquest
of Greece. However, the following year saw a Greek army decisively defeat the
Persians at the Battle of Plataea, thereby ending the Persian invasion. Both
ancient and modern writers have used the Battle of Thermopylae as an example of
the power of a patriotic army defending its native soil. The performance of the
defenders is also used as an example of the advantages of training, equipment,
and good use of terrain as force multipliers and has become a symbol of courage
against overwhelming odds.
Background:
The Greek city-states of Athens and Eretria had aided the unsuccessful Ionian Revolt against
the Persian Empire of Darius I in 499–494. The Persian Empire was still
relatively young and prone to revolts amongst its subject peoples. Darius,
moreover, was a usurper and had spent considerable time extinguishing revolts
against his rule. The Ionian revolt threatened the integrity of his empire, and
Darius thus vowed to punish those involved, especially the Athenians,
"since he was sure that [the Ionians] would not go unpunished for their
rebellion". Darius also saw the opportunity to expand his empire into the
fractious world of Ancient Greece. A preliminary expedition under Mardonius in
492, secured the lands approaching Greece, re-conquered Thrace and forced
Macedon to become a client kingdom of Persia's. The Spartans throw Persian
envoys into a well Darius sent emissaries to all the Greek city-states in 491
asking for a gift of "earth and water" as tokens of their submission
to him.
Having had a demonstration of his power the previous year, the majority of
Greek cities duly obliged. In Athens, however, the ambassadors were put on
trial and then executed by throwing them in a pit; in Sparta, they were simply
thrown down a well. This meant that Sparta was also effectively at war with
Persia. However, in order to appease the Achaemenid king somewhat, two Spartans
were voluntarily sent to Susa for execution, in atonement for the death of the
Persian heralds. Darius thus put together an amphibious task force under Datis
and Artaphernes in 490, which attacked Naxos, before receiving the submission
of the other Cycladic Islands. The task force then moved on Eretria, which it
besieged and destroyed. Finally, it moved to attack Athens, landing at the bay
of Marathon, where it was met by a heavily outnumbered Athenian army. At the
ensuing Battle of Marathon, the
Athenians won a remarkable victory, which resulted in the withdrawal of the
Persian army to Asia. Darius, therefore, began raising a huge new army with
which he meant to completely subjugate Greece; however, in 486, his Egyptian
subjects revolted, indefinitely postponing any Greek expedition. Darius then
died whilst preparing to march on Egypt, and the throne of Persia passed to his
son Xerxes I.
Xerxes crushed the Egyptian revolt and very quickly restarted the preparations
for the invasion of Greece. Since this was to be a full-scale invasion, it
required long-term planning, stockpiling, and conscription. Xerxes decided that
the Hellespont would be bridged to allow his army to cross to Europe, and that
a canal should be dug across the isthmus of Mount Athos (rounding which
headland, a Persian fleet had been destroyed in 492. These were both feats of
exceptional ambition, which would have been beyond any other contemporary
state. By early 480, the preparations were complete, and the army which Xerxes
had mustered at Sardis marched towards Europe, crossing the Hellespont on two
pontoon bridges. According to Herodotus, Xerxes' army was so large that, upon
arriving at the banks of the Echeidorus River, his soldiers proceeded to drink
it dry. In the face of such imposing numbers, many Greek cities capitulated to
the Persian demand for a tribute of earth and water.
The Athenians had also been preparing for war with the Persians since the
mid-480s, and in 482 the decision was taken, under the guidance of the Athenian
politician Themistocles, to build a massive fleet of triremes that would be
essential for the Greeks to fight the Persians. However, the Athenians lacked
the manpower to fight on both land and sea; therefore, combating the Persians
would require an alliance of Greek city-states. In 481, Xerxes sent ambassadors
around Greece requesting "earth and water" but very deliberately
omitting Athens and Sparta. Support thus began to coalesce around these two
leading states. A congress of city-states met at Corinth in late autumn of 481,
and a confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed. It had the power to
send envoys to request assistance and dispatch troops from the member states to
defensive points, after joint consultation. This was remarkable for the
disjointed and chaotic Greek world, especially since many of the city-states in
attendance were still technically at war with each other.[41] The
"congress" met again in the spring of 480. A Thessalian delegation
suggested that the Greeks could muster in the narrow Vale of Tempe, on the
borders of Thessaly, and thereby block Xerxes' advance. A force of 10,000
hoplites was dispatched to the Vale of Tempe, through which they believed the
Persian army would have to pass. However, once there, being warned by Alexander
I of Macedon that the vale could be bypassed through Sarantoporo Pass and that
Xerxes' army was overwhelming, the Greeks retreated. Shortly afterwards, they
received the news that Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont. Themistocles,
therefore, suggested a second strategy to the Greeks: the route to southern
Greece (Boeotia, Attica, and the Peloponnesus) would require Xerxes' army to
travel through the very narrow pass of Thermopylae, which could easily be
blocked by the Greek hoplites, despite the overwhelming numbers of Persians.
Furthermore, to prevent the Persians from bypassing Thermopylae by sea, the
Athenian and allied navies could block the straits of Artemisium. Congress
adopted this dual-pronged strategy. However, the Peloponnesian cities made
fall-back plans to defend the Isthmus of Corinth, should it come to that,
whilst the women and children of Athens would evacuate en masse to the
Peloponnesian city of Troezen.
Prelude:
The Persian army seems to have made slow progress through Thrace and Macedon.
News of the imminent Persian approach eventually reached Greece in August
thanks to a Greek spy. At this time of year the Spartans, de facto military
leaders of the alliance, were celebrating the festival of Carneia. During the
Carneia, military activity was forbidden by Spartan law; the Spartans had
arrived too late at the Battle of Marathon because of this requirement. It was
also the time of the Olympic Games, and therefore the Olympic truce, and thus
it would have been doubly sacrilegious for the whole Spartan army to march to
war. On this occasion, the ephors decided the urgency was sufficiently great to
justify an advance expedition to block the pass, under one of its kings,
Leonidas I. Leonidas took with him the 300 men of the royal bodyguard, the
Hippeis. This expedition was to try to gather as many other Greek soldiers
along the way as possible and to await the arrival of the main Spartan army.
The legend of Thermopylae, as told by Herodotus, has it that the Spartans had
consulted the Oracle at Delphi earlier in the year.
The Oracle is said to have made the following prophecy:
O ye men who dwell in the streets of broad Lacedaemon! Honor the festival of
the Carneia!! Otherwise, Either your glorious town shall be sacked by the
children of Perseus, Or, in exchange, must all through the whole Laconian
country Mourn for the loss of a king, descendant of great Heracles.
Herodotus tells us that Leonidas, in line with the prophecy, was convinced he
was going to certain death since his forces were not adequate for a victory,
and so he selected only Spartans with living sons. The Spartan force was
reinforced en route to Thermopylae by contingents from various cities and
numbered more than 7,000 by the time it arrived at the pass. Leonidas chose to
camp at, and defend, the "middle gate", the narrowest part of the
pass of Thermopylae, where the Phocians had built a defensive wall some time
before. News also reached Leonidas, from the nearby city of Trachis, that there
was a mountain track that could be used to outflank the pass of Thermopylae.
Leonidas stationed 1,000 Phocians on the heights to prevent such a manoeuvre.
Leonidas and his companions devoting themselves to death. Finally, in
mid-August, the Persian army was sighted across the Malian Gulf approaching
Thermopylae. With the Persian army's arrival at Thermopylae the Greeks held a
council of war. Some Peloponnesians suggested withdrawal to the Isthmus of
Corinth and blocking the passage to Peloponnesus. The Phocians and Locrians,
whose states were located nearby, became indignant and advised defending
Thermopylae and sending for more help. Leonidas calmed the panic and agreed to
defend Thermopylae.
According to Plutarch, when one of the soldiers complained that, "Because
of the arrows of the barbarians it is impossible to see the sun", Leonidas
replied, "Won't it be nice, then, if we shall have shade in which to fight
them?" Herodotus reports a similar comment, but attributes it to Dienekes.
Xerxes sent a Persian emissary to negotiate with Leonidas. The Greeks were
offered their freedom, the title "Friends of the Persian People", and
the opportunity to re-settle on land better than that they possessed. When
Leonidas refused these terms, the ambassador carried a written message by
Xerxes, asking him to "Hand over your arms". Leonidas' famous
response to the Persians was, "having come, take [them]", but usually
translated as "come and take them"). With the Persian emissary
returning empty-handed, battle became inevitable. Xerxes delayed for four days,
waiting for the Greeks to disperse, before sending troops to attack them.
Opposing forces:
Persian army:
A depiction of the Soldiers of the Achaemenid army of Xerxes I at the time of
the Battle of Thermopylae shows.
Top rank: Persian, Median, Elamite, Parthian, Arian, Bactrian, Sogdian,
Chorasmian, Zarangian, Sattagydian, Gandharan, Hindush (Indians), Scythian.
Bottom rank: Scythian, Babylonian, Assyrian, Arabian, Egyptian, Armenian,
Cappadocian, Lydian, Ionian, Scythian, Thracian, Macedonian, Libyan, Ethiopian.
The number of troops which Xerxes mustered for the second invasion of Greece
has been the subject of endless dispute, most notably between ancient sources,
which report very large numbers, and modern scholars, who surmise much smaller
figures.
Herodotus claimed that there were, in total, 2.6 million military personnel,
accompanied by an equivalent number of support personnel. The poet Simonides,
who was a near-contemporary, talks of four million; Ctesias gave 800,000 as the
total number of the army that was assembled by Xerxes.
Modern scholars tend to reject the figures given by Herodotus and other ancient
sources as unrealistic, resulting from miscalculations or exaggerations on the
part of the victors. Modern scholarly estimates are generally in the range
120,000–300,000. These estimates usually come from studying the logistical
capabilities of the Persians in that era, the sustainability of their
respective bases of operations, and the overall manpower constraints affecting
them. Whatever the real numbers were, however, it is clear that Xerxes was
anxious to ensure a successful expedition by mustering an overwhelming
numerical superiority by land and by sea. The number of Persian troops present
at Thermopylae is therefore as uncertain as the number for the total invasion
force. For instance, it is unclear whether the whole Persian army marched as
far as Thermopylae, or whether Xerxes left garrisons in Macedon and Thessaly.
Greek army:
According to Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus, the Greek army included the
following forces:
Group Number – Herodotus Numbers – Diodorus Siculus Lacedaemonians/
Perioeci 900? 700 or 1,000 Spartan hoplites 300 300 Mantineans 500 3,000 (other
Peloponnesians sent with Leonidas) Tegeans 500 Arcadian Orchomenos 120 Other
Arcadians 1,000 Corinthians 400 Phlians 200 Mycenaeans 80
Total Peloponnesians 3,100 or 4,000 4,000 or 4,300 Thespians 700 – Malians
– 1,000 Thebans 400 400 Phocians 1,000 1,000 Opuntian Locrians "All
they had" 1,000
Grand total :
5,200 (or 6,100) plus the Opuntian Locrians 7,400 (or 7,700)
Strategic and tactical considerations:
From a strategic point of view, by defending Thermopylae, the Greeks were
making the best possible use of their forces. As long as they could prevent a
further Persian advance into Greece, they had no need to seek a decisive battle
and could, thus, remain on the defensive. Moreover, by defending two
constricted passages (Thermopylae and Artemisium), the Greeks' inferior numbers
became less of a factor. Conversely, for the Persians the problem of supplying
such a large army meant they could not remain in the same place for very long.
The Persians, therefore, had to retreat or advance, and advancing required
forcing the pass of Thermopylae.
Tactically, the pass at Thermopylae was ideally suited to the Greek style of
warfare. A hoplite phalanx could block the narrow pass with ease, with no risk
of being outflanked by cavalry. Moreover, in the pass, the phalanx would have
been very difficult to assault for the more lightly armed Persian infantry. The
major weak point for the Greeks was the mountain track which led across the
highland parallel to Thermopylae, that could allow their position to be
outflanked. Although probably unsuitable for cavalry, this path could easily be
traversed by the Persian infantry (many of whom were versed in mountain
warfare). Leonidas was made aware of this path by local people from Trachis,
and he positioned a detachment of Phocian troops there in order to block this
route.
Topography of the battlefield:
Map of Thermopylae area with reconstructed shoreline of 480.
It is often claimed that at the time, the pass of Thermopylae consisted of a
track along the shore of the Malian Gulf so narrow that only one chariot could
pass through at a time. In fact, as noted below, the pass was 100 metres wide,
probably wider than the Greeks could have held against the Persian masses.
Herodotus reports that the Phocians had improved the defences of the pass by
channelling the stream from the hot springs to create a marsh, and it was a
causeway across this marsh which was only wide enough for a single chariot to
traverse. In a later passage, describing a Gaulish attempt to force the pass,
Pausanias states "The cavalry on both sides proved useless, as the ground
at the Pass is not only narrow, but also smooth because of the natural rock,
while most of it is slippery owing to its being covered with streams...the
losses of the barbarians it was impossible to discover exactly. For the number
of them that disappeared beneath the mud was great."
It is also said that on the southern side of the track stood cliffs that
overlooked the pass. However, a glance at any photograph of the pass shows
there are no cliffs, only steep slopes covered in thorny bushes and trees.
Although no obstacle to individuals, such terrain would not be passable by an
army and its baggage train. On the north side of the roadway was the Malian
Gulf, into which the land shelved gently.
When at a later date, an army of Gauls led by Brennus attempted to force the
pass, the shallowness of the water gave the Greek fleet great difficulty
getting close enough to the fighting to bombard the Gauls with ship-borne
missile weapons. Along the path itself was a series of three constrictions, or
"gates" (pylai), and at the centre gate a wall that had been erected
by the Phocians, in the previous century, to aid in their defence against
Thessalian invasions. The name "Hot Gates" comes from the hot springs
that were located there. The terrain of the battlefield was nothing that Xerxes
and his forces were accustomed to. Although coming from a mountainous country,
the Persians were not prepared for the real nature of the country they had
invaded. The pure ruggedness of this area is caused by torrential downpours for
four months of the year, combined with an intense summer season of scorching
heat that cracks the ground. Vegetation is scarce and consists of low, thorny
shrubs. The hillsides along the pass are covered in thick brush, with some
plants reaching 10 feet (3.0 m) high. With the sea on one side and steep,
impassable hills on the other, King Leonidas and his men chose the perfect
topographical position to battle the Persian invaders. Today, the pass is not
near the sea, but is several kilometres inland because of sedimentation in the
Malian Gulf. The old track appears at the foot of the hills around the plain,
flanked by a modern road. Recent core samples indicate that the pass was only
100 metres (330 ft) wide, and the waters came up to the gates: "Little do
the visitors realize that the battle took place across the road from the
monument."
The pass still is a natural defensive position to modern armies, and British
Commonwealth forces in World War II made a defence in 1941 against the Nazi
invasion mere metres from the original battlefield.
Persian invasion map
Battle:
First day:
On the fifth day after the Persian arrival at Thermopylae and the first day of
the battle, Xerxes finally resolved to attack the Greeks. First, he ordered
5,000 archers to shoot a barrage of arrows, but they were ineffective; they
shot from at least 100 yards away, according to modern day scholars, and the
Greeks' wooden shields (sometimes covered with a very thin layer of bronze) and
bronze helmets deflected the arrows. After that, Xerxes sent a force of 10,000
Medes and Cissians to take the defenders prisoner and bring them before him.
The Persians soon launched a frontal assault, in waves of around 10,000 men, on
the Greek position. The Greeks fought in front of the Phocian wall, at the
narrowest part of the pass, which enabled them to use as few soldiers as
possible.
Details of the tactics are scant; Diodorus says, "the men stood shoulder
to shoulder", and the Greeks were "superior in valour and in the
great size of their shields." This probably describes the standard Greek
phalanx, in which the men formed a wall of overlapping shields and layered
spear points protruding out from the sides of the shields, which would have
been highly effective as long as it spanned the width of the pass. The weaker
shields, and shorter spears and swords of the Persians prevented them from
effectively engaging the Greek hoplites. Herodotus says that the units for each
city were kept together; units were rotated in and out of the battle to prevent
fatigue, which implies the Greeks had more men than necessary to block the
pass. The Greeks killed so many Medes that Xerxes is said to have stood up
three times from the seat from which he was watching the battle. According to
Ctesias, the first wave was "cut to ribbons", with only two or three
Spartans killed in return. According to Herodotus and Diodorus, the king,
having taken the measure of the enemy, threw his best troops into a second
assault the same day, the Immortals, an elite corps of 10,000 men. However, the
Immortals fared no better than the Medes, and failed to make any headway
against the Greeks. The Spartans apparently used a tactic of feigning retreat,
and then turning and killing the enemy troops when they ran after them.
Second day:
The flank exposed by Ephialtes:
On the second day, Xerxes again sent in the infantry to attack the pass,
"supposing that their enemies, being so few, were now disabled by wounds
and could no longer resist." However, the Persians had no more success on
the second day than on the first. Xerxes at last stopped the assault and
withdrew to his camp, "totally perplexed". Later that day, however,
as the Persian king was pondering what to do next, he received a windfall; a
Trachinian named Ephialtes informed him of the mountain path around Thermopylae
and offered to guide the Persian army. Ephialtes was motivated by the desire
for a reward. For this act, the name "Ephialtes" received a lasting
stigma; it came to mean "nightmare" in the Greek language and to
symbolize the archetypal traitor in Greek culture. Herodotus reports that
Xerxes sent his commander Hydarnes that evening, with the men under his
command, the Immortals, to encircle the Greeks via the path. However, he does
not say who those men were. The Immortals had been bloodied on the first day,
so it is possible that Hydarnes may have been given overall command of an
enhanced force including what was left of the Immortals; according to Diodorus,
Hydarnes had a force of 20,000 for the mission. The path led from east of the
Persian camp along the ridge of Mt. Anopaea behind the cliffs that flanked the
pass. It branched, with one path leading to Phocis and the other down to the
Malian Gulf at Alpenus, the first town of Locris.
Third day:
At daybreak on the third day, the Phocians guarding the path above Thermopylae
became aware of the outflanking Persian column by the rustling of oak leaves.
Herodotus says they jumped up and were greatly amazed. Hydarnes was perhaps
just as amazed to see them hastily arming themselves as they were to see him
and his forces. He feared they were Spartans but was informed by Ephialtes that
they were not. The Phocians retreated to a nearby hill to make their stand
(assuming the Persians had come to attack them). However, not wishing to be
delayed, the Persians merely shot a volley of arrows at them, before bypassing
them to continue with their encirclement of the main Greek force. Learning from
a runner that the Phocians had not held the path, Leonidas called a council of
war at dawn.
According to Diodorus, a Persian called Tyrrhastiadas, a Cymaean by birth,
warned the Greeks. Some of the Greeks argued for withdrawal, but Leonidas
resolved to stay at the pass with the Spartans. Upon discovering that his army
had been encircled, Leonidas told his allies that they could leave if they
wanted to. While many of the Greeks took him up on his offer and fled, around
two thousand soldiers stayed behind to fight and die. Knowing that the end was
near, the Greeks marched into the open field and met the Persians head-on. Many
of the Greek contingents then either chose to withdraw (without orders) or were
ordered to leave by Leonidas (Herodotus admits that there is some doubt about
which actually happened).
The contingent of 700 Thespians, led by their general Demophilus, refused to
leave and committed themselves to the fight. Also present were the 400 Thebans
and probably the helots who had accompanied the Spartans. Leonidas' actions
have been the subject of much discussion. It is commonly stated that the
Spartans were obeying the laws of Sparta by not retreating. It has also been
proposed that the failure to retreat from Thermopylae gave rise to the notion
that Spartans never retreated. It has also been suggested that Leonidas,
recalling the words of the Oracle, was committed to sacrificing his life in
order to save Sparta. The most likely theory is that Leonidas chose to form a
rearguard so that the other Greek contingents could get away. If all the troops
had retreated, the open ground beyond the pass would have allowed the Persian
cavalry to run the Greeks down. If they had all remained at the pass, they
would have been encircled and would eventually have all been killed. By
covering the retreat and continuing to block the pass, Leonidas could save more
than 3,000 men, who would be able to fight again. The Thebans have also been
the subject of some discussion. Herodotus suggests they were brought to the
battle as hostages to ensure the good behavior of Thebes. However, as Plutarch
long ago pointed out, if they were hostages, why not send them away with the
rest of the Greeks?The likelihood is that these were the Theban
"loyalists", who unlike the majority of their fellow citizens,
objected to Persian domination. They thus probably came to Thermopylae of their
own free will and stayed to the end because they could not return to Thebes if
the Persians conquered Boeotia. The Thespians, resolved as they were not to
submit to Xerxes, faced the destruction of their city if the Persians took
Boeotia. However, this alone does not explain the fact that they remained; the
remainder of Thespiae was successfully evacuated before the Persians arrived
there. It seems that the Thespians volunteered to remain as a simple act of
self-sacrifice, all the more amazing since their contingent represented every
single hoplite the city could muster. This seems to have been a particularly
Thespian trait – on at least two other occasions in later history, a
Thespian force would commit itself to a fight to the death.
At dawn, Xerxes made libations, pausing to allow the Immortals sufficient time
to descend the mountain, and then began his advance. A Persian force of 10,000
men, comprising light infantry and cavalry, charged at the front of the Greek
formation. The Greeks this time sallied forth from the wall to meet the
Persians in the wider part of the pass, in an attempt to slaughter as many
Persians as they could. They fought with spears, until every spear was
shattered, and then switched to xiphe (short swords). In this struggle,
Herodotus states that two of Xerxes' brothers fell: Abrocomes and Hyperanthes.
Leonidas also died in the assault, shot down by Persian archers, and the two
sides fought over his body; the Greeks took possession. As the Immortals
approached, the Greeks withdrew and took a stand on a hill behind the wall. The
Thebans "moved away from their companions, and with hands upraised,
advanced toward the barbarians..." (Rawlinson translation), but a few were
slain before their surrender was accepted. The king later had the Theban
prisoners branded with the royal mark.
Of the remaining defenders, Herodotus says: "Here they defended themselves
to the last, those who still had swords using them, and the others resisting
with their hands and teeth." Tearing down part of the wall, Xerxes ordered
the hill surrounded, and the Persians rained down arrows until every last Greek
was dead.
In 1939, archaeologist Spyridon Marinatos, excavating at Thermopylae, found
large numbers of Persian bronze arrowheads on Kolonos Hill, which changed the
identification of the hill on which the Greeks were thought to have died from a
smaller one nearer the wall. The pass at Thermopylae was thus opened to the
Persian army, according to Herodotus, at the cost to the Persians of up to
20,000 fatalities. The Greek rearguard, meanwhile, was annihilated, with a
probable loss of 2,000 men, including those killed on the first two days of
battle. Herodotus says, at one point 4,000 Greeks died, but assuming the
Phocians guarding the track were not killed during the battle (as Herodotus
implies), this would be almost every Greek soldier present (by Herodotus' own
estimates), and this number is probably too high.
Aftermath:
When the Persians recovered Leonidas' body, Xerxes, in a rage, ordered that the
body be decapitated and crucified. Herodotus observes this was very uncommon
for the Persians, as they traditionally treated "valiant warriors"
with great honour (the example of Pytheas, captured off Skiathos before the
Battle of Artemisium, strengthens this suggestion). However, Xerxes was known
for his rage. Legend has it that he had the very water of the Hellespont
whipped because it would not obey him. After the Persians' departure, the
Greeks collected their dead and buried them on the hill. After the Persian
invasion was repulsed, a stone lion was erected at Thermopylae to commemorate
Leonidas. A full 40 years after the battle, Leonidas' bones were returned to
Sparta, where he was buried again with full honours; funeral games were held
every year in his memory.
With Thermopylae now opened to the Persian army, the continuation of the
blockade at Artemisium by the Greek fleet became irrelevant. The simultaneous
naval Battle of
Artemisium had been a tactical stalemate, and the Greek navy was able to
retreat in good order to the Saronic Gulf, where they helped to ferry the
remaining Athenian citizens to the island of Salamis.
The Capture of the Acropolis and the destruction of Athens by the Achaemenids,
following the battle of Thermopylae.
Following Thermopylae, the Persian army proceeded to sack and burn Plataea and
Thespiae, the Boeotian cities that had not submitted, before it marched on the
now evacuated city of Athens and accomplished the Achaemenid destruction of
Athens. Meanwhile, the Greeks (for the most part Peloponnesians) preparing to
defend the Isthmus of Corinth, demolished the single road that led through it
and built a wall across it.] As at Thermopylae, making this an effective
strategy required the Greek navy to stage a simultaneous blockade, barring the
passage of the Persian navy across the Saronic Gulf, so that troops could not
be landed directly on the Peloponnese. However, instead of a mere blockade,
Themistocles persuaded the Greeks to seek a decisive victory against the
Persians Luring the Persian navy into the Straits of Salamis, the Greek fleet
was able to destroy much of the Persian fleet in the
Battle of
Salamis, which essentially ended the threat to the Peloponnese. Fearing the
Greeks might attack the bridges across the Hellespont and trap his army in
Europe, Xerxes now retreated with much of the Persian army back to Asia, though
nearly all of them died of starvation and disease on the return voyage. He left
a hand-picked force, under Mardonius, to complete the
conquest the following year. However, under pressure from the Athenians, the
Peloponnesians eventually agreed to try to force Mardonius to battle, and they
marched on Attica. Mardonius retreated to Boeotia to lure the Greeks into open
terrain, and the two sides eventually met near the city of Plataea. At the
Battle of
Plataea, the Greek army won a decisive victory, destroying much of the
Persian army and ending the invasion of Greece. Meanwhile, at the
near-simultaneous naval
Battle of Mycale,
they also destroyed much of the remaining Persian fleet, thereby reducing the
threat of further invasions.
Thermopylae is arguably the most famous battle in European ancient history,
repeatedly referenced in ancient, recent, and contemporary culture. In Western
culture at least, it is the Greeks who are lauded for their performance in
battle. However, within the context of the Persian invasion, Thermopylae was
undoubtedly a defeat for the Greeks. It seems clear that the Greek strategy was
to hold off the Persians at Thermopylae and Artemisium; whatever they may have
intended, it was presumably not their desire to surrender all of Boeotia and
Attica to the Persians. The Greek position at Thermopylae, despite being
massively outnumbered, was nearly impregnable. If the position had been held
for even a little longer, the Persians might have had to retreat for lack of
food and water. Thus, despite the heavy losses, forcing the pass was
strategically a Persian victory, but the successful retreat of the bulk of the
Greek troops was in its own sense a victory as well. The battle itself had
shown that even when heavily outnumbered, the Greeks could put up an effective
fight against the Persians, and the defeat at Thermopylae had turned Leonidas
and the men under his command into martyrs. That boosted the morale of all
Greek soldiers in the second Persian invasion. It is sometimes stated that
Thermopylae was a Pyrrhic victory for the Persians (i.e., one in which the
victor is as damaged by the battle as the defeated party). However, there is no
suggestion by Herodotus that the effect on the Persian forces was that. The
idea ignores the fact that the Persians would, in the aftermath of Thermopylae,
conquer the majority of Greece, and the fact that they were still fighting in
Greece a year later. Alternatively, the argument is sometimes advanced that the
last stand at Thermopylae was a successful delaying action that gave the Greek
navy time to prepare for the Battle of Salamis. However, compared to the
probable time (about one month) between Thermopylae and Salamis, the time
bought was negligible. Furthermore, this idea also neglects the fact that a
Greek navy was fighting at Artemisium during the Battle of Thermopylae,
incurring losses in the process.
George Cawkwell suggests that the gap between Thermopylae and Salamis was
caused by Xerxes' systematically reducing Greek opposition in Phocis and
Boeotia, and not as a result of the Battle of Thermopylae; thus, as a delaying
action, Thermopylae was insignificant compared to Xerxes' own procrastination.
Far from labelling Thermopylae as a Pyrrhic victory, modern academic treatises
on the Greco-Persian Wars tend to emphasise the success of Xerxes in breaching
the formidable Greek position and the subsequent conquest of the majority of
Greece. For instance, Cawkwell states: "he was successful on both land and
sea, and the Great Invasion began with a brilliant success. ... Xerxes had
every reason to congratulate himself", while Lazenby describes the Greek
defeat as "disastrous".
The fame of Thermopylae is thus principally derived not from its effect on the
outcome of the war but for the inspirational example it set. Thermopylae is
famous because of the heroism of the doomed rearguard, who, despite facing
certain death, remained at the pass. Ever since, the events of Thermopylae have
been the source of effusive praise from many sources: "Salamis, Plataea,
Mycale and Sicily are the fairest sister-victories which the Sun has ever seen,
yet they would never dare to compare their combined glory with the glorious
defeat of King Leonidas and his men". A second reason is the example it
set of free men, fighting for their country and their freedom:
So almost immediately, contemporary Greeks saw Thermopylae as a critical moral
and culture lesson. In universal terms, a small, free people had willingly
outfought huge numbers of imperial subjects who advanced under the lash. More
specifically, the Western idea that soldiers themselves decide where, how, and
against whom they will fight was contrasted against the Eastern notion of
despotism and monarchy—freedom proving the stronger idea as the more
courageous fighting of the Greeks at Thermopylae, and their later victories at
Salamis and Plataea attested. While this paradigm of "free men"
outfighting "slaves" can be seen as a rather sweeping
over-generalization (there are many counter-examples), it is nevertheless true
that many commentators have used Thermopylae to illustrate this point.
Militarily, although the battle was actually not decisive in the context of the
Persian invasion, Thermopylae is of some significance on the basis of the first
two days of fighting. The performance of the defenders is used as an example of
the advantages of training, equipment, and good use of terrain as force
multipliers.
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