CAVALRY
Col. Frederic Natusch Maude C.B.
Encyclopedia Britannica 11th ed. 1910,
vol. 5 pgs. 653-672
CAVALRY (Fr. cavalerie, Ger. Kavallerie or
Reiterei, derived ultimately from late Lat. caballus, horse), a
word which came into use in military literature about the middle of the 16th
century as applied to mounted men of all kinds employed for combatant purposes,
whether intended primarily for charging in masses, in small bodies, or for
dismounted fighting. By degrees, as greater refinement of terminology has
become desirable, the idea has been narrowed down until it includes only
"horsemen trained to achieve the purpose of their commander by the com
bined action of man and horse," and this definition will be found to cover
the whole field of cavalry activity, from the tasks entrusted to the cavalry
"corps" of 10,000 sabres down to the missions devolving on isolated
squadrons and even troops.
History.- The evolution of the cavalry arm has never been uniform at any
one time over the surface of the globe, but has always been locally modified by
the conditions of Earty each community and the stage of intellectual
develop- use of nient to which at any given moment each had attained. mounted
The. first condition for the existence of the arm warriors. being the existence
of the horse itself, its re~tive scarcity or the reverse and its adaptability
to its environment in each particular district have always exercised a
preponderating influence on the development of cavalry organization and
tactics. The indigenous horses of Europe and Asia being very small, the first
application of their capabilities for war purposes seems everywhere to have
been as, draught animals for chariots, the construction of which implies not
only the existence of level surfaces, perhaps of actual roads, but a very
considerable degree of mechanical skill in those who designed and employed
them. T'he whole of the classical and Oriental mythologies, together with the
earliest monuments of Egypt, Assyria and India, are convincing on this point.
Nowhere can we find a trace either of description or delineation of animals
physically capable of carrying on their backs the armed men of the period. All
the earliest allusions to the use of the horse in war either point directly to
the employment as a draught animal, or where not specific, as in the
description of the war-horse in Job, they would apply equally well to one
harnessed to a chariot as to one ridden under the saddle.
The first trace of change is to be found, according to Prof. Wm. Ridgeway
(Origin and Influence of the Thoroughbred Horse, p. 243), in an Egyptian
relief showing Nubians mounted on horses of an entirely different breed, taller
and more powerful than any which had gone before them. These horses appear to
have come from the vicinity of Dongola, and the strain still survives in the
Sudan. The breed is traced into Arabia, where only second~rate horses had been
reared hitherto, and thence to different parts of Europe, where eventually
centres of cavalry activity developed. The first detailed evidence of the
existence of organized bodies of mounted men is to be found in Xenophon, whose
instructions for the breaking, training and command of a squadron remain almost
as a model for modern practice. Their tactical employment, however seems still
to have been relatively insignificant, for the horses were still far too small
and too few to deliver a charge with sufficient momentum to break the heavy
armed and disciplined hoplites. The strain of ancient battle was of an entirely
different order to that of modern fighting. In the absence of projectiles of
sufficient range and power to sweep a whole area, the fighting was entirely
between the front ranks of 'the opposing forces. When a front rank fighter
fell, his place was immediately taken by his comrade in the rear, who took up
the individual combat, excited by his comrade's fate but relatively fresh in
mind and muscle. This process of feeding the fight from the rear could be
protracted almost indefinitely. If tben, as a consequence of a charge, a few
mounted men did penetrate the ranks, they encountered such a crowd of
well-protected and fresh swordsmen that they were soon pulled off their ponies
and despatched. Now and again great leaders, Alexander, Hannibal and Scipio
Africanus, for instance, succeeded in riding down their opponents', but in the
main, and as agiinst the Roman infantry in particular, mounted troops proved of
very little service on the battlefield.
It was, however, otherwise in the sphere of strategy. There, information was of
even greater importance, because harder to obtain, than it is nowadays, and the
army which could push out its feelers to the greater distance, surround its
enemy and intercept his communications, derived nearly the same advantages as
it does at present. Hence both sides provided them selves with horsemen, and
when these met, each in the performance of their several duties, charges of
masses naturally ensued. This explains the value attaching in the old days to
the possession of horse-flesh and the rapid spread of the relatively new
Dongola or African strain over the then known world.
The primitive instinct of aboriginal man is to throw stones or other missiles
for purposes of defence (apes will throw anything they can find, but they never
use sticks); hence, as the Romans penetrated ever farther amongst the barbarian
tribes, their horsemen in first line found ever-increasing need for protection
against projectiles. But the greater the weight of armour carried, the greater
the demands upon the endurance of the horse. Then, as the weight-carrying breed
was expensive and, with the decay of the Roman Empire, corruption and
peculation spread, a limit was soon placed on the multiplication of charging
cavalry, and it became necessary to fall back on the indigenous pony, which
could only carry a rider from place to place, not charge. Thus there was a
gradual levelling down of the mounted arms, the heavy cavalry becoming too
heavy to gallop and the light not good enough for united action. Against such
opponents, the lighter and better mounted tribesmen of Asia found their task
easy. They cut off the supplies of the marching infantry, filled up or
destroyed the wells, &c., and thus demonstrated the strategic necessity of
superior mobility.
With the decay of civilization discipline also disappeared, and, as discipline
consists essentially in the spirit of self-sacrifice for the good of the
community, its opposite, self-preservation, became the guiding principle. This
in turn led to the increase of armour carried, and thence to the demand for
heavier horses, and this demand working through several centuries led ulti
mately to the breeding of the great weight-carrying animals on whose existence
that of medieval, chivalry depended. These horses, however, being very costly
and practically useless for general purposes, could only become the property of
the wealthy, who were too independent to feel the need of combination, and
preferred to live on the spoliation and taxation of the weak. This spoliation
eventually impelled the weaker men to combine, and at first their combination
took the form of the construction of fortified places, against which mounted
men were powerless. On the other hand, expense put a limit to the area which
fortifications could enclose, and this again limited the supplies for the
garrison. Horsemen sweeping the country for miles around had no difficulty in
feeding themselves, and the surrender of all beleaguered places through
starvation was ultimately inevitable, unless food could be introduced from
allied towns in the vicinity. It was of no use to introduce fighting men only
into a place which primarily required food (cf. Lucknow, 1857) to protract its
resistance. Hence some means had to be found to surround the supply-convoys
with a physically impenetrable shield, and eighteen-foot pikes in the hands of
powerful disciplined soldiers met the requirements. Against eight to ten ranks
of such men the best cavalry in the world, relying only on their swords, were
helpless, and for the time (towards the close of the 15th century) infantry
remained masters of the field on the continent of Europe.
England meanwhile had developed on lines of her own. Thanks to her longbowmen
and the military genius of her leaders, she might have retained indefinitely
the command of the continent had it not been for the invention of gunpowder,
which, though readily accepted by the English for sieges in France, proved the
ultimate cause of their undoing. It was the French who developed the use of
siege artillery most rapidly, and their cavalry were not slow to take the hint;
unlike the longbow and the crossbow, the pistol could be used effectively from
horseback, and presently the knights and their retainers, having the deepest
purses, provided themselves with long pistols in addition to their lances and
swords. These weapons sent a bullet through any armour which a foot-soldier
could conveniently carry, or his commander afford, and if anything went wrong
with their mechanism (which was complicated and uncertain) the speed of his
horse soon carried the rider out of danger. A new form of attack against
infantry, introduced by the French at Cerisoles, 1544, thus developed itself. A
troop or squadron, formed in from twelve to sixteen ranks, trotted up to within
pistol shot of the angle of the square to be attacked and halted; then each
rank in succession cantered off man by man to the left, discharging his pistol
at the square as he passed, and riding back to his place behind the column to
reload. This could be prolonged indefinitely, and against such tactics the
infantry were powerless. The stakes carried by English archers to check the
direct charge of horse men became useless, as did also cheiaux de frise,
though the latter (which originated in the 14th century) continued to be
employed by the Austrians against the swiftly-charging Turks till the close of
the 17th century. Thus it became necessary to devise some new impediment which,
whilst remaining mobile, would also give cover and an advantage in the final
hand-to hand shock. The problem was solved in Bohemia, Poland and Moravia
(Hussite wars, about 1420), where, distances being great and the country open,
greater mobility and capacity in the convoys 'became essential. Great trains of
wagons were placed in charge of an infantry escort, of which a part had become
possessed of firearms, and these moved across country in as many as twelve
parallel lines drilled to form laagers, as nowadays in South Africa.
Again the cavalry proved helpless, and for nearly a century in central Europe
the word " Wagenburg" (wagon-fortress) became synonymous with
"army." Then an unfortunate inspiration came to the wagon-men. A
large gun was relatively cheaper to manufacture, and more effective than a
small one. To keep their assailants at a distance, they mounted wall-pieces of
about one-inch bore on their wagons. For a moment the balance inclined in their
favour, but the cavalry were qnick to see their advantage in this new idea, and
they immediately followed suit. They, too, mounted guns on wheels, and, as
their mobility gave them choice of position, they were able to concentrate
their fire against any side of the laager, and again ultimate surrender was the
only way out of the defenders' dilemma.
The interesting problem thus raised was never finally solved, for the scene of
action now shifted to western Europe, to the valley of the Po, and more
particularly to the Netherlands, where fortresses were closer together and the
clayey nature of the Rhine delta had already made paved roads necessary. Then,
the Wagenlurg being no longer needed for the short transits between one
fortified town and another, the infantry reasserted themselves. Firearms having
been much improved in the interval the spearmen (pikemen) had already (about
1515) learnt to protect themselves by musketeers trained to take advantage of
cover and ground somewhat in the same fashion as the modern skirmisher. These
musketeers kept light guns at a distance from their pikemen, but dared not
venture far out, as their fire was altogether inadequate to stop a rush of
horsemen; when the latter threatened to intervene, they had to run for safety
to the squares of pikemen, whom they assisted in turn by keeping the cavalry
beyond pistol range. Hence the horsemen had to fall back upon more powerful
guns, and these, being slow and requinng more train, could be most economically
protected by infantry (see also ARTILLERY). Thus about the close of the 16th
century western armies differentiated themselves out into the still existing
three types- cavalry, artillery and infantry. Moreover, each type was
subdivided, the cavalry becoming heavy, medium and dragoons. At this period
there was nothing to disturb the equilibrium of two contending forces except
the characters of their respective leaders. The mercenary element had triumphed
everywhere over the feudal levies. The moral qualities of all were on the same
indifferent level, and battles in the open followed one recognized course.
Neither army being able to outmarch the other, both drew up masses of pikes in
parallel lines. The musketeers covered the deployment of the heavy guns on
either side, the cavalry drew up on the wings and a strictly parallel fight
ensued, for in the absence of a common cause for which men were willing to die,
plunder was the ruling motive, and all control and discipline melted in the
excitement of the contest.
It is to the growth of Protestantism that cavalry owes its next great forward
leap. To sweep the battlefield, it was absolutely essential that men should be
ready to subordinate selfish con siderations to the triumph of their cause. The
Roman Catholicism of the day gave many loopholes for the evasion of clear duty,
but from these the reformed faith was free, and it is to the reawakened sense
of duty that Gustavus Adoiphus appealed. This alone rendered combination
amongst his subordinate leaders possible, and on this power of combination all
his victories depended. Other cavalry soldiers, once let loose in the charge,
could never be trusted to return to the field, the prospective plunder of the
enemy's baggage being too strong a temptation; but the king's men could be
depended on, and once brought back in formed bodies, they rode over the enemy's
skirmishers and captured his batteries. Then the equilibrium of force was
destroyed, and all arms combined made short work of the. opposing infantry
alone (Breitenfeld, 1631). But the Swedish king perished with his work half
done, and matters reverted to their former condition until the appearance of
Cromwell, another great leader capable of animating his men with the spirit of
devotion, again rendered the cavalry arm supreme. The essence of his success
lay in this, that his men were ready everywhere and always to lay down their
lives for their common cause. Whether scouting 70 m. to the front of their
army, or fighting dismounted to delay the enemy at defiles or to storm
fortified strongholds, or charging home on the battlefield, their will power,
focused on, and in turn dependent on, the personality of their great leader,
dominated all human instincts of fear, rapacity or selfishness. It is true that
they had not to ride against the modern rifle, but it is equally true that
there was no quick-firing artillery to carry terror through the enemy's army,
and it was against masses of spearmen and musketeers, not then subjected to
bursting shells or the lash of shrapnel and rifle bullets, that the final
charges had always to be ridden home.
Each succeeding decade thereafter has seen a steady diminu tion in the ultimate
power of resistance of the infantry, and a corresponding increase in the power
of fire preparation at the disposal of the supreme leader; and the chances of
cavalry have fluctuated with the genius of that leader in the employment of the
means at his disposal, and the topographical conditions existing within each
theatre of war. During the campaigns in Flanders, with its multiplicity of
fortresses and clayey Soil, cavalry rapidly degenerated into mounted infantry,
throwing aside sword and lance-proof armour, and ad, opting long muskets and
heavier ammunition. Presently they abandoned the charge at a gallop and
reverted to an approach at the trot, and if (as at Blenheim) their influence
proved decisive on the field of battle, this was because' the conditions were
common to both combatants, and the personal influence of " Corporal
John," as his soldiers called Marlborough, ensured greater steadiness and
better co-operation.
When Frederick II. became king of Prussia (1740), he found his cavalry almost
at the nadir of efficiency; even his cuirassiers drilled principally on foot.
"They can manoeuvre," on foot, " with the same precision as my
grenadiers, but unfortunately they are equally slow." His enemies the
Austrians, thanks to their wars against the Turks who always charged at a
gallop, had maintained greater dash and mobility, and at Mollwitz the Prussians
only escaped disaster by the astounding rapidity of their infantry fire. In
disgust the king then wrote, " Die Cavallerie is nicht emmal werth dasz
sie der Teufel weck holet," and he immediately set about their reform with
his usual energy and thoroughness. Three years after Moliwitz, the result of
his exertions was apparent in the greatly increased importance the arm acquired
on the battlefield, and the charge of the Bayreuth dragoons at Hohenfriedberg
(June 4, 1745)' who with 1500 horses rode over and dispersed 20 Austrian
battalions, bringing in 2500 prisoners and 67 colours, will always rank as one
of the most brilliant feats in military history.1 The following
years of peace (1745-1756) were devoted to the methodical preparation of the
cavalry to meet the requirements that Frederick's methods of war would make
upon them, and it is to this period that the student should devote special
attention. From the very outbreak of the Seven Years' War (1756) this training
asserted its influence, and Rossbach (1757) and Zorndorf (1758) are the
principal examples of what cavalry handled in masses can effect. At Rossbach
General v. Seydlitz, at the head of 38 squadrons, practically began and ended
the destruction of the French army, and at Zorndorf he saved the day for the
Prussians by a series of the most brilliant charges, which successively
destroyed the Russian right wing and centre. These battles so conclusively
demon strated the superiority of the Prussian cavalry that their enemies
completely altered their tactical procedure. They now utilized their enormous
numerical superiority by working in two separate armies, each almost as strong
as the whole Prussian force. When the latter moved against either, the one
threatened immediately threw up heavy entrenchments, against which cavalry
were, of course, ineffective, whilst the other pursued its march. When
Frederick, having more or less beaten his immediate opponent, ~ The 'loss 'of
the regiment was twenty-eight killed and sixty-six wounded. began to threaten
the other army it entrenched likewise. Against these methods the Prussian army
soon wore itself out, and though from time to time the cavalry locally
distinguished itself, no further opportunities for great decisive blows
presented them selves.
The increased demands made upon the mobility of the Prussian horsemen naturally
resulted in the gradual rejection of everything which was not essential to
their striking power. The long muskets and bayonets were laid aside, but the
cuirass was retained for the mele, and by the close of the great struggle the
various branches of the arm had differentiated themselves out into the types
still adhered to, heavy cavalry, dragoons, hussars, whose equip ment as regards
essentials thenceforward hardly varied up to the latter years of the 19th
century. The only striking difference lies in the entire rejection of the lance
in the armament of the charging squadrons, and the reason is characteristic of
the principles of the day. The Prussian cavalry had realized that success was
decided, not primarily by actual collision, but by the moral effect of the
appearance of an absolutely closed wall of horse- men approaching the adversary
at full speed. If the necessary degree of cohesion was attained, the other side
was morally beaten before collision took place, and either turned to flight, or
met the shock with so little resolution that it was ridden over without
difficulty. In the former case any weapon was good enough to kill a flying
enemy; in the latter, in the melee whlch then ensued, the crush in the ranks of
the victors was still so great that the lance was a hindrance rather than a
help.
In the years succeeding the war the efficiency of the Prussian cavalry sank
very rapidly, the initial cause being the death of Seydlitz at the early age of
fifty-two. His personality had alone dominated the discontent, lethargy and
hopelessness created by ruthless financial economies. When he was gone, as
always in the absence of a great leader, men adapted their lives to the line of
least resistance. In thirty years the wreck was complete and within the
splendid squadrons which had been accustomed to manoeuvre with perfect
precision at the highest speed, there were (as F. A. von der Marwitz in his
Nachiass clearly shows) not more than seven thoroughly trained men and
horses to each, the remainder being trained for little longer and receiving
less attention than is the case with modern 2nd line or auxiliary cavalry.
For the generation preceding the outbreak of the French Revolution, Frederick
the Great's army, and especially his cavalry, had become the model for all
Europe, but ixi the the mainspring of the excellence of his squadrons
revolution was everywhere overlooked. Seydlitz had manoeuvred great masses of
horsemen, therefore every one else must have great masses also; but no nation
grasped the secret, viz. the unconditional obedience of the horse to its rider,
on which his success had depended. Neither was it possible under the prevailing
social conditions to secure the old stamp of horse, or the former attention to
detail on the part of men and officers. In France, owing to the agricultural
decay of the country, suitable remounts for charging cavalry were almost
unobtainable, and as this particular branch of the arm was almost exclusively
commanded by the aristocracy it suffered most in the early days of the
Revolution The hussars, being chiefly recruited and officered by Alsatians and
Germans from the Rhine provinces, retained their individuality and traditions
much longer than the dragoons and cuirassiers, and, to the very close of the
great wars, we find them always ready to charge at a gallop; but the
unsteadiness and poor horsemanship of the other branches was so great that up
to 1812, the year of their destruction, they always charged at a trot only,
considering that the advantage of superior cohesion thus gained more than
balanced the loss of momentum due to the slower pace.
Generally, the growth of the French cavalry service followed the universal law.
The best big horses went to the heavy charging cavalry, viz. the cuirassiers,
the best light horses to the hussars, and the dragoons received the remainder,
for in principle they were only infantry placed on horseback for convenience of
locomotion, and were not primarily intended for combined mounted action.
Fortunately for them, their principal adversaries, the Austrians, had
altogether failed to grasp the lesson of the Seven Years' War. Writing in 1780
Colonel Mack, a very capable officer, said, " Even in 1769, the cavalry
could not ride, could not manage to control their horses. Not a single squadron
could keep its dressing at a gallop, and before they had gone fifty yards at
least ten out of forty horses in the first rank would break out to the
front," and though the veteran field marshal Lacy issued new regulations,
their spirit seems always to have escaped the executive officers. The British
cavalry was almost worse off, for economy had reduced its squadrons to mere
skeletons, and the traditional British style of horsemanship, radically
different from that in vogue in France made their training for combined action
even more difficult thctn elsewhere. Hence the history of cavalry during the
earlier campaigns of the Revolution is marked by no decisive triumphs, the
results are always in adequate when judged by the magnitude of the forces
employed, and only the brilliant exploit of the 15th Light Dragoons (now
Hussars) at Villers en Couche (April 24, 1794) deserves to he cited as an
instance of the extraordinary influence which even a few horsemen can exercise
over a demoralized or untrained mob of infantry.
Up to the campaign of Poland (see NAPOLEONIC CAMPAIGNS) French victories
were won chiefly by the brilliant infantry fighting, cavalry only intervening
(as at Jena) to charge a beaten enemy and complete his destruction by pursuit.
But after the terrible waste of life in the winter of 1806-7, and the appailing
losses in battle1 Napoleon introduced a new form of attack. The
case-shot preparation of his artillery (see ARTILLERY) sowed cohfusion and
terror in the enemy's ranks, and the opportunity was used by masses of cavalry.
Henceforward this method dominated the Napoleonic tactics and strategy. The
essential difference between this system and the Frederician lies in this, that
with the artillery available in the former period it was not possible to say in
advance at what point the intervention of cavalry would be necessary, hence the
need for speed and precision of manoeuvre to ensure their arrival at the right
time and place. Napoleon now selected beforehand the point he meant to
overwhelm and could bring his cavalry masses within striking distance at
leisure. Once placed, it was only necessary to induce them to run away in the
required direction to overwhelm everything by sheer weight of men and horses.
This method failed at Waterloo because the ground was too heavy; the slope of
it against the charge, and the whole condition of the horses too low for the
exertion demanded of them.
The British cavalry from 1793 to 1815 suffered from the same causes which at
the beginning of the 20th century brought about its breakdown in the South
African War. Oversea transport brought the horses to land in poor condition,
and it was rarely possible to afford them sufficient time to recover and become
accustomed to the change in forage, the conditions of the particular theatre of
operations, &c., before they had to be led against the enemy-hence a -
heavy casualty roll and the introduction into the ranks of raw unbroken horses
which interfered with the precision of manoeuvre of the remainder. Their losses
(about 13% per annum) were small as compared with those of South Africa, but
this is mainly accounted for by the fact that, operations being generally in
the northern hemisphere, the change of climate was never so severe. Tactically,
they suffered, like the Austrians and Piussians, from the absence of any
conception of the Napoleonic strategy amongst their principal leaders. As it
was not known where the great blow was to fall, they were distributed along the
whole line, and thus became habituated to the idea of operating in relatively
small bodies. This is the worst school for the cavalry soldier, because it is
only when working in masses of forty to sixty squadrons that the cumulative
consequences of small errors of detail become so apparent as to convince all
ranks of the necessity of conforming accurately to established prescriptions.
Nevertheless, they still retained the practice of charging at a gallop, and as
a whole were by far the most efficient body of horsemen who survived at the
close of the great wars.
In the reaction that then ensued all over Europe, cavalry practically ceased to
exist. The financial and agricultural exhaustion of all countries, and of
Prussia in particular, was so complete that money was nowhere to be found for
the great concentrations and manoeuvre practices which are more essential to
the efficiency of the cavalry than to that of the other arms. Hence a whole
generation of officers grew up in ignorance of the fundamental principles which
govern the employment of their arm. It was not till 1848 that the Prussians
began again to unite whole cavalry divisions for drill and manoeuvre, and the
soldiers of the older generation had not yet passed away when the campaigns of
1866 and 1870 brought up again the realities of the battle-field. Meanwhile the
introduction of long-range artillery and small arms had entirely destroyed the
tactical relation of the three arms on which the Napoleonic tactics and
strategy had been based, and the idea gained ground that the battle-field would
no longer afford the same opportunities to cavalry as before. The experiences
gained by the Americans in the Civil War helped to confirm this preconception.
If in battles waged between in fantries armed only with muzzle loading rifles,
cavalry could find no opportunity to repeat past exploits, it was argued that
its chances could not fail to be still further reduced by the breech- loader.
But this reasoning ignored the principal factors of former successes. The
mounted men in America failed not as a consequence of the armament they
encountered, but because the war brought out no Napoleon to create by his skill
the opportunity for decisive cavalry action, and to mass his men beforehand in
confident anticipation. The same reasoning applies to the European campaigns of
1866 and 1870, and the results obtained by the arm were so small, in proportion
to the numbers of squad rons available and to their cost of maintenance as
compared with the other arms, that a strong reaction set in everywhere against
the existing institutions, and the re-creation of the dragoon, under the new
name of mounted rifleman, was advocated in the hope of obtaining a cheap and
efficient substitute for the cavalryman. Later events in South Africa and in
Manchuria again brought this question prominently to the front, but the
essential difference between the old and new schools of thought has not been
generally realized. The " mounted rifle" adherents base their argu
ments on the greatly increased efficiency of the rifle itself. The "
cavalry "school, on the other hand, maintains that, the weapons themselves
being everywhere substantially equal in efficiency, the advantage rests with
the side which can create the most favourable conditions for their employment,
and that, fundamentally, superior mobility will always confer upon its
possessor the choice of the circumstances under which he wilL elect to engage.
Where the two sides are nearly equally matched in mobility, neither side can
afford the time to dismount, for the other will utilize that time to manoeuvre
into a position which gives him a relative superiority for whichever form of
attack he may elect to adopt, and this relative superiority will always more
than suffice to eliminate any advantage in accuracy of fire that his opponent
may have obtained by devoting his principal attention to training his men to
the range instead of on the mounted manoeuvre ground.
Finally, the " cavalry" school reasons that in no single campaign
since Napoleon's time have the conditions governing encounters been normal.
Either the roadless and barren nature of the country has precluded of itself
the rapid marching which forms the basis of all modern strategy, as in America,
Turkey, South Africa and Manchuria, or the relative power of the infantry and
artillery weapons, as in Bohemia (1866) and in France (1870), has rendered
wholly impossible the creation of the great tactical opportunity characteristic
of Napoleon's later method, for there then existed no means of overwhelming the
enemy with a sufficient hail of projectiles to render the penetration of the
cavalry feasible. The latest improvement in artillery, viz. the perfected
shrapnel and the quick-firing guns, have, however, enormously facilitated the
attainment of this primary fire superiority, and, moreover, it has simplified
the procedure to such a degree that Napoleon is no longer needed to direct. The
battles of the future will thus, in civilized countries, revert to the
Napoleonic type, and the side which possesses the most highly trained and
mobile force of cavalry will enjoy a greater relative superiority over its
adversary than at any period since the days of Frederick.
The whole experience of the past thus goes to show that no nation in peace has
ever yet succeeded in maintaining a highly trained cavalry sufficiently
numerous to meet all the demands of a great war. Hence at the outbreak of
hostilities there has always been a demand for some kind of supplementary force
which can relieve the regular squadrons of those duties of observation and
exploration which wear down the horses most rapidly and thus render the
squadrons ineffective for their culminating duty on the battle-field. This
demand has been met by the enrolment of men willing to fight and rendered
mobile by mounts of an inferior description, and the greater the urgency the
greater has been the tendency to give them arms which they can quickly learn to
use. To make a man an expert swordsman or lancer has always taken years, but he
can be taught to use a musket or rifle sufficiently for his immediate purpose
in a very short time. Hence, to begin with, arms of this description have
invariably been issued to him. But once these bodies have been formed, and they
have come into collision with trained cavalry, the advantages of mobility;
combined with the power of shock, have become so apparent to all, that
insensibly the "dragoon" has developed into the cavalry soldier; the
rate of this evolution being conditioned by the nature of the country in which
the fighting took place.
This evolution is best seen in the American Civil War. The men of the mounted
forces engaged had been trained to the use of the rifle from childhood, while
the vast majority had never seen a sword, hence the formation of "mounted
rifles "; and these " mounted rifles " developed precisely in
accordance with the nature of their surroundings. In districts of virgin
forests and marshland they remained "mounted rifles," in the open
prairie country of the west they became cavalry pure and simple, though for
want of time they never rivalled the precision of manoeuvre and endurance of
modern Prussian or Austrian horse. In South Africa the same sequence was
followed, and had the Boer War lasted longer it is certain that such Boer
leaders as de Wet and de la Rey would have reverted to cavalry tactics of shock
and cold steel at the earliest possible opportunity.
Therefore when we find, extending over a cycle of ages, the same causes
producing the same effects, the natural conclusion is that the evolution of the
cavalry arm is subject to a universal law which persists in spite of all
changes of armament.
Employment of Cavalry.- It is a fundamental axiom of all military
action that the officer commanding the cavalry of any force comprising the
three arms of the service is in the strictest sense an executive officer under
the officer commanding that particular force as a whole. The latter again is
himself responsible to the political power he represents. When intricate
political problems are at stake, it maybe, and generally is, quite
impracticable that any subordinate can share the secret knowledge of the power
to which he owes his allegiance.
The essence of the value of the cavalry soldier's services lies in this, that
the demand is never made upon him in its supremest form until the instinct of
the real commander realizes that the tinie has come. Whether it he to cover a
retreat, and by the loss of hundreds to save the lives of tens of thousands, or
to complete a victory with commensurate results in the opposite direction, the
obligation remains the same to stake the last man and horse in the attainment
of the immediate object in view, the defeat of the enemy. This at once places
the leader of cavalry in face of his principal problem. It is a matter of
experience that the broader the front on which he can deliver a charge, the
greater the chances of success. However strong the bonds of discipline may be,
the line is ultimately, and at a certain nervous tension, any a number of men
on horses, acting and reacting on one another in various ways. When therefore,
of two lines, moving to meet one another at speed, one sees itself overlapped
to either hand, the men in the line thus over lapped invariably and inevitably
tend to open outwards, so as at least to meet their enemy on an equal frontage.
Hence every cavalry commander tries to strike at-the flank of his enemy, and
the latter manoeuvres to meet him, and if both have equal mobility, local
collision must ensue on an equal and parallel front. Therefore both strive to
put every available man and horse in their first ]ine, and if men and horses
were invulnerable such a line would sweep over the ground like a scythe and
nothing could withstand it. Since, however, bullets kill at a distance, and
inequalities and unforeseen difficulties of the ground may throw hundreds of
horses and riders, a working compromise has to be found to meet eventualities,
and, other things being equal, victory inclines to the leader who best measures
the risks and uncertainties of his undertaking, and keeps in hand a sufficient
reserve to meet all chances.
Thus there has arisen a saying, which is sometimes regarded as axiomatic, that
in cavalry encounters the last used reserve always wins. The truth is really
that he who has best judged the situation and the men on both sides finds
himself in possession of the last reserve at the critical moment. The next
point is, how to ensure the presence of this reserve, and what is the critical
moment. The battle-field is the critical moment in each phase of every
campaign-not the mere' chance locality on which a combat takes place, but the
decisive arena on which the strategic consequences of all pre-existing
conditions of national cohesion, national organization and of civilization are
focussed. It is indeed the judgment-seat of nature, on which the right of the
race to survive in the struggle for existence is weighed and measured in the
most impartial scales.
Before, however, the final decision of the battle-field can be attained, a
whole series of subordinate decisions have to be fought out, success in each of
which conditions the result of the next series of encounters. Every commanding
officer of cavalry thus finds himself successively called on to win a victory
locally at any cost, and the question of economy of force does not concern him
at all. Hence the same fundamental rules apply to all cavalry combats, of
whatever magnitude, and condition the whole of cavalry tactics. Broadly
speaking, if two cavalries of approximately equal mobility manoeuvre against
each other in open country, neither side can afford the loss of time that
dismounting to fight on ,foot entails. Hence, assuming that at the outset of a
campaign each side aims at securing a decisive success, both seek out an open
plain and a mounted charge, sword in hand, for the decision. When the speed and
skill 'of the combatants are approximately equal, collision ensues'
simultaneously along parallel fronts, and the threat of the overlapping line is
the principal factor in the decision. The better the individual training of man
and horse the less will be the chances of unsteadi-ness or local failures in
execution, and the less the need of reserves; hence the force which feels
itself the most perfect in the individual efficiency of both man and horse (on
which therefore the whole ultimately depends) can afford to keep fewer men in
reserve and can thus increase the width of its first line for the direct
collision. Careful preparation in peace is therefore the first guarantee of
success in action. This means that cavalry, unlike infantry, cannot be expanded
by the absorption of reserve men and horses on the outbreak of hostilities, but
must be maintained at war strength in peace, ready to take the field at a
moment's notice, and this is actually the standard of readiness attained on the
continent of Europe at the present day.
Further, uniformity of speed is the essential condition for the execution of
closed charges, and this obviously cannot be assured if big men on little
horses and small men on big horses are indiscriminately mixed up in the same
units. Horses and men have therefore been sorted out everywhere into three
categories, light, nedium and heavy, and in periods when war was
practically chronic, suitable duties have been allotted to each. It is clear,
on purely mechanical grounds, that the greater the velocity of motion at the
moment of collision the greater will be the chances of success, and this
greater speed will be on the side of the bigger horses as a consequence of
their longer stride. On the other hand, these horses, by reason of their
greater weight, are used up much more rapidly than small ones. Hence, to ensure
the greater speed at the moment of contact, it is necessary to save them as
much as possible to keep them fresh for the shock only, and this has been the
practice of all great cavalry leaders all over the world, and has only been
departed from under special circumstances, as by the Germans in France in 1870,
when their cavalry practically rode everywhere unopposed.
Collisions, however, must be expected by every body of troops large or small;
hence each regiment~ultimately each squadron-endeavours to save its horses as
far as this is compatible with the attainment of the special object in view,
and this has led everywhere and always to a demand for some intermediate arm,
less expensive to raise and maintain than cavalry proper, and able to cover the
ground with sufficient rapidity and collect the information necessary to ensure
the proper direction of the cavalry commands. Originally this intermediate
force received the designation of dragoons; but since under pressure of
circumstances during long periods of war these invariably improved themselves
into cavalry and became permanent units in the army organization, fresh names
have had to be invented for them, of which Mounted Infantry and Mounted Rifles
are the latest, and every improvement in firearms has led to an increased dem,
and for their services.
It is now relatively easy to trace out the considerations which should govern
the employment of his cavalry by the officer commanding a force of the three
arms. Assuming for purposes of illustration an army numerically weak in
cavalry, what course will best ensure the presence of the greatest number of
sabres at the decisive point, i.e. on the battle-field? To push out
cavalry screens far to the front will be to court destruction, nor is the
information they obtain of much real service unless the means to act upon it at
once is at hand. This can only be supplied economically by the use of strong
advanced guards of infantry, and such supplementary security and information as
these may require will be best supplied by mounted infantry, the sacrifice of
whom will disturb least the fighting integrity of the whole army.
Imagine an army of 300,000 men advancing by five parallel roads on a front of
~o m., each column (60,000 men, 2 army corps) being covered by a strong advance
guard, coming in contact with a similarly constituted army moving in an
opposite direction. A series of engagements will ensue, in each of which the
object of the local commander will be to paralyse his opponent's will-power by
a most vigorous attack, so that his superior officer following him on the same
road will be free to act as he chooses. The front of the two armies will now be
defined by a line of combats localized- each about a comparatively small area,
and between them will be wide gaps which it will be the chief business of the
directing minds on either side to close by other troops as soon as possible.
Generally the call will be made upon the artillery for this purpose, since they
can cover the required distances far more rapidly than infantry. Now, as
artillery is powerless when limbered up and always very vulnerable on the
flanks of the long lines, a strong cavalry escort will have to be assigned to
them which, trotting forward to screen the march will either come in contact
with the enemy's cavalry advancing with a similar object, or themselves find an
opportunity to catch the enemy's guns at a disadvantage. These are
opportunities for the cavalry, and if necessary it must sacrifice itself to
turn them to the best account. The whole course of the battle depends on
success or failure in the early formation of great lines of guns, for
ultimately the victor in the artillery duel finds himself in command of the
necessary balance of guns which are needed to prepare the way for his final
decisive infantry attack. If this latter succeeds, then any mounted men who can
gallop and shoot will suffice for pursuit. If it fails, no cavalry, however
gallant, has any hope of definitely restoring the combat, for against
victorious infantry, cavalry, now as in the past, can but gain a little time.
This time may indeed be worth the price at which it can be bought, but it will
always be more economical to concentrate all efforts to prevent the emergency
arising. After the Franco-German War 'much was written about the possibility of
vast cavalry encounters to be fought far in advance of the main armies, for the
purpose of obtaining information, and ideas were freely mooted of wide-flung
raids traversing the enemy's communications, breaking up his depots, reserve
formations, &c. But riper consideration has relegated these suggestions to
the background, for it is now evident that such expeditions involve the
dissemination of force, not its concentra tion. Austria and France for example
would scarcely throw their numerically inferior cavalry against the Germans,
and nothing would suit them better than that the latter should huri their
squadrons against the frontier guards, advanced posts, and, generally, against
unbeaten infantry; nor indeed would the Germans stultify their whole strategic
teaching by weakening themselves for the decisive struggle. It follows
therefore that cavalry reconnaissance duties will be strictly local and
tactical, and that arrangements will be made for procuring strategical
information by wireless telegraphy, balloons, motor cars, bicycles, &c.,
and that on the whole that nation will be best served in war which has provided
in peace a nucleus of mounted infantry capable of rapid expansion to fill the
gap which history shows always to have existed between the infantry and the
cavalry. Such troops need not be organized in large bodies, for their mission
is to act by " slimness," not by violence. They must be the old
" verlorene ilaufe " (anglice, "forlorn hope") of
former days, men whose individual bravery and decision is of the highest order.
But they can never become a "decision- compelling arm," though by
their devotion they may well hope to obtain the grand opportunity for their
cavalry, and share with them in harvesting the fruits of victory.
The great cavalry encounters of forty to sixty squadrons on either side, which
it has been shown must arise from the necessity of screening or preventing the
formation of the all-important artillery lines, will take their form mainly
from the topographical conditions of the district, and since on a front of 60
to 100 m. these may vary indefinitely, cavalry must be trained, as indeed it
always has been, to fight either on foot or on horseback as occasion requires.
In either case, thoroughness of preparation in horsemanship (which, be it
observed, includes horsemastership) is the first essential, for in the end
victory will rest with the side which can put in the right place with the
greatest rapidity the greatest number of sabres or rifles. In the case of
rifles there is a greater margin of time available and an ~nitial failure is
not irremediable, but the underlying principle is the same in either case; and
since it is impossible to foretell exactly the conditions of the collision, all
alike, according to the class to which they belong, must be brought up to the
highest standard, for this alone guarantees the smooth and rhythmical motion
required for covering long distances with the least expenditure of physical and
nervous strength on the part both of horse and rider. As a consequence of
successes gained in these preliminary encounters, opportunities will
subsequently arise for the balance of fresh or rallied squadrons in hand to
ride home upon masses of infantry disorganized and demoralized by the combined
fire of infantry and artillery, and such opportunities are likely to be much
more numerous at the outbreak of future wars than they have been in the past,
because the enormous gain in range and rapidity of fire enables a far greater
weight of metal to be concentrated on any chosen area within a given time. It
cannot be too often reiterated that cavalry never has ridden over unshaken
infantry of average quality by reason of its momentum alone, but that every
successful cavalry charge has always owed its issue to a previously acquired
moral superiority which has prevented the infantry from making adequate use of
their means of defence. Nor will such charges entail greater losses than in the
past, for, great though the increase of range of modern infantry weapons has
been, the speed and endurance of cavalry has increased in a yet higher ratio;
whereas in Napoleon's days, with an extreme range for musketry of iooo yds.,
cavalry were expected only to trot 800 yds. and gallop for 200, nowadays with
an extreme infantry range of under 4000 yds., the cavalry are trained to trot
for 8000 yds. and gallop for 2000.
Neither the experiences in South Africa nor those in Manchuria seriously
influenced the views of the leading cavalry experts as above outlined, for the
conditions of both cases were entirely abnormal. No nation in western Europe
can afford to mount the whole of its able-bodied manhood, nor, with the
restricted area of its possessions, could repeat the Beer tactics with useful
effect; in Manchuria, the theatre of operation was so far roadless, and the
motives of both combatants so distinct from any con ceivable as a basis for
European strategy, that time was always available to construct entrenchments
and obstacles physically insuperable to mounted arms. In western Europe, with
its ex treme development of communications, such tactics are impractic able,
and under the system of compulsory service which is in force in all nations, an
early decision must be sought at any cost. This motive imposes a rapid-marching
campaign in the Napoleonic style, and in such warfare there is neither time nor
energy available for the erection of extemporised fortresses. Victory must
therefore fall to the side that can develop the greatest fire power in the
shortest time. The greatest factor of fire power is the long artillery lines,
and as cavalry is the one arm which by its mobility can hamper or prevent the
formation of such lines, on its success in this task all else must depend.
Hence both sides will concentrate every available horse and man for this
special purpose, and on the issue of the collisions this mutual concentra tion
must entail will hang the fate of the battle, and ultimately of the nation. But
the cavalry which will succeed in this task will be the one in which the spirit
of duty burns brightest, and the oath of allegiance, renewed daily on the cross
of the sword, is held in the highest esteem.
Organization.- The existing organization of cavalry throughout the
civilized world is an instance of the "survival of the fittest" in an
extreme form. The execution of the many manoeuvres with the speed and precision
which condition success is only possible by a force in which, as Frederick the
Great said, " every horse and trooper has been finished with the same care
that a watchmaker bestows upon each wheel of the watch mechanism."
Uniformity of excellence is in fact the keystone of success, and this is only
attainable where the mass is subdivided into groups, each of which requires
superintendence enough to absorb the whole energy of an average commander. Thus
it has been found by ages of experiment that an average officer, with the
assistance of certain subordinates to whom he delegates as much or as little
responsihility as he pleases, finds his time fully occupied by the care of
about one hundred and fifty men and horses, each individual of which he must
understand intimately, in character, physical strength and temper, for horse
and man must be matched with the utmost care and judgment if the best that each
is capable of is to be attained. The fundamental secret of the exceptional
efficiency attained by the Prussian cavalry lies in the fact that they were the
first to realize what the above implies. After the close of the Napoleonic Wars
they made their squadron commanders responsible, not only for the training of
the com batants of their unit, but also for the breaking in of remounts and the
elementary teaching of recruits as wefl, and in this manner they obtained an
intimate knowledge of their material which is almost unattainable by British
officers owing to the conditions entailed by foreign service and frequent
changes of garrisons.
Further, to obtain the maximum celerity of manoeuvre with the minimum exertion
of the horses, the squadron reqnires to be subdivided into smaller units,
generally known as troops, and experience has shown that with 128 sabres
in the ranks (the average strength on parade, after deducting sick and youhg
horses, and the N.C. officers required as troop guides, &c.) four troops
best satisfy all conditions; as, with this number, the squadron will, under all
circumstances of ground and surroundings, make any change of formation in less
time and with greater accuracy than with any other number of subdivisions. The
size of the unit next above the squadron, the regiment, is again fixed
by the number of subordinates that an average commander can control, and the
universal experience of all arms has settled this as not less than four and not
more than eight. Experiments with eight and even ten squadrons have been tried
both in Austria and Prussia, but only exceptional men have succeeded in
controlling such large bodies effectively, and in the end the normal has been
fixed at four or five squadrons in quarters, and three or four in the field. Of
these, the larger number is undoubtedly preferable, for, with the work of the
quartermaster and the adjutant to supervise, in addition, the regimental
eommander is economically applied to the best advantage. The essential point,
however, is that the officer commanding the regiment does not interfere in
details, but commands his four squadron commanders, his quartermaster, and his
adjutant, and holds them absolutely responsible for results.
There is no unity of practice in the constitution of larger units. Brigades
vary according to circumstances from two regiments to four, and the composition
of divisions fluctuates similarly. The custom in the German cavalry has been to
form brigades of two regiments and divisions of three brigades, but this
practice arose primarily from the system of recruiting and has no tactical
advantage. The territory assigned to each army corps provides men and horses
for two regiments of cairassiers or lancers (classed as heavy in Germany), two
of dragoons, and two of hussars, and since it is clearly essential to ensure
uniformity of speed and endurance within those units most likely to hav6 to
work together, it was impossible to mix the different classes. But the views
now current as to the tactical employment of cavalry contemplate the employment
not only of divisions but of whole cavalry corps, forty to sixty squadrons
strong, and these may be called on to fulfil the most various missions. The
farthest and swiftest reconnaissances are the province of light cavalry,
i.e. hussars, the most obstinate attack and defence of localities the
task of dragoons, and the decisive charges on the battle-field essentially the
duty of the heavy cavalry. It seems probable then that the brigade will become
the highest unit the composition of which is fixed in peace, and that divisions
and corps will be put together by brigades of uniform composition, and assigned
to the several sections of the theatre of war in which each is likely to find
the most suitable field for its special character. This was the case in the
Frederician and Napoleonic epochs, when efficiency and experience in the field
far outweighed considerations of administration and convenience in quarters.
Hitherto, horse artillery in Europe has always formed an integral portion of
the divisional organization, but the system has never worked well, and in view
of the technical evolution of artillery matetial is no longer considered
desirable. As it is always possible to assign one or more batteries to any
particular brigade whose line of march will bring it across vrnages, defiles,
&c. (where the suppoit of its fire will be essential), and on the
battle-field itself responsibility for the guns is likely to prove more of a
hindrance than a help to the cavalry commander, it is probable that horse
artillery will revert to the inspection of its own technical officers, and that
the sole tie which will be re tained between it and the cavalry will be in the
batteries being informed as to the cavalry units they are likely to serve with
in war, so that the officers may make themselves acquainted with the
idiosyncrasies of their future commanders. The same course will be pursued with
the engineers and technical troops required for the cavalry, but it seems
probable that, in accordance with a suggestion made by Moltke after the 1866
campaign, the supply columns for one or more cavalry corps will be held ready
in peace, and specially organized to attain the highest possible mobility which
modern technical progress can ensure.
The general causes which have led to the differentiation of cavalry into the
three types-hussars, dragoons and heavy- have already been dealt with.
Obviously big men on little horses cannot manoeuvre side by side with light men
on big horses. Also, since uniformity of excellence within the unit is the
prime condition of efficiency, and the greatest personal dexterity is required
for the management of sword or lance on horseback, a further sorting out became
necessary, and the best light weights were put on the best light horses and
called hussars, the best heavy weights on the best heavy horses and called
lancers, the average of either type becoming dragoons and cuirassiers. In
England, the lance not being indigenous and the conditions of foreign service
making adherence to a logical system impossible, lance?s are medium cavalry,
but the difference of weights carried and type of horses is too small to render
these distinctions of practical moment. In Germany, where every sultable horse
finds its place in the ranks and men have no right of individual selection, the
distinctions are still maintained, and there is a very marked difference
betWeen the weights carried and the types of men and horses in each branch,
though the dead weight which it is still considered necessary to carry in
cavalries likely to manoeuvre in large masses hardly varies with the weight of
the man or size of the horse.
Where small units ouly are required to march and scout, the kit can be reduced
to a minimum, everything superfluous for the moment being carried on hired
transport, as in South Africa: But when 10,000 horsemen have to move by a
single road all transport must be left miles to the rear, and greater mobility
for the whole is attained by carrying upon the horse itself the essentials for
a period of some weeks. Still, even allowing for this, it is impossible to
account for the extraordinary load that is still considered necessary. In
India, the British lancer, averaging 11 st. per man, could turn out in marching
order at 17 st. 8 lb (less forage nets). In Germany, the hussar, averaging 10
st. 6 lb, rode at 18 st., also without forage, and the cuirassier at 21 st. to
22 st. Cavalry equipment is, in fact, far too heavy, for in the interests of
the budgets of the departments which supply saddlery, harness, &c.,
everything is made so as to last for many years. Cavalry saddles fifty years
old frequently remain in good condition, but the losses in horse-flesh this
excessive solidity entails are ignored. The remount accounts are kept
separately, and few realize that in war it is cheaper to replace a horse than a
saddle. In any case, the armament alone of the cavalry soldier makes great
demands on the horses. His sword and scabbard weigh about 4 lb, carbine or
rifle 7 lb to 9 lb, 120 rounds of ammunition with pouches and belts about 12
lb, lance about 3 lb, and two days' forage and hay at the lowest 40 lb, or a
gross total of to l0 or 5 st., which with 11 st. for the man brings the total
to 16 st.; add to this the lightest possible saddle, bridle, cloak and blanket,
and 17 st. 8 lb is approximately the irreducible minimum. It may be imagined
what care and management of the horses is required to enable them under such
loads to manoeuvre in masses at a trot, and gallop for distances of 5 m. and
upwards without a moment for dismounting.
Reconndssance and Scouting.- After 1870 public opinion, misled by the
performances of the "ubiquitous Uhlan" and disappointed by the
absence of great cavalry charges on the field of battle, came somewhat hastily
to the conclusion that the day of "shock tactics" was past and the
future of cavalry lay in acting as the eyes and ears of the following armies.
But, as often happens, the fact was overlooked that the German cavalry screen
was entirely unopposed in its reconnoitring expeditions, and it was not till
long afterwards that it became apparent how very little these far-flung
reconnaissances had contributed to the total success.
It has been calculated by German cavalry experts that not I % of the reports
sent in by the scouts during the advance from the Saar to the Meuse, August
1870, were of appreciable importance to the headquarters, and that before the
orders based upon this evidence reached the front, events frequently
anticipated them. Generally the conviction has asserted itself, that it is
impossible to train the short-service soldiers of civilized nations
sufficiently to render their reports worth the trouble of collating, and if a
few cases of natural aptitude do exist nothing can ensure that these particular
men should be sufficiently well mounted to transmit their information with
sufficient celerity to be of importance. It is of little value to a commander
to know that the enemy was at a given spot forty-eight hours previously, uniess
the sender of the report has a sufficient force at his disposal to compel the
enemy to remain there; in other words, to attack and hold him. Cavalry and
horse artillery alone, however, cannot economically exert this holding power,
for, whatever their effect against worn-out men at the close of a great battle,
against fresh infantry they are relatively powerless. Hence, it is probable
that we shall see a revival of the strategic advanced guard of all arms, as in
the Napoleonic days, which will not only reconnoitre, but fix the enemy until
the army itself can execute the manoeuvre designed to effect his destruction.
The general situation of the enemy's masses will, in western Europe, 'always be
sufficiently fixed by the trend of his railway c6mmunications, checked by
reports of spies, newspapers, &c., for, with neutral frontiers everywhere
within a few hours' ride for a motor cyclist, anything approaching the secrecy
of the Japanese in Manchuria is quite unattainable, and, once the great masses
begin to move, the only "shadowing" which holds out any hope of
usefulness is that undertaken by very small selected;parties of officers, per
fectly mounted, daring riders, and accustomed to cover distances of 100 m. and
upwards. These will be supported by motor cars and advanced feelers from the
field telegraphs, though probably the motor car would carry the eye~witness to
his destination in less time than it would take to draft and signal a complete
report.
Tactical scouting, now as always, is invaluable for securing the safety of the
marching and sleeping troops, and brigade, divisional and corps commanders will
remain dependent upon their own squadrons for the solution of the immediate
tactical problem before them; but, since both sides will employ mounted men to
screen their operations, intelligence will generally only be won by fighting,
and the side which can locally develop a marked fire superiority will be the
more likely to obtain the information it requires. In this direction the
introduction of the motor car and of cyclists is likely to exercise a most
impo~rtant influence, but, whatever may be the conveyance, it must be looked
upon as a means of advance only, never of retreat. The troops thus conveyed
must be used to seize villages or defiles about which the cavalry and guns can
manoeuvre.
Illustration of tactical formations
Forma-tions and Drill.-Cavalry, when mounted, act exclusively by "
shock " or more precisely by " the threat of their shock," for
the immediate result of collision is actually decided some instants before this
collision takes place. Experience has shown that the best guarantee for success
in this shock is afforded by a two-deep line, the men riding knee to knee
within each squadron at least. Perfect cavalry can charge in larger bodies
without intervals between the squadrons, but, ordinarily, intervals of about 10
yds. between adjacent squadrons are ' kept to localize any partial unsteadiness
due to difficulties of ground, casualties, &c. The obvious drawbacks of a
two-deep line are that it halves the possible extent of front, and that if a
front-rank horse falls the rear-rank horse generally ' tumbles over it also. To
minimize the latter evil, the charge in two successive lines, 150 to 200 yds.
apart, has often been advocated, but this has never stood the test of serious
cavalry fighting; first, because when squadrons are galloping fast and always
striving to keep the touch to the centre, if a horse falls the adjacent horses
close in with such force that their sidelong collision may throw down more and
always creates violent oscillation; and secondly, be cause owing to the dust
raised by the first rank the following one can never maintain its true
direction. It is primarily to avoid the danger and difficulty arising from the
dust that the ranks in manoeuvre are closed to within one horse's length, as,
when moving at speed, the rear rank is past before the dust has time to rise.
Of all formations, the line is the most difficult to handle, and, particularly,
to conceal-hen'ce various formations in column are necessary for the
preliminary manoeuvres requisite to place the squadrons in'position for the
final deployment previous to the charge. Many forms of these columns' have been
tried, but, setting aside the columns intended exclusively for marching along
roads, of which " sections " (four men abreast) is most usual in
England, only these survive:- Squadron column. Double column of squadrons. Half
column.
In squadron column, the -troops of the squadron formed are in line one
behind the other at a distance equal to the front of the troop in line. The
ideal squadron consists of 128 men formed in two ranks giving 64 files, and
divided into four troops of 16 files a larger number of troops makes the drill
too complicated, a smaller number makes each troop slow and unhandy. When the
squadron is weak, therefore, the troop should still be maintaned as near 16
files as possible, the number of troops being if necessary reduced. Thus with
only 32 files, two troops of 16 files would be better than four of only 8
files.
All other formations of the regiment or brigade are funda mentally derived from
the squadron column, only varying with the order in which the squadrons are
grouped, and the intervals which separate them. Thus the regiment may move in
line squadron' columns at close interval, i.e. 11 paces apart or
in double column as in the diagram. To form line for the charge,
the squadrons open out, still in column, to full interval, i.'e. the
width they occupy when in line; and then on the command " Line to-the
front," each troop moves up to its place in line as shown in the diagram.
When in line a large body of cavalry can no longer vary its direction without
sacrificing its appearance of order, and as above pointed out, it is this
appearance of order which really decides the result of the chaige before the
actual collision. Since, however, the' enemy's movements may compel a change,
an intermediate formation is provided, known as the half column." When
this formation is ordered, the troops within each squadron wheel half right or
left, and each squadron is then able to form into column or line to the front
as circumstances demand,'or the whole line can be formed into column of troops
by continuing the wheel and in this formation gallop out into' a fresh
direction, re-forming line, ,by a simple wheel in the shortest possible time.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.-G. H. Elliot, Cavalry Literature (1893); V. Bismarek,
Uses and Application of Cavalry, in War (1818, English translation by
Lieut.-Col. Beamish, 1855); G. T. Denison, A History of Cavalry (1877);
Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, -Letters on Cavalry and
Conversations on Cavalry (English translations, I 88o and 1892); Colonel
Mitchell, Considerations on Tactics (1854) and Thoughts on Tactics
and Organization (I 838); ~'E. Nolan, Cavalry, st' History and Tactics
(1855); Roemer, Cavalry, its History, Manag~ ment and Uses (New
York, 1863); Maitland, Notes on Cavalry (I 878); F. N. Maude, Cavalry
versas Infantry and Cavalry, its' Past and Future; C. von Schmidt,
Instructions for the ~ ment and Leading of Cavalry (English translation,
1881 ; V. du Vernois, The Cavalry Division (i 873); Maj.-Gen.
-Walker, The Organization and Tactics of the Cavalry Dmision (1876); C.
W. Bowdler Bell, Notes on the German Cavalry - Regulations of i886; F.
de Brack, Light Cavalry Out osts (English translation); Dwyer, Seats
and Saddles (1869); J. acob, Vie',5 and Opinions (I8~7);
F. Hoenig, Die Kavatlerie ats Schlachteenkorper (1884); Sir Evelyn Wood,
Achievements of Cavalry (189'3); H. T. SiborneWaterlo. Letters;
Deshnere and Sautai, La Cavaterie de 1740 h 17'89 (1806);
Warnery, Remarques sur Ia cavaterie (i 781); V. Canitz,~
Histoire des ex, plaits et des vicis'sit"des de 11 cavalerie prussienne
dan" tescampagnes de Frederic II (1849); Cherfils', Cavalerie en
cam pa gn' (1888), Service de sarete' strat~giqu' de Ia cavalerie (I
874); Bonie, Tactique francaise, cavaterie en campagne, cavalerie an combat
(1887-1888) Foucart, Cam pagne de Pologne, opirations de la cavalerie,
no'v. i8o6- jan. 1807 (1882), La Cavalerie pendant la cam pagne
de Prusse (1880); Do Gal liffet, Projet d'in"truction sur l'amploi
de Ia eavaterie en liaison avec les autres armes (188o), Rapport sur les
grandes maneuvres de cavalerie de 1879; Kaehier, DIe preussische
Reitergi 1806-1876 (Frencb translation, La Cavaterie prussienne de i8o6
h); Cavalry Studies (translated from the French of Bonie and the German of
Kaehler, with a paper on U.S. cavalry in the Civil War) ; v.Bernhardi,
Cavalry in Future Wars (English translation, 1906); P.S., Cavalry
in tIe Wars of the Future (translated from the French J. Formby, 1905);
D.Haig,Cavalry Stuties (I 907); V. Pelet Narbonne, Die
Kavalleriedienst (1901),Cavalry on Service (English translation, 1906);
Ersiehung 'md Fuhrung von Kavallerie. The principal cavalry periodicals
are the Revue de cavaterie, the Kavalleristische Monatshefte
(Austrian), the Cavalry Journal (British), and the Journal
oftheu.& Cavalry Association. (F. N.M.)
