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THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT

James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock

Sub-title: Logical Foundations ofConstitutional Demoracy - Univ of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1962, 361 pgs., notes, paperback

 
 

Reviewer comment:

 
 

Preface:

 
 

Chapter 1 - Introduction:

 
 

Chapter 2 - The Individualistic Postulate

 
 

Chapter 3 - Politics and the Economic Nexus

 
 

Chapter 4 - Individual Rationality in Social Choice

 
 

Chapter 5 - The Organization of Human Activity

 
 

Chapter 6 - A Generalized Economic Theory of Constitutions

 
 

Chapter 7 - The Rule of Unanimity

 
 

Chapter 8 - The Costs of Decision-Making

 
 

Chapter 9 - The Structure of the Models

 
 

Chapter 10 - Simple Majority Voting

 
 

Chapter 11 - Simple Majority Voting and the Theory of Games

 
 

Chapter 12 - Majority Rule, Game Theory, and Pareto Optimality

 
 

Chapter 13 - Pareto Optimality, External Costs, and Income Redistribution

 
 

Chapter14 - The Range and Extent of Collective Action

 
 

Chapter 15 - Qualified Majority Voting Rules, Representation, and Interdependence of Constitutional Variables

 
 

Chapter 16 - The Bicameral Legislature

 
 

Chapter 17 - The Orthodox Model of Majority Rule

 
 

Chapter 18 - Democratic Ethics and Economic Efficiency

 
 

Chapter 19 - Pressure Groups, Special Inerests, and the Constitution

 
 

Chapter 20 - The Politics of the Good Society

 
 

Appendix I - The Marginal Noes on Reading Political Philosophy

 
 

Appendix 2 - Theoretical Forerunners

 
 

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