OSADA I VZYATIE VIBORGA 1710

VASIL'EV, M

Translation of extracts from Vasil'ev's book on the Siege and Seizure of Vyborg by Russian Army and fleet in 1710 by John Sloan

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1157 - Sweden and Novgorod at war

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1164 - Sweden siege of Novgorod & fort Ladoga

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1293 - Sweden captures Vyborg

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1294 - Novgorod seizes Vyborg

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1322 - Novgorod again takes Vyborg using 6 siege engines -
1323 - Novgorod built fort Oreshek on island in Neva River at Lake Ladoga - Peace treaty of Oreshek as basis for future relations

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Novgorod campaigns against Vyborg in 1337, 1339, 1350, 1411, 1423
- In 1425 Ivan III sent 60,000 troops against Vyborg for 3- month siege, but assault failed when Swedes blew up tower - constant border raids continued. - 1554 Swedes raided Novgorod region

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1555 - Russian siege of Vyborg and raid into Finland
- 1556 - War in Karelia and Russian raids - bloody battle near Vyborg - Ivan Sheremetev lead right wing that drove Swedes back and they retreated into Vyborg

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1557 -peace
- 1558 - Livonian War - Sweden entered and took Eastland and Revel
- 1590 - Russians attacked into Izhorski land and Narva and into Finland
- 1595 - Peace of Tyabzine, Russia received back Ivangorod, Yam, Kopor'e and Keksholm

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1615 - Gustav Adolf seized Pskov
- 1617 Peace of Stolbvda

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Quotation from Stalin on Russia's backwardness - Author tries to give historical necessity as a justification for war from Baltic to Black Sea. Russia's colonization toward west was due to unfavorable trade relations. - Peter's industrialization for war was to support the army

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Sweden had plans to seize Pskov, Novgorod and north of Russia's and wanted to control Russian trade and kept them backward.
So for Russians war with Sweden was progressive and just.

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Peter cleverly used the War of Spanish Succession to move against Sweden. He deprived Sweden of allies - but English fleet did help some.

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Peter had a good army and 42 ships-of-the-line, and 12 frigates and 13,000 sailors

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After his victory at Narva Charles XII mistakenly went after Augustus II instead of against Russia which was the main enemy.
While Charles was in Poland, Russians attacked the Neva River region

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Boris P. Sheremetev operated from Pskov and fought 2 battles with Swedish General Shleppinback - Dec. 1701 at Erestsfer and July 1702 at Humelsdof. He pushed the Swedes back. After long preparation, in summer 1702 Russian operations began at Neva River. Peter, and Apraksin reached the Neva at Tosna and entered battle with Swedes of General Kronhort. Apraksin drove on to the next Neva tributary at Izhore.
At the same time the Russians operated on Lake Ladoga and fell on the Swedish squadron of Vice-Admiral Numers near Keksholm. Good reconnaissance enabled a secret approach. Swedes lost 5 ships and 300 men. The Swedes retreated to Vyborg giving the Russian control of Lake Ladoga. In middle of September 1702 Russian forces were concentrated by the Nazi River to besiege Noteburg (Oreshek). Sheremetiv came from Pskov and joined Apraksin with 16,500 men. Peter came from Arkhanglesk with is two guards regiments.
On 12 October after a bloody assault, Noteburg fell and was renamed Shesselburg.
On 1 May 1703 the Russians took the next fort, Nienshants, and opened the Neva River route. Then they captured Yam and Kopor'ye. The Russians needed a new fort to guard the mouth of the Neva so founded on Zayarchi island the fort named Petropavlovski on 16 May 1703. This was also the founding of Petersburg. In fall of 1703 Peter inspected the Kotlin island and decided to build a fort there named Khronslot with a 44-gun battery opposite and on the island a 60-gun battery. This was the beginning of Khronshtat

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In August 1704 the Russians captured Narva after successful siege, plus Ivangorod and Dorpat
- In fall 1704 Swedes moved against Petersburg and Krohshlot.
- The armies were even in strength. Swedish general Maidel had 8,000 at Petersburg and the squadron of Admiral de Pru at Kronshlot of 1 ship, 5 frigates, 5 brigantines and 1 bandera.
-The Russians had 8,000 men army and 9 frigates, 4 yhats, 4 galleys and 24 half-galleys. In July and August the Swedish attacks failed.

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In summer 1705 the Swedes again attacked. The Swedish squadron had 7 ships, 6 frigates, 2 yahats, 2 bdifficultrmy to 13,000 men (9,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry) and their fleet had 12 frigates, 4 bandera, 7 galleys and other boats with 3,000 sailors - but no ships of the line. Their strength was increased by strong shore batteries.
In June 1705 the Swedes tried to make a landing on Kotlin Island but were thrown back by a unit of Col. Tolbukhin while loosing 400 killed, 170 wounded. General Maidel tried to cross over to the island but failed. The operations were a good school for the Russian forces.

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England assisted the Swedes - Ambassador Whitworth did espionage and sabotage against Russia.
After 1713 war operations increased.
In 1706 the International situation for Russia became difficult during the first campaign against Vyborg.
In fall of 1706 General Maidel's campaign to the rear of the Russian army was only recon, and did not change the picture. The situation in Izhorski land was mostly quiet as operations were on the western front..

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At Grodno the Russians escaped defeat thanks to Peter, who organized a retreat to Kiev. Charles' move into Saxony after Grodno gave the Russians a chance to move against Vyborg. Their purpose was to protect Petersburg.
- In August 1706 Russians began preparations. Troops were assembled and supplies created. On 4 October the 18,000 Russian siege corps left Petersburg to Vyborg.

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The Tsar went also. It required 7 days to reach Vyborg. During the first 5 days there was no opposition. On 10 October the advance guard hit the Swedish fort at a defile, Metbroiyia, There were 2 Swedish redoubts with 400 man garrisons and 2 cannon. The Russians took the redoubts and continued to Vyborg without further opposition.
On 11 Oct. the cavalry arrived and on the 12th the infantry arrived.
- Reconnaissance showed that only one land side was open to attack. The Russian force had no way to cross water. The fort had 3,000 Swedes under General Maidel. The General put the rest of his army outside the fort across the water.
- Peter realized the problem and evaluated the situation. The Fort could easily hold off an attack on one side. Peter only made bombardment for show and then returned to Petersburg on 28 October.

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To keep anyone from complaining of his failure, Peter organized the seizure of merchant ships. 45 grenadiers under Sgt. Mikhail Shchepatev with Preobrazhenski guards on 12 October in 5 boats went into Vyborg channel and hit 2 Swedish ships having 100 men and 4 cannon. The first boat was borded and captured. The second was alerted by the noise and escaped. But Mikhael Shchepatev was lost in the battle. All the survivors were promoted by Peter to be officers. Swedes lost 787 killed and 26 prisoners plus 4 cannon, 57 fusils and 53 swords.

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This campaign showed that the fleet would have to be used in a siege of Vyborg.
- 4th period of war 1707-09
- General Libeker replaced Maidel. Libeker was to capture Petersburg and had 13,000 men. Peter fortified Petersburg and reinforced both army and fleet. The Russians had 23,500 troops in the area including garrisons of forts. Fedor Matveyevich Apraksin was Commander in Chief of both army and navy and an excellent commander. He was experienced and able in naval and army tactics.
- 1707 was a quiet year. The Russian cavalry raided and there were some small expeditions to islands and a raid on the town of Borgo.
- 1708 General Libeker on 1 August moved to the border to capture Petersburg. There was heavy rain and poor roads and his huge pontoon convoy held him up. On 28 August he reched Koltush near Petersburg and then reached the Neva opposite the Tosno river. At the same time the Swedish fleet commanded by Admiral Ankershterna came to Kronshlot. Apraksin sent all the best dragoons and two infantrry battalions to take position at the Tosna River opposite the Swedes, and sent 8 galleys and 7 brigantinees under Admiral Botsis to prevent the Swedes from crossing, but these failed in their mission

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To conceal their crossing point the Swedes made a demonstration appearing on the upper Neva opposite the Mgi River far from Tosno and began to fortify a position. The Russians thought the Swedes were preparing to cross. Apraksin on 10 August moved troops to the Mgi River. On the same day 2,000 Swedish advance guard of General Hastfer crossed the Neva at Tosno and fortified a bridge head. Following him came the rest of the Swedish force which crossed without opposition, so Libeker had succeeded.
- The Swedes remained at the crossing point until the end of September 1708. Libeker did not want to attack with only 13,000 Swedish troops. He was traveling light and did not have supplies organized. He hoped to get the Russian supplies at Tosno, but there weren't any.
- So the Swedes were in a critical situation of hunger and sickness which hurt their discipline. The number of deserters increased.
- Libeker feared to try to cross back and try to move on a road the Russians had destroyed. He decided to move on the south bank to the Finnish Gulf and reboard ships.
- Apraksin went on the attack. He sent small units to break up the Swedish units. Libeker managed to get 6-7,000 men to the Gulf.
- Apraksin attacked his rear guard and destroyed it. The Swedes lost 4-5,000 men.
- In 1709 the war declined into recon. and raids.

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The plan for 1710 - Three Russian attacks on 3 fronts - Riga, Revel, and Vyborg. - Vyborg was the key strategic spot. The town had two parts, the old stone tower from the middle ages at the end of a peninsula and to the east of the old town a new town spread out but made of wood.
- The main fortification elements were the castle, stone walls around the old town and an earthen wall around the new town. Vyborg was well cited.
- The castle was located on a small island in the middle of a bay and consisted of a high stone tower - a 2-3 story living quarters - stone walls and casements 50 meters high. It was 700 years old and had a bridge across the gulf to the town.
- The fort had bastions and towers and curtain walls strengthened by simple military works. The main fort had the old town inside and went along the bank and had six bastions named: Gol'ts, Neuport, Zait, Klernplatform, Vasserport, Ellonora. The bastions were located on the gulf. Golts and Neuport were wood and the rest were stone.
- The new fort had 3 bastions; Valport, Pantserlaks, and Europe. The old and new towns were separated by stone wall with 4 towers. There were supplementary works in front of the curtain of the new wall.

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One was the ravelin, Klein, and the other was incomplete ravelin, KronIV. There were two caponiers and an earth redoubt. In front of wall on the lake side there was a water moat on the main east front between bastions Pantserlaks and Evrop. It had only a dry moat in front of the left face of bastion Pantserlaks there was no moat at all. Behind the counterscarp there was a covered way with stone redoubts and spaces. All the walls, scarp and counterscarp had a stone cover. The east front was the strongest on the land side. The water side has a simpler design but it still had flanking positions.
- Vyborg was the strongest Swedish fort in Finland and had withstood many sieges. It had a garrison of 6,000 troops under Colonel Sternstral, the commandant. It had 141 cannon, 8 mortars, 2 howitzers and a large supply. The Swedes expected the Russian attack and prepared their defense. But despite their experience they over valued their strength and under estimated the Russian strength. They mistakenly thought the Russians would only attack with land forces on the land side. and on the land side. The Swedes did not strengthen the other side.
- On 21 February 1710 Peter signed the order for campaign to Vyborg.

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The experience from the first campaign showed that the roads to Vyborg were very poor. A siege would be difficult to accomplish. It also showed that the Swedish fleet after a winter at Karestron would come to Vyborg in spring and stay there all summer near Berexov Islands guarding the sea approach. Peter wanted to use the army and fleet in combined operations. He wanted a long and constant siege with large engineer works on all sides and much artillery.
-The Russian plan provided for the the formation of a siege corps assembled secretly on Kotlin Island. He would move the corps to Vyborg over the ice. Then he would blockade Vyborg and construct engineer works and destroy the fortress walls by artillery fire. Then when the ice cleared the Baltic fleet would move to Vyborg to bring more supplies and more artillery. Only after all preparations were completed would an assault be attempted according to a careful plan. The Assault would be on two sides, - from the gulf side using prepared bridges and from the land. The galleys would support the assault on the water side. The plan required excellent work by all to be accomplished. Peter gave personal attention throughout the siege.
- The Tsar appointed General-Admiral Apraksin to command the siege corps and conduct the siege. His assistants were General Major Roman Bruce, General Major Berkholts, Brigadier Chernishev - they had led 7 infantry and 1 dragoon regiments at Poltava.

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The regiments at Vyborg:
- Life Guard Preobrazhenski, Life Guard Semenovski, 2nd Grenadier Regiment (later Life Guard Keksholm), Infantry regiments Azov, Arkhangelogorodski, Vladimir, Vyborg (former Andreisnaglis), Perm, Smolensk, Troitski, Galitsk, Yaroslavl, St. Petersburg, Shuvalov, Zheltukhin, Shnevents, Mikishin - dragoon regiments Narva, Lutsk, Vologda, separate grenadier battalion, two grenadier companies (Grekov, and Lutkovski), bombardier company, governor's squadron of Menshikov.
- On 11 March 1710 Apraksin reported to the Tsar on the preparation of the army at Kotlin. For transport they had 2609 wagons divided with 163 to each of the 16 regiments. They had 12 infantry regiments and 4 dragoon regiments
- The total number of 13,000 men, the Artillery park had 20 12 lb. cannon and 4 mortars. Considering the strength of Vyborg this was just an advance force and not enough artillery fora full siege. The purpose was to begin the siege before navigation opened. Then artillery would come by sea. They would build the engineer works in the meantime.

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On 15 March Peter inspected the force on Kotlin Island and on the 16th the army left for Vyborg. The route of march over the ice was difficult, but roads were worse. This route gave them the element of surprise advantage. They had avoided detection by Swedish units on the land side. On 21 March they reached Vyborg a distance of 150 versts over the ice.
- The Army reached the land beyond Vyborg and marched so as to cut the city off from Finland.

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On 21 March the advance guard under Brigadier Cherenishev reached the Vyborg suburb on the north west side, where the Swedes least expected them. On 22 March the remainder of the army arrived. There were two Swedish regiments in the Khietal suburb where the advance guard had moved. After a short battle the Swedes retired into the fort.

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In this minor engagement one Swedish corporal of dragoons, 5 soldiers, and one muisician were taken prisoner and 2 killed and 12 wounded.
- Meanwhile 10 ships were captured with 72 sailors. Apraksin made a reconnaissance and then distributed the forces. The plan followed Peter's idea of a two-sided attack with the bridge on one side and the other attack on the land side. Russian forces were deployed along the bay shore. He had Bruce in command of the works along the bay facing the castle -One series was on the tip of the point of the harbor -the other was opposite the castle. The works were built to cover the rear from a Swedish attack. He sent 6 regiments under General Verkholts to the land side. Apraksin sent a sketch of the siege plan to Peter. The plan allocated 4 days to prepare approaches. The Swedish prisoners revealed that General Libeker had left Vyborg for Stokholm only l8 days before. Stern Stras was in command. Peter immediately answered and told Apraksin he was close to the plan and could better know what to do, so Peter only sent advice, not and order.

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Apraksin decided on a gradual attack - that is Vauban style with formal trenches. This would need 2,000 men per bastion. Until the 13th century Russian sieges had been mostly blockades or open strorming assault with a coup de main - Only later were siege engines in use and in the 15th century artillery.

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The author writes the pre-revolutionary historians claim the Russians did not know engineering - that is before Peter. These included famous Caesar Cui and F. Lockovskii. He cites Caesar Cui - Kratkii istorireckii ocherk dolgo vremennou fortificatsii 2 vol St. Pete. 1897. and F. Lockovskii - Matgerial' dlya istorii inchenernogo iskusstva v Rossii, 2 vol St . Pete. 1861. But the author claims this is not true and cites the siege of Kazan in 1552 that shows otherwise in the use of engineer methods. The siege of Kazan involved use of parallel lines. The siege work was commanded by tallented engineer, Ivan Virodkov. The methods were widely used in the 16th and 17th centuries. The credit given to Vauban 100 years later is all wrong.
- At any rate Peter developed the siege art, especially rules for attack the selection of the front to attack, massive artillery use and the organization of assault.

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The first period of the siege was 22 March to 14 May. That is until the arrival of the fleet. It consisted of engineer work, construction of trenches and artillery positions on the bay side in which two sections were opened opposite the castle and on the end of the split of land. On the Petersburg side parallels and positions were built in two places: Along the shore of the lake opposite bastion Europa and along the shore of the bay opposite bastion Pantserlaks.
- The frozen ground and stone soil made the work of digging difficult. Where they could not dig down they built up earth works, all under heavy Swedish fire.
- From 21 March to 8 April the Swedes fired 3,033 cannon rounds and 265 mortar shells. "Visokii German" especially fired 30 sazhen from their engineer works. The Russian engineer work proceeded well. By 30 March the attackers had built several lines and set up 3 batteries one on the Petersburg side and two on the gulf side opposte the castle and on the spit.

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At the same time as engineer work continued the Dragoons and cossacks conducted recon of the area. It was found that a separate unit of Swedes was on the road to Vyborg. On 26 March news came of Swedish regiments on the way. To eliminate this, Apraksin sent Chernishev with 600 dragoons and two regiments of infantry. He encountered the enemy and took two corporals and 20 riters prisoner. The Swedish unit of Kivik was out in the area and sent troops to hit the roads to Petersburg on which mail traveled. On 2 April Apraksin sent against him a unit of skiers under Poruchkik of grenadiers, Naidinski. They fell on the mounted party of Swedes and took 30 prisoners and killed 17. They captured Kivik himself. On 24 April Lt. Col. Lutkovsksi came from the Tsar as a courier. He was a former commander of a grenadie regiment. After a few days he returned with Apraksin's answer. He had an escort of grenadiers and cossacks. Five versts from Vyborg they were attacked by Swedish cavalry.

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But the Russians made it through.
- Russian dragoons and cossacks won skirmishes while covering the rear of the siege force.
- The siege progressed slowly due to the lack of artillery. On 30 March they began the bombardment and intensified it on 2 April. On the first day day they fired 130 bombs at the town and castle and on the second day 90. Then they fired 65 a day for 10 days. From 30 March to 8 April they fired 961 bombs. The bombardment was successful. The castle was on fire and parts of its works and roof were destroyed. Some houses in the town were destroyed. Swedish soldiers had to man the walls day and night for fear of an attack.
- But the Swedes had a superiority in artillery. Apraksin had 20 12 pounders while the Swedes had 141 cannon. In 10 days the Russians fired 966 shots to the Swedes' 3,033.

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During the total period the Russians launched 2,975 mortar bombs and 1,531 cannon shots. The Swedes launched 399 bombs from mortars and 7,464 cannon shots.
- Apraksin wrote to the Tsar about the problem. He noted the enemy fires at a rate of 10 to one. He wrote on 2 April that the enemy had hit one cannon. He said he had only 10 cannon left in battery. He complained again on 8 April. - On 12 April the Swedes made a sortie on the land side and tried to break the siege, but were driven back -Details of this action are not known.
- Counter to Peter's plan of a gradual attack, soldiers in the army developed the idea of an open assault using ladders. Generals Brfuce and Berkholtz the French Engineer, Colonel de Lapatrier

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decided that the reasons for a storm were the ineffective artillery fire and losses the besiegers were sustaining from Swedish fire and the possibility of a Swedish relief by General Libeker. - Peter, who received the general's plan, was against an assault before the ice broke up and more forces could arrive. The garrison was still strong and the walls had not been destroyed. The Russians would lose men uselessly and would not have enough left to repeat an assault.
- "When the ice breaks", Peter wrote, "then fewer men will be needed in trenches all around as the enemy would not be able to cross the ice."
- But giving his opinion against assault, Peter did not forbid it. Again, Apraksin was on the scene, so he made the decisions.

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Apraksin agreed with Peter.
- Swedish deserters said conditions in the town were very bad. The numbers of dead were increasing.
- But the condition of the Russians was also bad. They had lost man from sickness as well as enemy fire. They lost 1,500 -2,000 men. By April not counting dragoons, they had 7,500 men left plus 2,500 dragoons (4 regiments) and 1,000 irregular cavalry. That is a total of 11-11,500 men. They had started with 13,000 men. There was also danger of famine. Supplies were brought to last a few weeks past the usual opening of navigation. But winter was unusually severe and the bay still was covered with ice throughout April. At the beginning of April Apraksin noticed the problem and wrote the Tsar about food and forage. There were practically no local supplies. At the end of April Apraksin wrote that only 10 days of supplies remained. Peter, well knowing the danger, had the Baltic Fleet read to go to the rescue.
- Since the first period of the siege was for preparation with the main aim a blockade this was achieved..

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The Russian fleet:
The Russians had no ships of the line while the Swedes had many. Butr the Russians were superior in their galley fleet. Their ship-building wharfs were on the Volkhov River and at Olonets and Syas'sk and the Luga River and at Petersburg. The workers on the docks were paid 12 rubles a year - for forced labor. For the ships, guns, sails, equipment were all made in state factories by forced labor. The ship crews at first were foreigners, but the foreigners did not play an independent role. They trained the Russians. The commanders were Ipat Mukhanov; Ermolai Skvartsov; Fedosei Sklyaev; Ivan and Narim Senyavin.

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The campaign to Vyvorg in 1710 was the first Naval Campaign of the Baltic Fleet. Peter decided to select a special unit of shnyab. He made 3 units containing ships, galleys and shnyab - The ships were 9 frigates, 2 bombadier, 20 armed transports. The frigates had 28-32 cannon. Bombardier ships had 12 cannon and 2 howitzers. There was a total of 250 cannon, 1,500 men and 40 officers. The unit of shnyab had 30 ships, 8 shhaf, 5 bronder, 2 tartan, 140 cannon and 600 men with 26 officers. The galley fleet had 177 ships, 5 galleys, 54 briganteens, 118 small vessels. On a brigantine were the guards regiments - Preobrazhenski and Semenovski. The galleys and brigantines had 150 cannon, 80 had mortars and 3,000 men. In total they had 250 ships. The ship unit was under Vice Admiral Cornelius Cruys who had been brought to Russia by Peter in 1697. He was formally in command of the entire fleet, during the campaign. The galleys commander was Counter Admiral Ivan Batsis, who came to the Russian service in 1702, after years of experience at Venice.

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Peter was a Rear Admiral and headed the shnyab unit. Peter's request to command that unit was sent by Cruys to Apraksin who approved it. he also had the Russian brigantines. The Italian brigantinees were under Batsis. Then, on 30 April all brigantines were sent to Batsis. There were many Russian officers in command of ships and units who had been on the Great Embassy in 1697-98. But there was not enough Russans, so Peter used foreign officers as well. The order of battle is shown on the general orders by Peter in 1717. - Cruys' unit was led by the Brander-Krokodil, then the frigates were the Mikhail Arkhangel, Nava, Olifant, New Bombarderski, Ivangord, then the brander Flam.

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The next group was the frigate Shesselburg, then transports and two flets, Velkom and Patriarkh - 3 shmak and others. The the frigate Dumkrat.
- The third group was the frigate Petersburg, frigate Kronshlot, and in between them various ships. Cruys had his flag on the frigate Olifant.
- The shnyab unit that Peter commanded had the brander, Eagel, and transports Rosa, Brander Bever. A second group had shnyab Anler, Degas, Feiks, Lizet, Munker, Saint Yakim, Ostatshikov, The third group had brander De Fam, 2 tartan, brander Derpt, and Triumf. Peter's flag was on the Lizet.
- The unit of Batsis, with his flag on the galley St. Nataliya, had 4 groups including 2 Russian brigantines, Italian brigantines, and galleys

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They started down the Neva on 25 April and in 4 days reached Kronshlot. They continued through dangerous ice. The tsar could get out of his ship and stand on ice. Peter used the ice problem to beat the Swedish ships to Vyborg. The galleys could maneuver better than sailing ships in the shallows. - From Kronshlot Peter sent two shnyaf to recon the islands - On 30 April the rest of the fleet set out to sea.

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It soon became clear that the Gulf of Finland was still closed by ice. Peter went ahead to see if there was a way. He decided to go along the south shore where the ice was open. On 2 May the fleet in a light north wind reached Krasni Gork. From there Peter wanted to cross to the north shore, but the way was blocked by ice. He had to stay over night on the south side

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He finally found a route and sent small freighters over, despite Cruys being worried.
- On 3 May Peter reached Kuroma, 6 miles from Berezovi Island. He put to anchor there. From there Peter sent a letter to Apraksin. He left the galleys and ships there and went back across the gulf to the south side.
- On 4 May he want to Petersburg and then on 5 May back to the fleet.
- On 5 May the sun cleared the ice from Krasni Gork.
- On 6 May the ice broke in Vyborg gulf and Peter moved his squadron to the north shore. On 6 May drift ice moved at the galleys which were in danger. During a conference on Cruys' ship, Peter advised to use the bog ships to break up the ice.

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The first try at that failed by using 3 shnyab. Then he ordered two new heavy ships to help. The frigate Dumkrat and bombardier galiot could force the ice. A few ships were wrecked in the ice but their cargos were saved.
- On 7 May the shnyab moved on to the islands were the rest of the galleys and ships were already anchored.
- On 8 May Peter reached Vyborg harbor with the supply ships The frigates remained at the islands.

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When the ships were at anchor, Apraxin came to Peter and reported on the siege. The men were eating horses already and had only 3-days of bread remaining.
- On 9 May the fleet left Trongzund and approached Vyborg. To protect against the danger of a Swedish sortie, Peter used military tricks. He put a Swedish flag and uniforms on the lead ship. The Swedish commandant believed help was coming and opened the gates and went out to meet them. But the ships passed the dangerous place close to the town and went to the Russian camp. The Swedes opened fire too late.
-The Swedes still hoped Libeker and Admiral Vatrang would come to help. But the arrival of the Russian fleet hurt the Swedish morale.

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On 10 -14 May the Russian troops disembarked along with the artillery and supplies. Peter studied the fortress and the siege units.
- On 14 May with the unloding completed, Peter started back with a good wind, leaving the galley fleet to help with the siege. The Swedes began firing at the departing ships, but fire from the Russians batteries silenced them The ships safely passed the fortress heights. At the islands they met Cruys and the frigates.
- On 16 May Peter with 2 shnyab was back at Petersburg. So the fleet successfully accomplished its mission. This was one of the bravest and best campaigns of the fleet. It showed high naval art of both Peter and the fleet and a good quality of the ships.
- On 16 May, while some Russian ships had not reached Kronshlot, the Swedish fleet appeared in the Gulf with 8 ships, 5 frigates and several smaller vessels, commanded by Admiral Ankershtern. Peter's fear of meeting the Swedish fleet was justified.

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But the Swedes were late. Their fleet could not help their garrison in Vyborg. The big ships could not get into the harbor and the Swedes did not have galleys. Peter ordered Apraksin to sink a few frigates full of rocks in the entrance shallows near Trongzund to block the Swedish ships out.
- During the siege, Swedish ships stayed at Berezov Islands to cut the Russian supply line to Kronshlot. Their ships continuously patrolled between Trongzund and Kotlin Island.
- Captain Daniel Cruz sent from Vyborg in a galiot convoy the three remaining provision ships but they unexpectedly fell into a Swedish squadron. He saved himself in shoals in a sloop but a galiot and ships with crews were captured. Cruz returned to Vyborg.
- Peter ordered Admiral Cruys to investigate the affair. Court was convinced but the result is unknown.

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The second part of the siege: |
The attackers received the two guard regiments by land in M y from Petersburg and 4 infantry regiments of 7,000 men. Each regiment had 2 battalions except the Preobrazhenski had 4 battalions (1400 men) and the Semenovski had 3 battalions. Thus the total army reached 18,000 men. The artillery now had 80 cannon of 24 and 18 pounds and 28 mortars and 190 hand mortars. Also they had the new means of the galley fleet.

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Apraksin continued Peter's plan of the principle of a gradual attack. He had a military soviet with Generals Bruce and Berkholts, Brigadier Chernishev and the commanders of the guards regiments, Prince M. M Golitsin and Prince V. V. Dolgorukov.
- Peter left instructions for Apraksin
(1) To attack on two sides, the main attack on the water side on the west front fort and the secondary attack on the land side.
(2) Before the assault he should complete all engineer work and artillery preparation.
(3) Concentrate the most artillery on the side of the main attack with 60 cannon and 18 mortars and 140 hand mortars against bastions Golts and Neuport and against the castle.
(4) Secure close coordination between army and fleet, especially during the assault. The mission of the fleet would be the destruction of bastions Golts and Neuport, if possible get the ships close to the bastions.
(5) Objective of the assault on the land side bastions Pantserlaks and Evropa and ravelin Kron and both caponiers was to occupy positions on two parts of the front. Bastion Pantserlaks was less fortified. Against bastion Evropa, Peter wanted artillery fire from artillery at positions and the decision to storm was to be made by Apraksin after observation. Peter wrote the he could not predict where would be the best location.

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Peter said the redoubt and redan could be assaulted.
(6) The assault should bge conducted in daylight and not at night. Peter considered night attacks not good.

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The order shows Peter's talent and quick evaluation of the situation. His order is in enough detail so Apraksin only had to carry it out. The order well used the method of approach attack.
- Apraksin assembled 8 regiments on the main attack, including the two guards - with 9,000 men. The secondary attack was by 6 regiments, 6,000 men. An attack line was on the spit of land, 300 sazhen .
- On 17 May batteries were created on the spit; number 3 with 40 cannon; and number 4 with 20 cannon. They also had at number 5 with 8 mortars and 20 small hand mortars.
- On 18 May batteries numbers 6 and 7 with 5 mortars each and number 3 was completed in front with 70 small mortars.
- On 20 May batteries numbers 8 and 9 with 6 cannon each were placed against the castle and number 10 had 50 small mortars. Everything was completed on the spit by 24 May, and opposite the castle by 28 May.
- On the land side the attack was prepared against the unfinished side of the defense line against Panterlaks. Engineers made small parallels on top of a height.
- Then three batteries: number 11, had 12 cannon to destroy the face of the bastion and Valport bastion. Number 12 had 4 cannon against the right face of ravelin Kron. Battery 13 with 5 mortars had the task of hiting inside the bastion from the general parallel. A zig-zag was dug forward to where the soil was to rocky to dig. There a wall of sand bags was built. Gabbions (wooden baskets filled with dirt) were placed to absorb bullets.
- To prepare the attack of Evropa bastion batteries were established and a trench dug in accordance with the terrain. These approach trenches reached the glacis at the outer point of the angle of the bastion. There by force of arms the Russians captured the earth redoubt. Between the approaches were placed battery 14 with 4 cannon with a mission of firing on the front to aid the aproach work and a mortar battery number 15 with 5 mortars was established to destroy the interior parts of the bastion. Also, battery number 2 was established to fire on the bastion.
- On 28 May all mortar batteries on the secondary front were finished, but the cannon batteries were only partially ready. Work on the connecting trench was not finished.

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The attack awaited this work.
Apraksin, having his headquarters on the opposite side of the town did not have complete details on the course of the work on the other side. His reports to Peter reflect this. He was optimistic on completion by 23-24 May.
- On 24 May he wrote that General Berkholts was nearly finished.
- On 29 May Apraksin, Golitsin and Berkholts inspected the land side front and found that although the men were working hard it would take weeks to finish the job.
- On 29 May Apraksin wrote Peter and gave the exact situation. On the side for the main attack all was ready, but on the other side batteries were not finished and the main trench was unfinished. Fearing that the work in the swamp and rocks would take even longer and delay the attack, Apraksin decided to begin the bombardment anyway. He told Peter of the need to begin the attack. The Russians would lose men, but would lose them anyway to enemy fire during any delay.

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While waiting for Peters's answer, Apraksin to avoid bloodshed sent a messenger to the garrison commandant asking for surrender. The Swede refused at that time.
- On 31 May Apraksin received the Tsar's answer and ok for the attack.
- On 1 June Apraksin sent the Preobrazhenski Guard Major Linman to the commandant with another demand for surrender. The Swede again refused.

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At 6 AM on 1 June the bombardment began and lasted for 5 days. All batteries fired. On the side of the main attack, cannon, some at musket range, did heavy damage to the town wall and castle. On the secondary front fire was directed toward the water bastion and south wall. Mortars on three sides sent bombs into the fort and town. In all 2,975 rounds from mortars and 1,539 from cannon were fired. The Swedes returned fire. They expended 7,464 cannon rounds and 394 mortar bombs.
- As a result of the artillery fire there was great destruction of the town and fortress. The wall of the old town and castle were greatly damaged. The wall had large breaches. From the corner bastions the flanking curtain cannon were hit and destroyed. The wall was knocked down for 100 sazhen, nearly the whole side, making a easily climbed ramp of fallen stone. The Swedish efforts to repair the breaches were unsuccessful. In the town the most of bombs fell and damaged everywhere. On the secondary front the attacker's fire was weaker. Here weapons were hit in the ravelin and part of the wall. On the left flank from the occupied redoubt on the glacis work was prepared for entering the moat and on the left flank. The objective of attack at first was the water bastion, Pantelaks, at which was directed almost all fire. However, the bastion was every strong and did not break. Then it was decided to bring to the wall and infernal machine - a mine under ground.

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Before planting the mine, it was necessary to capture the caponiers in the unfinished face of the ravilin. This very risky operation was given to the grenadiers and was accomplished. One of the heroes for the battle was Ensign Tit Tikhonovich Duganov, who was the first into the caponier. As soon as the caponier was taken, the Swedes sallied from the fort. A hand-to-hand battle lasted all night. Not only the grenadiers, but infantry regiments were sent from the left flank. By morning the Swedes were driven off and the Rusisans held the caponier. The grenadiers had large losses. Seizure of the caponier had major significance. The moat was now without defense in front of it. So the attackers could freely reach the bastion walls. The machine could be carried across the moat to the walls.

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General Burkholts reported to Apraksin that he was ready for the storm. Apraksin reported in detail to the Tsar on the outcome of the attack. His letter was optimistic on a quick victory. The begining of summer daylight (all night at that latitude) hindered the Russians. They could not move cannon without receiving heavy fire from the Swedes.
- On 5 June Apraksin noted that the enemy had no forces near to aid the fortress. Nevetheless, he took measures to check the areas. He sent Brigadier Chekin along the road to Abov, deep into Finland to block Libeker, if he tried to come to Vyborg. Vice-Admiral Batsis was ordered to watch the Swedish ships in the gulf and keep them out.
- On 6 - 8 June the besiegers made final preparations for the assault. Fire on the town did not stop, but was already weak. In the military council it was decided to start the assault on 9 June. Their plans are still available today. The Main attack would be by Bruce and Golitsin on the gulf side.

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A total of 7,384 men were designated for this assault, not counting the guards regiments. Command of the assault was given to Brigadier Chernishev.
Two detachments were established: the lead unit and support. Each unit had its reserve. The Life Guard Regiments were kept in general reserve, to repel sorties and deliver the final blow. The list of men in each unit follows:
Rank ------ lead unit ------------support unit
Brigadier----1
Colonel ------5------------------------- 3
Lt. Col. ------5 -------------------------3
Major -------7 -------------------------6
Captain -----36------------------------25
1st Lt. -------38 -----------------------27
2nd Lt. ------37------------------------27
Ensign ------4 --------
Jun. Ensign 8---------------------------2
Sgt.--------- 49-------------------------28
Kapten-----36-------------------------25
Corporal --121-----------------------105
Drummer --40------------------------50
EM---------4576----------------------2120
Total-------4963----------------------2421

The forces had to cross the bay on two specially made floating bridges. Plans were made to assign men to units and units to columns and an order of movement to the attack on the two bridges. In the lead were small groups of volunteers. Behind them came the grenadiers and then the musketeers. The number of columns were designated in such quantity that the force of the blow would build up without stop. Senior officers (colonel, Lt Col, and major) lead the last columns with the largest numbers.

An interesting note here that Peter had used Streltzi and prisoners in lead detachments to build bridges under fire with the promise to those who did outstanding work for reduced sentences and more pay.

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The plan designated distances between columns of 30 to 50 sazhens. Storming ladders, boards, picks and shovels, were taken by lead columns. grenadiers all carried grenades and axes, musketeers had muskets and had to carry fascines. The assault had to start according to the order of the Tsar at 10 AM. The Guards regiments were kept in readiness. The Order ended with words "Genera- Lt. Prince Golitsin with regiments of Life Guards, to be in all readiness".
- The second part of the assault was on the land side by the division of General Berkholts. The disposition of his units is no longer available. Only a draft copy of the division into columns in the first detachment that was written by Berkholts now exists. It is not known if the military soviet adopted this plan or not. In the draft it is seen that storming columns were divided into two streams. From this we can conclude that the objectives of the assault were the two bastions Panterlaks and Evrope. The Lead detachments contained over 1,700 men. The strength of the reserve is not known. The order of movement was similar to that for Bruce. First were volunteers, then cossacks, then grenadiers, and then musketeers.
- On the eve of the assault Apraksin sent Berkhohlts a letter containing orders for the development (deployment) of the attack. On that day late i in the evening Streltzi and cossacks had to move to the bastion Panterlaks and place on the face at the proper moment the mine (machine). In case of successful explosion, Berkholts had to send a signal of 3 rockets and in case of failure one rocket.
- In both cases Berkholts had to wait for the general signal for the assault from Bruce (3 shots of mortars) On receiving that signal he was to assault rapidly in accordance with plans. Apraksin closed his letter as follows:
"if the enemy signals surrender, insist that he surrender 'at discretion' and if he does not want to do that keep up the assault".
- From the plan we can say that the assault on the land side was as important as on the main side.
Special instructions covering the actions of the troops and officers during the assault and in the town were published. The central two points had the force of an order to attack and keep attacking despite any enemy action, don't do any criminal acts, obey commanders and not get out of formation.

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And if anyone turned out to be a criminal he would be ruthlessly punished. - Upon capture of the town, a guard was to be placed on the power magazine and treasury. Point 5 was on humanitarian relations with the population - To protect women andchildren and church men - and also robbery was forbidden.
- Thus all was made ready for assault.
- The main problem for Bruce would be crossing the water under open fire from the enemy. Berkholts had to attack by scaling a wall that was little damaged by Russian fire. Even after Pantserlaks bastion would be taken, there would remain the Evrope bastion for which ladders were needed to climb the walls. Bh evening of 8 June all was ready. The assault columns were in position in near approaches, bridges were connected and ladders were all ready. - Grenadiers were ready to use their grenades to continue the fire and open the path for the attack.
- Peter, being ill and remaining in Petersburg, continued to follow progress closely.
- While the attack was being prepared, the Swedish garrison began to waver and to realize that no help could reach them.

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The Swedish fleet tried to make a rescue from Berezovi Islands. Each time they met fire from the shore batteries and galleys and had to retire. The Swedes tried to make a landing near Tronhzund, but the arrival of Russian ships blocked that attempt. - General Likbeker made partizan war raids on Russians along the roads. His indecisiveness and fear is explained by the Russians' well organized defense of their rear and their controlling all the territory of Karelia even west of Vyborg. There the dragoons and cossacks operated in keeping Likbeker's units in alarm. Despite the lack of help, the garrison defended the town well. They had strong walls and plenty of supplies. But in the end the commandant, Sternstral, saw that it was hopeless and began discussions on surrender. Before the artillery preparation for the assault, he sent a message to Apraksin. Apraksin answered on 23 May that the besieged had no hope of relief. Still the commandant decided to wait. After the town and walls were destroyed, on 9 June he again sent two staff officers to Apraksin with a letter containing a request for capitulation. Apraksin insisted on surrender at discretion.

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The commandant asked twice more, on 10 and 11 June for terms. Peter arrived on 11 June from Petersburg during the negotiations. Being made acquainted with the course of the talks, he decided to not break them off but push to a conclusion. At first he demanded surrender at discretion. Apraksin sent a letter on 12 June telling the commandant the terms were given usually before the assault reached the counter scarp and while the town had defenses intact and not when they were already at the bastions and the walls were broken down and the garrison without help of succor. Then only mercy of the Tsar would help the garrison. The commandant wanted honorable terms. Apraksin had orders from Peter to take the garrison prisoner with no terms.

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It is hard to say to what level Peter and Apraksin thought they could support their position on surrender. Perhaps they were fully serious on demanding full surrender. On 12 June probably after another letter from Apraksin, Sternstral sent an officer to Apraksin with the same request for 'accord'. This time the answer was favorable. Peter decided to meet the Swedes and agree to terms. Quickly a guard captain, Semen Narishkin, was sent to take final resolution. The points of accord by Apraksin probably differed little from what Sternstral demanded.
The points are in the "Relation on the Capture of Vyborg".
1. March out, no music, flags or drums - take weapons and put things on the road.
2. Merchants, artisans and churchmen would be treated well.
3. Rural people would return to their lands.
4. Supply men and military administrative would go with first point.
5. After completion of the accord the Tsar would put a guard on the walls - the time limit for an answer was 7 hours. The only limit Peter put on was no music or flags etc. It was a generous accord.

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The same day, 12 June, at 6 PM the commandant returned the accord signed and stamped. Thus the garrison surrendered.
- On 13 June the Russians took the town.
- On 15 June with cannon salvos on all sides there was the triumphant entry of General Admiral F. M. Apraksin into the town, where he was meet by the commandant and staff officers, the burgomaster, and merchants. They gave him on a silver tray the keys Peter stood during this in the ranks of the Preobrazhenski Regiment.