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WARFARE, STATE AND
SOCIETY
ON THE BLACK SEA STEPPE, 1500-1700
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Brian L. Davies
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Warfare, State and Society on the Black
Sea Steppe 1500 -1700, Routledge, London, 2007, 256 pgs. index,
bibliography, footnotes, 2 general maps, no illustrations.
- review by John Sloan
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Reviewer's comment -
One may compare this book with Alexander Filjushkin's book,
Ivan the Terrible: A military history;
and Carol Stevens' book, Russia's Wars of
Emergence 1460-1730. They obviously overlap in subject matter, but in
many respects they are complementary. I recommend that they all three should be
studied together.
The author makes extensive use of Russian sources as well as Western and
Polish. But there is a lack of Turkic language sources. The narative and
analysis is from the Russian point of view. The Polish, Crimean Tatar, Ottoman
Turkish, and Cossack positions are described but the reader gets the feeling it
is all based on Russian reporting about these actors. He describes the
Polish-Lithuanian border defenses and their efforts to control the steppe. He
describes Cossack society and includes a brief description of the Crimean
Tatars. He identifies the principal Tatar invasion routes. The main purpose of
the Tatar raids was to capture slaves and livestock. The economy of Crimea
depended on slave trading. They usually tried to avoid battle, except for two
major campaigns to attack Moscow. The khan would call up groups of tribal
warriors, but local tribal leaders were independent and would conduct their own
raids. The khan's full army could reach 80,000 warriors with 200,000 horses,
but usual raids were conducted with 20,000 men. The khan depended on the tribal
beys and mirzas who controlled most of the warriors. And these high-ranking
family leaders played a major role in internal Crimean politics. When the
Ottomans conquered Crimea (from Italians and others) the local economy was
altered along with the power of the khan.
The author has a big task in covering two centuries of complex interactions of
all these groups. But at least by focusing on the warfare for the steppe he
avoids having to deal extensively for the other wars in which these major
powers were engaged during this period. He gives due attention to the leaders
of all parties and describes their motives and objectives - but from the
Russian view point. He makes a good point in noting that the Russian military
term 'polk' at this time is often mistranslated as 'regiment' Instead he
prefers the term 'corps'. The Russian army of 1500 was mostly cavalry, armed in
Turkish fashion. It was called up for service in an adhoc manner. He discusses
the methods used for mobilizations. These included pomest'e service,
conscription, and volunteers plus Cossacks.
The focus is on the warfare for the steppe, so great attention is given to
detailed descriptions of Muscovite border defense structures (such as the
abatis line - Zaschniaia cherta) He gives verbal descriptions of
fortification methods. (See Konstantin Nossov's two books - Russian
Fortresses 1480-1682, and Medieval Russian Fortresses AD 862-1480
for much more detail). The author explains army organization, command and
control, order of battle, mobilization, and logistics. However, as is typical
in books about the medieval - early modern Rus and Muscovite army, one notes
with disappointment a lack of information about how these various components of
the armed forces were trained.
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Chapter 1 - Colonization, Slave Raiding and War in the 16th Century
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Chapter2 - Muscovy's Southern Border Land Defense Strategy
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Chapter 3 - Belgorod Line
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Chapter 4 - Ukrainian Quagmire
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Chapter 5 - Chyhyrin (Chigrin) Campaigns and Wars of the Holy League
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Chapter 6 - The Balance of Power at Century's End
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