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MILITARY HISTORY RUSSIA - CONTINUED - 17TH CENTURYJohn Sloan |
Russia's Wars of Emergence 1460-1730 Pearson, London,
2007; Brian L. Davies',
Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea
Steppe, 1500 - 1700 Routledge, New York 2007, and Chester Dunning's
Russia's First Civil War, Pennsylvania State University 2001; In addition there
are many valuable entries in the multi-volumes of The Modern Encyclopedia of
Russian and Soviet History, edited by Joseph Wiecznski, published over
several years by Academic International Press. From Russia we now have the many
issues of Tsyeikhgaus - rossiiskii Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnalthat
contain excellent, well-researched articles on Russian military topics. - its
history in the several wars and photography from our visit in 1992article in Encyclopedia Britannnica-
history original article and
and | and
and
and and set off to a good start in September 1632. Michael Shein had
32,000 men and 158 cannon and was later reinforced to 64,000 men. By October
18th Dorogobuzh had fallen and 17 other towns soon followed into Russian hands.
In December the army reached Smolensk, which was taken under siege. The Polish
garrison numbered only 1,500 men, but the fortress walls built by the Russians
in 1596 were quite good. 1642
The situation in Azov during the winter of 1641-42 remained critical. The town defenses were destroyed and the supplies exhausted. The Cossacks sent a delegation headed by Ataman Naum Vasil'ev, one the heros of the siege, to Moscow in October 1641 to ask the Tsar to take Azov under his own command and garrison it with his troops. It would take a major operation by a large force to repair the fortifications bring in supplies and defend the city from the next Turkish siege.
The Russian government discussed all sides of the issue and then put the question to the Boyar Duma. The Boyars decided that to properly defend Azov would require a garrison of 10,000 and a yearly salary of 100,000 rubles, 50,000 rubles worth of food, 20,000 puds of powder worth 50,000 rubles, 6,000 rubles worth of lead and firearms costing 15,000 rubles for a total cost of 221,000 rubles. In view of this significant expenditure the Tsar and Duma convened a Zemski 3obor to consider the issue. The Sobor decided it was out of the question.
Having heard all opinions, the government decided not to change its policy of peace with the Ottoman Empire and preparations for war against Poland. On 27 April 1642 the boyars gave the Cossacks the Tsar's Ukase to leave Azov. The Cossacks destroyed. the remaining fortifications and returned home.
During 1642 the Turkish fleet appeared at Azov once more and landed a strong army which spent 7 months rebuilding the fortress and placing 70 large and 300 small cannon in it. The rebuilding of Azov worsened the Cossack situation, as the Turks used it as a base from which to clear the Don of Cossack villages and block the exit from the Don to their ships. 106
A new phase in Russo—Tatar relations began in 1642 with the Tatars again on the offensive against the now strengthened southern border defenses. The Crimeans considered the abandonment of Azov by the Russians to be a sign of weakness. The Great Nogai, however, having moved back to Astrakhan during the siege of Azov, remained there for a few years and did not participate in the raids along the border.
1643
Despite the official peace and possibly over the objections of Khan Mahmet Gerei, the Tatars continued their raids throughout 1643 in detachments of several hundreds to several thousands. 107
With the Nogai again back at Astrakhan, the Kalmyks on 19 February suddenly appeared and attacked them. The voevode, Trakhaniotov, sent service troops to help the Nogai, to little avail. Some Nogai gave up resistance and joined the Kalmyk horde. 108
1644
The situation on the border continued unchanged in 1644. There were two major Tatar attacks against Orel and Samara, Islam Gerei became the new khan in August 1644, and immediately launched a new series of raids on both Poland and Moscow. The Tatars particularly concentrated on the area west of the western end of the Russian border defenses, that is the area of common border of Poland and Russia. Here their raids were helped by the lack of coordination between the Russian and Polish defenders. 109
The Kalmyks began to follow the Nogai across the Volga in 1644. On 4 January 12,000 Kalmyks attacked the towns along the Terek river. They were 30 versts from the Terek on 13 January waiting for their main army, when they were attacked by Muscovite streltsi, Kabardians and Terek Cossacks. Urluk was killed and only 2,000 Kalmyks escaped. They fled back across the Volga where they were again attacked, by troops from Astrakhan. Then troops were sent from Ufa under the voevode L. Pleshcheev. In a battle on the Yaika river the Kalmyks lost 480 more men. 110
1645
In 1645 Tsar Mikhail died on 13 July and was succeeded by his son, Alexei Mikhailovich.
The Crimean Tatars were the next on the scene in the Caucasus. Still keeping the peace with Russia, Khan Islan Gerei made a successful campaign against the mountain Cherkass in December 1644 January 1645. The Tatars soon had more interesting campaigns to plan.
In 1645 the Ottoman fleet suffered a disaster off Crete in the long war with Venice. The Sultan had to rush a new fleet into being and for this he needed thousands of slaves. One 200 galley fleet would take 160,000 men. The strong Russians were especially prized. Therefor the Sultan sent a secret message to the Khan asking him to procure prisoners. The Tatar raids began in August with the first gathering of the war bands in the steppe. Moscow was warned of the coming attack and began to call up troops. Suddenly on 4 October the Tatars appeared at Tsaregorodski Sloboda and made off with a few peasants. Still these minor raids did not prove anything unusual was coming.
Islan Gerei gave his Nuradin, Kazi Gerei, the kaftan on 15 October and ordered him to attack Moscow. In order to gain surprise the rank and file Tatars were told that the target would be Poland. A maximum effort was made to round up warriors; everyone who could sit a horse was sent, making the force over 40,O0O total. On 11 November a group of 30—40 Tatars were captured by the Russians and under torture in Moscow revealed that a major winter campaign was being planned. This news was confirmed by information that Tatars were gathering on the Lithuanian border, but still the target was not known. In December the Turkish garrison at Azov was strengthened and word leaked out of the Sultan's request for galley slaves. This was enough reason for the Russian government to call up a maximum defense effort. Prince A. N Trubetskoi was ordered to Tula, Princes V. Prozorovski and I. M. Beklemishev to Mtsensk, Princes S. R. Pozharsky and A. T. Lazarev to Kursk, and junior voevodes to Krapivin, Odoev, Venev, and Ryazan. But after this almost a month passed with no news of Tatar attacks, up to the moment of the main campaign. This stop in raiding somewhat lessened the vigilance along the border and Moscow's belief in the likelihood of an attack. Often the voevodes and polki were not sent out until the Tatars had already begun their campaign, but this time the early warnings helped the Russians prevent a complete surprise.
On 18 December one of the advanced stations sent word that a large Tatar force of 20,000 or more was coming on the Muravski trail. On 19 December the Tatars crossed the Vorksla River and on the 20th reached Ril’sk and Putivl uezds. The same day they began rounding, up prisoners from the villages, taking most of the peasants in Putivil uezd. In Ril’sk uezd the 7,000 man advance guard under Kazi Gerei arrived first and then the main force of over 20,000 burned all the villages. At Kursk the Tatars took 3,000 prisoners in the towns and forts. In one day the Tatars occupied the whole immense area. By the 28th the Tatars were starting home. On the 30th the Russian voevodes began attacking the Tatar rear guards.
The Tatars used the same route back this time, not bothering to go an alternate way. Their main weapon was speed and surprise. Further attacks would not increase the number of prisoners, because they already had all they could manage and the Russian troops would soon be on the scene. Winter turned out to be a good time to raid because the troops were not at their stations and all the peasants were collected in their villages. This winter however, was unusually cold and this brought extreme hardship on the Tatar. They had to retire slowly taking two 4-day rests due to the cold. Then they had to break up into small bands, their horses were dying due to the lack of fodder and the men were often on foot. If the Russian troops had pursued more vigorously and attacked in numbers they could have inflicted a real disaster on the Tatar force.
While the Tatars were struggling with the cold the Russians were struggling with bureaucracy. When the Tatars attacked there were not enough service troops in any of the southern towns, nor were all the voevodes present. It was unclear who was in charge of the defense. The defense was conducted from two centers, Tula, where the commander in chief, A. N. Trubetskoi, was not sent until 24 December; and Belgorod, where Prince F. A. Khulkov was supposed to be with the troops from Yablomov, Koroch, Userd, Volni, and Khotmishsk.
1646
But he did not get the order until 15 January 1646. Meanwhile the troops were waiting in their areas. Khulkov had only his own 2,000 or so and could not engage a major Tatar force. Prince S. R. Pozharsky arrived in Kursk on 19 December, but he too was too late. He had only 1,500 men from Kursk, but he at least did not wait for reinforcements but went immediately into battle. On 20 December he fought the Tatars near Snikhini and on the 23rd relieved the siege of a number of smaller forts and villages. On 24 December Pozharsky led his men in battle near Ril’sk and again on the 28th engaged the Tatars at Gorodenk. In this battle he freed 2,700 prisoners and inflicted a major blow on the Nuradin's personal guard. Then Prince Khilkov arrived with his troops. From 10 versts away he sent word to Moscow that he was participating in a battle, but he really did not want to join Prince Pozharsky, who continued fighting on the 29th and 30th and only returned to Kursk on 31 December.
When the first news from Prince Pozharsky reached Moscow on the 24th of December the government sent out the call to arms to all the polki. Prince Trubetskoi was sent to Tula with the Tsar's “dvor”, (the strapchi, stolniki, zhtltsi, etc) and streltsi two prikazi of Moscow streltsi. They arrived in Tula on the 29th, but the dvoriani did not leave Moscow until the 31st of December. The service men living north of Moscow were ordered to Mtsensk.
The Razryad planned a campaign to Belgorod for Prince Trubetskoi's forces, but it didn't take place due to the Tatar withdrawal. A few days later the Razryad ordered the voevodes of the towns already listed to join Prince Khilkov and pursue the Tatars, but as indicated earlier the order was not received until the Tatars were long gone. But pursuit could have been undertaken if the voevodes had been allowed to express initiative. The Razryad took all control of defense to itself yet did not issue orders until too late. It would not give general or standing orders and threatened anyone who violated orders with prison. In fact several were put in prison for alleged failures in this campaign. The commander of the frontier station which first sent word was knouted and cashiered from the service because his report was late. Prince Pozharsky himself was arrested on 29 January and sent to Moscow where he was put in prison for three days, He was the one voevode with initiative and bravery. Apparently the government knew his ability was needed, because the next year he was given command against the Nogai on the Don River. 111
To make matters worse, the Polish Hetman, I. Vishnevetsky, had 15,000 troops in Nedrigailov and should have pursued the Tatars according to the agreement between Poland and Russia, but he moved out only on 29 December and went very slowly, then delayed two days while the Tatars left. The Poles claimed they were late due to the freezing weather.
This attack showed the weaknesses of the border defense system; which were: the slowness of the forces to gather, the dispersed location of the forces, the absence of unified command with power to act, and the weakness in the unfinished defense line on the Muravski trail side of Belgorod. The government realized what the defects were and took corrective measures.
The Tatars wanted to continue their raids and the Sultan still wanted prisoners; the 1645 raid had only netted 6,300 of them. In January 1646 Moscow received reports on new preparations for a spring raid and of Cherkass teaching the Tatars how to shoot firearms. The government ordered the construction of a new defense line and the strengthening of the troop units in the Ukranian towns. Further projects were as follows;
1.A new scheme of distribution of the troops on the Belgorod
line was created; and the command was unified;
2.The number of Don Cossacks was increased;
3.An attack on the Crimeans and Nogai from the Don area was organized;
4.Negotiations for peace with Crimea were renewed.
Step one was a change in the location of the polki and a scheme for the unification of the troops. Until 1637 the polki were stationed at Odoev, Krapivna, Tula, Dedilov and Mtsensk; and in the Ryazanski Razryad at Tula, Ryazan, Mikhailov and Pronsk. When the old defense line was rebuilt in 1638 the polki were at Gdoev, Krapivna, Tula, Venev and Mtsensk.
In 1639 they were at Tula, Pereyaslavl- Ryazan, Venev, Krapivna, Odoev and Mtsensk. The total number of troops reached 28,000 in this year. In this location the defense of the center was assured, but the Tatars could not reach this far north anyway due to the new line being built to the south. Thus until the middle 1640's the polki were very from the scene of actual conflict. When the new line at Belgorod was completed in 1646 the polki continued to gather at the old places and new polki were created for Belgorod.
In 1646 the first polki were moved forward to the front line. On 1 February the Great polk was assigned to Belgorod with Prince N. I. 0doevski as voevode. With him were sent strapchi stolniki, Moscow dvoriani and service people. The lead polk went to Karpov with V. P. Sheremetev as voevode. The guard polk was at Yablomov under command of F. B. Sheremetev. But this duty was hard for the service people of the Moscow region to perform.
They moved forward on 14 July because a Tatar attack was expected and also to add force to the construction of the line itself by providing a guard for the workers, but they could not remain so far away from their homes on a permanent basis. In the winter the polki moved north to Kursk and Elets. The same procedure of shifting south in summer and north in winter was followed in 1647 and 1648. Besides the polki near the Belgorod line other polki were detailed for duty on the old line through Tula. Thus there were forces on both lines simultaneously in a situation similar to the one in the 158O’s. The government did not want to give up the old line too soon and two lines of defense made it all the better. 112
Step two was to increase the number of Don Cossacks and to send them on an expedition against Azov. The campaign of the Don Cossacks on Azov in 1649 is typical of much of the military activity of the Muscovite government, which always desired to do things as cheaply as possible. It had poor supply and preparation, was divided in command and was a mixed force which showed the conflicting interests of the groups. It had Don Cossacks, streltsi, Tatars, Cherkass, service people and ex—serfs.
Moscow decided to try to divert the Tatars from a major campaign against Moscow by an attack on Crimea. But the government desired to avoid displeasing the Turks if possible. It wanted an attack directly against Crimea, but the Don Cossacks, who were directly subject to the raids, pointed out that Azov was the chief center fro raids and that if they went toward Crimea it was likely that a raid would be conducted on their homes while they were away. They succeeded in diverting the attack to Azov, despite the protests of Moscow's commander in the field. The Tatars and mounted stre1tsi did not care where the raid went, just so long as it kept moving so that the grass would be available for their horses. The government wanted to show the Crimeans that they also were not immune to raids.
On 18 January 1646 the government sent a letter to the Don Cossacks mentioning the campaign and the sending to Astrakhan of the voevode, Prince S. H. Pozharski, who would gather the Astrakhan troops and the Great Nogai, Urtovski Tatars and others and move to the Don. After joining forces they were to all move against Crimea. To increase the number of troops it was decided to enroll free people of the border towns, even though they were not militarily trained. B. Udrimov and Okarpov were ordered to recruit free people in the Shatski and Tambov uzeds. In March the attaman, Pert Krasnikov, received an order to recruit in Pronsk, Sapozhk, Dankov, Efremov, Nikhailov, and other districts.
The Moscow dvorianin, Zhdan Kondirev, was appointed to Voronezh to gather recruits from the free people and take them to the Don. He was to then organize all the recruits for service. He was ordered to enroll 3m000 men and lead them in the campaign, after which they would be turned into Cossacks and kept on duty in the south. The government wanted to strengthen the Cossack forces in as painless a way as possible. It was expected that at least 2,200 would survive the campaign to be enroled as Cossacks.
At the same time Poland was alienating the Ukrainian Cossacks by impositions and was attempting to limit them. But Moscow was playing for the favor of the Ukranian people and winning the Don Cossacks' confidence. The movement of people from the towns to the Don agreed with the ideas of the Moscow service people. They did not want to serve on the Don on long campaigns themselves,. However the service people of the border towns did not like the idea of their losing their own servants or serfs so they complained to the government.
By 20 April Kondirev had completed enrollment of 3,000 men. Many were tempted by the chance to leave the old hard life in the towns, Some were attracted by the government pay. Each man who had his own weapon was paid 5 ½ rubles, if he had no firearm he was given one and paid 5 rubles. Kondirev soon had 10,000 men and voevode A. Buturlin had another 3,000. The government organized a caravan of ships to Voronezh to bring supplies. ,
All these preparations were no secret from the Tatars. They spent the spring recovering from their winter raid and then in May began the usual small scale raiding. A 2,000-man detachment reached the Mordvin lands and attacked Altor, which was defended by Tatars and Cossacks under T. Poretski. He did not believe his opponents were very strong and ventured into the steppe after them. His unit was destroyed and 300 Russians were taken prisoners. In June the Tatars continued with a series of raids but could not mount a major campaign. They were mostly conducting reconnaissance to see if the Russians were moving on Azov as yet.
Kondirev moved his troops down the Don to Cherkass fort on 27 May. His 10,000 were joined there on 16 June by Prince S. H. Pozharsky from Astrakhan with 700 mounted streltsi, and 2,350 Great Nogai and other Tatars under command of Saltanash Murza
Aksakov. Prince Pozharsky moved the streltsi across the Don while the Nogai remained on the east bank. Then Prince Mutsal Cherkasskii arrived with the mountain Cherkass, Tatars and the Greben and Terek troops for a total of 1,200 men. Bi Mursa Ishterekov also arrived with 300 more Tatars. All these troops remained on the East bank. This brought the total force to 20,000 including the Don Cossacks.
The organization of this motley collection was very poor. Prince S. Pozharsky had the highest place by rank, but he was not the official commander. He had to carry out his orders from Moscow and at the same time get the agreement of the independent atamans and Kondirev and Mutsal Cherkasskii. This complicated process never achieved results. The Cossack atamans did not
like Kondirev's right to command the volunteers, claiming that he was not militarily experienced. A worse problem was the split in the plans of the units. Moscow had ordered Pozharsky and Kondirev to fight Crimeans and not bother Azov or Turkish property. The government gave the Cossack atamans the same order, however the Don troops raised the issue of the danger of leaving Azov unwatched. They pointed out that the Turks lived in Crimean towns also and that it was impossible to reach Crimea anyway. Then the Tatars, Nogais, and Cherkass refused to consider going such a long way as to Crimea.
With Prince Pozharsky in this difficult spot the mounted streltsi and Tatars demanded any action in order to get the force moving into new grazing areas. After three days the Cossacks got into their boats and set out. The streltsi voted likewise, and the rest had to follow suit. The infantry went down the river in the Cossack boats and the cavalry moved along the bank.
The units met at Azov in June and attacked the fortress. Some even penetrated into the town, but were soon thrown back. Without strong artillery it was impossible to besiege the city, therefor the troops divided. The mounted men raided Azov and Nogai villages and took prisoners and cattle. They then returned to Cherkasskii. The Don Cossacks and volunteers went to sea in the boats and sank three Turkish ships, returning to Cherkasskii with the captured supplies.
After a few days the Cossacks asked Prince Pozharsky to participate in a new undertaking; the attack on Nogai and Azov villages which netted 7,000 prisoners and a large quantity of cattle. As the raiders were busily dividing up the spoil at Cherkasskii’s fort a surprise was being prepared for them.
In June the Tsarevich and Nuradin left Crimea with their troops and
headed for Azov, while the khan himself went to guard Perekop. On 6 July the
Crimean Tsarevich appeared on the east bank of the Don and approached the camp
of the Nogais and mountain Cherkass at dawn with 1,000 Crimeans and 6,500
Kaziev Tatars. Attacking Prince Cherkasskii's position they grabbed his banner
while Bi Murza Ishterek and the Nogais fled into the steppe. Recovering from
the first attack Prince Cherkasskii and his Cherkessians and the Terek and
Greben troops began the real battle. The Don Cossacks crossed the river to
their aid and then Prince Pozharsky, seeing the battle, crossed also followed
by the volunteers. Three versts from the Don they were engaged in battle until
evening. The Crimeans had the advantage at first until the Russian
reinforcements turned the battle and the Crimeans were forced to retreat.
Prince Pozharsky was wounded by an arrow in the right arm. The Nogai did not
wait to find out the outcome and later when they showed up at Astrakhan their
leaders explained that they had left because of rumors that the khan himself
was at attacking.
Losses on both sides are unknown but probably fairly heavy. The streltsi may
have lost 50 men killed and the volunteers lost 900 taken prisoner. The
Russians received word that the Tsarevich was resting his force at Kagal'nik,
having suffered heavy casualties. Not content with their exploits to date the
combined army crossed the river again to the east side and at dawn on 4 August
fell on the Tatar camp killing many, taking 207 prisoners and much booty. The
Nuradin even lost his tents.
Then the Azov and Temrutski Tatars came to the aid of the Crimeans
with 8,000 cavalry, 2,000 infantry and cannon. The Russian force of 7,200 was
mostly composed of Kondirev's volunteer infantry and the Don Cossacks plus the
small cavalry contingents of Prince Pozharsky and Prince Cherkasskii. The
allies had to retreat under continuous attack from the Tatar cava±ry and
fire from the artillery. After an all-day battle the Tatars broke contact at
dark. The allied force arrived back at Cherkasskii fort once more on 6 August.
This action resulted in greatly increased losses, the streltsi alone losing 200
more men. The Russians had to destroy part of the booty and slaughter most of
the Tatar prisoners; the booty still came to a substantial sum for each man.
The Muradin returned to Azov and asked the Khan for more aid as he had suffered
sizeable casualties also. But the Khan was at Perekop with 30,000 men
feverishly fortifying the and expecting an attack momentarily. 113
The Khan had good reason for worry. During 1646 the Polish and Muscovite governments were conducting talks on a Muscovite proposal for an offensive alliance against the Tatars. The Polish Seim would not agree to break their peace with the Ottoman Empire, even though Venice gave King Wadislaw a subsidy of 800,000 zloty to support a war. The money freed him from dependence on the Seim for cash and he began hiring troops and preparing arsenals in Warsaw, Cracow and L'vov. Word of this was bad news indeed for the Turks and Tatars. The Turks were fully engaged in war with Venice over Crete and in Dalmatia and Malta was keeping control of the sea from them. The Ottoman Empire needed peace with Poland and Russia as much as Moscow desired, peace with the Ottomans Officially therefore the Turks only waged war on the Don Cossacks and the Russians did not help the Cossacks. The Polish nobility would not consider a war in which their lands might become subject to Tatar attacks This effectively prevented the formation of the Russo-Polish offensive alliance. The two governments did agree to stop using Tatars against each other and to try to coordinate their defensive operations. 114
To the east 1646 witnessed a momentous event for the steppe peoples when the Kalmyks submitted to the Muscovite Tsar, keeping their own Khan. They were soon providing excellent cavalrymen to the Tsar for use against the Tatars and in central Asia. 115
Along the Don, the Cossacks continued their attacks on Azov in November and December 1646. The Atamans reported to Moscow that the town could be taken easily in the spring if the Tsar would only sent troops.
1647
In April 1647 the Cossacks successfully attacked the Crimean towns
of Temruk and Arbatok from the sea. During the summer the Turks sent
reinforcements to Azov and Crimea. In June the Cossacks attacked Crimea from
the sea and in July repelled an attack on Cherkass fort by the Azov Crimean and
Nogai Tatars. On 28 July they repulsed a second attack, capturing many of the
Turkish boats.
The Turks backed attacks on Cherkass fort continued all fall and throughout
1648. The Cossacks were being gradually worn down in preparation for a major
Turkish campaign up the Don, possibly as far as Voronezh. The government in
Moscow therefore sent Andrey Lazarev with 1,000 recruited soldiers to garrison
Cherkass fort. They arrived in October 1648 and with this the Turkish attacks
came to an end.
The Crimeans did not like the bloody work at Cherkasskii’s fort any more than assaulting any other fort so they stayed away and concentrated on attacking the Belgorod area throughout 1647. They also crossed the Don and attacked Voronezh in July but were met by 1,500 Cossacks, deti boyars and dragoons and driven off with sizeable losses. Apparently the Tatar leader, Karash Murza, did not know that the Russians had a large concentration of forces in the area due to the construction of the Tareva Alekseeva fortified line and town. 116
1648
In January 1648 the Kalmyks made their first campaign on the Don river in support of the Russians. According to the Cossacks there were 30,000 of them, but the Russian sources reported only 20,000. How many ever there were, there were enough to make the Nogai flee panic to the Dnieper and to Perekop. The Kalmyks stopped their campaign early due to the snow, but it was a portent of things to come. 117
The year 1648 began the series of events which led to the unification of the Ukraine with Russia. In this year Bogdan Khmelnitski, the Cossack Hetman, asked the Khan for an alliance against the Poles. The khan was delighted, but his problem was that at the same moment, in March, the Sultan ordered him to sent aid for the war against Venice. The Tatars were very much opposed to the idea of such a long campaign and refused the Sultan's command on the grounds of prior commitment to support the Cossacks. Prince Sherinski was sent with the leading Tatar elements against the Poles, and then the Khan himself brought more troops. 118
Bogdan Khmelnitski began a Cossack uprising that soon turned into a general social war. His Cossacks defeated the Polish army at Zolte Wody and then at Korsun the combined Cossack-Tatar army routed the Polish army of Crown Hetman Potocki. The Crown and, Field Hetmen were among the prisoners taken to Crimea for ransom. The Poles lost 8,500 out of their 10,000 man army. At this the Polish nobility was called up and, a splendidly arrayed force of 40,000 cavalrymen in jeweled capes with 100 cannon set out to subdue the Cossacks. On 23 September they were met at Pylavo by the Tatars and Cossacks and in a three day battle the Polish host was destroyed. 119 The Tatars moved on to besiege Lvov and Zamostye.
The sultan demanded that the Tatars stop helping the Cossacks and come help him instead, but on 8 August he was killed and his 12 year old son was placed on the throne. This left the Tatars free to do as they pleased. With the rich Polish lands wide open to them they could hardly resist the Cossack offer. It was many years before Russia had to worry about major Tatar raids as the Tatars were fully occupied in Poland. 120
The only thing Moscow had to worry about in 1648 was a streltsi revolt, itself a sign of things to come. The foreign troops were used to guard the Kremlin.
1649
The Cossacks invaded Poland again with their Tatar allies but were met in June 1649 by Prince Jeremiah Wisniowiecki, who held them at his fortified camp at Zborovo until the new king, Jan Casimir, could come up with 25,000 additional troops. The valor of the king and the Polish artillery won the day after Polish money bribed the Tatars to leave the area. The Poles and Cossacks agreed to the Truce of Zborovo. 121
1650
In 1650 with her fortified lines in the south completed from Belgorod to Voronezh to Nizhni Lomov, the Muscovite government began to use the Cossack uprising in the Ukraine to blackmail the Poles out of Smolensk. 122
The Poles renewed the war in the Ukraine in 1651 by calling on the Elector of Brandenburg, a Polish vassal for his fief of east Prussia, to supply veterans of the 30 Years’ War for use in the Ukraine. The Poles attacked and won at Krasnyi in Podolia and then at the Battle of Berestechko the 34,000-man Polish army under the command of Hetman Wisniowiecki and Jan Radziwill defeated the Cossack army while the Tatars fled. Kiev was sacked and. a new truce signed in September. This pushed Bogdan Khmelnitski into signing the Periaslavl agreement with the Russians to gain the support of Moscow. This agreement was supposed to bring the Cossacks assistance, but all it brought was trouble as the Tsar used it as a support for his own plan to conquer Smolensk. The Cossacks considered they were signing a temporary military alliance, but found out later that the Russians considered it a permanent act of unification of the Ukraine to Muscovy. 123
1652 - 1653
In 1652 the Cossacks defeated the Poles at Batoka. For 1653 Poland made a supreme effort, Jan Casimir led 60,000 men into the Ukraine and defeated Khmelnitski at Zranto on 24 August. 124
The Tsar's government was forced to deal with an attack by Persian and Daghestani troops against Sunzhenski Ostrog on the Terek River and with border clashes along the Amur River Valley, but it did not let these incidents distract attention from events in Poland and the Ukraine. 125
In 1653 the Muscovites decided that their war preparations were sufficiently advanced to safely make another attempt to capture Smolensk. Large quantities of muskets and powder had been purchased in Sweden and Holland and the new style troop units were, hopefully, in readiness. On 1 October the decision for war was made. The resulting 13 year war has been characterized as exceeding the Thirty Years War in cruelty and barbarity. “No other war of modern times can show so little of the glories, so much of the horrors, of warfare.” 126
With the Cossacks now allied with Moscow, the Crimean Tatars quickly reviewed their interests and changed sides to support the Poles. Their plan was not to attack the well defended regions of Muscovy, but to use their participation in the war as an excuse to raid the Ukraine and the Russo-Polish border regions.
1654
The Russian army was blessed with due pomp in April and sent to the border. The “Most Pacific” Tsar's plan of war envisaged a three pronged offensive; a northern army was to invade Lithuania, the main army was to capture Smolensk, and a southern army was to seize Ukranian towns including Kiev. 127
The Northern army under command of Prince Alex Trubetskoi began its invasion in late May. From his base at Veliki Luki, with the help of 20,000 Cossacks, he overran eastern Lithuania to the Dvina River, seizing Belya Polock in June and July. In August he defeated the weak Polish— Lithuanian forces raised by Prince Radziwill at Szepielwica and captured Mogilev.
The Main army was personally led by the Tsar. With 100,000 men he quickly occupied Dorogobuzh, Borisov and Polotsk and on 2 July laid siege to Smolensk. This fortress was garrisoned by 2,000 men, far to few to man its long walls and 34 towers, but the heroic Polish forces held out until 26 September. Success in the main offensive was due to overwhelming Russian strength plw3 careful cultivation of the support of the Orthodox peasantry in Belo-Russia.
In the south, the 4O,00O man army of Theodore Buturlin moved from, its base at Briansk to seize Mstislavl and continued on to capture Kiev, which the Tatars promptly raided. He was theoretically there to support the Cossack cause, but he did his best to ignore the Tatars and avoid fighting them. He did not neglect to put Russian officials in Kiev and Chernigov.
The Cossacks, meanwhile sent their main army into Volynia and another force under Khmelnitsky's brother—in—law, Colonel I. N. Zolotarenko, with Russian support, devastated the area near the Pripet Marshes. This force captured Gomel and held it for the Cossack government. Moscow did not like this idea at all. This was one of the first indications of the divergence between the objectives of the Russians and Cossacks. In the Ukraine itself fear of Tatar attacks kept additional Muscovite and Cossack troops occupied in garrisoning the towns.
In October 1654 a strong Polish army under Hetman Potocki expert
invaded Ukraine and with the expert help of the Tatar raiders burned villages
and killed the population. The Tatars took 300,000 people off to the Crimean
slave markets and another 100,000 inhabitants were killed.
During the winter 1654—55 the Poles and Tatars joined in an attack on the
Cossack army in Moldavia and were in the process of defeating them when
Buturlin finally brought Russian forces into action and in a series of heavy
battles at Uman succeeded in driving the Tatars off. 128
1655
In January 1655 the Tsar sent Mateev to Khmelnitski to plan a joint campaign for the year. The Cossacks were asked to recruit people along the border to be trained by Russian officers in the new German style infantry formations. Khmelnitski, however, was not satisfied with Muscovite help and was suspicious of the Russian intentions. He therefore began to look for new allies. He found his allies in Sweden.
The Cossack offensive against the Poles finally got under way in 1655 with the help of 9,000 Russians under Sheremetev. This army soon ran into a Polish counter offensive led by Hetman Stanislas Lanckoronski. The combined Polish and Tatar armies annihilated Sheremetev's army at the battle of Okhmatov. 129
In February the Swedes seized the Polish fortress on the Dvina River to forestall the Russians from taking it. The Swedes feared that Russian success against Poland would eventually hurt Sweden. Two Swedish armies were mobilized in Pomerania and Livonia.
The Russian offensive began again in May and in June King Charles X of Sweden invaded Poland from Stettin in the west. King John Casimir fled to Silesia while the Sweden and Russians raced to occupy territory and the Cossacks ravaged central Poland and Galicia. The dismemberment of Poland was of great concern to Vienna, Istanbul and all the European capitals. In May the Emperor, Leopold I, concluded a treaty with King John Casimir to supply Imperial troops for his cause. 130
In July the Russians occupied Vilno and in August took Kovno. Alexis's advance to the Nieman river in Lithuania was harassed by Lithuanian partisans. In September a combined Cossack Russian army attacked Lvov, but the Cossacks refused to capture the town because the Russian commander, Buturlin, wanted to claim it for Russia. Prince Gregorii Romodanovski lead a joint Russo- Cossack force against Potocki's army and drove them off. On 20 October Lublin fell to the Cossacks.
Charles X had the Baltic provinces as his main objective. He took Courland and warned Alexis to stay away. In September the Swedes took Warsaw and with their new Cossack allies laid siege to Cracow. 131
In November Khan Mahmet Gerei brought 150,000 Tatars into the Ukraine, captured Khmelnitski and forced the Russians to retreat.
In December an agreement to partition Poland was made between the Cossacks, Transylvanians, Brandenburg and Sweden. Hetmen Potocki and Lanckoronski formed a federation against Sweden and drove the Swedish forces back. 132
The Cossack agreement with Sweden caused Alexis to reevaluate his war aims. He decided to take the Baltic provinces from Sweden, and therefore signed a truce and alliance with Poland. Finding that military operations in the west were going to be more extensive than expected, the Russians looked around for aid. They found the Kalmyks ready and willing to help. The Kalmyks took a oath of loyalty and contracted to guard the eastern regions. The Russians granted free pasture on both sides of the Volga to the Kalmyks and arranged for agreements to prevent any future Kalmyk- Bashkir conflicts. 133
1656
On May 17th 1656 Tsar Alexis declared war on Sweden. In July a strong army under command of Prince I. K. Cherkasskii and Sir Alexander Leslie invaded Livonia The Russians captured Dunaberg August 10th and Kokenhausen and laid siege to Riga. The garrison was small, but King Charles arrived by sea with reinforcements. They sortied and defeated the huge but incompetent Russian army. The Russians lost 8,000 killed and 14,000 wounded or prisoners. Sir Alexander and the other foreign officers urged the Tsar to raise the siege, which he did even though he and the other Russians felt that the foreigners wanted the Swedes to win. In October the Tsar withdrew to Pskov.
The Russian armies in the north had been more successful. Dorpat was captured along with Nienshanz and Shusselburg. 134
In November Prussia declared its independence from Poland and King Jan Casimir was besieged in Danzig.
1657
In 1657 the situation became even more confused. In January Khmelnitsky sent 12,000 Cossacks under command of Colonel Anton Zhdanovich to help the Magyars invade Poland. The true purpose of this campaign was withheld from the lower ranking Cossacks, who did not support Khmelnitsky’s foreign polities. Rakoczy invaded Poland with a mixed force of 20,000 Hungarians and other mercenaries and was joined by the Cossacks in March. Cracow and Brest Litovsk were captured and Lvov was besieged. In April the Magyars were joined by part of the Swedish forces. Sweden was also fighting the Poles and their Imperial allies, and another Swedish army was devastating Karelia and moving from Finland to the support of Riga.
At this point Denmark, becoming ever more concerned about a possible Swedish domination of the Baltic, declared was on Sweden, forcing King Charles X to withdraw troops to the Danish front. On 9 June Warsaw was captured by the Cossacks, Magyars and remaining Swedes. The town was thoroughly looted, after which the rest of the Swedes withdrew to Denmark. The religious problem brought on by the Swedish occupation was causing a Polish national resistance movement to gain strength, making it doubtful if the Swedes could have sustained their position in Poland much longer anyway.
With the Swedes gone the Magyars and Cossacks were no match for the Lithuanian army and were forced to retreat into Podolia. In July the Cossack soldiers found out about Khmelnitsky's real policies and revolted. This left the Magyars to face the Lithuanians alone; Rakoczy was forced to surrender on 23 July and give up all the loot from Warsaw and Cracow. He and his army were freed, to continue their march back to Hungary, but one week later they were surrounded by the Crimean Tatars near the Bug river and wiped out. The death of Khmelnitsky on 6 August brought on a struggle for power among the Cossack leaders and a struggle between the Cossack upper and lower classes that reached open civil war by January 1658 when one group of Cossacks besieged another at Poltava. 135
On 30 March 1657 the Kalmyks signed a new treaty of assistance with Moscow and sent hostages to live in Astrakhan. On this basis Taisha Monchuk led his warriors against the Crimean Tatars and Nogais near Azov. 136
1658
Russia resumed the offensive in 1658 against Sweden and, after the Poles allied themselves with the Cossacks, against Poland as well. In the north a small Russian force captured Yamburg and besieged Narva, but was soon ejected from the Baltic region and the Gulf of Finland. The Swedes recaptured their previously lost towns.
In the Ukraine Moscow stirred the Poltava Regt. and the Zaporozhie into action against the Cossack Hetman, Vygovskii. In May he assembled 20,000 Cossacks and 6,000 Tatar and mercenary soldiers and captured Poltava, killing 8,000 of the defenders and burning the town. A new Poltava Regiment was then formed.
In August Vygovski sent 20,000 Cossacks plus Tatar allies to attack Kiev. The city was defended by Sheremetev with a garrison of streltsi and dragoons. Another Muscovite army commanded by Romadonovski supported from Belgorod. The Cossacks were unable to capture Kiev. In September Vygovski’s negotiations with Poland finally resulted in the Treaty of Gadiach. This reopened the Russo—Polish war. The Cossacks were still split between the upper levels which supported Poland and the lower ranks who were in favor of Moscow. In October the Poltava regiment began another pro—Moscow revolt. Cossack assaults on Kiev were beaten off by the streltzi and dragoons while Romodanovski advanced 20,000 Muscovite troops to Lokhivitsa in November. During the same month the Lithuanians and Vygovsky's Cossacks pressed the Muscovites in Lithuania while the Cossacks besieged Minsk. The Lithuanians were defeated by Prince I. A. Dolgurukov near Vilno.
Tsar Aleksei had to choose which enemy he should fight first. His chief advisor, Anastasy Orduin-Nashchokin, recommended fighting Sweden for the Baltic first, but the Tsar insisted on fighting for the Ukraine and security for Smolensk. On December 1658 Moscow and Sweden signed a three year truce freeing the Swedes to concentrate on Denmark and the Russians to concentrate on Poland. 137
1659
In January 1659 Vygovski with 30,000 Cossacks, 30,000 Poles and 15,000 Tatars attacked Mirgorod and Poltava and captured them, but failed to capture the Sech. In March Prince Alexei Trubetskoi and Romadanovski advanced to Konstantinovka where they were joined by rebel Cossacks. In April Trubetskoi with 40,000 Muscovites and Cossacks started for Konotop. There he was defeated by the Cossack defenders under the command of Colonel Grigori Gulianitski who held the town for a month against all attacks. The Crimean and Belgorod Tatars and other Cossack forces came to the relief of Konotop in June, caught the Muscovite forces between themselves and the town garrison and inflicted one of the most crushing defeats yet administered on the Muscovites who retreated to Putivl where they were besieged. The flower of Muscovite dvoriani cavalry perished among the 30,000 dead at Konotop. The government feared for the safety of Moscow and set about strengthening the fortifications. Then the Zaporozhie Cossacks attacked the Tatars driving them off. Atman Serko followed this attack with one on the Hetman's capital at Chigirin forcing Vygovski to give up the siege of Putivl. In September the Hetman was overthrown and in October in new negotiations at Periaslavl with the new Hetman, Yuri Khmelnitsky, the Russians secured a new agreement. Princes Trubetskoi and Romadanovski still had 40,000 men nearby and were able to influence the deliberations. It was a triumph for Muscovite diplomacy that turned a military defeat into a political victory.
1660
With the Cossacks back on their side the Russians launched a new
offensive in January 1660 by defeating the Poles at Polubenski, and Obykhovich.
General V. Sheremetev routed a Polish army of Andrei Potocki near Kiev and
General Ivan Khovanski captured Brest Litovsk and burned it.
In March the Poles retaliated by sending an army under command of Stanislaw
Potocki and Ivan Vygovski to attack Mogilev. The Poles received help from the
Tatars and Turks in this campaign.
During the summer Vasilii Sheremetev led 60,000 well—equipped and trained, soldiers west in an effort to capture Lvov. This move left central Ukraine open to Tatar attack. The Tatars who had to worry about attack from the Don Cossacks received help from the Ottoman Sultan. Ivan Serko led the Zaporozhie Cossacks against the Tatars at Ochakov, while the Chernigov, Nezhlin, and Cherkassy Regiments also attacked Tatar camps in the Ukraine.
Expecting Tatar reprisals, the Cossacks asked for 20,000 Muscovite streltsi to be sent to Periaslavl, but the Polish attack on the Russians in Lithuania prevented the dispatch of any troops to Ukraine. The Polish invasion of Belorussia was commanded by Paul Sapieha and Stefan Czarniecki. They routed the Russian force of Ivan Khovanski at Volone Solonka and forced the Russians back to Polotsk.
While Hetman Khmelnitski waited at Korsun for the Muscovite troops he had requested and tried to convince the Tsar's government to sent the Don Cossacks against Crimea, the Tatar Princes Kalga and Nuradin moved to join the Poles.
In the fall a large Russian army commanded by Prince Yuri Dolgorukov was defeated near Mogilev and forced to retreat on 11 October. The Polish army of Sapieha and Czarniecki advanced defeating Ivan Khovanski again and routing Peter Dolgorukov's army at Shklov.
In the west General V. Sheremetev was not doing well either. On 5-6 September 30,000 Poles commanded by Stanislaw Potocki and 60,000 Tatars attacked him at Liubar in Volynia. The Muscovites lost 1,000 men, the Cossacks 200 men and the Muscovite supply train was destroyed.
General Sheremetev ordered 3,000 Cossacks out to forage for food, but the Tatars quickly surrounded them and killed 1,000. Sheremetev then fortified his camp and awaited reinforcements. On 17 September some Russians escaped from the camp to Chudnov. Hetman Khmelnitski, trying to join Sheremetev with 40,000 pro- Russian Cossacks was defeated at Slobodyszcze by General Lubomirski. On 4 October the Russians tried to break out of their besieged camp and lost another 3,000 men. They finally surrendered on 23 October.. General Sheremetev was taken prisoner to Crimea where he waited 20 years for ransom.
This disaster convinced Hetman Khmelnitski to chance sides once more, but the Poles and Tatars still could not take Kiev which was well defended by Prince Yuri Bariatinski. The government in Moscow was again in panic fearing an attack on the capital. The Ukraine split, with the left bank controlled by Ataman Samko remaining loyal to Moscow, and the right bank controlled by Khmelnitski supporting Poland.
With Russian efforts concentrated In the west during 1660, the Ottoman government sent a fleet of 33 ships with 10,000 troops to the Don river. Together with 40,000 Tatars and Cherkassi and 10,000 slaves from Hungary they fortified the mouth of the Don, putting up two towers and stretching a chain barricade across the river. They also fortified the mouth of the Donetz River. The Tsar's troops and Don Cossacks attacked the Turkish positions on the Don without success, but the Kalmyks gained some success in their raids on the Crimeans and Nogai Tatars. 139
1661
After the disasters in 1659 and 1660 the Russians needed the assistance of the Kalmyks even more than ever. A special Kalmyk relations department was set up in the Foreign Office and a new treaty was signed. in June of 1661. After this treaty was signed the Kalmyks sent from one to ten thousands of horsemen each year to participate in coordinated raids with the Don Cossacks and streltsi. 140
Yuri Khmelnitski and his Polish allies attacked Nezhin which was held by 10,000 Cossacks loyal to Moscow, 6 times beginning in January 1661 but failed to capture the town. In February the Cossacks and Poles routed the Muscovite army commanded by Ivan Khovanski in Lithuania. Both sides were out of money and suffering terribly but the war dragged on. The Tsar could barely defend his western border and had to rely on the Cossacks loyal to him to keep the line of communications to Kiev open. 141
On 21 June 1661 the Tsar signed the Peace of Kardis with Sweden in order to be free to deal with the Ukraine. He gave back to Sweden all the area taken by Russia in the war in Livonia and at the mouth of the Neva. 142
Conditions in the Ukraine became somewhat more stab1e when the Ottoman Sultan ordered the Tatars to join him in his war in Hungary. The Tatars sent 3O,OOO cavalrymen into Hungary and left the Ukraine alone for the year. They were not left alone themselves however. The Ka1myks carried out the raid planed earlier against the Tatar rear areas. This brought a Turkish force to Tavan to try to fortify and defend the area from further attacks. 143
In the Fall of 1661 Orduin-Nashchokin and Khovanski were badly defeated at Zeromsk losing 19,000 men, 10 cannon, all their standards and a miraculous Icon. The Po1es recaptured Grodno, Mogilev, and Vilno and cleared the Russians from Lithuania. 144
1662
The war in the Ukraine dragged on in 1662. In June 6,000 Po1es and Tatars attacked Periaslavl, which was defended by Ataman Samko. The battle lasted into July, when on the 17th in the decisive battle of the campaign Khmelnitski with his Polish allies was defeated by General Romadanovski. Khmelnitski then resigned as Hetman. 145
The hardships of the war had their effect in the eastern part of Muscovy as well. In 1662 the Bashkirs rose in rebellion due to the heavy taxes and tribute levied to support the war in Poland. The country was beset by inflation, foreign trade deficits and crop failures; and the serfs were plowing up Bashkir grazing land despite official government attempts to control them. The Bashkirs asked the Tatars and Kalmyks for aid but did not get much. The Kalmyks especially, thanks to the government's wise policy of enlisting them, were ready to support the government and suppress the Bashkirs. The government was unprepared for the rebellion which quickly spread throughout the Urals. The voevode of Astrakhan, G. S. Cherkasskii, went to Tsaritsyn and organized a Russian and Tatar army to quell the disturbances. From Kazan, the governor, F. F. Volkonski, also moved out against the Bashkirs. 146
1663
King Jan Casimir personally led 40,QQQ Poles, West Bank Cossacks, and 5,000 Tatars in a campaign to conquer the Ukraine. He was successful in Volhynia and captured many left bank towns. He stormed Lokhvitsa, but when he tried to retake the east bank Ukraine the Poles were defeated at Glukhov and had to give up the campaign. 147
With 10,000 Tatars still in Hungary the Kalmyks attacked their eastern territories and were counter attacked in turn. Then the east bank Hetman, Brukhovetsky, used the Kalmyks and Muscovite troops to try to retake the west bank from the Polish general Czarnecki but was repulsed. 148
1664
By 1664 the war had so exhausted all participants a peace congress was begun. The Cossacks continued to fight each other throughout the year, but there were no major battles between Poles and Russians. One Muscovite commander reported in September that he had only 68 reiters and 159 soldiers left in his unit. The troops were deserting due to lack of food and clothing. Not content to rest, the “Most Pacific” Tsar sent the Cossacks on a raid deep into Persia at Mazandaran from which they were driven out after causing much damage.149
1665
In the spring of 1665 a combined Muscovite, Cossack, Kalmyk army raided Belaia Tserkov and defeated the west bank Cossacks. In October Peter Doroshenko was elected Hetman of the west bank and with Turkish and Tatar help raided in Poland as far as Lublin, taking 100,000 captives. 150
1666
The Poles were defeated again in July 1666 by a Cossack, and Tatar army while the Turks mobilized in Moldavia and Wallachia for an invasion of Poland. In September Nuradin Devlet Gerei brought 60,000 Tatars to help Doroshenko. They plundered Periaslavl and Nezhin on the left bank and then turned and broke through the Polish defenses into central Poland. The Poles were defeated at Mezhibozh. The Tatars took 100,000 prisoners home to Crimea with them including the 40,000 Poles taken at Mezhibozh. These disasters led the Poles to agree to the Treaty of Andrusovo in 1667, in which the Ukraine was partitioned between Poland and Moscow at the Dnieper River, except for Kiev which went to Moscow. It was a great victory for Moscow, however the Russians did not retain Belorussia. The new common border with Turkey in the Ukraine soon became the scene of conflict.151
1667
The war with Poland was no sooner ended that the Don Cossacks rose in rebellion under the leadership of Stenka Razin. In 1667 he settled near Astrakhan with his gang and began to levy tribute on the Volga river traffic. Then he moved over to the Yait (Ural) river. While Razin was raiding Persia and merchant convoys on the Caspian Sea the East bank Cossacks began an uprising in agreement with him. They asked the Sultan for protection and did get some Tatar help, but the Turks would not support the East (left) Bank Hetman, Brukhovetsky, against their vassal on the west (right) bank, Doroshenko. In June Doroshenko attacked and Brukhovetsky was assassinated. 153
1671
In February 1671 Razin failed in an attempt to seize the Don Cossack headquarters at Cherkasskii fort. He was captured on 14 April and executed on 6 June. Ivan B. Miloslavsky then besieged Astrakhan from August until it surrendered on 26 November.
1672
The Russians watched in 1672 as the Poles fought the Cossacks, Tatars and Turks in the Ukraine, John Sobieski?s victory over the Cossacks and Tatars brought Sultan Mohammed IV with an 300,000 man Ottoman army. The Turkish advance guard was defeated near Batoga but the main army plus the Crimeans attacked the Polish fortress at Kamenets—Podolski and forced the garrison to surrender on August 27th. The Poles and Cossacks were surrounded at Buchach by the Turks and Doroshenko's Cossacks. King Michael agreed to peace in which Poland lost Podolia, and Ukraine to the Ottoman Empire and agreed to pay tribute. The Ukrainian people began fleeing from the right bank to the left to escape the Turks. 154
On the Muscovite eastern frontier in 1672 the Khan of the Torgut Mongols raided through western Siberia and across the Urals as far as Kazan before making peace with Moscow.
1674
War continued between Doroshenko's right bank Cossacks and the left bank Cossacks, whose new Hetman was Ivan Samoilovich. The Russian commander-in-chief in the Ukraine was Romodanovski, the best general in their service. The west bank Cossacks and Tatars attacked Cherkasi and other towns and were met by troops sent against them by Romodanovski. The Ottoman Turks sent an army commanded by Kaplan Pasha to support Doroshenko. But King Jan Sobieski defeated the Turks, who withdrew leaving Doroshenko without their support. Ivan Mazeppa, the secretary general in Doroshenko's Cossack army, was captured and sent to Moscow.
1675
General Romodanovski and Hetman Samoilovich decided it would be necessary to block the Crimean Tatars first and then deal with the Turks, without helping the Poles if possible. They prepared a plan in 1675 for a campaign against Crimea itself.
The plan called for a force of all the Cossacks, 50,000 Muscovites, the Don Cossacks, the Bashkirs, and the Kalmyks, for a total of 90,000 troops. This was a somewhat ambitious plan in view of the fact that in 1675 the Bashkirs led by Seyed Sadir were in revolt against Moscow. The Kalmyks at first supported them, but then changed sides and suppressed the revolt for Moscow. Still, it would be wishful thinking to expect the Bashkirs and Kalmyks to join in a campaign together. 155
1676
Tsar Alexei died on 30 January 1676 and with him died the plan for a campaign on Crimea. Alexei was succeeded by his 14- year-old son, Feodor III. Alexei’s death removed Matveev from power in Moscow and this cut Romodanovski?s power in Ukraine. The new administration of Tsar Feodor sent Prince Vasilii J. Golitsyn to observe Romodanovski's actions. Golitsyn's uncle was voevode of Kiev and he was given a separate command at Putivl, thus effectively tying the hands of the official commander-in-chief. During the summer Romodanovski and Samoilovich attacked Chigirin with 15,000 Muscovites and Cossack regiments. Doroshenko was captured and sent to Moscow, and the town was occupied.
The Sultan ended his war with Poland in 1676 and received title to the right bank Ukraine. He made Yuri Khmelnitsky Hetman again, as a Turkish vassal, and prepared to drive the Muscovites out of his new domains.
1677
The Ottoman army commanded by Ibrahim Pasha arrived at Chigirin on 4 August 1677 to begin the siege. The garrison was commanded by Major General Tranernicht, a German in the Tsar's service. The Crimean Tatars soon arrived, followed by General Romodanovski and Hetman Samoilovich, who forced a river crossing and on 28 August soundly defeated the Turks, who fled leaving from 4 to 8 thousand dead Janissaries and all their cannon. According to the account of Patrick Gordon, Prince Golitsin had 15—20,000 more troops, mostly the dvoriani and boyars, and could have brought them into battle, but remained away until the next day. Prince Golitsin hated Romodanovski and the reverse. After the battle Romodanovski and Samoilovich withdrew their armies and Golitsin took over command of the defense, the armies passing each other at the river. Romodanovski and Samoilovich advised Moscow to hold Chigirin with a very strong force and to prepare for the inevitable return of the Turks. Golitsin, however, did not press for strengthening the fort. Ivan I. Rzhevsky was appointed voevode but he did not inspect the fort until March 1678, when he found it in very poor shape and began repairs. 156
During the winter 1677-78 both Romodanovski and Golitsin were in Moscow arguing for their views. The government backed Golitsin and made him voevode of the main polk, i.e. commander in chief, with Romadonovski to serve as a subordinate commander. Princes Dolgorukov, Lykov, and Khovansky were also ordered to command units at the front.
As expected, the Ottoman army returned to Chigirin, on 8 July 1678. The Vizier, Mustafa Pasha, brought 50,000 Turks, 50,000 Tatars, 4 great cannon, 27 other siege guns, 130 field guns, 6 mortars, and 9 smaller guns. The supply train had 8,000 Wagons and 5,000 camels loaded with ammunition and 100,000 wagons of supplies; 8,000 herdsmen controlled the livestock. The later plus the wagoners and miners were Christian subjects of the Sultan. The fortress garrison contained 12,000 men. Gordon commanded his dragoon regiments and the streltsi and was chief engineer. He supervised the construction of the defenses and directed their use.
On hearing of the Turk's arrival Romodanovski and Samoilovich hurried forward with their forces. They engaged the enemy in a fierce but indecisive battle, after which the Turks and Tatars withdrew into their camp before the city. On 3 August the Russians seized a height and broke the blockade of the town, but the garrison commander, Rzhevsky, was killed. On 4 August Golitsyn's army which had been advancing as slowly as possible arrived and who camped a few miles away, refusing to help. Gordon who was made commander of the garrison, was furious at the lack of initiative of the Russian “relief” army. But Golitsin had instructions that he did not have to defend Chigirin, so he didn't.
Finally on 12 August Romodanovski ordered the town evacuated and blown up. Gordon supervised the withdrawal and was himself the last man out after having fired a mine in the powder stores. He barely nan escaped death or capture, but his mine killed 4,000 Turks who were coming on the other side of the city. Both armies then retreated, the Turks supposedly lost 30,000 out of their 100,000 men. The siege showed that the Russian army had serious deficiencies, particularly in supply and command. 157
The loss of Chigirin damaged Muscovite prestige and lost them control of the right bank Ukraine. Yuri Khmelnitski used Tatar help to regain control of the area and by December 1678 was raiding the left bank again at Korsun, Cherkasi, Pereiaslavl and other towns.
1679-1681
In 1679 negotiations for peace were begun which lead to the signing on 3 January 1681 of the Peace of Bakhchisarai. Among the prisoners returned to Russia was the unfortunate boyar Sheremetev, who had been captured in 1660 at Chudov.
1682
The country was at peace again, but all was not quiet. Tsar Feodor Alexeyevich died on 27 April. He was succeeded by the joint rule of his sons, Ivan V and Peter I. Initially Peter was chosen by an assembly convened by the Patriarch. But on 29 April 1682 sixteen streltzi regiments staged a rebellion. The regent, Natalia, (Peter’s mother) gave in to their demands that they be allowed to kill their colonels. On 15 May the streltsi again rioted, this time killing Artemon Matveev, Michael and Yuri Dolgorukoi, and three Naryshkins. Sophia Alexeyevna was proclaimed Regent and the streltsi commander, Khovanski, demanded that Ivan be named at least co-ruler, to which Sophia agreed.
On 9 September Sophia executed the streltsi leader, Prince Khovanski, and appointed Feodor Shaklovity as the new commander. Twelve streltsi units were transfered to the provinces. The streltsi were then replaced as the guard in Moscow and the Kremlin. 158
1683
Sophia and her confidant, Golitsyn, desired peace with all neighbors, but the Turkish siege of Vienna changed the picture. Poland and Austria asked for help, which the Russians were only to glad to give, for a price.
1684
Golitsyn asked General Gordon, the commander at Kiev, for advice on a projected campaign against Crimea. Gordon replied that with 40,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry he could capture Crimea in a one of two year campaign. Golitsyn agreed and began negotiations with Poland to gain the maximum advantage from Russian help in the war against the Turks.
While negotiations were progressing with the Poles, attention was distracted by events on the Amur river frontier.
1685
Manchu troops numbering 10,000 to the 450 Russians present forced the garrison at Albasin to surrender and abandon the post. The Russians soon returned and rebuilt the fort.
1686
In 1686 the Russian garrison was increased to 670 men with 5 cannon. The Chinese also returned with 3,000 cavalry and from 3 to 6,000 infantry and 30 cannon. The Chinese infantry had only bows and scythes however. They attacked on 7 July 1686 and maintained a siege for five months. The Russian garrison was reduced to 115 men, but in December the Chinese withdrew. 159
The final “Treaty of Eternal Peace” was signed by Poland and Russia on 26 April 1686. In exchange for Russian aid, of their own choosing, in the war the Poles gave up all claims to Kiev and Smolensk and the other disputed towns.
Meanwhile methodical preparations were being made for a campaign against Crimea. The boyar Duma met to consider the issue and appoint officers. On the 31st of September a decree was issued ordering all nobles and dvoriani to prepare for war. No one wanted to risk being in charge of a defeat, therefore Golitsyn had to take command himself. 160
1687
The army assembled on 22 February for movement by the traditional river portages and ostrogs. The Main polk was commanded by Golitsyn and Prince V. 0. Sheremetev and V. A. Zmeev. It assembled at Akhtyrka on the Vorskla River. The Novgorod polk commanded by A. S. Shein assembled at Sumy on the Vorskla. The Ryazan polk under V. D. Dolgorukov and P. D. Skuratov formed at Khotmyzhsk on the Vorskla. The Sevsk polk was at Krasny Kut on the O'lmnel'nik River under command of N. R. Nepluev. General Gordon was given command of the select regiments and was in addition the army Quartermaster General in charge of all transport. He also had to conduct the reconnaissance, build the bridges, and roads and select the camp sites.
The officers were late to the assembly and were as usual engaged in arguments over position. Some of the officers had to be threatened with prison. The army marched from Akhtyrka to the Meil River then to Orel, to Poltava, to the Samara River. It was joined on 30 May by the 50,000 Cossacks of Hetman Ivan Samoilovich. The army moved on to Zaporozhe and then crossed to Konstie Vody. The march formation was in dense columns with 20,000 wagons in rows on the flanks, The formation was 1,000 fathoms long and 557 fathoms wide. The artillery marched on one side.
On 13 June at Bolshoi Zug they met soggy marsh ground and steppe fires set by Tatars or Cossacks. With no fodder and low rations the army was rapidly getting into difficulty. The Russians continued on toward Perekop without sighting any Tatars and it became obvious that the food would run out before they did see any. To find a pretext for retreat the Hetman Samoilovich was declared to be a traitor and Ivan Mazeppa was made the new Hetman. The army returned by September and the generals were proclaimed victors. 161
N. R. Nepluev won the only battle of the campaign against a detachment commanded by Nuradyn Sultan. In July Nepluev was ordered to build a fort at Novo Bogoraditski on the Samara River as a supply point for future operations, The fort was designed by the Dutch engineer, Vazal.
Poland asked for another campaign to which Golitsyn agreed.
1688
In January 1688 Roman Nepluev and Gregorii Kosagov were named voevodes for the new campaign and were sent to the Ukraine to prepare the way. The Tatars took the offensive first and raided Volhynia. They threatened Kiev, effectively keeping the Cossacks, Poles and Russians at home on the defensive.
During the year Peter increasingly, called on General Gordon to supply men and assistance for his private “play” regiments. Gordon began to recognize the potential political situation represented by Peter.
The proclamation for the second campaign was published on 18 September 1688. The same month another streltsi rebellion was suppressed. In October Peter called for more recruits for his regiments. He also favored the Sukharev streltsi regt.
In December the armies began to assemble for the new campaign. The commander in chief was again Golitsyn with Ya. F. Dolgoruki and V. A. Zmeef voevodes of the main polk.
The Novgorod polk was commanded by A. S. Shein, Ryazan polk by
V. D. Dolgoruki and A. I. Khitrovo; Sevsk polk by L. R. Nepluev; and the Kazan polk by B. P. Sheremetev. Among the foreign officers who commanded regiments were Gordon, Trauernicht, von Graham, Lefort, and von Weiden.
1689
In February 1689 Gordon was ordered to prepare plans for a defense line on the Dnieper and to prepare his regiment for the campaign. He was again the Quartermaster General. The campaign was to begin early, so as to avoid the possibility of steppe fires, but the officers were late to the muster again. Gordon advised following the course of the Dnieper, but Golitsyn did not agree. The polki united on the Orel river in April. It was cold with a late thaw which made swamps and flooded the rivers. The fort at Novo-Bogaradish proved very valuable as the rest and supply point. There the army received two month’s rations. In May as the army began to move on, the Tatars began to attack. On the 15th of May the Kazan polk was attacked by 10,000 Tatars and forced to retreat, Golitsin sent help and the Tatars fled, but the damage was done. There was disorder in the Russian ranks. On 16 May a large Tatar army appeared in a rain storm and attacked the right flank and rear. Golitsin used artillery to drive them off. Then another Tatar attack came on the left and on the Cossacks. Again the artillery repelled the attackers. The Tatar attacks continued during the next two days.
When the Russians reached Perekop Golitsin stopped the army and immediately opened negotiations. He feared to attack the strong fortifications, not having confidence that his army could do well. He proposed truce terms and then did not wait for an answer. During the retreat the Tatar and Turkish attacks were renewed and the steppe was burned, but the Tatars did not launch a really massive attack. The Russians made it from Perekop to the Dnieper in 4 days in a well executed retreat. 162
This time Peter refused to sanction rewards for the officers. On 7 August he ordered the foreign officers to the Troitsa monastery. Gordon led the rest to Peter, bringing the select regiments. The Sukharev streltsi regiment also came to support the new Tsar. By early September Peter had the upper hand and forced Sophia to move to the Novodevichy Convent. Her advisers were replaced, Vasilii Golitsin was exiled.
Note: These citations were intended to follow those in the proposed book on Russian military history - the section on the period prior to 1604 - consequently the use of ibid and op cit referring to the prior citations.
Professor Chernov claims another first for Russia in that the Tsar's army for the first time in history used “linear tactics”. But the fact that the streltsi lined up more or less in a line to fire their arquebuses does not constitute linear tactics.
5. Barbour, op. cit. p 86-88; Chernov op. cit. p. 107-108.
6. Barbour, op. cit. p. 96
7. ibid.
8. ibid. p. 98-114; Chernov, op. cit. p. 108. Chernov praises the streltsi for remaining loyal when the deti boyars deserted. He might have mentioned that the foreign mercenaries remained loyal even longer and in fact went out of their way to show their loyalty.
9. ibid. p 138.
10. Dmitri re-instituted the double line of defense in the south, on the “shore” and in the Ukraine, in anticipation of war with the Tatars. Upon becoming Tsar, Vasilii Shuiski ordered the polki sent to Serpukhov, Aleksin, Kaluga, Kolomna, Kashir, Mtsensk, Novosil, and Orel; but this order was probably never carried out because all the armed forces were needed against Bolotnikov. Novoselski, op, cit. p. 66.
In 1606 the Kalmyks, a Mongolian nation having 14 divisions of men (total of 140,000) , began approaching The Tobol and Irtysh River valleys on the Russian border. The Russian border guards had firearms and the support of the Siberian Tatars. The chief Russian defense, however, was to exploit dissection among the Kalmyk leaders and to use conflicts between the Kalmyks and the other nomads such as the Kazaks and Nogai. (Vernadsky, op. cit. Vol V, p.294.
11. Chernov, op. cit. p. 109—110.
12. ibid. p. 110. Chernov states that Sheremetev did suppress the rebellion in Astrakhan. But Novoselski, op. cit. p. 59. gives a detailed account of this operation, showing that the Sheremetev did not achieve his objective. He remained on an island 15 versts from Astrakhan until October 1607 when he retired to Tsaritsin, where he stayed until being recalled to Moscow with his entire force in 1608. Novoselski indicates the importance of this mission and of its failure due to the influence Astrakhan had over the great Nogais. When the Moscow government could not hold Astrakhan the Nogais took this as a sign that they could attack; Muscovite territories with relative impunity.
13. Chernov, op.cit. p.110; Razin, op cit. p. 84—132, contains a full account of the campaign of 1606—1607.
l4. Chernov, op. cit p. 110.
15. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 45.
l6. ibid. p. 67. Prince Urusov figured in Crimean military and political affairs until the 1630's.
17. ibid. p. 55. There were no polki on defense duty in the south from 1607 until 1613.
18. Chernov, op. cit. p. 110. In the fall of 1607 the first Kalmyk embassy started for Moscow, where they were greeted by Tsar Shuiski in February of 1608. (Vernadsky, op. cit. vol. V p. 294. The same year local Siberian natives attempted to storm Tobolsk and were repulsed with the help of the Siberian Tatars. In 1608 a large scale Tatar operation was conducted in the region of Temnikov. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 69.
l9. Vernadsky, op. cit. vol V p. 246-7; Chernov, op. cit. p. 115. Jacob De La Gardie was the son of Pontus De La Gardie, who fought Russia in the Livonian War. G. N. Bibikov, “The Experience of the Military Reform of 1609— 1610 in Istoricheskie Zapiski, no. 19, 1946, gives a very interesting account of the campaign. He notes that De La Gardie had personally studied the latest tactics under Maurice of Orange in Holland. Thus the most up-to-date innovations of the founder of modern European military science were quickly brought to Russia, where they were on their way to being adopted when the death of Prince Skopin Shuiski disrupted the experiment and the state itself.
Razin, op. cit. vol. III p. 150—194 gives an excellent account of the campaigns of 1609 - 1612 including indispensable maps.
20. Michael Roberts, op. cit. Vol 1. p. 34, shows that the Swedes were interested in much more than the cash and territories promised them by Tsar Shuiski. He gives the best description of the Swedish involvement in the Time of Troubles that I have found. The picture of half-starved Swedish troops looting the nearly starved peasants in order to survive makes the reality of war much more vivid to the reader.
21.Vernadsky, op. cit. Vol. V p. 247; Chernov, op. cit. p. 115.
22. Bibikov, op.cit. p. 7-9.
23. ibid. Vernadsky, op. cit. Vol. V p. 247
24. Vernadsky, op. cit. Vol. V 247.
25. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 69, 70
26. Vernadsky, Vol. V p. 248; Bibikov, op. cit. p. 9
For Skopin—Shuiski's entrance into Moscow, see S. M. Solov'ev, Istorila Rossia a Drevneishikh Vremen, Moscow, 1962, Book 7. p. 565,
27.Bibikov, op. cit. p. 9; Soloviev, op. cit. p. 568.
28.Vernadsky, op. cit. Vol V p. 249; Chernov, op. cit. p. 115. Joseph Hamel, England and Russia Comprisung the Voyages of John Tradescant the Elder. London l968 p. 406. The author says that the Scotish Captain Robert Carr commanded one of the six companies of British cavalry which remained the longest on the field at Klushino against the Poles. The Captain had 1,200 to 1,400 men against the 8,000 Poles. Evidential all the mercenaries did not desert to the Polish side.
29. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 62.
30. ibid. p. 70—71.
31 Vernadsky, Vol V_p. 249.
32. ibid._p. 258.
33. ibid. and Roberts, op cit. Vol I p. 75.
34. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 73.
35. Vernadsky, Vol V p. 268-9; Chernov, op. cit. p. 117—120. Vasilii Kliuchevski, Coure in Russian History — 17th Century, translated by Natalie Duddington, Chicago, Quadrangle, 1968, p. 62. Marina was the widow of both of the False Dmitri' and a duly crowned Tsarina of Russia.
The Russians do not emphasize the role the Tatars played in freeing Moscow from the Poles, Jerome Horsey however emphasized the Tatar role. He says the “national” uprising on the Volga was Nagoi, Mordvins, Kazan Tatars, and Chermis who were used to obedience to the Tsar and hated the Poles. They were excellent horsemen and warriors who “stood the Rus and themselves now in most oportun steed”. “They took head and arms in great numbers besett the Poles and so endangered their safety... and freed the country of them.” Sir Edward Bond, Russia at the Close of the 16th Century, London, Hakluyt Society, 1856, p. 263.
36. Vernadsky Vol V p. 269; Soloviev, op. cit. p 680— 683.
The most thorough study of this battle, from which these details are taken, is G. N. Bibikov, “The Battle of the Russian People’s Militia with the Polish Interventionists, 22-24 August 1612 at Moscow” in Istoricheski Zapiski, no. 32. 1950
38. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 74.
39. Vernadsky, Vol V p. 290
40. ibid. p 280, 283. The government forces were led by
Prince I. N. Odevsky. The Don Cossacks wrote to the other Cossack hosts urging support of the government.
4l. ibid. p. 286.
42. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 66.
43. ibid._p. 75.
44. Vernadsky Vol. V p. 287.
45. Gustavus' campaign is described from the Swedish point of view in Michael Roberts, op. cit. vol. 1. The possibility that Gustavus’ brother, Karl Filip, might have been elected Tsar instead of Michael Romanov leads to speculation on what the military history of Russia would have been like if that had occurred. There surely would have been a western influence in military organization and tactics.
46. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 66.
47. Vernadsicy, Vol. V p. 295.
48. ibid. p. 283; Novoselski, op. cit. p. 76. The streltsi were supported by Terek Cossacks.
49. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 85 — 87.
50. ibid. p. 77.
51. Vernadsky, op. cit. Vol V, p. 290, 291.
52. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 78. The Russian ambassadors to the Ottoman Empire, P. Mansurov, and S. Samsonov, discussed the Tatar — Cossack problem with the Grand Vizier. The Vizier accused the Russians of supporting Cossack raids and the Russians asked him to prevent raids by the Azov and Lesser Nogais. The Russians agreed that the Crimean Tatars were not currently at fault. The Vizier replied that the Nogai were a free and independent people, full nomads who were not under the control of the Sultan. But the Azov Tatars were diverted to raiding of the right bank Ukraine. The lesser Nogai were the most unruly of all the hordes; they attacked their Tatar neighbors as well as the Russians.
53. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 87, 99.
54. At the Treaty of Stolbovo, in 1617, Sweden gave Novgorod back to Moscow ànd Moscow gave up Ingria and its entire sea coast area on the Baltic. Vernadsky, Vol. V p. 290; R. Nisbet Bain, The First Romanovs, London, l9O5, p. 40—50. For an excellent explanation of the strategic problems that faced Sweden and Russia in the Baltic sea area see, Robert Kerner, op. cit. He includes excerpts from Gustavus Adolphus' speech to his parliament on the occasion of the Treaty of Stolbovo to show how well Gustavus knew the strategic situation.
55. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 99. The only frontier raids on Muscovy in 1618 were private affairs by the Azov Tatar clans. ibid. p. 150.
56. ibid.__p. 102.
57. ibid. p. 159, 160, 66. The strength reports for the southern order guard polki and town garrisons are very incomplete. For comparison, note that in 1616 the main polk had 1,649 men at Tula, the lead polk had 884 men at Mtsensk and the guard polk had 801 men at Novosi1. In 1619 the polk moved from Novosil to Dedilov, the guard polk from Ntsinsk to Krapivna, and the reserve polk to Mtsinsk. In 1619 the only border raids were again those of the Azov T Tatars,. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 150.
58. Vernadsky Vol V p. 329; Novoselski, op. cit. p. 100. The Poles need Cossack help against the Turks, The Cossacks in turn demanded recognition of Orthodox religious rights in Ukraine as a proce for their help.
59. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 129, 142, 158, 160.
60. Vernadsky, Vol IV p. 331; Novoselski op. cit. p. 100. According to David Eggenberger, A Dictionary of Battles, New York, Thomas; Crowell, 1967, when the ailing Hetman died he was replaced by Prince Stanislaw Lubomirski. The Turkish defeat was due to the decline in discipline of the Janissaries, who broke under the Polish attacks and fled the field. See also, Dupuy, op. cit. p. 573. There were no Tatar raids on Muscovy in 1620. (Novoselski, op. cit. p. 150.
61. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 100, 160. In 1622 the Kalmyks attacked the Nogai, who fled across the Volga, despite Muscovite efforts to stop them by providing streltsi units to defend them from the Kalmyks. The movement of the Nogai from the Volga—Ural area to the Kuban—Don area was regarded as a very dangerous development by Moscow because in the new location, closer to Crimea, the Nogai would be more tempted to renew their raids on Moscow. The government continued to press for the Nogais to return to the Volga region.
62. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 100, 114. During the Khotin campaign the Sultan made Kantimir Murza of the Belgorod Tatars independent of Crimea. The Sultan also replaced Dzhanibek Gerei as Khan for alleged incompetence on the campaign. In 1623-4 the Crimeans captured the Belgorod Tatars and took them to Crimea. In doing this the Crimeans were rebelling against the Sultan. In 1625 the Crimeans and Zaporozhie Cossacks reached an agreement on joint action against the Ottoman Turks. The Zaporozhie sent two fleets to Crimea and landed troops on the coast. They blocked the Turkish naval forces and prevented them from landing in Crimea, and disrupted the Turkish military effort against Poland and Persia as well. This Cossack campaign assumed international significance and was felt as far away as the Mediterranean, where the Turks confronted Spain and Venice. There were many small raids by the Azov Tatars in 1623, but no Tatar raid on Russia in 1624. However, the Don Cossacks raided Crimea, near Balaclava in the spring of 1624.
63.ibid. p. 129.
64. ibid. p. 117. In 1626 the Don Cossacks raided the lesser Nogai villages, while the Nogai were away raiding the eastern part of the Muscovite border. The Swedes and Poles were still at war in 1626. The Poles wanted to divert the Cossacks against Sweden, but feared for the consequences of Turkish attacks in the Ukraine if they removed the Cossack forces. The Swedish king, Gustavus Adolphus, also sought Cossack help and that of Moscow. For details of the Polish Swedish War of 1617—1629 see Dupuy, op. cit. p. 573, 574. and Roberts, op. cit. p.182-255.
65. ibid. p. 129
66. ibid. p. 120—136. There were a few frontier raids on Russia by the Azov Tatars in 1629.
67. The year 1630 was not without its military action, as the Don Cossacks attacked Kerch with 1,500 men in 28 vessels and then raided the Turkish coast from Sinope to Iconium. Novoselsiki, op. cit. p. 129. The Russian government asked the Don Cossacks aid the Turks at Ochakov against the Poles, but the Cossacks refused to do this on the grounds of religious; belief, they also refused to stop raiding Turkey, for which the government seized some Cossack leaders and officially condemned the Cossack host. (ibid. p. 216.) The Cossacks killed the voevode Ivankar Anishev. During 1630 the Kalmyks continued moving west into Bashkir lands. Kliuchevski, op. cit. p. 283, discusses the mission of Colonel Les1ie to Sweden. Colonel Van Dam was sent at the same time to other Western countries to recruit mercenaries. The mercenaries regiments were a great financial burden. Kluchevski estimates that each regiment cost 1.5 million rubles a year in the currency of 1900.
68. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 183, 205—7. He has studied these raids in great depth and describes them exhaustively, giving the names of the Tatar leaders, the size of the raiding party the towns attacked and the names of the leaders of the defense, The Tatar practice was to sweep large area; with many sma11 detachments and avoid battle or long sieges.
69. Vernadsky Vol V p. 347—8; Bain, op. cit. p. 59-60; Novoselski, op. cit. p. 215; 0. L. Vainshtein, Rossiya i Tridtsateletnaya Voina, Leningrad, 1947, Vainistein suggests that the desire to coordinate with Gustavws Adolphus on an invasion of Poland was behind the delay in the attack on Smolensk. He also gives a good account of the Russian diplomatic efforts to bring the Turks into the war against Poland. Novoselski shows the connection between the Tatar raid and the delay in the campaign. For details of the Polish and Swedish campaigns which were interrupted by the Truce of Altmark in Sept 1629 see, Roberts, op. cit. and Dupuy, op. cit. p. 574. Gustavus died at Leutzen on 6 November 1632. At the time, his government had been negotiating with the Crimean Tatars for two years on the Tatar offer of 30,000 men against whichever enemy Gustavus would select. Vernadsky gives the details of Shein’s appointment as voevode of the Main polk with Artemi V. Izmailov as second in command. Shein had been held prisoner after his capture in 1611 at the defense of Smolensk and had sworn never to fight Poland again as a condition of his release. He had served since 1619 as head of the Pushkarski Prikaz. The boyars opposed Shein and used the issue of his previous oath to Poland against him in 1634, securing his execution. The Russian public was concerned about the morality of breaking the truce a year ahead of its expiration, and was self conscious about the possible effects this might have. There was also concern about the use of foreign troops.
70. Novoselski , op cit. p. 209 —213; Vernadsky Vol V. 347 The Tatar Khan led these attacks himself, but later tried to deny this fact. He again blamed the Azov and Kantimir Tatars In 1632 the new Sultan, Murad IV, planned war on Poland and ordered Khan Dzhanibek Gerei, to keep the peace with Russia while preparing to fight Poland. That the Tatar khan was anxious to find someone to fight during the period 1629 — 1632 is indicated by his sending ambassadors as far as Stockholm for this purpose. He risked his job in attacking Russia against the Sultan’s orders, but did so again in 1633 due to the pressure far action from his subordinates.
71. ibid. p. 225—226. The streltsi attempted to operate in the steppes against the Kalmyks by using mobile wagon forts containing six cannon and two prikazi of streltsi, but against upwards of 10,000 Kalmyks even these measures were fruitless.
72. Vernadsky, Vol V. p. 348—350; Bain, op. cit. p. 60. Kliuchevski, op. cit. p. 283, notes that the army had six foreign trained, regiments of l,500 Germans and 13,000 Russians. He comments that never before had Russia had so many infantry trained with firearms.
73. Vernadsky, Vol V p.350; Novoslski op. cit. p. 214—271. Novoselski gives detailed information on the raids at each town and the results. He considers this to be one of the most destructive Tatar raids in the first half of the 17th century. Hundreds of homes were burned and about 5,700 prisoners were taken the central provinces alone. Some of the representative figures he gives are as follows: Ryazan -1,350 ;Kashir — 1,276; Serepukhov — 893; Pronsk — 200; Zapaisk 38; When the Tatars returned home they found themselves ordered to undertake an immediate winter campaign against Poland or else Dzhanibek Gerei would lose his job.
74. ibid. Novoselski gives more details of the government reaction and of desertions; from the army not prompted by the Tatar raid. The Don Cossack contingents were especially active in revolt against the government and even captured some towns during their movement east.
75. The dates of the various troop movements given by Vernadsky and Bain differ, as do their troop strength data. Vernadsky says there were 9,000 Poles and 15—20,000 Cossacks, Bain gives Wladislaw 16,000 Poles and 15,000 Cossacks. Vernadsky says Shein's execution was due to boyar revenge.
76. Vernadsky Vol 1 _p. 510, mentions the Campaign in the Kuban. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 216—20, gives the details. There was a surprise attack in the spring, which captured the Tatar Mursa Saltan Murat’s family and 700 other Tatars. Then on March 31st it was decided to attack the lessor Nogai using troops from the lower Volga region. The The main force left Astrakhan in July and assembled in the steppe. Prince Volkonski had 8,250 Cherkass, Terek Cossacks and Yedisan Tatars, 685 Astrakhan mounted streltsi, 570 Volga service men, and 350 others from the Terek region. He freed at least 870 Russian, whom he sent back to Astrakhan. The number of prisoners freed by the Cossacks is unknown. Volkonski. complained to the government on behalf of his troops and the Nogais that the Cossacks had arrived late for the campaign, yet were appropriating all the booty for themselves.
77. Vernadsky, vol. V p.352.
78 Novoselski,op. cit. p. 238.
79. ibid. p. 223-238.
80 ibid. 204, 222, 293, 295. The fortified lines were well illustrated by Razin op,. cit. Vol III p. 224—228
81. ibid. p. 237.
82. Vernadsky, Vol V P. 355.
83. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 251—3. 233, 245.
84. ibid. p. 234, 295,243.
85. Vernadsky , Vol V,p. 357
86. The siege and occupation on Azov from 1637 to 1641 is described by Vernadsky, op. cit. Vol V p. 360, and by Novoselski op. cit. p. 260. But the most complete study is “Azovskoe Sidenie” by U. A. Tikonov, in Voprosii Istorii number 8, August 1970; from which this account is taken The ambassador, Forma Kantakuzin, was captured by the Cossacks and held in their camp on the grounds that the snow was too deep for travel.
87. The Ottoman ambassador sent messages out of the Cossack camp informing the Tatars and his government of the Cossack strength. Some of the messengers were intercepted and the ambassador was executed for his pains. But a 4,000 man relief force was assembled from the garrisons of Kerch, Taman and Temruk. The Cossacks learned of this in time and succeeded in meeting this force at the river Kazulnik and defeating it.
88. Novoselski, op cit. p. 304, 295, 265. Yablomov, for instance, was connected to the Oskol River by a fortified line of ditch and palisade with two earthen forts and three stockades. The garrison had not all arrived in July when the Tatars attacked, but it still blocked the raiders front passing through on the Izumski Tral. However, in September the garrison was overwhelmed by a mass attack.
89. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 263, 265—266, gives the details of this raid. Tikhanov and Vernadsky both mention the execution.
90. ibid,
91. Tikhonov, op. cit. p. 105. On the way back to Crimea the Tatars fell into an ambush. This so irritated the Murzi that they decided to vent their anger on the Russian ambassadors to Crimea. These men were subjected to humiliation and torture to such a degree that popular opinion in Moscow, expressed in the Zemski Sobor of 1639, called for war. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 270—271, 275.
92. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 282; Tikhonov, op. cit. p. 105.
93. ibid. 295. That this line was already having some effect is seen by the ultimatum the khan sent demanding that it be destroyed.
94. This defense line, and specifically the reconstruction program of 1638, is the subject of a fine monograph, Zasechnaya Cherta, written by A. Yakovlev in 1916. He has studied the archives of the financial organs of the Tsar's government to be able to give a section by section account; of the construction, who was responsible, what their problems were and how the work was accomplished. The defense line will be examined in more detail in the section of this paper on Fortifications.
95. Vernadsky, op. cit. Vol V p. 358.
96. Tikhonov, op. cit. p. 105.
97. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 295.
98. ibid. p. 279.
99. Tikhanov, op. cit. p. 106; Novoselski, op. cit. p. 289.
l00. Tikhanov,_op.cit. p. 106.
101, Novoselski, op. cit. p. 286. There was one small raid by 1,000 Tatars in May.
102. Tikhanov, op. cit.~.106—168. The Turks blockaded the Don River, but the Cossacks succeeded in entering Azov anyway, by swimming underwater, breathing through straws.
103. ibid. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 286—289.
104. Novoselski, op. cit._p.245.
105. ibid. p. 285. Tikhanov, op. cit. p. 108. Vernadsky, Vol V p. 365.
106. Tikhanov, op. cit. p. 109. Vernadsky, Vol V p. 372, says Azov could have been the key to Russian expansion into the Caucasus, Black Sea area. It controlled the Nogai and Circassians and would have helped control the Crimeans. But with Smolensk still in Polish hánds only a few miles west of Moscow, it seems hard to fault the Tsar’s decision.
107. Novoselski, op. cit.p. 315—320.
l08. Novoselski, op. cit.p. 358. Vernadsky, op. cit. Vol V p. 548, says that the Kalmyks attacked Astrakhan, but failed to capture the city. From Novoselski's account it is clear that they were not trying to attack the town, but only the nomads living near it.
l09. Vernadsky, Vol. V p.372, Mentions the unusually heavy raiding which took place in 1644. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 326-7, 335-45, gives the details.
110. Novoselski, op. cit.368.
111. Novoselski, op. cit. 350—357. Prince Pozharski died. In battle against the Tatars in the famous Russian defeat at Konotop in 1659. It is not indicated in the sources I have used whether or not the death of Tsar Michael and the accession of Alexis in 1645 disrupted the administration and control of the border defense.
112. ibid._p. 371.-372.
113. ibid. p. 373—382.
114. ibid. _p. 385, 331; Vernadsky, Vol V. P. 663.
115. Vernadsky Vol V. p., 664.
116. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 293
117. ibid p. 293
118. ibid._p. 394
119. ibid. Bain, op. cit. p. 89. Carl O’Brien, Muscovy and the Ukraine, From the Pereyaslavl Agreement to the Truce of Andrusovo 1654- 1667, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1963, p. 12. Razin, Vol III p. 307 — 312, provides excellent maps of Korsun and Zolte wody battles and illustrations.
l20. Novoselski, op. cit. p. 395.
121. Bain, op. cit. p. 91; 0'Brien, op. cit. p. 17; Kliuchevsky, op. cit. p. 151—53 discusses the Ulozhenie of 1649 which established military service responsibilities and serfdom. He notes that this law code remained in force until 1833.
122. Bain, op. cit. p. 94
123. 0'Brien, op. cit. p. 18 — 27.
124. Bain, op. cit. p. 107; Kliuchevski, o,p. cit. p. 289 notes that the foreign suburb was established in 1652 when the foreigners were forced out of Moscow.
125. Vernadsky, op. cit. p. 662.
126. Bain, op. cit. p. 109.
127. Vernadsky, Vol V p. 498.
128. ibid. Bain, op._cit. p. 109 O'Brien, op. cit. p. 31.
129. 0'Brien, op. cit. p. 33.
130. ibid. p. 35; Bain, pp. cit. p. 110. Vernadsky,Vol V p. 501. Patrick Gordon, Passages from the Diary of General Patrick Gordon of Auchlenchries, Aberdeen 1859. Patrick Gordon was one of the Scotish adventurers, hired by King Charles X in Germany. His diary is a practically day by day account of his service in the Swedish, Polish, Swedish and again Polish armies during this war. The picture of looting and general banditry practiced by the soldiers cannot be reproduced in an historical summary such as this.
131. Gordon, op. cit. He was almost captured in this siege and was captured several times during later periods of the war. The ease with which he changed sides when captured is illustrative of the general practice in dealing with mercenary troops at that time.
l32. 0'Drien, op. cit. p. 38—39; Bain, op. cit. p. 110; Vernadsky, Vol V p. 501.
133. Vernadsky, Vol V p. 550.
l34. ibid._p. 504. Bain, op._cit. p. 112; O’Brien, op. cit. p. 40. Gordon, op. cit. Patrick Gordon was among the several thousand mercenaries King Charles brought to Riga. Bain says Riga was defended by Simon Helmfelt, but O'Brien gives Magnus De la Gardie as the Swedish commander. Sir Alexander Leslie was in disgrace with the Tsar due to the suspected collaboration of the foreign officers with the Swedes. But he apparently regained the royal favor because he was Governor of Smolensk when he died in 1663.
135. Vernadsky, Vol V p. 506—507; Bain, op. cit. p. 115—116.
136. Vernadsky, op. cit. Vol V p. 550.
137. ibid,_p. 517—526; Bain op. cit. p. 115-116. O’Brien, op._cit. p.50
138. Vernadsky, Vol V p. 517—529; O'Brien, op cit. p. 63; Bain, op. cit. p. 117. Kliuchevski, op. cit. p. 128-9. During 1659 Patrick Gordon was captured by the Poles and accepted service in their army as a quartermaster. He was occupied with the fighting which continued in western Poland during the year.
139. O’Brien, op. cit. p. 68. The size of the armies and their commander's names very from one source to another. Patrick Gordon writes that the Polish Field Marshal Lubomirski was at Cudno. He gives the Russian losses at 36,000 men, 67 cannon and 115 standards. Gordon himself was wounded in the action. Gordon, qp.cit.p. 31.
140. Vernadaky, Vol V p. 552. He notes that Stepan Razin was one of the envoys of the Don Cossacks who met with the Kalmyks in March 1661 to plan joint campaigns. To placate the Kalmyks, the Russian government forbade the Bashkirs from raiding Kalmyk villages. This led to the Bashkir uprising of 1662. In 1664 the government gave the Kalmyks a special state banner as a token of their service.
141. O'Brien, op. cit. p. 75. Gordon, op. cit. p. 34, describes conditions in the Polish camp, where mutinies were started by the unpaid soldiers. He and, several friends, decided in July to quit the Polish service and go to Moscow. They arrived in Moscow in September 1661 and were accepted into the Russian service. Gordon's description of the testing process whereby the head of the Foreigners office E. Miloslavski, verified the skills of the foreign applicants is especially interesting. Gordon, op cit. p. 40.
l42. Vernadsky, Vol V p 534.
143. O'Brien, op. cit. p. 82.
144. Bain, op., cit p. 117.
145. O'Brien,_op, cit. p. 83.
146. Alton Donnelly, The Russian Conquest of Bashkiria, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968 p.22—25, Vernadsky, Vol V p. 555. The government policy regarding the Kalmyks did not remain so wise for long. After using their excellent services in war for a century, the government of Empress Catherine II allowed the Kalmyks to be exploited by local governors. The typica1 Russian attitude when dealing with the nomads was one of condescension and a “like it or not you are dependent on us” attitude. But the Kalmyks were not to be treated like Tatars or Bashkirs. In January 1771 they picked up their tents and moved back eastward clear across the semiarid steppe, from the Volga to beyond Lake Balkash and reentered the domain of the Manchu Emperor. It was estimated that 300,000 people made this trek of nearly a year's duration. They were forced to fight their way across the lands of a number of peoples in the process. Harold Lamb, The March of Muscovy, New York, Doubleday, 1948, p. 282—289.
147. Bain op. cit. p 117; Vernadsky, Vol V p. 534.
148. Vernadsky, Vol V p. 535·
149. ibid, p. 535.
150. Vernadsky, op. cit. Vol V, p. 536, Bain, op. cit. P 118.
151. O’Brien, op. cit. p. 96; Vernadsky, Vol V.p. 539.
152. Bain, op. cit. p. 121; Vernadsky vol V p. 614. Donnelly, op. cit. p. 26.
153. Vernadsky, Vol V p. 628.
154. ibid. p. 635, Bain, op. cit. p. 179. The initial defeat of Poland alarmed Moscow. The Tsar agreed to a treaty with Poland. On November 11, 1673 Jan Sobieski routed the Turka at Chocim (Khotin). He became King of Poland in May 1674. The Tsar’s army united with the Poles at the Dnieper. Kliuchevski, op. cit. p. 135.
155. Vernadsky, Vol V p. 637; Donnelly, op. cit. p. 26. The Poles and Turks agreed to peace on 16 October 1675.
156. Vernadsky, Vol V p. 641; Gordon, op._cit. Soloviev, op. cit. Book 13, p. 209. For the reforms of V. V. Golitsin see Kliuchevski, op. cit. p. 380~ 382. B. H. Sumner, Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire, Oxford University Press l949, p. 7, points out that the Ottoman Empire was much strong militarily in the last half of the 17th century than it had been in the first, due to the military reforms effected by the Kuprili Vizer.
157. Vernadsky, Vol V. p. 644; Soloviev, op. cit. p. 213.-214
158. O'Brien, C. Bickford, Russia Under Two Tsars~, 1682-1689 The Regency of Sophia Alekseevna, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1952, p. 89. Bain, op. cit. p. 196.
159. ibid. p. 91-93, 111.
160. ibid. p. 93, 127, Bain op. cit. p. 204.
161. 0'Brien, op. cit. p. 128; Bain, op. cit. p. 205 Razin, op. cit. Vol IV, p. 252—2 gives full descriptions with tables of organization and march diagrams. He says Gordon warned Golitsin about the need for water, but nothing was done. Before the second campaign Gordon again urged that careful preparations be made. The water and food supplies were improved but Gordon's suggestion that siege engines and ladders be taken on the campaign went unheeded. Therefor when the Russian army finally reached Perekop they had no equipment to use to overcome the fortifications.
162. O'Brien, op. cit. p. 135—138.